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ABSTRACT 
Recent years have witnessed renewed interest in farmer-based organisations (FBOs) as 
important local institutions for promoting smallholder agriculture and improving rural 
livelihoods. Many believe that the establishment of FBOs would, amongst other things, 
strengthen the ability of smallholder farmers to access agricultural services such as 
extension services and inputs, as well as reduce their risks and transaction costs of 
accessing these services. This thesis examines the extent to which FBOs improve 
smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and credit in Ghana. Central to 
this thesis is to understand whether, and to what extent, smallholder farmers’ 
participation in FBOs improves their access to extension services, inputs and credit, with 
special attention to understanding the factors that shape their performance in this 
process.  
The study employs a mixed-methods approach to data collection and analysis. The data 
collection involved structured questionnaires to 240 smallholder farmers; semi-structure 
interviews with 90 smallholder farmers, 12 government officials and four NGO officials. 
It also used a variety of secondary sources, such as documentation from FBOs, survey 
data, and project data from government agencies and NGOs. The data analysis utilised 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches, namely descriptive and inferential 
statistics, thematic analysis and descriptions.  
The analysis in the thesis shows that while smallholder farmers’ participation in FBOs 
improves their access to extension services, inputs and credit, their access to these 
services is on a limited basis. The thesis argues that the limited roles that FBOs play in 
improving smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and credit relate 
largely to their governance and management structure and their internal collective 
capabilities, as well as the smallholder farmers’ motivations for participating in the 
FBOs. The study argues that when external institutions (e.g. government and NGOs) do 
not invest in building FBOs’ organisational structure and leadership capacities, the 
results are FBOs that are passive and have weak leadership with regard to mobilising 
their members for the purpose of accessing agricultural services. Contrary to the 
empirical and theoretical arguments that FBOs and related organisations with 
xv 
 
homogenous and small memberships should have a positive collective outcome, this 
thesis argues that collective activities will remain limited in FBOs if their leaders do not 
have the experience and skills to mobilise their members for such activities. Developing 
sound organisational structures, such as suitable rules and regulations, would contribute 
to ensuring that FBOs invest time and resources into collective activities, such 
investment is a significant factor in their success. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Setting the context: the research problem 
Agricultural growth is recognised as crucial for fuelling economic growth, alleviating 
poverty and ensuring food security in many developing countries (World Bank 2007; 
Chang 2012; Hazell & Rahman 2014).1 In particular, improvements in smallholder 
agricultural productivity continue to be indicated as a key driver of poverty reduction in 
developing countries (Hazell & Rahman 2014; Carletto, Jolliffe & Banerjee 2015).2 This 
recognition is even more important for the majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), where smallholder agriculture is the main economic activity for the majority of 
the population.  
This is the clear case for Ghana, where about 54% of the country’s population is 
involved in agriculture (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) 2013) and agriculture accounts 
for about 22% of national gross domestic product (Institute of Statistical Social and 
Economic Research (ISSER) 2013). Agriculture in Ghana is predominantly smallholder-
based and rain-fed, with more than 60% of farm holders cultivating less than 1.2 
hectares, 25% between 1.2 and 2 hectares, and only 15% cultivating more than 2 
hectares (Owusu-Baah 2012). Another study estimates that about 90% of the farm 
holdings in the country are less than 2 hectares in size (World Bank and IFPRI 2010). 
Not surprisingly, smallholder farmers produce about 80% of Ghana’s total agricultural 
1 For example, the 2008 World Development Report renewed policy attention with regard to the role of 
smallholder farmers as agents of poverty reduction when it stated that agricultural growth is ‘vital for 
stimulating growth in other parts of the economy and smallholder farmers are at the center of this 
strategy’ (World Bank 2007, p. xiii). 
2 Although there is no conceptually clear way to define smallholder agriculture, it often refers to the type 
of agriculture in which the farmers have limited physical resources – that is, the land or animals they 
manage – and operational resources; that is, the resources available to manage the land or animals 
(Tinsley 2004). Smallholder farmers operate with a low asset base, usually less than 2 hectares of 
cropland (World Bank 2003), and they have limited resource endowments, relative to other farmers in 
the sector (Dixon et al. 2004).  
1 
 
                                                          
 output (Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) 2011), such that their performance 
has crucial implications for overall agricultural development in the country.  
This thesis focuses on smallholder farmers because of their dominance in Ghanaian 
agriculture and the belief that smallholder farmers are ‘game changers’ in the country’s 
agricultural sector (Government of Ghana (GOG) 2007; MOFA 2011).3 The current 
Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II) of the Government of 
Ghana, developed in 2007 to guide development and interventions in the agriculture 
sector, in fact also recognises that smallholder ‘agriculture is expected to lead the growth 
and structural transformation of the [Ghanaian] economy’ (GOG 2007, p. 21).  
In spite of the significance of smallholder agriculture in overall agricultural 
development, two key related factors – that is, agricultural growth driven by land 
expansion and smallholder farmers’ inadequate access to essential agricultural services – 
limit its sustainability and compromise the overall development opportunities that 
agriculture holds for Ghana’s economy. The first relates to the fact that, as in many 
countries in SSA, agricultural growth in Ghana over the years has been mainly driven by 
land expansion rather than improvements in the productivity of current smallholder 
farming land (Breisinger et al. 2012). Between 1994 and 2006, for example, total 
cultivated land expanded by 60%; that is, from 4.5 million hectares in 1994 to 7.2 
million hectares in 2006 (Breisinger et al. 2012). As a consequence of prioritising 
expansion over productivity, the yields of most crops are still far below their potentials, 
largely because the adoption of modern technology such as fertiliser and high-yielding 
planting materials in agricultural production in the country is still extremely low 
(Breisinger et al. 2012). Fertiliser usage in the country, for example, averaged about 
34,000 metric tonnes per annum between 1994 and 2004 (Asuming-Brempong, Sarpong 
& Asante 2005) with a current national average rate of 8 kilograms per hectare (kg/ha), 
which is one of the lowest in SSA (Benin et al. 2013).  
3 To accommodate a variety of smallholder farmers, this study included farmers with up to 5 hectares of 
land under cultivation as smallholder farmers.  
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 It is also problematic when land expansion drives agricultural growth because this may 
not be environmentally sustainable. Indeed, the available evidence already indicates that 
due to population growth and urbanisation, agricultural growth through land expansion 
has slowed down in recent years, particularly in Southern Ghana, where agricultural land 
is becoming relatively scarce (Breisinger et al. 2012).4 A more sustainable approach to 
the development of smallholder agriculture is productivity-led growth; that is, increasing 
yields of existing agricultural land using appropriate agricultural technologies such as 
improved seeds, fertilisers and agrochemicals.5 Fundamental to improving productivity-
led smallholder agricultural growth, however, is the existence of effective agricultural 
extension services that facilitate smallholder farmers’ access to, and use of, technologies 
as well as farm inputs such as new crop varieties and fertiliser (Norton 2004; Chang 
2012; Diao et al. 2013).6  
The linking of improved agricultural productivity with extension services is also 
identified by the Ghanaian government’s agricultural policy. Here, the FASDEP II 
espouses two key strategies that support productivity-led growth rather than growth 
driven by land expansion: (1) enhancing smallholder farmers’ access to extension 
services to improve their uptake of improved farming technologies; and (2) facilitating 
smallholder farmers’ access to inputs such as improved seed varieties, fertiliser and 
agrochemicals, as well as credit (GOG 2007).  
The need for effective agricultural extension services, inputs and credit, however, leads 
us to the second key limitation of smallholder agriculture in Ghana, which is that 
smallholder farmers experience limited access to support services such as inputs and 
extension services. Smallholder farmers are not only large in number but they are also 
4 According the 2010 population census, Ghana’s population grew from 18.9 million in 2000 to 24.6 
million in 2010. 
5 Of course, other factors, which are mostly beyond farmers’ control, may determine agricultural 
productivity; for example, climate or weather. 
6 In this study, agricultural extension services refer mainly to advice on improved and proven agricultural 
technologies and practices, and input is used to refer largely to improved seeds, fertiliser, agrochemicals 
and credit to smallholders 
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 geographically dispersed and are therefore constrained in accessing extension services 
and inputs. Because of their scale of operations, governments and other development 
agencies with limited resources find it difficult to improve their access to extension 
services, inputs and credit. For instance, the Directorate of Agricultural Extension 
Services, the government agency directly responsible for the delivery of agricultural 
extension services, estimates that there are about 2,500 farmers per extension worker, a 
ratio considered very high for an extension worker to handle (Chang 2012). Yet, it is 
important to reach as many smallholders farmers as possible, because the challenges 
they face are growing more difficult (Collier & Dercon 2014).  
To address the above challenges, FASDEP II identified the need to organise smallholder 
farmers into groups (referred to as farmer-based organisations (FBOs)) with the view 
that providers of extension services with limited resources can reach out to a large 
number of smallholder farmers; such groups will also equip smallholder farmers to 
demand extension services (GOG 2007).7 In addition, it notes that the provision of 
inputs by government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private-sector 
organisations is easier when smallholder farmers are in organised groups (GOG 2007). 
Similarly, in regard to credit, FASDEP II recognised that individual smallholder farmers 
find it extremely difficult to access financial credit partly because of the risky nature of 
their farming and their lack of capital assets for collateral. To this end, FASDEP II noted 
that organising smallholder farmers into groups will serve as collateral for them to 
access credit and improve credit recovery through peer pressure (GOG 2007). 
The recognition of FBOs as crucial for improving smallholder agriculture has recently 
received global attention and is not limited to just Ghana (Rondot & Collion 2001; 
Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003; World Bank 2007; Bernard et al. 2008; Hazell & 
Rahman 2014). Many have argued that when effectively established in a country, FBOs 
– particularly those that operate at the local level – will: 
7 It uses FBO as an umbrella term to denote farmer groupings in all aspects of agricultural production, 
processing and marketing.  
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 – increase the ability of smallholders, through a collective voice, to demand 
agricultural services from service providers as well as serving as channels for 
improving the delivery of rural and public services to smallholders (Stockbridge, 
Dorward & Kydd 2003; World Bank 2007);  
– reduce smallholders’ transaction costs of accessing inputs, market information, 
new technologies and the high-value market through collective actions (Hussein 
2001; Shiferaw, Hellin & Muricho 2011; Gollin 2014);  
– enable smallholders to gain a stronger voice to advance their interests in both 
policymaking and the market through collective action (Hussein 2001; World 
Bank 2007); and 
– provide smallholders with collateral to access credit facilities and give them 
opportunities for income generation through microfinance schemes (World Bank 
2007). 
As a consequence, today, many governments, donors, NGOs and private individuals 
invest in the development of FBOs to provide goods and services to smallholder farmers 
more effectively, as well as to encourage collective activities among smallholder farmers 
(Bernard et al. 2008; Salifu, Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010).  
Between 2000 and 2012, for instance, the Ghanaian government implemented two key 
agricultural projects that placed strong emphasis on the establishment and strengthening 
of FBOs to improve the smallholder agricultural sector. The first was the World Bank 
sponsored Agricultural Services Subsector Investment Program (AgSSIP, implemented 
between 2000 and 2007) that supported ‘the development of FBOs to allow them to play 
a major role in shaping agricultural policy, providing services to farmers and in 
engaging in export activities’ (AgSSIP 2007, p. 15). At the end of AgSSIP, the World 
Bank invested more than US$9 million in the establishment of FBOs and supported 
them with leadership and technical training, farm implements, credit and agro-
processing equipment, amongst other things (AgSSIP 2007). 
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 The second project was the Millennium Challenge Account program, the United States’ 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) sponsored program, implemented from 2007 
to 2012.8 By the end of the Millennium Challenge Account program, approximately 
1,200 FBOs had received support ranging from training in agricultural technologies, 
seeds and fertiliser to the provision of credit (ISSER 2012). Salifu and colleagues 
provide a list of more than a dozen projects implemented by government, donors and 
NGOs in pursuance of the development of FBOs and smallholder agriculture (Salifu, 
Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010).  
In spite of the huge investments made to develop FBOs as important institutions for 
improving the productivity of smallholder agriculture in Ghana and many developing 
countries, it remains largely unclear whether FBOs make a significant difference to 
smallholder agriculture, especially with regard to the extent to which they improve 
smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and credit. In the case of 
Ghana, the few available studies on FBOs focus on their characteristics and internal 
collective activities, such as joint production and joint marketing of farm produce 
(Amezah & Dormon 2004; Salifu, Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010; Francesconi & 
Wouterse 2011; Salifu et al. 2012). An overarching conclusion of these studies is that 
FBOs are largely inactive and have less capacity to mobilise their members for internal 
collective activities because the members perceive them largely as institutions to receive 
external support such as grants and credit (Amezah & Dormon 2004; Salifu, Francesconi 
& Kolavalli 2010; Francesconi & Wouterse 2011; Salifu et al. 2012). However, many of 
these studies fail to provide detailed diagnoses of their claims, as well as neglecting to 
consider the extent to which FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension 
services, inputs and credit, which are critical for improved productivity.9 Yet, there is a 
8 An amount of US$547 million was approved for the Millennium Challenge Account program and about 
39% of this amount was used to promote agricultural growth.  
9 For example, it is not clear how Amezah and Dormon (2004) arrived at the conclusion that Ghanaian 
FBOs are inactive, as their paper failed to present a clear methodology. Salifu et al. (2010) based their 
conclusion on a review of the literature and interviews with 17 FBOs in Ghana. 
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 growing need for evidence on the nature of successful FBOs in the development of 
smallholder agriculture as well as their shortcomings. 
This thesis therefore sets out to deepen our understanding of the roles and capacities of 
FBOs in improving their members’ access to extension services, inputs and credit, with 
Ghana as the focus. In particular, it highlights key factors that shape the roles of FBOs in 
improving their members’ access to these essential agricultural services. The aim and 
research questions of this thesis are outlined in the section that follows. After identifying 
the research aim and questions, the next two sections provide a brief history of the 
development of FBOs in Ghana and a rapid review to situate the study in the broad 
literature.  
1.2 The research aim and questions 
Informed by the notion that improved knowledge of and access to agricultural 
technologies (extension services), inputs (e.g. seeds and fertiliser) and credit play 
important roles in improving the overall productivity of smallholder agriculture, this 
study is concerned with the role that FBOs play in this process and intends to subject 
FBOs to close critical scrutiny. To that end, using a collective action approach, the main 
aim of the research is as follows: 
  
To explore the extent to which FBOs play a role in improving smallholder 
farmers’ access to extension services (and in doing so improving their 
knowledge and application of agricultural technology), access to inputs 
(seeds, fertiliser and agrochemicals) and credit.  
 
To achieve this aim, the following key questions are examined: 
• Does membership of FBOs improve access to extension services, inputs and 
credit? 
– If so, what are the factors and/or features of FBOs that enable this?  
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 – If not, what are the impediments and barriers (structural, cultural and 
institutional) faced by FBOs in enabling members to access extension 
services, inputs and credit? 
– What could be done by the relevant stakeholders (e.g. government, 
farmers and NGOs) to resolve these impediments and remove barriers? 
1.3 Farmer-based organisations in Ghana 
The recognition of FBOs as important agents for agricultural development is not a recent 
phenomenon in Ghana. It dates back to the colonial period, particularly in the 1920s, 
when the colonial authority introduced agricultural cooperatives into the cocoa sector.10 
The British colonial government introduced agricultural cooperatives as a mechanism 
for organising smallholder cocoa producers into clusters to facilitate the transfer of 
technology, credit and the marketing of the cocoa beans in the most cost-effective way 
(DeGraft-Johnson 1958; Hussi, Lindberg & Brennernan 1993). Although agricultural 
cooperatives were later expanded to the production of food crops in the pre-
independence era (before 1957) as a ‘means of increasing productivity and improving 
the marketing of farm products’ (Miracle & Seidman 1968, p. 3), it is reported that their 
impact on productivity at the national scale was not significant (Miracle & Seidman 
1968; (Department of Cooperatives (DOC) 1995).11 While little research has been 
conducted to understand why agricultural cooperatives failed to make a significant 
impact on food crop productivity during the pre-independence period, a report by 
Miracle and Seidman (1968) on cooperatives in Ghana between 1951 and 1965 noted 
10 According to the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), a cooperative is a type of organisation 
owned and run by a group of individuals for their mutual benefit. The ICA has defined cooperatives as 
autonomous associations of persons getting together voluntarily to meet their common economic, social 
and cultural needs and aspirations through jointly owned and democratically controlled organisations. 
For details, see http://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles  
11 The formation of such cooperatives was far more than just improving productivity. For example, a yam 
producer’s cooperative formed in Attabubu in Northern Ashanti in the early 1940s was primarily set up 
under a contract to market the surplus produce of members of the army during the Second World War; 
the cooperative disintegrated rapidly when the contracts terminated at the end of the war (Miracle & 
Seidman 1968). 
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 that the cooperatives in general failed to expand the output of farmers more rapidly for 
the following reasons: 
– the cooperatives established in Ghana were not ‘true cooperatives’, and 
standardised uniform methods of operation were completely absent; 
– the officers responsible for the development of cooperatives appeared to be 
uninformed on proper farming methods and cooperative practices;  
– cooperatives were often forced on farmers by the government, rather than being 
formed based on farmers’ own interests; and 
– the farmers in the country were highly individualistic and did not like working 
together (Miracle & Seidman 1968). 
Nevertheless, following Ghana’s independence in 1957, agricultural cooperatives 
continued to be promoted as preferential channels for the provision of credit, the 
distribution of agricultural inputs and the marketing of farm produce among farmers, 
especially those in the cocoa sector, as part of the wider agricultural policies of the new 
sovereign government. However, turbulent political changes appear to have affected the 
roles and performance of agricultural cooperatives in agriculture development during the 
post-independent period. For instance, the first sovereign government (led by President 
Kwame Nkrumah) supported agricultural cooperatives for a short period, but by 1961 it 
had dissolved all cooperatives because of distrust in their operations; their assets were 
confiscated and put under the control of a government agency (Young, Sherman & Rose 
1981). This suggests that agricultural cooperatives started as a popular movement and 
ended up as parastatal instruments.  
After the overthrow of the Nkrumah-led government in 1966, distortions in government 
due to frequent coups d’états between 1966 and 1981 also affected agricultural-sector 
policymaking, and as a result there were no clear policies promoting the role of 
agricultural cooperatives in agricultural development during this period. Nonetheless, 
the 1972–8 government (led by I.K. Acheampong) focused agricultural development 
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 towards smallholder farmers, with some projects implemented through small informal 
farmer groups. For instance, in 1976, a World Bank–sponsored program, the Upper 
Region Agricultural Development Program (URADEP), helped smallholder farmers 
with credit, seeds and fertiliser through farmer service centres. The URADEP 
encountered difficulties and only gained momentum after smallholder farmers were put 
into groups to access those services (Jiggins 1979; Akoto 1987).  
While Ghana had a stable government from 1981 to the late 1990s, the development of 
agricultural cooperatives and other FBOs did not feature strongly in any development 
policy of the Ghanaian government except for a few projects implemented by NGOs.12 
For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) sponsored the People’s 
Participation Program (PPP), which supported the formation of small, informal and 
homogeneous groups that engaged in income-generating activities, and served as useful 
channels for the delivery of development inputs and services to farmers (Oakley 1991).  
Structural adjustment reforms towards market liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s in 
SSA led to the dissolution of most state-controlled agricultural cooperatives in many 
countries, including Ghana (Onumah et al. 2007), and there were calls for more 
independent and business-oriented FBOs (Hussi, Lindberg & Brennernan 1993; Onumah 
et al. 2007). By the end of the 1990s, many state-controlled agricultural cooperatives 
had become inactive and were not visible in agricultural activities in Ghana. 
One can argue that due to the increased calls for independent and business-oriented 
FBOs in developing countries,13 Ghana witnessed the establishment of somewhat 
autonomous FBOs (their establishment is discussed in Chapter 4) at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. In 2010, Salifu and colleagues estimated the number of FBOs in 
12 In this study, I used NGOs under the umbrella of Civil Society Organisations to refer to highly 
institutionalised non-profit organisations that operate at the local, national or international levels to 
provide a variety of services to farmers, including but not limited to extension services, inputs and credit.  
13 These calls are still ongoing; the year 2012 was declared by the United Nations as the International 
Year of Cooperatives, recognising that cooperatives, in their various forms, promote the participation of 
people in economic and social development, which can contribute to poverty reduction, employment 
generation and social integration. 
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 Ghana at around 10,000 (Salifu, Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010). As I will examine later 
in this thesis, these FBOs have emerged in Ghana in different forms: some have emerged 
under government initiatives; others have been set up through NGOs, donors and private 
individuals, as well as farmers themselves. FBOs also differ in scale (local, regional and 
national); that is, they are formed at the village, district, regional and national levels. It is 
useful to mention here that this thesis focuses on FBOs at the local or village level.  
I now turn to providing a rapid review to situate this study in the broad extant literature, 
followed by a brief examination of the role of FBOs in agricultural development in 
developing countries, highlighting knowledge gaps and thereby providing a clear 
justification for this study in terms of both theory and practice.  
1.4 Theoretical perspectives on the roles of FBOs in smallholder 
agriculture  
The understanding of the roles and impact of FBOs on smallholder agriculture, such as 
the extent to which they improve their members’ access to inputs and outputs markets,14 
has been studied and interpreted through multiple but interrelated theoretical 
perspectives such as collective action, participatory development and transaction cost 
theories (Uphoff & Wijararatna 2000; Hellin, Lundy & Meijer 2009; Shiferaw, Hellin & 
Muricho 2011). While Chapter 2 of this thesis discusses in detail the main theoretical 
strands that inform and guide this study, a brief review of the collective action theory is 
important here to situate this study.  
Collective action refers to any goal-directed activity engaged in jointly by two or more 
individuals (Snow, Soule & Kriesi 2004), or action taken by a group in pursuit of the 
members’ perceived shared interests (Marshall 1998). The theory on collective action 
has evolved significantly over the past four decades, particularly since the publication of 
14 The inputs market here denotes acquisition of extension services, credit and farm inputs such as 
fertiliser and seeds, while the outputs markets denotes the sale of farm produce.  
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 Garret Hardin’s The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968)15 and Mancur Olson’s The 
Logic of Collective Action (Olson 1965). The evolution of the theory has emphasised 
three main elements as necessary for effective collective action: a group of people, a 
shared interest within the group and some kind of common action that works in pursuit 
of that shared interest (Meinzen-Dick, DiGregorio & McCarthy 2004).  
In the development studies and development economics literature, collective action has 
been widely recognised as a force for rural development and has been applied to a wide 
range of fields of studies, such as agriculture and natural resource development, health, 
education and governance. In the field of natural resource management in particular, it 
has been applied to the study of common-pool resources such as forests, fisheries and 
irrigation schemes (Ostrom 2000; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004). The central argument in 
this field has been that the overuse of common-pool resources such as forests and 
fisheries creates sustainability problems, which can be resolved only when users act 
collectively. Researchers in this field have therefore concentrated on understanding 
under what conditions collective action is effective in the sustainable management of 
common-pool resources. A dominant view has been that the success of collective action 
among users of common-pool resources depends on how their organisations (groups) are 
designed; that is, the way they build agreements and rules that control their use of the 
resources (Olson 1965; Hardin 1968; Taylor 1987; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom & Varughese 
2001; Agrawal 2002). 
Similarly, the role of collective action in agriculture production has also received some 
research attention (see, e.g., Stringfellow et al. 1997; Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 
2003; World Bank 2007; Bernard et al. 2008). Here, the central theoretical assumption 
has been that collective action through FBOs provides farmers the opportunity to 
cooperate and/or invest in institution building to improve their access to the inputs and 
15 Hardin (1968) referred to the "tragedy of the commons" as the problem that common-pool resources, 
such as oceans, lakes, forests, irrigation systems and grazing lands, can easily be overused or destroyed if 
property rights to these resources are not well defined. 
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 outputs markets, such as collective marketing of agricultural goods, and increasing 
access to external credit and knowledge (Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003; Dorward 
et al. 2004; World Bank 2007). One main argument is that individual farmers’ 
transaction costs16 of accessing inputs (e.g. seeds, fertiliser) and outputs (e.g. selling 
farm produce) markets are minimised as a result of economies of scale if they engage in 
collective action (Williamson & Masten 1995; Markelova et al. 2009). This line of 
theoretical argument has been analysed from two key perspectives.  
First, when governments, donors and other NGOs deliver services to farmers in groups, 
they are likely to reduce their operational costs as well as ensure mutual transparency 
and accountability (Uphoff 1991; Uphoff & Wijararatna 2000; World Bank 2007). 
Second, the participation of smallholder farmers and the disadvantaged in collective 
activities empowers them to learn, take ownership of policies and build social capital to 
act collectively to their advantage (Chambers 1983; Pretty 1995; Mansuri & Rao 2004). 
However, in both common-pool resource management and agricultural production, there 
are still ongoing debates among researchers about the suitability of collectively based 
approaches and the conditions under which they promote sustainable development. First, 
questions remain as to whether membership in groups necessarily serves the interests of 
their members, especially if they are externally driven. This is particularly the case when 
governments, donors and NGOs set up FBOs to meet their predetermined goals in 
projects (Hussi, Lindberg & Brennernan 1993; Rondot & Collion 2001). Such FBOs 
often do not survive beyond the projects’ life span, particularly when they are set up 
hastily, with little reference to the underlying patterns of the social, cultural and 
economic conditions of the people (Stringfellow et al. 1997). FBOs that rely solely on 
external agents to act collectively are likely to cease operation once the flow of 
resources is discontinued (Uphoff 1991). Similarly, in their work on organisational life 
cycles, Cook and Chambers (2007) suggested that FBOs are likely to be short-lived, 
16 Transaction costs are the observable and unobservable costs of market exchange at any given time 
(Williamson & Masten 1995). 
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 especially when they are formed to pursue ‘defensive’ purposes rather than ‘offensive’ 
purposes. They explained that defensive organisations are those that rely largely on 
external support for their activities, while offensive organisations rely heavily on 
internal investment and resources for collective activities (Cook & Chambers 2007). 
Second, the theoretical assumption that with a common interest, rational members will 
act to promote those interests has been challenged in the literature. Olson (1965) has 
been influential in the debate and, as he argued, individual rationality does not provide a 
sufficient basis for collective action in groups. The size of the group and the membership 
composition have also come up strongly as important factors that influence the 
performance of collective action in membership organisations (Olson 1965; Rondot & 
Collion 2001; Kaganzi et al. 2009).  For instance, it has often been argued that collective 
action in groups is more effective if the number of individuals in a group is quite small, 
the group members are homogeneous and there is some level of coercion to make 
individuals act in their common interest (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990). Regarding the 
relation between the group’s size and its performance, there is still little consensus on 
what constitutes a small or large group.  
Third, successful collective action in groups such as FBOs has been associated with the 
managerial capacities and governance styles of the groups (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom & 
Varughese 2001; Bernard et al. 2008). The creation of ‘paper-based’ FBOs – in the 
name of employing participatory approaches in their projects – that do not have the 
capacity to act collectively has been documented (Cooke & Kothari 2001; Upton 2008). 
When little effort is put into building the skills, interests and capacity of local people, 
they may have no stake in maintaining organisational structures and activities beyond 
the point at which the flow of resources stops (Pretty 1995; Cooke & Kothari 2001; 
Upton 2008). The success of collective action in FBOs is therefore undermined when 
governments, donors and NGOs fail to recognise that smallholder farmers lack the skills 
and experience to work collectively to achieve common interests (Stockbridge, Dorward 
& Kydd 2003). For instance, external agencies must not impose rules about FBO 
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 governance on local people; rather, they must help the local people to develop their own 
rules. In her extensive research on irrigation systems, for example, Ostrom found that 
rules crafted by farmers themselves are better understood and adapted more easily than 
those imposed by external agencies (Ostrom 1990, 1995).  Participation in groups 
therefore thrives better if external agencies provide an enabling framework for collective 
activities to take place (Pretty 1995; Pretty & Ward 2001).  
The main point worth noting in the above theoretical review is that the success of 
collective action in FBOs depends on a variety of factors. Key among these factors is the 
way in which FBOs are set up, especially the way rules and agreements are crafted and 
enforced to regulate collective activities. Their ability to interact with the external 
environment, such as government agencies, donors, NGOs and private individuals, has 
also been widely acknowledged in the theoretical literature. However, the theoretical 
debates are yet to agree on the definitive list of conditions that are conducive for 
effective collective action in FBOs. In particular, the literature is inconclusive about how 
FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ ability to work together to access services that are 
critical for improving their productivity. In the case of Ghana and other countries in 
SSA, few studies (see, e.g., Bratton 1986a; Bernard et al. 2008; Fischer & Qaim 2011) 
have contributed to the theoretical literature on whether FBOs have the capacity to 
mobilise smallholder farmers to access agricultural services as well as examining the 
factors that influence the effectiveness of FBOs in improving smallholder farmers’ 
access to these services.  
The next section reviews the role of FBOs in the development of smallholder 
agriculture, with a focus on key knowledge and research gaps in the literature, to provide 
a further justification for this study. 
1.5 The roles and impact of FBOs on smallholder agriculture: evidence 
and knowledge gaps  
Several studies have contributed to our understanding of the existence, characteristics, 
performance and benefits of FBOs in SSA to their members (Bernard et al. 2008; 
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 Bernard & Spielman 2009; Shiferaw, Hellin & Muricho 2011; Fischer & Qaim 2011). 
However, the majority of the available studies in SSA are limited in many respects. 
First, their main focus has been to understand the characteristics of FBOs and the extent 
to which they improve their members’ access to the outputs market; that is, easy access 
to the market to sell their produce as well as higher prices for their produce (Bernard et 
al. 2008; Bernard & Spielman 2009; Fischer & Qaim 2011; Shiferaw, Hellin & Muricho 
2011). Many of these studies do not pay particular attention to the performance of FBOs 
regarding how they improve their members’ access to the inputs market, such as 
acquiring access to extension services, credit, fertiliser and improved seeds. While there 
are only a small number of studies that offer detailed analyses about the extent to which 
FBOs improve their members’ access to the inputs markets (see, e.g., Bratton 
1986a,b),17 the studies tend to ignore the factors that enable or impede FBOs in 
improving their members’ access to the inputs market (Moustier et al. 2010). This study 
addresses this knowledge limitation by examining the performance of FBOs in 
improving smallholder farmers’ access to the inputs market as well as the factors that 
shape their performance.  
Second, except a few studies such as Bratton (1986a) and Francesconi and Wouterse 
(2011), many studies have largely focused on smallholder farmers who produce 
commodities with a particular set of characteristics – high-value, exportable, perishable 
crops – to the neglect of those producing staple crops or cereals (see, e.g., Fischer & 
Qaim 2011; Shiferaw, Hellin & Muricho 2011). Yet, the majority of FBOs in SSA 
appear to have their members cultivating cereals as both food staples and tradable 
commodities – crops that are critical to the livelihoods of the vast majority of 
smallholders in the developing world (Bernard et al. 2010). It is therefore the goal of this 
study to increase our understanding of the role of FBOs in the production of cereals and 
other staple crops. This new focus of research will widen our empirical and theoretical 
17 Bratton (1986a), for instance, studied the role of FBOs in food productivity in Zimbabwe and found 
that membership of FBOs is a major factor explaining the high level of agricultural extension agents 
contacting farmers. 
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 understanding of the effectiveness of FBOs across a wide range of crops. In particular, 
the study seeks to improve our understanding of the ways we should govern FBOs under 
different circumstances to make them effective local organisations for smallholder 
farmers.  
Third, many of these studies are often limited to a single high-value crop or to FBOs that 
have participated in a project or program within a very limited geographical location; for 
example, the study of banana smallholder farmers in Kenya (Fischer & Qaim 2011). 
While restricting the scope of a study to a crop, project or location may provide detailed 
results, it undermines any comparison of the performance of similar FBOs in different 
circumstances. Research that examines FBOs that cultivate different crops and that have 
participated in several projects is important, and is the focus of study. This study, for 
example, examines the performance of FBOs depending on whether they were set up by 
government or NGOs (see Chapter 7).  
Finally, studies evaluating the impact or performance of FBOs are often limited to 
members of the organisation (see, e.g., Bernard et al. 2008). This study employed a 
more useful approach for evaluating the impact or performance of FBOs on their 
members by comparing FBO members with FBO non-members (see Chapter 3), 
although the selection of FBO non-members without any bias could be a challenging 
task (Bernard, Taffesse & Gabre-Madhin 2008). By comparing members of FBOs to 
carefully selected non-members, it is easier and more reliable to determine if FBOs 
significantly improve their members’ access to services. This study employed this 
strategy, which is discussed in Chapter 3. 
In summary, the above review shows that while there is substantial progress in research 
regarding our understanding of the role of FBOs in agricultural development, gaps 
remain. The review provides a compelling case for further research to understand the 
roles of FBOs and the extent of their effectiveness in improving smallholder farmers’ 
access to extension services, inputs and credit. While there may be the need for further 
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 research in this field in many countries in SSA, Ghana offers a compelling case, where 
there has not only been a renewed interest in FBOs to improve smallholder agriculture 
but also available evidence on the roles that FBOs play in this process is very limited.  
This study responds to the above knowledge gaps in the literature of collective action on 
rural agricultural development by employing a mixed-methods approach to explore the 
extent to which FBOs make a difference regarding smallholder farmers’ access to 
extension services, inputs and credit. The study utilised a cross-sectional survey design 
by first administering structured questionnaires to smallholder farmers (both FBO 
members and non-members) to measure whether membership of FBOs improves access 
to extension services, inputs and credit. Second, it conducted semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with some smallholder farmers, officials from government agencies and 
NGOs to understand the factors that enable or impede FBOs in improving smallholder 
farmers to extension services, inputs and credit. In addition to the structured 
questionnaires and semi-structured qualitative interviews, the study conducted a 
thorough analysis of documents collected from FBOs, government agencies and NGOs.  
1.6 The argument of the thesis and an outline 
This thesis shows that FBO membership does improve smallholder farmers’ access to 
extension services, inputs and credit, although on a limited basis. It presents three main 
arguments to explain this limited role of FBOs. First, it argues that governmental 
agencies and NGOs pay insufficient attention to building the governance and 
management structures of FBOs, leading to weak leadership in FBOs, which cannot 
mobilise their members to either acquire and/or demand services. Second, it maintains 
that the way in which external institutions such as government agencies and NGOs set 
up FBOs creates the perception among smallholder farmers that FBOs are largely local 
institutions to receive ‘handouts’ such as inputs, grants and credit. As a consequence, 
smallholder farmers rarely view FBOs as organisations that can provide them with the 
opportunity to engage in collective activities that will provide benefits for members. 
Finally, it argues that the majority of the external agencies involved in the development 
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 of FBOs fail to nurture them into stronger organisations through regular supervision and 
monitoring of their activities. I discuss these key arguments in detail in the remainder of 
the thesis, which is organised as follows. 
Chapter 2 builds on the theoretical context already outlined above. It reviews the role 
and effectiveness of FBOs in improving rural and agricultural development in 
developing countries, with a focus on SSA. It outlines and discusses the key concepts 
associated with the broad theory of collective action, especially how these concepts have 
been used to analyse the effectiveness of collective action in rural agricultural 
development. Finally, it provides a detailed account of the conceptual and theoretical 
framework that guides this study.  
Chapter 3 outlines the research design and the methods of the study. It begins with a 
justification of why a mixed-methods approach is the appropriate strategy to answer the 
research aim and questions of the study, and then outlines the mixed-methods approach.  
Chapter 4 is the first of the four main empirical chapters of the thesis. It provides a 
background on FBOs and sets the stage to examine the questions of whether, and the 
extent to which, FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs 
and credit. In particular, it discusses the formation of FBOs and their types, as well as 
their functions and activities in Ghana. The chapter also examines the factors associated 
with smallholder farmers’ participation in FBOs. The chapter shows that a variety of 
FBOs exist in Ghana, and that their number continues to grow, as both government and 
NGOs prefer to use them to implement their programs. The chapter argues that 
smallholder farmers largely perceive FBOs as local institutions through which 
government and NGOs deliver support to farmers, rather than institutions through which 
farmers can engage in collective activities to improve their access to inputs and outputs 
markets.  
Chapter 5 recognises the existence of agricultural extension services as critical for 
agricultural growth among smallholder farmers and examines the degree to which FBOs 
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 improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension services. The chapter discusses key 
extension services offered to smallholder farmers and provides a critical comparison 
between FBO members and non-members regarding their access to these services. In 
addition, it discusses the factors that influence the role of FBOs in improving 
smallholder farmers’ access to extension services. The chapter shows that membership 
of FBOs has had a rather limited impact on improving smallholder farmers’ access to 
extension services. The chapter argues that the limited role of FBOs in improving 
smallholder farmers’ access to extension services is partly due to their weak capacity to 
demand extension services; their members’ perception that FBOs are mainly institutions 
to access farm inputs and financial support; and the limited resources available to 
agricultural extension agents (AEAs) to organise regular extension meetings with FBOs. 
Chapter 6 builds on the analysis in Chapter 5. It notes that smallholder farmers’ access 
to extension services alone is not enough to ensure productivity-led agricultural growth. 
It argues that access to inputs such as fertiliser, seeds and herbicides are equally critical 
for the adoption of technology and smallholder farmers’ productivity. The chapter 
therefore examines the extent to which FBOs are helping smallholder farmers to access 
these inputs. It also examines whether FBO membership improves the adoption of 
extension technologies by smallholder farmers. The analysis shows that the majority of 
FBOs do not have the capacity to purchase inputs collectively. Rather, they largely serve 
as targeted local institutions for external agencies to implement their projects and 
programs, through which they provide irregular and limited inputs to smallholder 
farmers. The chapter shows that the input intensity of smallholder farmers is below 
optimal levels largely due to their limited access to financial resources.  
Chapter 7 recognises that the availability of financial resources is crucial for 
smallholder farmers to intensify their use of inputs such as fertiliser, seeds and 
herbicides. The chapter examines smallholder farmers’ access to credit, particularly the 
extent to which FBO membership improves their access to credit. The chapter explores 
the extent to which FBOs improve such access, and examines the conditions under 
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 which FBOs improve credit delivery among smallholder farmers. Among other things, 
the chapter argues that the formation of FBOs to deliver credit to smallholder farmers 
alone would not guarantee improved credit delivery and loan repayment. It demonstrates 
that when FBOs have weak leadership and little in the way of collective activities, loan 
recovery requires effective participation of the loan providers in educating the FBO 
members, ensuring timely delivery of loans, supervising and monitoring loan use, and 
undertaking loan recovery itself.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. First, it synthesises the findings on the main research 
question of whether, and to what extent, FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to 
extension services, inputs and credit. It also provides a summary of the implications of 
the findings to the broad theory of collective action in agriculture as well as policy – the 
best ways to govern FBOs in Ghana and many developing countries in SSA. It then 
concludes with possible directions for future research.  
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 CHAPTER TWO 
RURAL COLLECTIVE ACTION AND ITS ROLE IN AGRICULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 underscored the need for research to examine the extent to which farmer-
based organisations (FBOs) improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, 
inputs and credit as well as the overall development of smallholder agriculture in 
developing countries. It also highlighted briefly the theoretical context in which this 
study is conducted. This chapter builds on the theoretical context already outlined in 
Chapter 1. It begins with a review of key debates about the need to support smallholder 
agriculture for improved economic growth, poverty reduction and food security in 
developing countries. It then focuses on the variety of approaches that have been 
debated as important for improving smallholder agriculture. Here, the focus is on one 
approach that merits much greater consideration for the purpose of this study – the role 
of rural collective action through FBOs in improving smallholder agriculture. The 
chapter then discusses the main theoretical elements associated with the theory of 
collective action in the context of agricultural development.  
In the second section, the chapter reviews current debates on the role of rural collective 
action in agricultural development in developing countries. Specifically, it examines 
empirical and theoretical arguments on the importance of rural collective action through 
FBOs in smallholder agricultural development. In this regard, it critically examines the 
conditions that facilitate or hinder rural collective action in FBOs, drawing on the 
literature of agriculture, natural resources management and community development. 
Finally, the chapter outlines a conceptual framework that guides the discussions and 
analyses in the remainder of the study. 
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 2.2 Improving smallholder agriculture: some theoretical debates 
As noted in Chapter 1, smallholder agriculture in developing countries, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is increasingly recognised as critical for economic growth, 
poverty reduction and food security, as the majority of the people in these countries still 
depend on agriculture for their livelihood (World Bank 2007; International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) 2010; Chang 2012; Hazell & Rahman 2014). There 
are arguments that smallholder agriculture may have to play a much greater role than it 
does today when it comes to feeding an estimated global population of over 9 billion by 
2050 (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 2009; Collier & Dercon 2014). This is 
particularly the case as much of this increase in population is expected to take place in 
developing countries (FAO 2009). As a consequence, recent global meetings have 
supported a need to improve smallholder agriculture in developing countries.18 The 
strong commitment to develop smallholder agriculture is often inspired by the fact that 
poverty is concentrated largely in rural areas among smallholder farmers, as well as the 
argument that growth among smallholder farmers has higher growth linkages in other 
sectors of an economy (Collier & Dercon 2014). 
It is important to note that long before the global call to support smallholder agriculture, 
Karl Kautsky, in his work The Agrarian Question, published over a century ago, raised a 
question that is still debated in today’s agricultural development in developing countries: 
is there a need and justification for agricultural policies that specifically support 
smallholder agriculture (Kautsky 1988 [1899])? In response to Kautsky, there have been 
recurring predictions in the literature that small farms, and by extension smallholder 
agriculture, are about to disappear (von Braun 2005). Some have viewed small farms as 
18 For example, in 2008, the United Nations High-Level Task Force on Global Food Security Crisis 
produced the Comprehensive Framework for Action, which among other things recommended support 
to smallholder farmers in order to build resilient food systems among the poor (United Nations 2008). In 
addition, the 2009 G8 L’Aquila Food Security Initiative and the subsequent Global Agriculture and Food 
Security Programme emphasize improving smallholder agriculture in developing countries as part of the 
solution to feeding a growing global population. Again, in the May 2012 Camp David G8 Summit on Food 
Security, smallholder agriculture was at the centre of discussions and a number of pledges were made to 
support smallholder farmers in Africa through the World Bank’s Global Agriculture and Food Security 
Programme (GAFSP) (Campbell, Watkins & Malumo 2012). 
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 inefficient and an impediment to development, and have expressed a naive belief that 
large-scale mechanised farming necessarily means greater efficiency and productivity, 
which has led some policymakers to seek to merge small farms through land seizures 
(Hazell & Rahman 2014).  
However, there are empirical arguments in favour of smallholder agriculture over large-
scale production. A common one is the inverse productivity relationship argument; that 
is, yields or output per hectare are higher on smaller farms, compared with large farms 
(Collier & Dercon 2014). In addition, those who argue that smallholder farms are 
inefficient and will disappear fail to consider the enormous diversity of small-farm 
situations around the world today and the potential they have for overall agricultural 
development in developing countries (Hazell & Rahman 2014). Those arguing in favour 
of large-scale farms also do not suggest how a rapid exit from small farms could be 
managed without leading to a much larger number of smallholder farmers becoming 
trapped in abject poverty (Hazell & Rahman 2014).  
In spite of the arguments against small farms, smallholder agriculture continues to 
dominate in many developing countries; and policies and investment designed to 
promote poverty reduction, economic growth and food security must be cognisant of the 
vast majority of smallholder farmers in developing countries (World Bank 2007; Hazell 
& Rahman 2014). Consequently, researchers, donors and policymakers are proposing a 
variety of strategies to improve smallholder agriculture in developing countries. Before I 
discuss some of these key strategies, though, it is important to first understand the 
principal challenges confronting the smallholder sector.  
2.2.1 The principal challenges confronting smallholder agriculture 
It is a well-known fact that the majority of the smallholder farmers in developing 
countries are poor and have limited capital (both cash and credit), and that their 
productivity levels are far below the optimum (Tinsley 2004; IFAD 2010). Several 
factors are associated with the poor performance of smallholder agriculture in many 
developing countries, including physical limitations, inappropriate policy and 
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 institutional frameworks, technological constraints, unpredictable weather and climate 
change (World Bank 2007; Chang 2012). 
First, smallholder farmers have limited access to physical assets and infrastructure such 
as land, irrigation systems, roads and communication networks (Stockbridge, Dorward 
& Kydd 2003). In relation to land, for example, there is a growing competition for land 
among smallholder farmers in many developing countries (IFAD 2010). Compared to 
other developing regions, SSA is largely regarded as a region with ample land, although 
smallholder farmers in SSA are often confronted with poor tenancy laws and land lease 
legislation (Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003; Jayne, Mather & Mghenyi 2010).  
Second, smallholder farmers, especially those in remote areas, often have limited access 
to improved technologies and inputs (Narayanan & Gulati 2002; Norton 2004), although 
these technologies and inputs are crucial if they have to improve their productivity. 
Similarly, the transaction costs of acquiring these technologies and inputs as well as 
selling their produce is often high, partly because their operations are below optimum 
scale and they live far away from the inputs and technologies markets (IFAD 2001; von 
Braun 2005; Poulton, Dorward & Kydd 2010). Furthermore, they are not only far away 
from markets where they can sell their produce, but also these markets are unstable and 
unreliable (IFAD 2010). 
Another challenge confronting smallholders that has been discussed extensively in the 
literature is limited access to credit (IFAD 2001; Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003; 
von Braun 2005, Chang 2012). Credit provision to smallholders has been one of the 
most important challenges facing policymakers in developing economies (Chang 2012), 
partly because smallholder agriculture involves a high level of risk and smallholder 
farmers lack assets that can serve as collateral to acquire credit from financial 
institutions (Tinsley 2004).  
Furthermore, smallholder farmers are exposed to uninsured risks such as price volatility, 
conflicts, natural disasters and unpredictable weather conditions (World Bank 2007; 
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 IFAD 2010). In particular, it is important to note again that smallholder agriculture in 
most developing countries is highly dependent on rainfall, which is now becoming more 
unpredictable due to climate change and global warming.  
While the above discussion does not claim to be a comprehensive review of the 
challenges with which smallholder sector is confronted, the literature abounds with the 
key strategies and sets of policies necessary for overcoming these challenges and 
constraints (see, e.g., Birner & Resnick 2010; Chang 2012; Collier & Dercon 2014). Key 
debates regarding these strategies and policies are discussed below.  
2.2.2 Strategies for improving smallholder agriculture 
Although the literature informs us about a wide range of strategies and sets of policies 
for overcoming constraints in the smallholder agricultural sector, one can broadly 
organise them into four broad categories: 
– strategies and policies for improving the overall environment in rural areas, such 
as infrastructure, social and economic services (modern inputs, credit and market 
services) and governance; 
– strategies and policies for investing and providing new technologies through 
agricultural research; 
– strategies and policies for investing in the education of people, especially the 
poor, to develop the skills they need to take advantage of economic 
opportunities; and  
– strategies and policies for strengthening the collective capabilities of smallholder 
farmers, especially through the use of membership-based organisations such as 
FBOs (World Bank 2007; Birner & Resnick 2010; IFAD 2010; Chang 2012). 
Indeed, in the mid-1960s, the ‘early green revolution’ countries such as India, Indonesia 
and the Philippines implemented most of these strategies and policies, which led to 
increases in the productivity of small farms (World Bank 2007, 2010; Birner & Resnick 
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 2010).19 A common thread that runs through all the four broad issues mentioned above 
is that smallholder farmers should be assisted in developing systems that are sustainable, 
resilient, productive and profitable. This is because strategies that support the economic 
development of smallholder farmers have proven to be successful route to 
industrialisation in today’s developed countries and the fast-growing Asian economies 
(Birner & Resnick 2010; Chang 2012). 
Among the four strategies and policies outlined above, this study focuses on the last one, 
and examines whether FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, 
inputs and credit, which are all critical for improving their productivity. Before I subject 
this fourth aspect to theoretical and empirical scrutiny, it is important to briefly review 
the first three strategies and policies. 
The first approach relates to improving the environment of smallholder farmers through 
an increase in the quality and quantity of both public-sector and private-sector 
investment (World Bank 2007; IFAD 2010; Chang 2012). In this sense, the environment 
means that efficient public spending is needed in critical areas such as electricity, roads, 
irrigation, farm inputs, markets to sell produce, and radio, mobile phones and the 
internet for easy communication among farmers. The options often considered are 
mechanisation of farm operations, the use of productivity-enhancing inputs20 and the 
provision of irrigation schemes (Tinsley 2004; IFAD 2010), as well as linking 
smallholder farmers to market information systems (World Bank 2007). The need to 
strengthen and expand financial services to provide credit for smallholder farmers, 
particularly those in rural areas, has also been highlighted (World Bank 2007; Poulton, 
Dorward & Kydd 2010). 
19 Among others, these countries invested in agricultural research, extension and irrigation 
infrastructure, subsidised access to inputs, agricultural credit, price guarantees, and establishing and 
building the capacities of rural organisations such as FBOs (World Bank 2007; Birner & Resnick 2010; 
World Bank 2010). 
20 For example, there is also a renewed interest in providing free inputs and/or subsides for smallholder 
farmers so as to encourage them to apply modern inputs on their farms (IFAD 2001; World Bank 2007). 
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 The second broad approach for improving smallholder agriculture relates to the 
provision of new technologies to smallholder farmers based on agricultural research. It is 
argued that investments in agricultural research to produce new technologies must be at 
the top of the policy agenda in smallholder countries (World Bank 2007). The available 
evidence shows positive results for countries that have invested in agricultural research 
and development (World Bank 2007). For instance, a recent study conducted to evaluate 
700 research and development projects in developing countries concludes that the low 
level of investment in research and development in SSA has partly contributed to 
stagnant cereal yields in the region and a wide yield gap when compared to the rest of 
the world (World Bank 2007, p. 165).  
Third, there is the need to invest in the production capabilities of smallholder farmers 
(Atkinson 2006; World Bank 2007; Jayne, Mather & Mghenyi 2010). The key argument 
with this approach is to improve extension service delivery to smallholder farmers 
through collaboration among governments, NGOs and the private sector (IFAD 2001, 
2010).  
As already indicated, the fourth approach of strengthening the collective capabilities of 
smallholders through membership-based organisations is the focus of this research 
(World Bank 2007; Shiferaw, Hellin & Muricho 2011; Chang 2012). What makes this 
approach even more important is that it is crucial for the implementation of the other 
three approaches to smallholder agricultural development. For instance, collective action 
through FBOs has the potential to reduce the transaction costs of dealing with 
smallholder farmers, increase farmers’ access to markets, and increase their 
representation in national and international policy forums, among others (Bernard et al. 
2008; Bernard & Spielman 2009; Shiferaw, Hellin & Muricho 2011). Similarly, when 
investment in agricultural research leads to the production of new technologies, there 
must be a whole range of institutions and rural organisations such as FBOs to facilitate 
the delivery of such new technologies. It is therefore not surprising that the need for the 
establishment of FBOs has been finding its way into national development policy 
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 documents in many developing countries in recent times (Bernard et al. 2008;  Salifu, 
Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010; Salifu et al. 2012). 
 In the next section, I situate this approach of strengthening the collective capabilities of 
smallholder farmers in the broad literature of collective action to provide the theoretical 
and empirical foundations that inform this study.  
2.3 The theory of collective action 
As indicated in Chapter 1, understanding the extent to which smallholder farmers’ 
collective capabilities (e.g. FBOs) improve their productivity has been studied and 
interpreted through multiple but interrelated theoretical perspectives. These varied but 
closely linked theories include collective action, participatory development, social 
capital and transaction costs.  
In this study, I review these theoretical strands under the umbrella of ‘the theory of 
collective action’. Chapter 1 has already laid the foundation for how the theory of 
collective action is understood and approached in this study. In particular, it highlighted 
how this theory has been applied in studies on agricultural development, with a central 
theoretical assumption that collective action allows farmers to cooperate in institution 
building to improve their access to the inputs and outputs markets (Stockbridge, 
Dorward & Kydd 2003; Dorward et al. 2004; World Bank 2007). 
In the field of agriculture, the theory of collective action is intertwined with other 
theories, such that it is hard to make much progress in a study the employs collective 
action theory if one fails to conceptualise it in the proper context. In this study, the 
theory of collective action is used within the framework of the interrelated theories such 
as transaction costs, social capital and participatory development. It is therefore 
important to briefly explain these theories and how they are interrelated within the broad 
theory of collective action.  
First, it is important to note that collective action takes place either through structures 
(e.g. FBOs) or not (e.g. a spontaneous response in a village through a meeting). This 
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 study focuses on collective action in structures or organisations. It is much easier to 
notice collective action when it happens through organisations with clearly defined 
boundaries (Ostrom 1990). However, many rural organisations exist on paper only, and 
do not lead to collective action (Meinzen-Dick, DiGregorio & McCarthy 2004). In 
addition, in the field of agriculture, collective action in organisations takes many forms, 
including mobilisation of resources (e.g. new technologies, agrochemicals) and 
management of resources, such as irrigation schemes (Poteete & Ostrom 2004). This 
study largely understands collective action in the context of mobilisation of resources 
among smallholder farmers.  
In relation to social capital, it refers to the norms, institutions and networks that enable 
collective action to take place (North 1990b; Ostrom 1990).21 Social capital can take two 
main forms: cognitive and structural (Upton 2008). While smallholder farmers with 
cognitive social capital are more likely to engage in voluntary collective action to 
improve their livelihoods, structural social capital facilitates collective action through 
mobilisation (Upton 2008). For example, when structural social capital in FBOs is high, 
the members will have the confidence to invest in collective activities to address their 
common needs (Ostrom 1995; Uphoff & Wijararatna 2000; Upton 2008). Narayan & 
Pritchett (1999), in their analysis of the importance of social capital in Tanzania 
regarding FBOs, conclude that ‘greater associational activity may lead to less “imperfect 
information” and hence lower transaction costs and a greater range of market 
transactions in outputs, credit, land, and labour, leading to higher incomes’ (Narayan & 
Pritchett 1999, p. 873). In spite of the positive role of social capital in collective action, 
others have argued that that unbalanced investment or overinvestment in social capital 
can transform a potentially productive activity into a liability (Gabbay & Leenders 
1999).  
21 Social capital may also be described as the trust and solidarity that exist between people who work in 
groups and networks, and the use of reciprocity and exchange to build relationships in order to achieve 
collective and mutually beneficial outcomes (Upton 2008). 
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 Studies examining social capital in FBOs fall into two broad categories. The first 
focuses on the sites of the social interaction such as FBOs and their members’ 
characteristics. The second concerns the underlying conditions in which social capital 
ensures effectiveness in FBOs, such as rules, cultural norms and the policy environment. 
This study examines social capital in both categories to understand how it influences 
smallholder farmers’ access to goods and services. 
As noted already, the transaction cost theory is another theoretical strand that is 
embedded in collective action theory. It has been argued that the individual cost of 
transactions is minimised through collective action in organisations (Williamson & 
Masten 1995).22 It is argued that effective organisational governance brings out 
economies of scale, which result in a reduction in external transaction costs (North 
1990a; Markelova et al. 2009). To minimise their cost of delivering goods and services 
to smallholder farmers therefore, governments, NGOs and private-sector organisations 
prefer to work through FBOs (World Bank 2007), although FBOs may not necessarily 
serve the interests of their members, especially if they are externally driven. Similarly, 
through collective action smallholder farmers may reduce their transaction costs of 
acquiring goods and services. While minimising transaction costs through groups is a 
preferred development option, it is important to examine whether this approach always 
operates to the benefit of smallholder farmers who participate in FBOs.  
The last theoretical strand mentioned above is participatory development. It is a 
development approach founded on the principles of empowering the poor and 
disadvantaged to act collectively, as well as mobilising ordinary people and stakeholders 
to take ownership of policies and projects (Chambers 1983; Pretty 1995; Cooke & 
Kothari 2001).23 
22 Transaction costs are the observable and unobservable costs of market exchange at any given time 
(Williamson & Masten 1995). 
23 The Oxford English Dictionary defines participation as ‘to have a share in’ or ‘to take part in’, thereby 
emphasising the rights of individuals to take part in development initiatives. 
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 One can therefore identify two broad participatory approaches. First, it is a means of 
promoting efficiency, as people are more likely to agree with and support new 
development if they are involved in its design and implementation (Chambers 1983; 
Pretty 1995; Mansuri & Rao 2004). Second, it aims at mobilising people for collective 
action, empowerment and institution building (Pretty 1995; Dorward et al. 2004), which 
is the focus of this study.   
It is argued that the second approach to participatory development will build and 
strengthen the capacity of the poor for successful collective action (Chambers 1983; 
Pretty 1995). There is therefore a link between participatory development and capacity 
building of FBO members. However, if little effort is put into building the skills, 
capacity and interests of the people, they may have no stake in maintaining 
organisational structures and activities beyond the point at which external support ends 
(Pretty 1995; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Upton 2008). 
Participatory development also seeks to ensure efficiency and more cost-effective 
service delivery, as well as transparency and accountability among people (Dongier et 
al. 2002; Mansuri & Rao 2004). This approach to development holds that the failures of 
development initiatives in many developing countries can be explained by their top-
down approach, and thus emphasises the need for bottom-up approaches (Chambers 
1983; Escobar 1995; Scott 1998). However, Mansuri and Rao (2004) argue that when 
participatory approaches are public and open-ended regarding the target groups and the 
types of activity, they are likely to have a political character and may be shaped by local 
relations of power, authority and gender. In spite of these arguments, questions remain 
regarding the extent to which mobilising people for collective action in FBOs improves 
their members’ access to goods and services. 
The above review has shown that social capital enables collective action to take place as 
well as determining the quality of collective actions, and the fact that participatory 
development can empower is critical in galvanising the collective capabilities of 
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 smallholder farmers, which also has a great potential for minimising their transaction 
costs.  
The review has also shown that the theory of collective action is applicable to this study 
from at least three perspectives. The first relates to how we understand the conditions 
under which FBOs provide smallholder farmers with the confidence to invest in 
collective activities. The second relates to identifying the characteristics of FBOs, 
especially the extent to which they build and strengthen the capacity of smallholder 
farmers to engage in active collective activities. The final perspective has to do with 
showing the performance of FBOs and identifying the context in which they are likely to 
succeed, as well as the extent of their impact.  
In the section that follows, I now focus on FBOs and critically review their role in 
agricultural development in developing countries.  
2.4 The role of FBOs in agricultural development 
This section reviews the theoretical and empirical debates on the role of FBOs in 
smallholder agriculture in developing countries. This is necessary as improving the 
collective capabilities of smallholder farmers through FBOs has been highlighted 
strongly as a key strategy to improve smallholder agriculture (see Section 2.2). A review 
of the roles of FBOs in smallholder agriculture can be approached from at least two 
perspectives. The first relates to the kind of agricultural activity they undertake; that is, 
whether the FBOs and their members engage in agricultural production, agro-
processing, the marketing of agricultural produce, the provision or distribution of 
agricultural technologies, the financing of agricultural activities, or advocating for 
improved agricultural policies (Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003). The second 
approach concerns the functions of the FBOs; that is, whether they are performing 
economic functions, advocacy and policy formulation functions, local development 
functions, or coordination and information-sharing functions (Rondot & Collion 2001; 
Bosc et al. 2002). As this study aims at understanding the performance of FBOs in 
improving smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and credit, the 
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 review here adapts the second perspective and is conducted according to four major 
themes: 
– providing internal services to their members; 
– improving their members’ access to external services; 
– representing the interests of farmers in policymaking and implementation; and 
– providing services to the larger community. 
2.4.1 Providing internal services to their members 
FBOs and their members undertake a variety of internal activities, such as joint 
production, joint processing, joint marketing and joint purchase of farm inputs (Rondot 
& Collion 2001; Bosc et al. 2002; Narayan, Pritchett & Kapoor 2009; Salifu, 
Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010, Salifu et al. 2012). The underlying argument for such 
joint activities is to reduce transaction costs and improve productivity and the livelihood 
of their members (World Bank 2007; Bernard & Spielman 2009; Markelova et al. 2009).  
The role of FBOs in improving the marketing of their members produce, for example, 
has received some research attention (Shiferaw, Obare & Muricho 2006; Roy & Thorat 
2008; Markelova et al. 2009; Shiferaw et al. 2009; Moustier et al. 2010; Fischer & Qaim 
2011). Research has shown that FBOs can help their members to achieve competiveness, 
improve their market power and enhance their ability to negotiate for better prices in the 
market (Shiferaw, Obare & Muricho 2006; Roy & Thorat 2008; Fischer & Qaim 2011). 
For example, using data from a survey of 183 farmers in India, Roy and Thorat (2008) 
have shown that smallholder farmers who cultivated grape and belonged to FBOs 
reduced their transaction costs as well as improving their bargaining position for good 
prices, compared to smallholder farmers who were not members of FBOs. In Kenya, 
Fischer and Qaim (2011) also found that marketing through banana FBOs yielded a 
higher price than selling individually. In Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia Okello et al. 
(2007) observed that green bean growers who belonged to FBOs were able to enter 
markets in Europe with their produce for competitive prices.  
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 In addition, FBOs provide their members opportunities for income generation through 
joint production and processing (World Bank 2007); such income is sometimes offered 
to their members as loans for investment (Bosc et al. 2002; Salifu, Francesconi & 
Kolavalli 2010, Salifu et al. 2012). Furthermore, by working collectively in FBOs, 
smallholder farmers are likely to improve the quantity of inputs they use on their farms 
(Kirsten, Karaan & Dorward 2009). This is because when smallholder farmers purchase 
inputs in bulk, it reduces their transaction costs and as a result they benefit from 
economies of scale (Kirsten, Karaan & Dorward 2009; Shiferaw, Hellin & Muricho 
2011). Indeed, some FBOs are established solely to provide inputs such as seeds and 
fertiliser more cheaply to their members (Shiferaw, Obare & Muricho 2006).  
The role of FBOs in helping smallholder farmers to deal with peak labour demands is 
also highlighted in the literature (Bratton 1986a; Rondot & Collion 2001; Salifu, 
Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010; Salifu et al. 2012). For example, in Ghana, Salifu et al. 
(2012) note that FBO members pool labour to weed on every member’s farm in turns, as 
a way of dealing with labour demands. Similarly, a recent World Bank study involving 
15 developing countries suggests that FBOs also engage in the provision of social and 
welfare services for their members (Narayan, Pritchett & Kapoor 2009). In line with 
this, Tsekpo (2008) and Salifu et al. (2012) find in Ghana that several FBOs assist their 
members with monetary contributions in the event of funerals, weddings and ill-health.  
2.4.2 Improving their members’ access to external services 
FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to external services in two broad ways. First, 
it is believed that organised groups of smallholder farmers are likely to have greater 
credibility in seeking external support such as financial services and extension services 
than individual smallholder farmers (Penrose-Buckley 2007). When smallholder farmers 
participate in FBOs, it makes it much easier for service providers to recognise and work 
with them (Penrose-Buckley 2007). Thus FBOs are in a position to link smallholder 
farmers to service providers at the local, district, regional, national and global levels, to 
acquire or demand services (Bosc et al. 2002; Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003; 
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 World Bank 2007). In Mozambique, for example, Penrose-Buckley (2007) reports that 
smallholder farmers were able to access input and extension services from exporters 
only when they participated in FBOs. 
Second, many governments, donors, NGOs and private-sector organisations today use 
FBOs to provide a wide range of services to smallholder farmers, to lower the cost of 
providing such services. Here, one of the key arguments is that the high costs of service 
delivery to smallholder farmers limit the supply of and their access to inputs, credit and 
extension services, which are critical in improving their productivity (Chang 2012). 
Thus, smallholder farmers need to be organised into FBOs to reduce cost and achieve 
economies of scale in service delivery (Chirwa et al. 2005; Dorward et al. 2009). Those 
who are in favour of the ‘minimising the cost of services delivery’ argument appear to 
neglect the fact that, while FBOs may reduce the transaction costs of service providers, 
all kinds of new costs are created within FBOs, which their members must bear. For 
example, when a government or NGO delivers fertiliser to an FBO on credit, the leaders 
of the FBO must distribute the fertiliser and collect the money to pay the government or 
NGO. These internal arrangements undoubtedly involve cost that can have dire 
consequences, especially if there are delays in distributing the fertiliser to members and 
collecting the money for the government or NGO.  
In addition to the minimising of cost of service delivery, donors and NGOs sometimes 
prefer to deal with farmers directly through FBOs, particularly if they feel there is 
institutional failure in the public or private sector (Rondot & Collion 2001). In Kenya, 
two NGOs, Africa Harvest and TechnoServe, have helped banana farmers to establish 
self-sustaining FBOs to facilitate their access to clean planting material, technical 
extension and outputs markets (Fischer & Qaim 2011). 
In the same way, external development agents such as donors and NGOs also prefer to 
provide credit to smallholder farmers who participate in FBOs as a mechanism to 
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 improve credit recovery through peer pressure (Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003; 
Gulati et al. 2007; World Bank 2007).  
Similarly, some buyers of the produce of smallholder farmers prefer FBOs to individual 
farmers because FBOs are better able to provide reliable volumes and stable supplies of 
quality products (Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003; Gulati et al. 2007; Vorley et al. 
2007; Shiferaw, Hellin & Muricho 2011). It is therefore reasonable that FBOs are 
becoming a dominant force in linking smallholder farmers to outputs market, especially 
farmers who produce high-value crops, such as cash crops (see Section 2.4.1).  
However, because of the preference of governments, donors, NGOs and the private 
sector to support smallholder farmers through FBOs, participation in FBOs has now 
become the most important channel through which smallholder farmers can receive 
support (Tinsley 2004). Yet, when FBOs remain the only vehicle to deliver support to 
smallholder farmers, the tendency to concentrate support on a small group of 
smallholder farmers is very strong, especially if FBOs are not widespread in the area and 
do not have the ability to pass on the support to other smallholder farmers. Indeed, 
studies conducted in some developing countries have shown a wide range of disparities 
between smallholder farmers who participate in FBOs and those who do not. For 
example, in India, Matuschke and Qaim (2009) find a positive relationship between 
FBOs and the adoption of hybrid wheat. In Kenya, Fischer and Qaim (2011), in a study 
of banana farmers, found that farmers who were members of FBOs had expanded their 
plantations significantly more than non-members, which they largely attributed to 
improved access to technical extension information, clean planting material and other 
incentives offered through the FBOs. In spite of these studies, questions remain as to 
what extent the benefits of FBOs extend beyond their members, particularly in relation 
to inputs, extension services and credit.  
2.4.3 Representing the interests of farmers in policymaking and implementation 
FBOs also contribute to policy formulation and decision-making (Hussein 2001; World 
Bank 2007). Their role here takes three broad forms. First, FBOs and their members, 
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 particularly those at the national and regional levels, sometimes come up with proposals 
to contribute to agricultural and other related policies (World Bank 2007; Markelova et 
al. 2009). For example, in Central America, a comparative study of three contrasting 
farm sectors in Costa Rica (coffee, milk and black beans), involving representatives of 
21 FBOs, eight representatives of public authorities and ten private-sector firms, found 
that FBOs played a key role in influencing policy decisions that resulted in better access 
to agricultural markets (D’Hôtel & Bosc 2011). Second, FBOs are sometimes directly 
involved in the implementation of policies in the agricultural sector (World Bank 2007, 
p. 23).  
Finally, FBOs give political voice to smallholder farmers ‘to hold policymakers and 
implementing agencies accountable’, such as participating in monitoring the budget 
(World Bank 2007, p. 23). The World Bank’s 2008 Report on agriculture, however, 
noted that FBOs can only participate in high-level negotiations if they have the right 
technical and communication skills (World Bank 2007). The report suggested the need 
for FBOs to be equipped with communication skills, seek professional advice and recruit 
expertise to prepare their inputs into the policy dialogue (World Bank 2007). 
2.4.4 Providing services to the larger community 
Sometimes FBOs work in partnership with NGOs and government programs to improve 
rural infrastructure and livelihoods, such as building dams, health centres and schools 
(Rondot & Collion 2001; World Bank 2007). It has also been argued that FBOs have the 
potential to introduce more democratic forms of decision-making and self-governance, 
issues that are becoming increasingly important for development in rural communities 
(Rouse 2006). Because decisions in FBOs are governed by democratic principles, it is 
believed that when smallholder farmers participate in FBOs, it helps to strengthen local 
democracy. 
2.4.5 Summary 
The following key points have emerged from the above review. First, FBOs provide 
services to both their members and non-members, although services to non-members 
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 appear limited. Second, while governments, donors and NGOs use FBOs to deliver 
services to smallholder farmers, FBOs also demand a wide range of services from them. 
Third, they contribute to policy formulation and implementation.  
In addition, the review largely suggests that once FBOs are established, they have a 
positive impact on their members and the wellbeing of other smallholder farmers, but 
this is not always the case in the context of many developing countries. In the next 
section, therefore, I present the conditions that shape the performance of FBOs. As the 
review will show, studies have shown the conditions under which FBOs have improved 
or failed to improve the socio-economic conditions of their members and other 
smallholder farmers. 
2.5 Factors that influence rural collective action in FBOs 
There is little agreement as to why some FBOs are successful and improve the wellbeing 
of smallholder farmers while others remain unsuccessful. The literature remains 
inconclusive about the conditions required for effective collective action in FBOs. 
Debates about the factors that influence the effectiveness of collective action in FBOs 
have focused largely on the following:  
– the purpose and how FBOs are formed;  
– governance and the managerial capacities of FBOs; 
– the membership characteristics of FBOs; and 
– the interactions of FBOs with their external environment.  
2.5.1 The purpose and how FBOs are formed  
The success or effectiveness of FBOs first depends on who forms them and why they are 
formed. Research has shown that FBOs initiated and formed by smallholder farmers 
themselves tend to perform much better than those initiated by external organisations 
(Uphoff 1991; World Bank 2007). As Hussi, Lindberg and Brennernan (1993) argues, 
FBOs will be effective in their collective activities if there is a felt need for association 
such that FBOs have a business potential and make economic sense to the members.  
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 The formation of FBOs at the initiative of outsiders, especially if they are used mainly to 
deliver goods and services to smallholder farmers, has generally been proven to be an 
unsustainable way of developing FBOs in rural communities (Hussi, Lindberg & 
Brennernan 1993). This is because when FBOs rely solely on external organisations to 
act collectively, they are more likely to cease operations once the flow of resources by 
the external organisation is discontinued (Uphoff 1991). If FBOs cannot live beyond 
external support, it would not be out of place to describe them as organisations formed 
to serve the interests of external organisations and not those of smallholder farmers. This 
line of thinking corroborates Shiferaw, Hellin and Muricho (2011) when they note that 
many FBOs in Africa suffer from inadequate operational resources because of the 
withdrawal of external support.  
2.5.2 Governance and the managerial capacities of FBOs 
The organisational arrangements that relate to structures or rules, and also leadership, 
constitute key determinants of the outcome of collective action in FBOs (Wanyama et 
al. 2014). Rules, which North (1990b) refers to as “institutions”, are necessary for any 
effective collective action to take place in an organisation. In FBOs, one can identify 
two interrelated set of rules. The first set of rules relates to how the FBO is formed and 
functions, while the second set of rules ensures that there is commitment on the part of 
all members to abide by the rules regarding the functioning of the FBO (Ostrom 1990; 
Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003).  
The first set of rules includes how to become a member, how to undertake collective 
activities, how benefits are shared and how to exit (Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003; 
World Bank 2007). These rules shape the expectations of FBO members about the 
overall viability and gains they will get from a collective activity (Shiferaw, Hellin & 
Muricho 2011). The second set of rules relate to how members should conduct 
themselves as well as penalties for non-compliance (Ostrom 1990; Stockbridge, 
Dorward & Kydd 2003). Irrespective of either of the two sets of rules, many studies 
have suggested that rules crafted by members of local organisations themselves are 
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 better understood and adapted more easily than those imposed by external organisations 
(Ostrom 1990, 1995). For example, in her extensive research on common-pool resources 
such as irrigation systems, fisheries and forestry, Ostrom argues that local people have 
better information about the subtle nuances of their environment than do outsiders, 
which is why they are often best placed to ensure congruence between rules and local 
conditions (Ostrom 1990, 1995).  
While FBOs are likely to accept rules emanating from outsiders for their immediate 
benefit (e.g. accessing credit or fertiliser), enforcing rules that are alien to them would be 
challenging. FBOs and their members may be successful in enforcing the outsiders’ 
rules as long there is a continuous flow of support, but once that support ends, they are 
likely to reject them. Rules originating from FBO members themselves that are easy to 
understand are more likely to be adopted and followed (Wanyama et al. 2014). Without 
good rules and enforcement, FBOs are likely to perform poorly. As field research 
confirms, the temptation for group members not to cooperate and free-ride is high when 
rule enforcement is weak (Ostrom 2000). 
In addition to rules, the leadership of FBOs plays a key role in determining their 
performance. The preferred style of leadership often introduced in many FBOs in 
developing countries is one that adheres to democratic principles (Stockbridge, Dorward 
& Kydd 2003; World Bank 2007).24 As expected, democratic styles of governance will 
not always be in congruence with the traditional leadership style in rural communities of 
developing countries. Thus, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) argue that in the management of 
FBOs in rural communities, there should be a balance between traditional leadership and 
modern leadership styles. Handy (1999) also advocates a “best-fit” approach to 
leadership style in organisations, in which leaders adopt a style that accords both with 
the style preferences of those they lead and with the nature of the activity being led. 
24 Other forms of leadership styles include hierarchical, relatively autocratic or structured. 
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 Notwithstanding the different forms of leadership styles, leaders of FBOs should provide 
technical expertise, drive and managerial skills (World Bank 2007). They should be 
trusted, able to motivate their members and have necessary skills for the collective 
enterprise, as well as able to engage with outsiders (Markelova et al. 2009).  
One can categorise the roles of leaders in FBOs into two broad activities. The first 
involves interactions between leaders and members of the FBO, to achieve desired 
outcomes. Here, if leaders are not motivated and fail to interact effectively with their 
members, it will be difficult to achieve the desired outcomes of the FBO. As Day and 
Schyns (2010) note, high-quality exchanges, relationships and agreements between the 
leaders and their members are crucial to achieving set organisational outcomes. Second, 
the leaders should be able to interact with outsiders such as government agencies, donors 
and NGOs. This is important because weak leaders will find it difficult to interact with 
the external environment. Yet, government, donors and NGOs wishing to improve the 
socio-economic conditions of farmers by implementing projects and programs through 
FBOs fail to recognise that these farmers lack the leadership skills and experience to 
work collectively and interact with their external environment (Stockbridge, Dorward & 
Kydd 2003). 
The capacity of an FBO to pursue highly beneficial activities may therefore be impaired 
if the majority of its leaders are inexperienced, with little or no skill (Bernard et al. 
2008). In SSA, case studies have shown that weak leadership has had adverse effects on 
the performance of FBOs (see, e.g., Bernard et al. 2008). In their study of the role of 
village organisations such as FBOs in rural development in Burkina Faso and Senegal, 
Bernard et al. (2008) observe that village organisations have weak managerial capacity 
because their leaders largely comprise village elders and chiefs, and the majority of them 
do not have basic formal education. A recent study in Tanzania also suggests that the 
level of formal education for both FBO leaders and members of FBOs influences their 
performance (Barham & Chitemi 2009). They found that FBOs whose leaders and 
members had more years of schooling were more likely to improve their market 
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 situation than those with fewer years of schooling (Barham & Chitemi 2009). 
Nonetheless, FBO leaders with no or little formal education can still perform better if 
they receive adequate training in the initial stages of the establishment of the FBO 
(Poulton, Dorward & Kydd 2010).  
Similarly, Chirwa et al. (2005) argue that leaders’ misappropriation of funds, corruption 
and lack of accountability to members continue to undermine the performance of FBOs 
in SSA. This is particularly the case in FBOs whose members entrust leaders with 
considerable power to make decisions on their behalf (Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 
2003).  
In spite of the above, there is still much to learn about the effectiveness of leadership in 
FBOs; in particular, we need to deepen our understanding about the conditions under 
which effective leadership will evolve.  
2.5.3 The membership characteristics of FBOs 
The major theoretical and empirical arguments about how the characteristics of FBOs 
influence their performance focus on two issues (see, e.g., Barham & Chitemi 2009; 
Markelova et al. 2009):  
– the membership size of the group; and 
– the composition of the members, often referred to as the heterogeneity of the 
group. 
The group size argument 
The group size argument became popular in the collective action literature after Olson 
(1965, p. 2) argued that, ‘unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or 
unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their 
common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interests’. It is widely accepted that the cost of coordinating collective 
action increases with an increase in the size of the group (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990, 
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 2000; Coulter et al. 1999; Markelova et al. 2009; Wanyama et al. 2014). The main 
conclusion is that small groups are more successful in collective action than large groups 
because they find it easier to organise for collective action than large groups (Coulter et 
al. 1999; Wanyama et al. 2014). In other words, researchers argue that homogeneity of 
FBO members is necessary for effective collective action, and it is presumed that FBOs 
with a small membership will have more homogenous members.  
Ostrom (1990, 2000) in particular, in her extensive work on irrigation schemes, fisheries 
and forests, has shown that collective action will be more effective if the group is small, 
homogeneous in membership, exists for a long period and the members have associated 
with each other for a longer period. It has also been argued that, with small groups, the 
transaction costs of organising members are not only lower but also there is less 
temptation for some members to ‘free-ride’ on the group’s efforts (Stockbridge, 
Dorward & Kydd 2003): larger group sizes may increase coordination costs and create 
management inefficiencies (Wanyama et al. 2014). The enforcement of rules is also 
often easier in small groups than large ones because small groups have higher internal 
cohesion, as it is easier to know and monitor all of the members (Coulter et al. 1999). 
In spite of the apparent consensus among researchers about the relationship between the 
size of a group and its performance, they have failed to agree what constitutes a small 
group. When scholars have debated the importance of group size in the performance of 
FBOs, they have often failed to indicate the numerical ranges of small groups. For 
example, is a group of about 50 members small or large? If 100 members is considered a 
large group, what about a group with 1,000 members? Nevertheless, evidence 
concerning successful collective action in agricultural marketing suggests that a group 
size of 20–40 members is most suitable for effective collective action (Wanyama et al. 
2014). 
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 The heterogeneity argument 
FBO members may also differ along a diversity of dimensions, including their 
sociocultural background (e.g. ethnicity, values or norms), endowments (e.g. economic 
inequality in income or assets), interests, knowledge, skills and locations. This diversity 
is often referred to as heterogeneity (Ostrom & Varughese 2001; Meinzen-Dick et al. 
2002; Barham & Chitemi 2009; Markelova et al. 2009; Wanyama et al. 2014). Similar 
to membership size, there is ongoing debate about the heterogeneity of members in 
FBOs and their performance (see, e.g., Ostrom & Varughese 2001).  
For instance, mixed evidence exists as to whether heterogeneity in ethnicity or family 
relations, wealth, age and the location of FBO members influence the outcome of 
collective action. In a study of four irrigation systems in India, for example, Meinzen-
Dick and colleagues observe that social heterogeneity makes communication, 
cooperation and the enforcement of rules more difficult (Meinzen-Dick, Raju & Gulati 
2002). They observed that the enforcement of rules is easier for organisations whose 
membership comes from the same neighbourhood or other social sphere (Meinzen-Dick, 
Raju & Gulati 2002). In sharp contrast with this observation by Meinzen-Dick et al. 
(2002), a study on small-scale agriculture in Chile found that close social relations 
prevented FBO members from enforcing rules for fear of alienating friends and 
neighbours (Berdegué 2002). Similarly, in their study of 18 forest-user groups in Nepal, 
Ostrom and Varughese (2001) show that heterogeneity is not a strong predictor of the 
level of collective activity. Rather, they argue that heterogeneity is a challenge that can 
be overcome by good institutional design, such as investing time and effort to craft 
better rules about the collective action involved (Ostrom & Varughese 2001). They 
further argue that groups that have wealthier members and members who have strong 
ties with outsiders are important in stimulating and supporting collective action (Ostrom 
& Varughese 2001).  
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 2.5.4 The interactions of FBOs with their external environment  
The external environment also influences the outcome of collective action in FBOs. 
Here, the external environment includes the legislative framework within which FBOs 
operate as well as major stakeholders such as governments, donors, NGOs and private-
sector organisations.  
In relation to the legislative framework, it has been argued that developing countries 
should have legislations that enable FBOs to function as business enterprises (Hussi, 
Lindberg & Brennernan 1993; Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003). Legislative 
frameworks that encourage FBOs to function as business-oriented enterprises and limit 
the role of governments mainly to the provision of the enabling policy environments are 
considered useful for the success of FBOs (Hussi, Lindberg & Brennernan 1993; Pretty 
1995; Pretty & Ward 2001; Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003). Research has shown 
that the performance of FBOs is hindered when existing legislation ties FBOs to the 
centralised government and makes them into government institutions rather than 
independent enterprises (Onumah et al. 2007). In addition, the effectiveness of FBOs is 
frequently constrained when governments, donors, NGOs and private-sector 
organisations fail to recognise FBOs as full partners in smallholder agriculture 
development, but only as channels through which they deliver services to smallholder 
farmers (World Bank 2007). 
A similar factor that has recently received some attention in the literature is the 
politicisation of FBOs and their members (see, e.g., Birner & Resnick 2010). The 
outcome of collective action in FBOs is affected if political leaders support smallholder 
farmers who are participating in them in exchange for votes during elections (Birner & 
Resnick 2010; World Bank 2010). Here, it is argued that governments and political 
leaders should focus on providing an enabling environment for FBOs through an 
effective legislative framework rather than politicising the activities of the FBOs (Pretty 
1995; Pretty & Ward 2001).  
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 2.5.5 Summary 
The review has shown that unresolved theoretical and empirical issues still exist about 
the definite set of conditions that improve the outcome of collective action among 
smallholder farmers in developing countries. In particular, debates about the definite set 
of conditions that improve the outcome of collective action in FBOs have not been 
addressed adequately. Issues such as the managerial and governance capacities, the 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of members and the membership size still require research 
attention.  
The remainder of this thesis develops and applies the theory discussed here to address 
the research questions of this study, set out in Chapter 1. However, before embarking on 
this effort, it is necessary to develop a conceptual framework to guide the analysis in this 
study. The framework draws on theoretical debates and agreements regarding the role of 
FBOs in improving smallholder agriculture, the challenges associated with their 
establishment and the operations of FBOs, as well as the conditions under which 
collective action in FBOs is effective.  
2.6 A conceptual framework for understanding collective action among 
smallholder farmers 
This section sets out a conceptual framework for understanding collective action in 
FBOs among smallholder farmers. As much as it is necessary to conceptualise collective 
action in a study that utilises the theory of collective action, it is also important to 
develop an analytical conceptual framework for studying collective action. The 
framework discussed here identifies key elements that one needs to consider when 
analysing the role of FBOs in improving smallholder farmers’ access to agricultural 
goods and services, such as extension services, inputs and credit. It thus provides an 
analytical context in which to understand the performance of FBOs.  
As shown in Figure 2.1, the framework has four main elements: the environment (oval 
A), FBOs and their attributes (oval B), key actors and their attributes (oval C) and 
outcomes (oval D). The logic of this framework is that one has to consider the 
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 environmental factors (oval A) that influence how FBOs are organised, structured and 
supported, as well as how they function and perform (ovals B and C). The framework 
recognises that the environment (oval A) influences how key actors such government 
agencies, donors, NGOs and the private sector interact with FBOs (oval C). The 
interaction of FBOs (oval B) and the key actors (oval C) lead to outcomes, which then 
feed back to the environment (oval A). I shall now describe the elements in the 
framework in more detail, as follows.  
 
Figure 2.1. A conceptual framework for understanding collective action in FBOs  
Source: Adapted from Kirsten, Karaan and Dorward (2009)  
2.6.1 The environment 
The environment in this framework includes a set of exogenous factors or variables that 
influence the structure, behaviour and performance of FBOs and the key actors. The key 
set of variables that constitute the environment include the governance and legislative 
framework, socio-economic factors and the available physical resources.  
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 Here, the governance and legislative framework variable concerns the strategy as well as 
the legal ground rules that establish the basis for FBOs and their operations. In other 
words, it refers to the kind of strategies available for the development of FBOs as well as 
the legal framework within which those strategies operate. In this regard, the 
performance of FBOs will depend on whether the state or the private sector is 
spearheading the development of strategies and legislations to guide and regulate the 
activities of FBOs in a country. For example, if the state is at the forefront of the 
development of policies, a political change may lead to a change in policy intervention, 
which will also affect the performance of FBOs and the key actors.  
In relation to the socio-economic variable under this element, I am referring to factors 
such as traditions, customs and the cultural and economic underpinnings of societies. 
Differences in culture, traditions and customary practices may affect the nature, scope 
and outcomes of collective among smallholder farmers. We need to recognise that 
culture, traditions and customs shape the values and behaviour of people (Kirsten, 
Karaan & Dorward 2009). This is more important given that people in developing 
countries and smallholder communities tend to hold their beliefs and habits deeply and 
outsiders sometimes find it difficult to change them (Kirsten, Karaan & Dorward 2009). 
Thus, when smallholder communities have a high level of social capital (which can take 
the form of strong social networks, trust and sharing of norms), the outcome of 
collective action in FBOs is likely to be high. Similarly, the macroeconomic and market 
conditions of the environment not only influence the set of variables present in oval A, 
but also affect ovals B and C of the framework.  
Physical/natural factors constitute the last set of variables under the environment 
element. The availability of physical resources such as roads, farm inputs, credit, land 
and irrigation are also critical for agricultural development and therefore the 
performance of FBOs. The governance strategies and the socio-economic environment 
provide the settings for the physical resources to express themselves. For instance, there 
must be governance strategies in place that encourage investment in resources such as 
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 roads, irrigation and improved technologies. A common form of state intervention in 
recent years is subsidies on prices of key inputs such as fertiliser and seeds (Banful 
2011; Benin et al. 2013). In addition, unintended effects of the environment, such as 
degradation of natural resources and climate change, will affect the behaviour of the 
variables in ovals A and B.  
In sum, the wider environment, which is considered in three parts – the governance and 
legislative framework, socio-economic factors and physical/natural factors – affects the 
behaviour and performance of FBOs and the key actors that directly interact with FBOs. 
The success of FBOs will therefore depend on their ability to deal with a sometimes 
unfavourable external environment.  
2.6.2 FBOs and their attributes 
One of the elements that constitute the heart of the framework is ‘FBOs and their 
attributes’ (oval B). This element has the following key endogenous variables: rules and 
leadership in FBOs, the types and extent of the activities of FBOs, and the level of 
coordination and resources in FBOs.  
First, the existence of rules and the form they take are critical for the performance of 
FBOs. Rules on how to become a member or leader and how to exit, as well as those 
that determine the costs and benefits associated with particular actions and outcomes, 
influence collective action in FBOs. There must be a mechanism to ensure the 
enforcement of rules such as motivations or incentives. As the review in this chapter 
showed, the ways in which rules are designed influence the performance of FBOs. The 
framework also takes into consideration the leadership capacity of FBOs. The skills and 
experience of leaders are important variables that determine the kind of activities FBOs 
undertake. For example, for FBOs to demand extension services, they need leaders with 
management skills and knowledge of procedures, such as the ability to interact with 
extension workers and other stakeholders. The leaders should also be able to deal with 
heterogeneous members and resolve conflicts among them.  
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 Second, in FBOs, the existence of rules and effective leadership alone is not enough for 
positive collective action; FBOs also need resources to execute their functions. In 
particular, the financial resources that are available to FBOs are particularly important in 
boosting their capacity. FBOs that are able to generate internal income through 
contributions or collective activities, for example, are more likely to function well.  
Similarly, effective coordination is very critical in FBOs. If FBOs have a high level of 
coordination in collective activities, they are likely to have positive outcomes in their 
collective efforts. Coordination in this sense is a process of encouraging FBO members 
to take common actions necessary to achieve their individual goals. Analysis should 
therefore consider how FBOs search for goods and services as well as negotiate for and 
monitor their use in the interests of all their members. 
Finally, and related to the above, is the types of collective activities that FBOs 
undertake. The type and complexity of collective activities should influence the 
performance of the FBOs. The collective capacities of FBOs and the extent to which 
members participate in collective activities are also important factors. In summary, 
internal factors in FBOs, such as rules, responsive management approaches and the 
availability of resources, are all important factors that influence the collective outcomes. 
2.6.3 Key actors and their attributes 
The set of variables in this element (oval C) are largely exogenous to FBOs’ 
performance. As Figure 2.1 shows, one cannot examine the performance of FBOs in 
isolation: their interaction with key players such as government agencies, NGOs and 
private-sector organisations (oval C) is important. These key actors, together with the 
FBOs, constitute the heart of the conceptual framework. The capacity of the key players 
involved in supporting or working with FBOs is an important factor. If the capacity of 
government and its agencies is relatively high in terms of staff, resources and skills, 
FBOs that rely on them are likely to perform well. For example, the proportion of the 
agriculture budget that a government would spend on staff resources and skills targeted 
at smallholder farmers and the development of FBOs will influence the performance of 
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 those FBOs. Likewise, NGOs and private-sector organisations with the capacity to build 
the collective capabilities of FBOs, and not just considering FBOs as channels through 
which to implement their programs, are likely to improve the performance of FBOs.  
The capacity of these key players in turn influences the type and magnitude of support 
that they provide to FBOs. Support to FBOs comes in a variety of forms, including 
credit, subsidised inputs, grants, training in new agricultural practices and training in 
FBO governance and management. Regardless of the type of support, its magnitude, 
consistency and delivery mechanism are crucial for a positive outcome in an FBO. For 
instance, performance in FBOs may vary depending on whether support is provided to 
the FBO as whole or to individual members within the FBO. The performance in FBOs 
is also likely to be influenced by the support timeframe; that is, whether it is a short or a 
long period. 
Consequently, the ways in which the key actors deliver and coordinate support to FBOs 
is central. Their performance will be influenced by whether delivery and coordination of 
that support is based on participatory approaches – that is, the involvement of FBO 
members in planning and solving their problems (bottom-up) – or top-down; and 
whether they are interested in improving the wellbeing of smallholder farmers (farmer-
centred) or simply interested in meeting their project objectives (project-centred). There 
should be range of tools to harmonise the way in which government, NGOs and private-
sector organisations work to support FBOs. Similarly, the ability of these key players to 
facilitate support for FBOs, including planning, monitoring and evaluation of their 
activities, is central in their performance. 
2.6.4 Outcome 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the interactions among the environment, the FBOs and the key 
actors will lead to outcomes in FBOs and perhaps smallholder farmers. These outcomes 
may include improved access to extension services, inputs, credit and change in farming 
practices, as well as access to improved markets. A major criterion for assessing the 
performance of FBOs will be their collective action outcomes (oval D). However, 
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 measuring collective outcomes in FBOs may be challenging for researchers. An 
alternative approach will be to measure the benefits to individual FBO members. 
Nonetheless, studies seeking to understand the role, performance and impact of FBOs 
would also need to undertake data collection at the FBO level.  
As Figure 2.1 shows, there is a feedback link to the environment. Collective action 
outcomes in FBOs may therefore reinforce or lead to changes in the environment as well 
as in FBOs and their key actors.  
2.6.5 Summary 
The conceptual framework presented here provides the key concepts and variables that 
are crucial for analysing the performance of FBOs. The framework shows that one needs 
to recognise that the efficiency and effectiveness of FBOs will vary based on the kind of 
interactions they have with the environment on the one hand, and the key actors 
(government, NGOs and private-sector organisations) that deal directly with them on the 
other. Studies seeking to understand the performance of FBOs in developing countries 
may therefore find it necessary to collect information on the interaction among the four 
main elements (ovals A, B, C and D) discussed in Figure 2.1.  
The framework presented may be used for analysis that goes beyond understanding the 
performance of FBOs, to include understanding the performance of key stakeholders in 
the development of FBOs in developing countries, as well as identifying reform options 
for the development of FBOs. This is because the framework specifies set of exogenous 
and endogenous factors that information may have to be collected to understand the 
performance of FBOs.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has first reviewed the theoretical and empirical debates about the 
development of smallholder agriculture in developing countries, with a focus on the role 
that rural collective action in FBOs plays in this process. It has also outlined collective 
action theoretical approach as the main perspective through which this study is 
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 conducted. This review has demonstrated how the theory of collective action, which 
underscores the diversity of conditions under which people organise to satisfy their 
economic and social interests, is applicable in this study. The chapter argues that the 
theory of collective action is applicable in this research, as the study focuses on the 
extent to which FBOs build and strengthen the capacity of smallholder farmers to 
engage in active collective activities. 
Next, the review has outlined the variety of roles that FBOs play in improving 
smallholder agriculture, including facilitating smallholder farmers’ access to inputs, 
extension services, credit, policy formulation and implementation. In this respect, the 
review has shown the conditions under which FBOs improve or fail to improve the 
socio-economic conditions of their members and smallholder farmers. A key point that 
emerges from such a review is that unresolved theoretical and empirical issues exist 
about the definite set of conditions that improve the outcome of collective action among 
smallholder farmers in developing countries. Among other things, researchers have not 
successfully addressed the extent to which the management and governance capacities, 
heterogeneity and group size of FBOs affect their performance in providing services to 
their members and other smallholder farmers. The review therefore further suggests a 
need for more research to deepen our understanding of the performance of FBOs and the 
set of conditions necessary for FBOs to thrive and improve smallholder agriculture in 
developing countries.  
Finally, the chapter has developed a conceptual framework to guide the study’s main 
aim of exploring the extent to which FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to 
extension services, inputs and credit. The framework has identified key variables that are 
important for analysing the performance of FBOs. In particular, it recognised that the 
efficiency and effectiveness of FBOs depends on their interactions with their external 
environment, on the one hand, and the key actors (government, NGOs and private-sector 
organisations) that deal directly with them on the other.  
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 The next chapter outlines the methodology and methods employed to answer the 
research questions in this study. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapters 1 and 2 set out the research problem, aim and questions as well as the 
theoretical framework through which this study is undertaken. This chapter outlines the 
research methodology and methods employed to address the research aim and questions. 
The choice of methodology is often driven by a researcher’s epistemological and 
theoretical framework, as well as the nature of the research questions (Hall 2003; 
Bryman 2008). As this study aims to understand the outcomes of collective action 
among smallholder farmers – examining, in particular, the question of whether, and to 
what extent, FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to agricultural services – the 
survey research methodology is employed. One of the key features of the survey 
research methodology is its ability to measure the relationship between variables and test 
theory. This methodology was applicable for this research as it largely sought to 
measure the performance of FBOs. As Silverman and Marvasti (2008) argue, in 
choosing a research methodology, the emphasis should be on what we are trying to find 
out.  
It is also important to note that this research went beyond measuring the performance of 
FBOs in relation to smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and credit 
to also understanding the factors that account for the performance of FBOs. While the 
survey research methodology is often used interchangeably with surveys/questionnaires, 
it is important to note that this methodology also has the ability to accommodate other 
data collection methods (e.g. interviews) that enable researchers to find answers to ‘why 
questions’. Thus, a researcher using a survey research methodology can design the 
research to accommodate a variety of methods for data collection (e.g. a questionnaire 
and interviews) to be able to answer ‘what’ and ‘why’ questions in the research.  
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 The reminder of the chapter is structured in four main sections. First, it introduces the 
research design, which provides the structure, principles and logic of the survey research 
methodology in relation to the research questions. The second section outlines the 
sampling procedure adopted to select the study participants. In the third section, the 
chapter examines the methods used for data collection. The final section then discusses 
the methods used to analyse the data.  
3.2 The research design 
Many scholars have identified a variety of research designs, including experimental, 
case study, comparative, longitudinal and cross-sectional designs (Vaus 2001; Bryman 
& Teevan 2005; Bryman 2008, 2012).25 While there is no standardised format in each of 
these research designs, the choice of a particular design is influenced by whether the 
research seeks to understand causal connections between variables, understand 
behaviour and meaning making, or wants to generalise from a study sample, as well as 
the time available to conduct the research (Bryman 2012). In other words, the choice of 
a research design depends on how the researcher understands social reality as well as the 
philosophical position of the researcher regarding the production of knowledge in 
relation to the research questions (Limb & Dwyer 2001). Thus, it is important to note 
that researchers employing the same research methodology may have different research 
designs.  
Among the different research designs mentioned above, the cross-sectional design is 
perhaps the most popular in the social sciences, partly because it enables researchers to 
collect data from a sample at a particular point in time, thereby enabling researchers to 
obtain results quickly (Vaus 2001; Jupp 2006). For instance, unlike experimental and 
longitudinal designs that often require researchers to wait for various interventions 
before data collection and analysis, cross-sectional designs do not entail repeated data 
collection, tracking respondents or experimental interventions over a long period (Vaus 
2001; Jupp 2006).  
25 For a detailed explanation of the different types research designs, see Bryman (2012). 
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 This research employed the cross-sectional design not because of its popularity, but 
because it ensures the collection of data at a given point in time and enables systematic 
comparisons between cases, or groups of cases (Vaus 2001; Jupp 2006). In addition, 
governing the choice was the need for a design that allows the use of both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches to data collection and analysis. While the cross-sectional 
design allows a researcher to use both approaches, surveys or structured questionnaires 
are the methods that are often equated to this design (Walliman 2006). As Vaus (2001) 
argues, the logic of cross-sectional design does not require the use of only quantitative or 
qualitative data, but it does require that data are systematic, such that there is 
information on cases or groups. It does not matter whether the data are in the form of 
numerical or coded data, or whether they are quotes from interviews, extracts from 
diaries or observations (Vaus 2001).  
This study employed a mixed-methods approach,26 which involves either simultaneous 
or sequential procedures whereby a researcher combines both quantitative and 
qualitative methods of data collection and analysis to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of a research problem – to address the research questions outlined in Chapter 1 
(Creswell 2003; Greene et al. 2005). The employment of a mixed-methods approach 
enhances confidence in the validity of findings (Greene et al. 2005), as such an approach 
enables researchers to address various dimensions of a research question or address 
different research questions in a given study (Bryman & Burgess 1994b; Limb & Dwyer 
2001; Lieberman 2005).  
The mixed-methods approach was important in this study for three main reasons. First, 
as one of the key research questions set out (see Chapter 1) was to determine the extent 
to which FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and 
credit, a quantitative approach to data collection through a structured questionnaire was 
26 The roots of mixed methods in social research are found partly in the concept of triangulation, which 
involves the use of multiple methods to assess a given phenomenon in order to validate the findings; 
that is, to check different findings against each (Greene, Kreider & Mayer 2005). 
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 necessary to understand this. With a quantitative approach, one would be able to make a 
systematic comparison in order to account for the variance in the phenomenon; that is, 
whether FBOs improve their members’ access to extension services, for example 
(Silverman & Marvasti 2008). Second, the study set out to understand not only whether 
FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and credit, but 
the features of FBOs and other factors that enable or impede the ability of FBOs to 
improve smallholder farmers’ access to such services. To understand this, the study 
employed a qualitative approach through oral interviews and participant observation. 
Finally, the study sought to understand the different ways in which relevant stakeholders 
can resolve the impediments of FBOs to make them more effective local institutions for 
improving smallholder farmers’ access to the services. Here,  qualitative strategies such 
as oral interviews are used.  
Indeed, the use of mixed methods in social research is gaining popularity for two 
important reasons. First, debates about the superiority of some methods over others have 
given way to an appreciation of trade-offs and complementarities in using different 
methods for data collection and analysis to maximise the understanding of research 
problems (Valentine 2001; Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom 2010). As Gray et al. (2007) 
argue, rigorous research that combines complementary methods will be superior to 
research that relies on any single method. Second, mixed methods enable the 
understanding of research problems more defensibly, with stronger validity or credibility 
and less known bias, as well as the development of more complete portraits of a social 
phenomenon through the use of multiple perspectives (Greene, Kreider & Mayer 2005).  
In spite of the benefits of the mixed-methods approach, the use of multiple methods can 
be challenging. For instance, integrating or linking data from different methods of data 
collection, especially where the integration is between numbers and text, can be 
challenging if researchers do not have the requisite technical competences to deal with 
such data, given that the methods have different logical principles, techniques of 
analysis and interpretation of results (Mason 1994). In addition, there are concerns that 
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 with mixed methods, researchers are likely to mix epistemological and ontological 
viewpoints such as positivism or objectivism, constructionism and subjectivism (Greene, 
Kreider & Mayer 2005). However, Patton (2002) argues that epistemological 
assumptions are useful conceptual tools in social research, but that they should not drive 
practical decisions such as methods. Patton (2002) further argues that practical decisions 
concerning the research design and methods used should be driven by the research 
problem being studied.  
The discussion in this section has outlined the research design and demonstrated why a 
mixed-methods approach was important for the study. The analysis has emphasised that 
mixed methods become handy when a researcher wants to understand the ‘what’ and 
‘why’ of a research problem. 
Before I provide detailed discussions on how the data in the study was collected and 
analysed, it is important to examine the study sample.  
3.3 The study sample 
The study population was diverse, including smallholder farmers with membership of 
FBOs (referred to as FBO members in this study) and those with no membership 
(referred to as FBO non-members in this study), government and NGO officials who 
work with FBOs. As in most studies, sampling was important because it was not 
practical to study all the members of the study population. In quantitative studies, 
researchers are often concerned with selecting a sample that is representative of their 
study population, which is often not the case for qualitative studies (Bryman 2012). It is 
important to indicate that the sample for the quantitative approach of this study, 
discussed below, may not be representative for Ghana as a whole, but may be 
representative for the administrative regions and districts in which the study took place. 
Researchers adopting a quantitative approach are often reminded that the bigger the 
sample size, the greater is the possibility that it will represent all the different 
characteristics of the population being studied, and that conclusions drawn from a study 
of a large sample are more convincing than those from a small one (Vaus 2001; 
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 Walliman 2006). If a researcher’s objective is to make a claim about how much, how 
well or how closely the finding from a sample applies to the entire population, then the 
utmost care should be taken to select a representative sample (Vanderstoep & Johnston 
2009). However, in many studies, including this one, which include a quantitative 
approach, the sample size is often balanced against the practicalities of the research 
resources, including funds, time, access to potential participants, and planned methods of 
data collection and analysis (Vaus 2001; Walliman 2006).  
Concerning the qualitative approach to this study, the sampling strategy was guided by 
the desire to generate in-depth knowledge about the benefits of FBOs to smallholder 
farmers, their operational performance and the factors that influence their performance. 
As noted already, the principle of representativeness of the sample with respect to the 
qualitative approach was taken to be less important.  
The next two subsections outline how I selected the smallholder farmers and officials 
who participated in the study, as well as explaining why I included the different 
categories of people in the sample.  
3.3.1 The sample of smallholder farmers 
The study employed multi-stage sampling procedure to select 240 smallholder farmers 
(120 FBO members and 120 FBO non-members). As outlined in Table 3.1 and discussed 
below, the sampling procedure involved the selection of large primary sampling units 
such as administrative regions, and then districts, towns/villages, FBOs and finally 
smallholder farmers.  
The first of the sampling procedures involved the selection of administrative regions. 
Ghana has ten administrative regions (see Figure 3.1). This research focused on two 
regions: the Northern and the Eastern. One region each was selected purposely from the 
Northern and the Southern to enable a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of FBOs 
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 when necessary.27 The governing of the choice of the Eastern and Northern regions 
Southern and Northern Ghana was based on the fact that each region in their respective 
zones (i.e. Northern and Southern Ghana) had the establishment of the majority of FBO 
projects as well as the FBOs established (Salifu, Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010).  
 
Figure 3.1. The two study regions, out of the ten administrative regions of Ghana  
27 The administrative regions that constitute Northern Ghana are Upper East, Upper West, Northern and 
Brong Ahafo, while those that constitute Southern Ghana are Ashanti, Central, Western, Eastern, Volta 
and Greater Accra.  
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 The second stage of the sampling procedure involved the selection of districts from the 
two regions. Using a random sampling approach, eight districts, four from each region,28 
were selected as outlined in Figure 3.2. 
Table 3.1  
The sample for smallholder farmers, using a multi-stage sampling procedure 
Regions No. of 
Districts 
No. of 
FBOs 
Villages 
with FBOs 
Villages 
without FBOs 
No. of FBO 
members 
No. of FBO 
non-members 
Northern 4 20 20 4 60 60 
Eastern 4 20 20 4 60 60 
Total 8 40 40 8 120 120 
Note: In the subsequent discussion, I refer to villages with FBOs as ‘FBO communities’ and villages without 
FBOs as ‘Non-FBO communities’. 
  
 
Figure 3.2. The districts selected for the study 
Note: The asterisk (*) denotes that due to administrative demarcation in 2012, the district has been divided into two.  
28 The Northern Region of Ghana contains 26 districts, while the Eastern Region contains 26 districts. 
Regions 
Northern 
East Gonja District 
Tamale 
Metropolitan 
District 
Tolon-Kumbungu* 
District 
West Mamprusi 
District 
Eastern 
Akuapim North District 
Akuapim South District 
East Akim Municipal 
District 
Yilo Krobo District 
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 In the third stage, I selected six communities (towns/villages) from each district. Five of 
these communities in each district had FBOs set up within them, while one community 
had no FBOs (see Table 3.1). I therefore studied five FBOs in each district with only one 
FBO studied in a village/town. In total, 40 FBOs from 40 communities were studied. 
Eight villages/towns with no FBO presence were also studied. Figure 3.3 depicts the 
areas that I studied.  
 
Figure 3.3. A map of Ghana showing the studied communities 
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 The fourth stage of the sampling procedure involved the selection of smallholder 
farmers (both FBO members and non-members). In those communities that have an 
FBO, three members from the FBO were selected, consisting of one leader and two 
randomly selected ordinary members (see Figure 3.4). The surveying of both leaders and 
ordinary members is important, as Bernard et al. (2008) have suggested that some 
leaders are corrupt and tend to capture benefits that are meant for the entire group for 
their own benefit. Additionally, leaders are likely to have more information about the 
FBO than do ordinary members, due to leaders’ likely and frequent interaction with 
stakeholders (e.g. providers of extension services). In addition to the three FBO 
members selected in each community with an FBO present, I randomly selected two 
smallholder farmers who were not FBO members. The selection of FBO non-members 
was aimed at having a comparison group in order to determine the extent to which 
membership of FBOs improves smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs 
and credit by comparing FBO members to FBO non-members. To add further robustness 
to the comparison group of FBO non-members, in each district five farmers who are not 
FBO members and who live in a community with no FBO presence were selected at 
random. The justification for this is that FBO non-members who are located in a 
community with FBOs may be exposed to the benefits and experiences of FBO members 
and potentially be affected by spillover effects (Bernard & Spielman 2009). Figure 3.4 
summarises the way in which I selected the communities, the FBOs and their members, 
and the FBO non-members in each district. 
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Figure 3.4. The sampling strategy in each district 
The four-stage sampling procedure discussed above resulted in the selection of a total of 
240 smallholder farmers, of which 120 were FBO members and 120 FBO non-members 
(see Table 3.2). Approximately 66% of the 240 smallholder farmers were males and 
44% females. Of the 120 FBO members, 40 were leaders and 80 ordinary members. 
Similarly, of the 120 FBO non-members, 80 were selected from communities with the 
presence of an FBO and 40 with no FBO presence (see Table 3.2).  
District  
5 FBO communities 
1 
FBO leader 
FBO ordinary 
member 
FBO ordinary 
member 
FBO non-
member 
FBO non-
member 
2 
FBO leader 
FBO ordinary 
member 
FBO ordinary 
member 
FBO non-
member 
FBO non-
member 
3 
FBO leader 
FBO ordinary 
member 
FBO ordinary 
member 
FBO non-
member 
FBO non-
member 
4 
FBO leader 
FBO ordinary 
member 
FBO ordinary 
member 
FBO non-
member 
FBO non-
member 
5 
FBO leader 
FBO ordinary 
member 
FBO ordinary 
member 
FBO non-
member 
FBO non-
member 
1 Non-FBO 
community 
Farmer 
Farmer  
Farmer 
Farmer 
Farmer 
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 As I have noted already, the inclusion of both FBO members and non-members in the 
sample was important in answering the question of whether, and to what extent, FBOs 
improve smallholder farmers’ to agricultural services. For instance, by comparing the 
extension services that FBO members received from extension workers in a farming 
season to those received by FBO non-members, one may be able to determine the roles 
that FBOs play in this process.  
Table 3.2 
The sample of smallholder farmers 
Type of village Type of participant 
Total 
FBO leaders FBO members FBO non-members 
FBO community 40 80 80 200 
Non-FBO community  0 0 40 40 
Total 40 80 120 240 
 
3.3.2 The sample of government and NGO officials 
The study also employed a purposive sampling strategy to select 16 officials from NGOs 
and government agencies that work with FBOs. In other words, I deliberately included 
these officials in the study to help me address my research questions set out in Chapter 1 
(a list of the officials included can be found in Appendix 1). The basis of this sampling 
framework was to understand, from officials who deal directly with FBOs, how they set 
up FBOs and the kinds of support they provide to them, as well as how the support is 
provided. These officials were also deemed important to provide information about the 
performance of the FBOs and the factors that influence their performance, as well as 
what can be done to improve the effectiveness of FBOs.  
Of the 16 officials selected, 12 belonged to government departments or agencies, 
including eight agricultural extension agents (AEAs), two senior staff at the Directorate 
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 of Agricultural Extension Services (DAES) and two senior staff at the Northern 
Regional Agricultural Development Unit (RADU). With regard to the AEAs, I selected 
one AEA from each of the eight districts studied. It was important to include AEAs in 
the study because they are governmental officials who interact directly with FBOs at the 
village/town level, and they are likely to know the activities, performance and 
challenges of the FBOs. Indeed, the AEAs play key roles in the establishment of FBOs 
and in providing support such as extension services, inputs and credit to FBOs. The two 
senior staff at the DAES, located in the national capital, were included in the study in 
order to understand the broad policies and strategies that drive FBO development, as 
well as the relevance of FBOs to smallholder agriculture. Finally, two senior 
government officials, who are located away from the national capital, were included in 
order to understand the development and performance of FBOs at the regional level.  
Similarly, four persons who work for NGOs that provide support to FBOs were 
included. This was necessary because the way in which the government establishes and 
supports FBOs may differ from that of the NGOs.  
Table 3.3 
The sample of government and NGO officials 
Type of official No. of officials 
AEAs 8 
DAES staff 2 
RADU staff 2 
NGO officials 4 
Total 16 
Note: AEAs denotes Agricultural Extension Agents; DAES denotes the Directorate of 
Agricultural Extension Services; and RADU stands for the Regional Agricultural 
Development Unit.  
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 In the section that follows, I discuss how data were collected from the sample of 
smallholder farmers and from the officials from NGOs and government agencies. 
3.4 Methods of data collection 
This section provides a systematic account of how and what form of data I collected 
from the different categories of people in the sample discussed above. Again, in deciding 
the methods for data collection, this research benefited from Silverman and Marvasti's 
(2008) argument that the choice of methods for data collection should not be 
predetermined but, rather, should be based on the appropriateness of the methods to 
gather data that can answer the research questions.  
This research employed three main methods to collect data: surveys/questionnaires, oral 
interviews and participant observation. Before I discuss how and why I used these 
methods to collect data, it is important to position myself as the researcher and discuss 
some practical issues that I encountered during my fieldwork in Ghana. This is because, 
as a researcher, it is sometimes useful to reflect on your identity, especially in relation to 
how it may influence or shape the interaction you have with your study participants. 
This self-reflection is often referred in the academic literature as the ‘positionality’ or 
‘reflexivity’ of the researcher (Limb & Dwyer 2001; Smith 2001).  
First, prior to undertaking this research, I worked with the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI)29 from February 2009 to February 2012 as a Research 
Officer. In that capacity, I participated in a wide range of research projects, including 
one that involved FBOs. During my work at IFPRI, particularly under its FBO project, I 
undertook fieldwork to understand the characteristics and activities of FBOs and this 
contributed significantly to my heightened interest in this research project. In addition, 
owing to my work at IFPRI, I had access to a database of FBOs, which facilitated my 
selection of the FBO sample discussed above.  
29 The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) is an international research centre that seeks 
sustainable solutions for ending hunger and poverty.  
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 Second, as a native of Ghana, I benefited from my knowledge of the local context during 
data collection, particularly in relation to community entry and recognising local 
institutions, as well as interpreting cultural observations. The majority of the smallholder 
farmers in Ghana cannot speak English. A researcher’s ability to speak the dominant 
local languages in the study areas was essential, as the use of translators may result in 
errors and biases during translation. In Northern Ghana, I did not use translators because 
I understand the main local languages in the study areas. Although I used translators in 
Southern Ghana, this involved only ten out of the 120 smallholder farmers I surveyed. 
Although I could not collect data from those ten participants in their local language 
without using translators, my basic understanding of the local language helped me to 
accommodate bias in translation. For instance, it was possible for me to tell when a 
translator was not asking questions correctly and to make clarifications.  
Finally, dealing with smallholder farmers can be complicated, as the majority of them 
considered me a potential provider of grants, credits and inputs. Owing to farmers’ 
suspicion that I could provide direct support to them, one needs tactics and strategies to 
unearth the truth. I took considerable time to explain to the smallholder farmers that I 
was not going to provide direct support to them, but that the outcome of my research 
could improve how they manage FBOs to access essential services. While providing 
such explanations to the farmers, I was mindful of Barbour and Schostak's (2005) 
argument that the perceptions of the research participants about the researcher, as well as 
the presumed power, social status and knowledge of the researcher, may have a 
significant influence on the outcome of an interview. Therefore, in dealing with my 
participants, I was constantly reminded that participants could be messy, complicated 
and not necessarily unidirectional.  
Consequently, as the researcher is responsible for the way in which the research 
participants’ (especially the smallholder farmers) views are presented in this research, 
this meant ensuring ethical responsibility; that is, ensuring that the participants had 
consented to participate and maintaining their privacy and confidentiality, as well as 
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 ensuring that participation did not cause them any harm. Indeed, this research went 
through a formal ethics approval process and was approved by the Human Research 
Ethics Committee of my university (the Western Sydney University).30 As part of the 
ethics approval process, I provided a detailed account of how the research participants 
would be selected and how they would be approached, as well as the methods to be used 
in data collection (questionnaire/surveys, interviews and participant observation) to the 
ethics committee. In particular, the ethics committee reviews copies of the 
questionnaires and interview guides. 
I shall now discuss the individual methods used for data collection.  
3.4.1 Questionnaires/surveys 
To answer the research question of whether smallholder farmers’ membership of FBOs 
improves their access to extension services, inputs and credit (see Chapter 1), the study 
used questionnaires – often referred to as surveys – to collect data from the 240 
smallholder farmers. With questionnaires, one is able to collect measurable data and 
undertake statistical analysis. In addition, questionnaires ensure standardisation of both 
the asking of questions and the recording of answers, thereby providing grounds for 
comparison (Bryman & Teevan 2005; Bryman 2008). As Bryman (2008) argues, 
structured questionnaires eliminate the problem of whether the interviewer can write 
down everything that the respondent says or misinterpret the reply given.  
While the above arguments are relevant for this study, questionnaires were particularly 
considered as important in collecting data that can measure, evaluate, compare and 
describe the extent to which FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension 
services, inputs and credit. With the use of questionnaires, it was possible to collect 
information to find out the differences between FBO members and non-members about 
their access to the services.   
The study used three different but closely related types of questionnaires: 
30 The ethics approval reference number for this research is H9907. 
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 – questionnaires for smallholder farmer who are leaders of FBOs (Appendix 2.1); 
– questionnaires for smallholder farmers who are ordinary members of FBOs 
(Appendix 2.2); and 
– questionnaires for smallholder farmers who are not members of FBOs (Appendix 
2.3). 
The difference between the questionnaires for FBOs leaders and ordinary members of 
FBOs is that the former included a section that focused on understanding how FBOs 
were established, their purpose and their collective activities. Both questionnaires 
included sections that sought to collect information about reasons why smallholder 
farmer participate in FBOs and the level of their participation, their access to extension 
services and inputs (such as fertiliser, seeds and agrochemicals) and their adoption of 
technologies, as well as their access to grants and credit. Similarly, the questionnaire for 
smallholder farmers who were not members of FBOs included sections about farmers’ 
access to extension services, inputs, grants and credit as well as their adoption of 
technology. All three types of questionnaire included ‘Yes/No’ questions, multiple-
choice questions, ticking multiple indicators and open questions that required writing. 
Owing to the fact that the majority cannot read, the questionnaires were administered 
through a face-to-face approach. The face-to-face approach offered many benefits. First, 
there was a 100% response rate, as all of the consenting smallholder farmers 
participated. Second, I had greater control over who completed the questionnaires, as 
some research participants may delegate someone who is not a study target to complete 
the questionnaires if the approach is not face-to-face. Finally, it provided me the 
opportunity to deal with questions in the questionnaires that respondents might have 
misunderstood.  
Notwithstanding the discussions that support the use of questionnaires in the study, the 
questionnaires were not appropriate in answering the important research questions that 
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 sought to dig deeper into understanding the factors that influence the operational 
performance of FBOs, as well as how to improve their performance. Indeed, structured 
questionnaires have often been criticised for not being able to capture research 
participants’ perceptions, as the questions are mostly designed by researchers and give 
the respondents or participants little chance to express themselves (Creswell 2003; 
Silverman & Marvasti 2008). Bryman (2008) also supports this when he argues that with 
structured questionnaires, research respondents may not be able to come up with 
interesting replies that are not covered by the fixed answers provided in the 
questionnaire.  
In view of the above limitations of the questionnaires and the need to address the other 
research questions, semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials from 
government agencies and NGOs that work with FBOs. The interviews were also 
conducted with selected smallholder farmers, as discussed in the section below.  
3.4.2 Semi-structured interviews 
The study conducted a series of in-depth, semi-structured, tape-recorded interviews with 
some selected smallholder farmers, and officials from government agencies and NGOs 
(see Table 3.4), in order to understand the processes underlying the activities and 
performance of FBOs. The advantage of using semi-structured interviews is that the data 
collection is not limited to a particular set of questions or variables (Silverman & 
Marvasti 2008). Semi-structured interviews often have a series of general questions, but 
also allow a researcher to ask additional questions in response to what are seen as 
significant replies (Bryman 2008). These types of interviews can therefore generate a lot 
of information, as they enable the researcher to cover a wide variety of topics, clarify 
issues raised by the participants and follow up unanticipated themes that arise (Valentine 
2001; Bryman & Teevan 2005).  
The semi-structured interviews were important in this study first to understand the 
features of FBOs that make them succeed or, on the other hand, fail to improve 
smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and credit. In particular, it was 
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 important to understand the processes involved in establishing FBOs and their 
management and activities, as well as the different ways in which they receive support 
from external actors. Second, these interviews were necessary in order to understand 
how FBOs can be developed into important local institutions that improve smallholder 
agriculture.  
Table 3.4 
The participants for the semi-structured interviews 
Type of participant No. of participants 
AEAs  8 
DAES staff 2 
RADU staff 2 
NGO officials 4 
FBO leaders 30 
FBO ordinary members 25 
FBO non-members 35 
Total 106 
Note: AEAs denotes Agricultural Extension Agents; DAES denotes the Directorate of 
Agricultural Extension Services; and RADU stands for Regional Agricultural Development 
Unit.  
As shown in Table 3.4, 90 smallholder farmers were interviewed (including 30 leaders 
of FBOs, 25 ordinary members and 35 FBO non-members). It is important to note that 
these 90 smallholder farmers were randomly selected for interviewing from 240 
smallholder farmers who responded to the questionnaires (see Section 3.4.1). There are 
many reasons that underscore the need to interview the three categories of smallholder 
farmers. First, while one could elicit information about how FBOs are being managed 
from the leaders, ordinary members are in a better position to explain how the leaders 
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 are managing them. Similarly, smallholder farmers who are not members of FBOs can 
offer their views about the performance of FBOs as outsiders. Second, asking the same 
questions that were applicable to the three categories of smallholder farmers served to 
cross-check answers and thus improved the validity of the findings. Finally, one needed 
all the three categories of smallholder farmers to understand specific issues in each 
category (for the interview guides for each category, see Appendices 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). 
For example, FBO non-members could best explain the question of why some 
smallholder farmers are not members of FBOs.  
The semi-structured interviews with the AEAs and officials from NGOs were geared 
towards understanding what kinds of services they provide to FBOs and how they 
provide those services, as well as the factors that influence the way they provide services 
to FBOs (for the interview guide for officials, see Appendix 3.4). The interviews also 
elicited the AEAs’ views on the performance of FBOs, as well as the factors that 
influence the performance of FBOs.  
While the interviews with the DEAS staff were aimed at understanding broad policies 
and strategies driving the development and performance of FBOs at the national level, 
the interviews with the RADU staff were aimed at understanding these policies and 
strategies at the regional level (for the interview guide, see Appendix 3.4).  
In sum, the semi-structured interviews with the various stakeholders discussed above 
helped in understanding the evolution of FBOs, the policies and strategies under which 
they are established, the activities of FBOs and their performance, as well as the factors 
that influence their performance. The interviews also unearthed the institutional 
arrangements of government agencies and NGOs with regard to FBOs, as well as the 
performance and challenges that the government agencies and NGOs face.  
3.4.3 Participant observation 
The analysis in this study also benefited from my own observations during my 6 months 
of fieldwork (from December 2012 to June 2013) on the activities of FBOs and their 
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 members, as well as other smallholder farmers. Limb and Dwyer (2001) remind us that 
participant observation is a good strategy to explore some of the complexities of 
everyday life in order to gain deeper insight into the processes shaping our social worlds. 
While observations can take different forms (e.g. unstructured, semi-structured and 
structured), the observations in this study were unstructured. During the fieldwork, I 
participated in three FBO meetings, mainly as an observer. During such meetings, I 
recorded some issues FBOs discuss in meetings, the interactions between the FBO 
leaders and the members, and the decisions that the FBOs and their members arrived at 
in the meetings. It is also important to note again that this research involved visiting 48 
communities to interact with the 240 smallholder farmers (see Table 3.1). During my 
visit to these communities, I observed and took notes on a wide range of discussions that 
ensued among smallholder farmers and FBO members, particularly their discussions on 
why they participate in FBOs and the support that smallholder farmers receive for being 
FBO members, as well as the performance and challenges that FBOs face.  
While studies that depend largely on participant observation are often criticised for a 
considerable amount of subjectivity, as the researchers decide what to observe and what 
to record based on their own impressions and perceptions (Jones & Somekh 2005; 
Silverman & Marvasti 2008), the data collected through this strategy was used to 
complement the data collected through the questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews.  
3.4.4 Secondary sources 
In addition to data from the questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and participant 
observation, the study relied on secondary data from FBOs, government agencies, NGOs 
and a research organisation (IFPRI).  
A variety of documents was collected from about 20 out of the 40 FBOs studied. These 
documents included FBOs’ registration certificates, constitutions and by-laws, 
attendance books, minutes and records of their financial contributions. Collecting such 
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 documents was necessary, as they provide insights about the governance and internal 
activities in FBOs.  
In relation to government sources, the study collected secondary data on credit 
disbursement and recovery in FBOs under two government programs (discussed in 
Chapter 7). These data were used to understand the performance of FBOs in relation to 
credit access and repayment. Similar credit data were collected from two NGOs (also 
discussed in Chapter 7) to compare FBOs’ credit access and repayment under 
government and NGO projects. Furthermore, ‘grey’ literature such as FBO projects’ 
progress and completion reports was collected, which provided important background 
and contextual material and offered insights for further analysis. 
Finally, the research also used secondary data that IFPRI collected on 501 FBOs in 
2010, in the course of conducting a survey in order to understand the characteristics and 
activities of FBOs in Ghana. The sample for the IFPRI survey was drawn from a 
database of FBOs compiled by Ghana’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) 
through a nationwide voluntary registration process. The sample of 501 FBOs was 
drawn from 40 districts in six regions: Northern, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern, Greater 
Accra and Volta. The IFPRI survey data were used largely to provide background and 
offer insight for further analysis (see Chapter 4). 
3.5 Data analysis 
The discussions in the previous section show that the study collected a variety of data 
through the questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, participant observation and 
secondary sources. The section also shows that the research data were collected from 
five categories of participants, including FBO leaders, FBO ordinary members, FBO 
non-members, officials from government agencies and NGOs. Guided by the different 
research participants and the research aim and questions (Chapter 1), the analysis in the 
study took two broad forms: quantitative and qualitative approaches. Although the 
discussion here is structured according to quantitative and qualitative approaches, it is 
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 important to note that both approaches are integrated in the empirical chapters (Chapters 
4–7).  
3.5.1 Quantitative analysis 
The quantitative analysis was based on the data collected from FBO members and non-
members through the questionnaires, the secondary sources from IFPRI on 501 FBOs, 
and the credit disbursement and recovery data from the government agencies and NGOs. 
In quantitative analysis, the emphasis is always on numbers and statistics (Bryman 
2008). The quantitative analysis was geared towards describing, exploring, measuring 
and establishing effects on the extent to which FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ 
access to extension services, inputs and credit. In particular, the analysis compares as 
much as possible the extent to which FBO members and non-members access and use 
extension services, inputs and credit.  
With the help of the IBM SPSS Statistics computer software package, a wide range of 
statistical techniques – such as percentages, frequencies, chi-square (χ2) values, cross-
tabulation, means and t-test results – were employed to provide descriptions across 
FBOs, their members and FBO non-members. For instance, while frequencies, 
percentages and means were used to determine differences and relationships between 
FBO members and non-members with regard to their access to extension services, inputs 
and credit, the χ2 and t-test techniques were used to ascertain the statistical significance 
of the relationships and differences. In addition, the study employed standard multiple 
regression (Ordinary Least Squares, OLS) to understand the factors that determine and 
influence FBO members’ and non-members’ access to and use of extension services and 
inputs (Chapters 5 and 6).  
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, the study largely used a random sampling approach to 
selecting both the FBO members and non-members. However, one cannot claim that it 
was a completely randomised design, a technique usually associated with 
experimentation. Undoubtedly, researchers cannot always employ randomisation in all 
studies in order to understand treatment effects (that is, the impact of an intervention), 
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 partly because of cost- and time-related issues (Khandker, Koolwal & Samad 2010). In 
the case of this study, it was not possible to adopt randomisation (experimentation) to 
determine the extent to which FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension 
services, inputs and credit. The ideal situation would have been to compare how the 
same smallholder farmers would access extension services with or without FBOs. This 
was impossible to do because farmers cannot have two simultaneous forms of existence; 
that is, a farmer cannot be an FBO member and an FBO non-member at the same time. 
In other words, one could not observe how the outcome (e.g. access to extension 
services), would have looked without membership of FBOs (the counterfactual). 
Therefore, there was a problem of missing data on the counterfactual. For this, it was 
necessary to identify a suitable group (a control group) among the smallholder farmers 
who were not members of FBOs, to represent the counterfactual (Khandker, Koolwal & 
Samad 2010). As noted, through a probability sampling approach, this study identified a 
comparison group (FBO non-members) that had characteristics similar to those of the 
FBO members.  
However, in comparing these two groups through statistical analysis, one risks criticism 
regarding non-randomisation. A major criticism could be that since the recruitment of 
farmers into FBOs was not random (for a discussion on the recruitment of farmers into 
FBOs, see Chapter 4)31, it is not appropriate to compare how FBO members and non-
members access extension services, because the FBO non-members could be a 
misleading counterfactual.  In order to proceed with a comparison along these lines, one 
has to account for FBO membership selection bias. For instance, a key potential source 
of bias will be that FBO members may differ from FBO non-members regarding 
observed personal characteristics such as age, education and landholding sizes, as well 
as unobserved characteristics. In recent years, many researchers (see, e.g., Jalan & 
Ravallion 2003; Bernard et al. 2008; Fischer & Qaim 2011) use propensity score 
31 Section 4.4, for example, mentions that the selection of farmers to participate in FBOs could be 
through external agencies or family ties.  
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 matching techniques,32 a technique that was pioneered by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), 
to control for selection bias.  
Propensity score matching analysis 
The propensity score matching (PSM) approach is a statistical technique that mimics 
randomisation and controls for selection bias in a non-experimental setting, using a set 
of independent variables. The main objective of the PSM approach is to construct 
suitable comparison groups using observed characteristics (variables) of the respondents 
in the research (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2008). The most common variables for estimating 
the propensity scores are participants’ characteristics (pre-participation characteristics in 
FBOs). The PSM technique therefore assumes that selection bias is based only on 
observed characteristics of respondents in the study. Using the variables on participants’ 
characteristics, the PSM technique will assign pairs of FBO members and non-members 
based on their propensity scores or probabilities (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983; Khandker, 
Koolwal & Samad 2010). In the case of this study,  the PSM technique will give further 
robustness for a comparison between FBO members and non-members with similar 
propensity scores. 
In this study, the PSM technique used a logistic regression technique to estimate the 
scores based on the relevant characteristics of the respondents, including their age, 
gender, education level, farming experience, ability to read, ability to write, ownership 
of a cell phone and landholding sizes. The analysis relied on the 240 smallholder farmers 
being evenly split between FBO members and non-members. The PSM technique then 
matched FBO members and non-members with similar scores using a nearest-neighbour 
matching approach.33 In recognition of the relatively small sample of this study and to 
32 Other techniques include difference-in-difference, instrumental variable and regression discontinuity 
(Khandker, Koolwal & Samad 2010). 
33 It is important to note that there are other matching approaches such as kernel matching, caliper and 
radius matching, stratification and interval matching, and local linear matching. 
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 avoid the risk of bad matches, a tolerance level on the propensity score distance of 0.2 
was adopted (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2008). 
The PSM is expressed as:  e(x) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍 = 1|𝑋𝑋) 
where e(x) represents the propensity score, P is the probability of being an FBO member 
or FBO non-member, and Z = 1 is an indicator of FBO membership (the value is 0 for 
FBO non-members and 1 for FBO members). The symbol ‘|’ stands for ‘conditional on’ 
and X represents the set of observed characteristics (covariates). 
 
Table 3.5 
Matched FBO members and non-members by Region and District  
Region 
District 
FBO 
members 
FBO non-
members 
Total 
Eastern 
Akuapim North 15 10 25 
Akuapim South 15 15 30 
East Akim 15 8 23 
Yilo Krobo 15 13 28 
Northern 
East Gonja 15 15 30 
Tamale Metropolitan 15 15 30 
Tonlon-Kumbungu 15 15 30 
West Mamprusi 15 15 30 
Total  120 106 226 
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 In the PSM analysis, all of the FBO members found appropriate matches. However, the 
analysis eliminated 14 FBO non-members who did not get appropriate matches. As a 
result, the original sample of 240 smallholder farmers was reduced to 226 and Chapters 
5–7, which compare FBO members and non-members, rely on this reduced sample (the 
results of the PSM analysis are shown in Appendix 4). 
Table 3.5 shows the matched FBO members and non-members according to regions and 
districts. The table shows that the PSM analysis did not drop any FBO non-member in 
the Northern Region; the 14 FBO non-members were dropped from three of the four 
districts in the Eastern Region. 
It is important to emphasise the PSM technique used in the study was not intended to 
compare paired individual farmers outcomes but rather to ensure comparison between 
FBO members and non-members. In other words, the PSM technique was used mainly 
to ensure that the sampling approach used in the study in selecting the two groups (FBO 
members and non-members) was robust which will allow for comparison between the 
two groups on their access to extension services, inputs and credit.  
Table 3.6 provides some descriptive statistics about the reduced sample to be used for 
analysis in the chapters that follow.   This is important as it provides key characteristics 
of the smallholder farmers being investigated. These characteristics are also presented 
according to FBO members and non-members so as to appreciate some key differences 
between the two groups of smallholder farmers. The table shows that FBO members and 
non-members do not differ significantly in relation to four main characteristics, namely, 
their years in education, years of farming experience, total land holding size and the 
actual landholding under cultivation, which further supports the view that the two groups 
can be compared. However, Table 3.6 shows that FBO members differ significantly 
from their non-members counterparts in relation to age, English proficiency, access to 
radio and TV, ownership of cell phones.   
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 Table 3.6 
Descriptive statistics of  key variables for smallholder farmers in the reduced sample according to FBO members and non-members 
Variable All (n=226) 
FBOmembers 
(n=120) 
Non-members 
(n=106) Min Max 
Gender (dummy, 1 = male) 0.67 (0.47) 0.72 (0.45) 0.61 (0.49) 0 1 
Age (in years) 45.89(11.28) 48.27 (10.14) 43.21 (11.94)** 24 74 
Education (in years) 4.62 (5.32) 5.92 (5.73) 3.15 (4.40) 0 17 
Whether farmer can speak English (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.34 (0.48) 0.45 (0.5) 0.22 (0.41)** 0 1 
Whether farmer can write English (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.21 (0.41) 0.3 (0.46) 0.1 (0.31)** 0 1 
Whether farmer can read English (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.22 (0.41) 0.32 (0.47) 0.1 (0.31)** 0 1 
Whether farmer has access to radio (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.78 (0.42) 0.9 (0.301) 0.64 (0.48)** 0 1 
Whether farmer owns a cell phone (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.74 (0.44) 0.8 (0.40) 0.67 (0.47)* 0 1 
Whether farmer has access to TV (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.26 (0.44) 0.36 (0.48) 0.15 (0.36)** 0 1 
Years of farming experience 17.91 (11.07) 19.07 (10.49) 16.59 (11.60) 1 45 
Total landholding size (in acres) 10.35 (11.57) 10.76 (10.57) 9.89 (12.65) 1 63 
Landholding size under cultivation (in acres) 5.4 (3.411) 5.65 (3.37) 5.12 (3.45) 1 13 
The existence of extension center in the community 0.06 (0.23) 0.08 (0.26) 0.04 (0.19) 0 1 
Whether the village is assigned an AEA (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.68 (0.47) 0.96 (0.20) 0.36 (0.48)** 0 1 
The distance from the closest extension centre (in miles)  14.78 (16.71) 13.87 (15.50) 15.81 (18.01)* 0 61 
Distance to the closest agri-market 5.8 (6.99) 4.78 (6.31) 6.96 (7.54)* 0 25 
Whether there is a bank in the community 0.14 (0.35) 0.18 (0.38) 0.09 (0.294) 0 1 
Whether farmer has a bank account 0.4 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) 0.24 (0.43) 0 1 
Whether there is FBO in the village (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.85 (0.35) 1.00 (0.00) 0.69 (0.47) 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations of means. * and ** show that  mean differences between FBO members and 
non-members are significant at the 5% and 1% confidence levels. 
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 3.5.2 Qualitative analysis 
The qualitative analysis was based on the data collected through the semi-structured 
interviews from FBO members, FBO non-members, and the officials from government 
agencies and NGOs. The analysis also utilised my fieldwork notes, which were largely 
based on the participant observation. It also utilised secondary documents that I 
collected from FBOs, government agencies and NGOs. Unlike the quantitative analysis, 
the emphasis here was on in-depth understanding of processes. In other words, the 
qualitative analysis was geared towards understanding processes that underlie the 
establishment of FBOs, their activities, their performance and their challenges, as well as 
understating how their performance can be improved.  
The first step in the qualitative analysis in relation to the tape-recorded, semi-structured 
was to transcribe them. The transcripts were then imported to Nvivo 10,34 a computer 
software package that facilitates qualitative analysis. With the help of NVivo 10, I 
developed a coding system based on the research questions and coded the transcripts (for 
details of the coding framework, see Appendix 5). Coding is described as the process of 
categorising and sorting data, while the codes are summarised, synthesised and sorted 
data (Bryman & Burgess 1994a). Coding provides the link between data and the 
conceptualisation (i.e. the generation of concepts) (Bryman & Burgess 1994a). It must 
be noted that the NVivo software was mainly used as a tool to code as well as help in the 
retrieval and exploration of the qualitative data. I recognised that the NVivo software 
could not perform the creative and intellectual task of devising categories and deciding 
which categories were relevant to answer my research questions. I believe that the 
NVivo software freed me from the paper management of data, which can be time-
consuming, to enable me to concentrate on the interpretation of the data. 
The coding was a key step in the analysis as it enabled me to organise the qualitative 
data into themes. With help of Nvivo, I was able to search for themes in the imported 
34 NVivo is a qualitative data analysis computer software package produced by QSR International. It has 
been designed for qualitative researchers working with very rich text-based and/or multimedia 
information, where deep levels of analysis on small or large volumes of data are required. 
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 interview transcripts and develop analytical categories, while being mindful of surprises 
(again, for details, see Appendix 5). As Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) remind us, in 
undertaking qualitative analysis, researchers should immerse themselves in the data and 
then search for patterns, identify possibly surprising phenomena and be sensitive to 
inconsistencies such as divergent views offered by different individuals. 
Finally, I also examined the primary documents collected from FBOs, government 
agencies and NGOs. The analytical approach with these was to review and use their 
contents to provide background or context, as well as to use quotes from them to support 
further analysis. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The methodology and methods used in this study were informed by the need to 
understand the extent to which FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension 
services, inputs and credit as well as identify the factors that influence the performance 
of FBOs. The study used a mixed-methods approach of participant observation, 
secondary data from government agencies and NGOs, questionnaires to collect data 
from 240 smallholder farmers (including FBO members and non-members), and semi-
structured interviews to collect data from 90 smallholder farmers, 12 government 
officials and four officials from NGOs. The study also utilised primary documents from 
FBOs, government agencies and NGOs. While data from the questionnaire were used 
largely to answer the ‘to what extent’ question of the research, the data from the other 
sources were used to provide background and contextual information and, more 
importantly, to address the ‘why to that extent’ question of the research.  
The next chapter begins to present the results and discussions of the data. It focuses on 
explaining the formation of Ghanaian FBOs, their types and their activities. In particular, 
it discusses the governance and management of FBOs in relation to their collective 
activities. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
UNDERSTANDING THE FORMATION, TYPES AND ACTIVITIES OF 
FBOs IN GHANA 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the methodology and methods adopted to understand 
the extent to which farmer-based organisations (FBOs) make a difference among 
smallholder farmers. As outlined in Chapter 1, this study aims to understand whether, 
and to what extent, FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, 
inputs and credit. Before one begins to address this directly, it is important to understand 
first the nature, functions and activities of FBOs in Ghana. 
This chapter therefore delves deeper into understanding the types of FBOs and how they 
are formed, as well as their activities. This chapter is divided into three main parts. First, 
it defines and classifies the different types of FBOs that have emerged in Ghana during 
the past two and half decades, a period marked by a global call for developing countries 
to establish independent and business-oriented farmer organisations, as many farmer 
organisations were under state control (Rondot & Collion 2001).35 Second, it examines 
the rationale for FBO development as well as smallholder farmers’ motivations for 
participating in FBOs. Finally, the chapter considers the extent of participation and 
collective action among Ghanaian FBOs; in particular, identifying the factors that 
influence smallholder farmers’ participation in FBO activities. 
4.2 Defining the farmer-based organisation 
In Ghana, the term FBO first appeared in the World Bank’s sponsored Agricultural 
Services Sub-sector Investment Project (AgSSIP) document in 2000.36 The document 
used the term to denote all forms of associations or cooperation that involve farmers at 
35 The United Nations, for instance, declared the year 2012 as the International Year for Cooperatives 
(cooperatives can be categorized as one form of farmer-based organisation).  
36 AgSSIP started in 2000 and completed in 2006. AgSSIP aimed at increasing the growth of agricultural 
productivity, reducing rural poverty and improving food security.  
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 all levels of society. The AgSSIP project also used the term to embrace all associations 
of agriculture-related activities that have the potential to promote agricultural 
development. Following this conceptualisation, people who engage in agricultural 
production, processing and marketing (including crops, livestock, agro-forestry, and 
fisheries) can form an FBO. Therefore, ‘FBO’ is used as a generic term that embraces 
farmer cooperatives, groups, associations, unions, societies, organisations and 
federations.  
Owing to the wide range of terminologies used to denote FBOs, different authors have 
used these terminologies to describe collective action in agriculture without necessarily 
defining their scope or boundaries. For example, Bratton (1986a), Uphoff (1988), 
Chirwa et al. (2005) and Hellin et al. (2009) used ‘farmer organisations’ in their studies 
on agricultural collective action, while Oxby (1983), Parks and Tinnermeier (1983) and 
Barham and Chitemi (2009) preferred to use the term ‘farmer groups’. Similarly, in their 
study on agricultural collective marketing, Bernard and Spielman (2009) referred to 
FBOs as ‘producer organisations’. One key disadvantage of using these different 
terminologies in research is that it makes the comparison of findings from different 
studies challenging, especially if researchers fail to define the terminologies properly.  
Despite the above conceptual issues, in Ghana, there is some consensus on what the 
roles of FBOs should be (Salifu, Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010). They are voluntary 
membership groupings created for the social and economic benefits of their members, 
such as promoting access to agricultural extension services, farm inputs and credit; 
marketing of agricultural production; and undertaking collective processing of 
agricultural production and its marketing (MOFA 2009).  
The above paragraph already suggests that in the Ghanaian context, the term FBO 
embraces agricultural collective action that takes place at different levels of society. 
However, as the emphasis of this study is on smallholder farmers who mainly reside in 
rural areas, it also focuses on the types of collective action that takes place at the village 
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 level. In particular, this research examines FBOs that engage in crop production at the 
village level. Despite this relatively narrow focus here, however, it is imperative to have 
a broader understanding of the different types of FBOs that exist in Ghana. 
4.3 Typologies of farmer-based organisations 
Farmer-based organisations take different forms in Ghana ranging from informal to 
formal FBOs, village-level to national-level FBOs, production to multipurpose FBOs 
and those organisations initiated by farmers themselves to those established by external 
agencies. Although efforts to classify farmer FBOs have been based largely on the kind 
of activities they undertake (MOFA 2009), they can also be categorised using some 
other criteria, including the scale at which they operate (locational coverage) and their 
legal status (whether they are registered with a statutory agency). 
4.3.1 Types of FBOs based on location 
The evolution of FBOs in Ghana according to the scale at which they operate appears to 
be in line with the country’s decentralisation system, which has a four-tier structure of 
governance comprising the central government, regional coordinating councils, district 
assemblies and sub-district structures. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) 
also operates in a similar fashion, with National-level offices, Regional Agricultural 
Development Units (RADUs) and District Agricultural Development Units (DADUs), 
with their substructures. 
Although Ghana currently has no clear policy on the development of FBOs (Tsekpo 
2008), the typical approach to FBO development is that they are first developed at the 
village level and are then expected to network through a hierarchy of district and 
regional groupings to a national apex (GOG 2007). The available evidence, however, 
does not support the existence of strong network of FBOs from the village to the 
national level. As it will be shown later in this section based on fieldwork evidence, one 
can best describe the FBO networks as loosely structured networks of convenience. 
Tsekpo (2008, p. 185) makes a similar observation in his study of the cooperative 
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 movement in Ghana when he notes that, ‘… primary societies [agricultural cooperatives] 
have little interaction with the district/regional unions’.  
 
Figure 4.1. Types of FBOs according to geographical scope 
In spite of this seemingly weak link between village-level and national-level FBOs, one 
can identify four types of FBOs based on the jurisdiction within which they operate; 
namely, village-, district-, regional- and national-level FBOs (Figure 4.1). The rest of 
this section focuses on a brief examination of these four types of FBOs before paying 
more detailed attention to those organisations that are of interest in this study, the 
village-level FBOs. 
At the base of the pyramid (Figure 4.1) are village-level FBOs, sometimes referred to as 
primary FBOs, which constitute the majority of FBOs in Ghana.37 The majority of 
village-level FBOs are set up by external agencies such as government agencies and 
NGOs to facilitate the implementation of their projects (Salifu, Francesconi & Kolavalli 
37 An example of an NGO that refers to village-level FBOs as primary FBOs is the Association of Church 
Development Projects (ACDEP), based in Northern Ghana.  
National level 
•Apex FBOs 
Regional level 
•Tertiary FBOs 
District level 
•Secondary FBOs 
Village level 
•Primary FBOs 
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 2010; Salifu et al. 2012). At the village level, FBOs facilitate smallholder farmers’ 
access to various services such as credit, extension services and inputs from NGOs, 
government and private-sector companies. While some village-level FBOs mediate the 
relationship between their members and political and economic actors outside the village 
(Bernard et al. 2008), others operate mainly within the village. FBOs whose operations 
go beyond the village level sometimes result in the formation of district-level FBOs, also 
known as secondary FBOs. 
District-level FBOs constitute the second tier in the four-tier structure presented in 
Figure 4.1. The membership of this category of FBOs usually includes executives 
(leaders) of the village-level FBOs. As in the case of the formation of village-level 
FBOs, external agencies (particularly NGOs) initiate the establishment of district-level 
FBOs, rather than initiatives emanating from village-level FBOs themselves. As a result, 
the existence of district-level FBO depends on the presence and activities of NGOs or 
other development agencies in a given district. For example, within the scope of my 
studies, one of the districts in the Eastern Region, the East Akim District, did not have a 
district-level FBO, while the Tolon-Kumbungu district in the Northern Region had at 
least two district-level FBOs, both set up under different NGO projects. Primarily, it is 
expected that the district-level FBOs will coordinate the activities of village-level FBOs, 
such as arranging for credit and organising farm produce for marketing, as well as 
representing and lobbying for farmers at different fora. In addition, the setting up of 
district-level FBOs is a sustainable approach to FBO development. In particular, 
establishing such FBOs is an exit strategy for some NGOs. An NGO official in the 
Northern Region rightly echoed this when he noted that 
 … the idea of the secondary FBOs is to put in place a management system so 
that FBOs [up to the village level] can manage their [own] affairs after the end of 
the program. … [S]o we involve the secondary FBOs in almost all the processes 
of the program. For example, we let them [district-level FBOs] engage in the 
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 interaction with banks, inputs dealers ... (Interview with NGO official in 
Northern Region, 12/06/2013) 
Partly because NGOs set up district-level FBOs along project lines, not all village-level 
FBOs in the districts become members, making it difficult to build a united FBO front at 
the district level. The implication of this could be that there will be weak district-level 
FBOs to promote the development of village-level FBOs and their members. In spite of 
these apparently weak district-level FBOs, some NGOs have taken further steps to 
establish regional-level FBOs, whose main function is to interact with the village-level 
FBOs through the district-level counterparts.38  
As shown in Figure 4.1, regional-level FBOs are at the third level in the four-tier 
structure. The regional-level FBOs, also called tertiary FBOs, are expected to draw their 
membership from the district-level FBOs. The primary responsibility of FBOs at this 
level is more one of negotiating, lobbying and advocating for support on behalf of FBOs 
at the lower levels. As in the case of district-level FBOs, NGOs mainly initiate the 
formation of FBOs at the regional level. In the Northern Region, for example, under a 
Food Security and Rice Producers Organisation Project (FSRPOP), a Northern Region 
Intensive Lowland Rice Farmers’ Cooperative Union (NILRIFACU) was set up at the 
regional level to mediate among input suppliers, tractor owners, banks and rice 
processors on the one hand, and district- and village-level FBOs on the other 
(Wilhemina et al. 2010).39 It is reasonable to argue that development organisations (e.g. 
NGOs) are only interested in the establishment of FBOs in line with the country’s 
governance structure or a predetermined structure, regardless of whether FBOs at the 
village level have the skills or capacity to organise at the higher level. This line of 
reasoning becomes more evident as some FBOs are already evolving at the national 
level. 
38 The Association of Church Development Projects (ACDEP), based in Northern Ghana, is an example of 
such NGOs. 
39 The Association of Church Development Projects (ACDEP) in implementing its ‘farmer agricultural 
production and marketing project’ has also set up a regional-level FBO (Alebikiya 2011). 
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 National-level FBOs represent the final tier of the structure identified in Figure 4.1. 
These FBOs are located in the national capital. Although national-level FBOs claim to 
draw their membership from the lower-level FBOs, particularly those at the regional 
level (Tsekpo 2008), it is not clear how they recruit their members. As a senior official 
at the Directorate of Agricultural Extension services (DAES) of MOFA in the national 
capital observed, ‘… the apex FBOs in Accra do not even know their so-called 
grassroots FBOs’ (interview with official at DAES, 08/05/2013). It is reasonable to 
mention that the majority of the FBOs at the lower level may never become true 
members of the national-level FBOs throughout their lifespans. While in some African 
countries there exists a single apex body at the national level (Develtere, Pollet & 
Wanyama 2008), in Ghana one can identify several national-level FBOs. Some are 
formed on a commodity basis, as with the Vegetable Producers and Export Association 
of Ghana and the Citrus Growers Association of Ghana. Others are formed with no 
regard to specific commodities by embracing a wide range of FBOs. Such forms of 
FBOs include the Apex Farmers’ Organisation of Ghana, the Farmers’ Organisation 
Network in Ghana and the Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen. 
Similar to the regional-level FBOs, the primary responsibilities of national-level FBOs 
are to collaborate and negotiate with relevant stakeholders to support lower-level FBOs, 
as well as to lobby and advocate for good polices for farmers, among others. It is 
however, unclear whether national-level FBOs are able to influence policymaking to the 
benefit of regional, district, and village-level FBOs; and this goes beyond the scope of 
this study.  
In summary, the discussion in this section has identified four types of FBOs according to 
the scale or administrative unit within which they operate; that is, from the village to the 
national level. The analysis has also suggested that district- and regional-level FBOs are 
initiated through various projects as sustainability strategies, but it is not clear if these 
FBOs survive beyond the lifespan of the projects. While the discussion shows efforts by 
relevant stakeholders in adopting bottom-up approaches (vertical integration) to 
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 developing FBOs in Ghana, it also indicates the existence of a weak link among the 
different types of FBOs. In other words, the analysis suggests that FBOs that span 
spatial scales and governance responsibilities do not have adequate skills and capacities 
to discharge their duties.  
4.3.2 Types of FBOs based on legal status 
Based on whether village-level FBOs register with ‘statutory’ government departments, 
one can identify two types of FBOs: formal and informal. I classify all FBOs that have 
no registration with any government department as informal and those with registration 
as formal. It is important to note that this classification does not suggest that formal 
FBOs are more efficient and effective, compared to their informal counterparts. Rather, 
such a classification is undertaken for two important reasons: first, to demonstrate the 
weak legal framework governing the registration and operation of village-level FBOs; 
and, second, to show the significance of FBOs’ registration to farmers at the village 
level. 
Informal FBOs 
The available evidence indicates the existence of informal FBOs in Ghana long before 
the advent of colonialism (DeGraft-Johnson 1958; Onumah et al. 2007). While still 
present in today’s rural Ghana, the pre-colonial informal FBOs took the form of ad hoc 
farmer-initiated groupings to provide reciprocal labour support for farm work (DeGraft-
Johnson 1958). However, the current wave of informal FBOs takes at least two different 
forms. The first category is those FBOs formed to provide mutual labour support in the 
fields, with the anticipation that such informal groupings will attract agricultural 
assistance from government and NGOs. With regard to the second category of informal 
FBOs, government, private individuals and NGOs set them up to implement their 
projects. Because there are no clear policies in Ghana governing the way in which FBOs 
should be set up, particularly at the village level, government, NGOs and private 
individuals take advantage and form informal FBOs just to implement their projects, 
without helping them to register with the relevant institutions. However, when FBOs are 
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 not registered, they are likely to disappear after the lifespan of the projects, because such 
FBOs will not have their contact details logged with the relevant government agencies 
such that external actors who want to work with or support FBOs can contact them. 
Formal FBOs 
Similar to the informal FBOs, farmers, government, private individuals and NGOs can 
set up formal FBOs. As indicated, what distinguishes formal FBOs from the informal 
ones is their registration with government departments or agencies, or both. Field 
evidence suggests a high rate of registration among Ghanaian FBOs. For instance, 
fieldwork data for this thesis (sample size of 40 FBOs) and the 2010 IFPRI survey 
(sample size of 501 FBOs) show about 78% and 79% of registered FBOs, respectively. 
As the majority of FBOs are registered, it is important to understand the registration 
processes of FBOs, especially exploring the reasons why they register.  
It is important that we first understand where FBOs register. In Ghana, the law mandates 
two statutory departments to register a variety of organisations including FBOs. These 
are the Department of Cooperatives (DOC)40 and the Registrar General’s Department 
(RGD).41 However, in addition to these two statutory bodies, many FBOs register with 
District Assemblies and MOFA offices at the district level. Table 4.1 shows the pattern 
of FBO registration among the four institutions identified. While the proportions of 
FBOs that registered with the institutions are similar for both the 2010 IFPRI survey and 
this study’s survey, it is important to note that these surveys may not be comparable in 
terms of their sample size (see Table 4.1).  
 
40 The Department of Cooperatives (DOC) is a government agency under the Ministry of Employment and 
Social Welfare, whose operation stems from the Cooperative Societies Decree NLCD 252 of 1968. The 
key functions of the DOC include the registration, audit and inspection of cooperative societies. The 1968 
decree allows the head of the DOC to retain considerable control over cooperative organizations, to the 
detriment of members’ decision rights. 
41 The Registrar General's Department (RGD) is a government department of the Ministry of Justice and 
Attorney General, with one of its key mandates being the registration of businesses, industrial property, 
marriages, administration of estates and public trustees. 
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 Table 4.1 
FBO registration by different institutions  
Institution 
Year 
2010 2013 
 Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Department of Cooperatives 159 (40.8) 18 (58.1) 
District Assembly 109 (27.9) 7 (22.6) 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture 92 (23.6) 3 (9.7) 
Registrar General’s Department 27 (6.9) 3 (9.7) 
Total registered FBOs 387 (100) 31 (100) 
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data and the 2010 IFPRI survey 
Note: Year 2010 represents data from the 2010 IFPRI survey, while year 2013 represents the author’s 
fieldwork data. 
 
Table 4.1 suggests that the majority of FBOs register with the DOC – and this is not 
surprising, as the DOC has the direct mandate on the registration of FBOs. What is 
important to note is that about one third of FBOs register with District Assemblies, 
which do not have clear mandates to register FBOs. There may be several reasons for 
this. One is that these institutions are more accessible to farmers than the DOC and 
RGD, which are not present in every District of the country. Another likely reason is that 
registration with District Assemblies tends to be quicker, as the Assemblies issue 
certificates of registration at the district level, as compared to issuing certificates at the 
national capital through to the district level when FBOs register with the DOC and RGD.  
Based on interviews with FBO members, several reasons were identified that explain 
why farmers find it necessary to register their FBOs. These range from a requirement for 
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 setting up FBOs to strategies adapted to making these organisations legally recognised 
by relevant stakeholders. For instance, of the 31 out of 40 FBOs in this study that were 
registered (Table 4.1), about 80% mentioned that the main reason for registration was to 
make them known to relevant stakeholders in order to attract agricultural assistance such 
as extension services, credit, fertilisers and agrochemicals. Approximately 13% of the 
FBOs also indicated that they registered as part of the requirement for accessing support 
from government and NGOs.  
Three key issues are worthy of note in the discussion here. First, Ghana does not have 
clear policies governing the registration of FBOs. A 1968 Cooperative Societies Decree, 
which is not only outdated but also gives the Registrar at the DOC substantial powers, 
impedes the development of autonomous FBOs (Salifu, Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010). 
Although a new Cooperative Bill was drafted in 2001 and submitted to the Ghanaian 
government for onward submission to the Ghanaian parliament, this bill is yet to be 
passed after 10 years.42 It is reported that the draft Cooperative Bill offers significant 
improvements over the 1968 Cooperative Societies Decree and has the potential to 
enhance the registration and development of FBOs (Tsekpo 2008). It is still not clear 
when the draft bill is likely to pass into law, as there seems to be a lack of political will 
to push the bill through in parliament.43 Second, although the majority of FBOs may 
have registered, many of them have registered with government agencies that do not 
have a clear mandate to register them, which may pose some problems in compiling a 
national database of registered FBOs. Finally, it is important to note that most FBOs see 
registration as a means of formalising their organisations with the hope of attracting 
support from government, NGOs and private individuals. The section that follows 
discusses types of FBOs based on the activities they undertake.  
42 There are recent concerns about the need to pass the Cooperative Bill; see 
http://vibeghana.com/2013/03/15/parliament-urged-to-speed-up-passage-of-new-co-operative-law/ 
(accessed 30/06/2013). 
43 It is difficult to find reasons why successive Ghanaian governments have not found it attractive to 
submit the draft Cooperative Bill to Parliament for consideration, rather than speculate that the bill is 
not a priority for the various governments. 
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 4.3.3 Types of FBOs based on activity 
MOFA identifies four types of FBOs based on the economic activities they undertake: 
production, processing, marketing and multipurpose FBOs (MOFA 2009). Among the 
four types, the most common form is the production FBOs (see Figure 4.2), which, as 
noted earlier, are the focus of this this research project. Nevertheless, this section briefly 
discusses all four types. 
Production FBOs 
Production FBOs are those FBOs whose members engage in the production of crops and 
livestock. The majority of the production FBOs are set up to promote crop production. It 
is important to note that most production FBOs are not commodity-based. In other 
words, the memberships of such FBOs do not specialise in a single commodity but, 
rather, produce different types of crops. This is because the majority of the smallholder 
farmers in Ghana cultivate more than one crop. For instance, all the 120 FBO members 
surveyed for this study cultivate at least three commodities, with some producing as 
many as eight crops. However, the names of production FBOs (for example, ‘maize 
farmers group’) will suggest that their members specialise in a single commodity. The 
naming of FBOs as if their members engage in specific commodities may be attributed 
to MOFA’s vision of organising FBOs ‘… that are commodity specific, business 
oriented, operate as viable economic entities and provide relevant services to their 
members on a sustainable basis’ (MOFA 2010a, p. 5). Nevertheless, government and 
NGO projects do tend to support FBO members to produce a specific crop, especially if 
the support to members takes the form of credit, fertiliser, seeds or agrochemicals.  
Another area to wrongly assess what the production FBOs are about is to rationalise 
them as organisations whose members embark on joint production. Although about 51% 
of the total sample of 40 FBOs have group farms where they undertake joint production, 
the farms are relatively small, with an average size of about 3 acres (1.2 hectares). 
Agricultural extension agents (AEAs) sometimes use the group farms as demonstration 
plots; that is, plots where they teach farmers best agricultural practice. Members 
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 therefore do not regard group farming as profit-making activities (Salifu et al. 2012) and 
may decide whether to do a group farm depending on the resources available to the 
FBO. In many production FBOs, therefore, members have their individual farms but 
participate in FBOs to take advantage of mutual farm labour exchange, collective input 
acquisition and collective marketing of farm produce, among other things. Farmers also 
believe that participating in FBOs will lead to capturing assistance such as inputs, 
improved agricultural technologies and credit from development agencies. It is 
important to note that production FBOs in the Ghanaian context are more akin to 
community-oriented organisations, which Bernard et al. (2008) describe, in their study 
on rural organisations in West Africa, as organisations that provide only club or local 
public goods, such as casual labour exchange, cultivation of collective fields and 
participation in social activities. 
Processing FBOs 
Processing FBOs, unlike production FBOs, may be described as market-oriented 
organisations (Bernard et al. 2008); that is, they support income-generating activities as 
well as being effective in linking their members to the market (Francesconi & Heerink 
2010). They constitute about 7% of FBOs (see Figure 4.2). The main function of 
processing FBOs is to transform or add value to agricultural produce; for example, the 
processing of cassava into gari.44 This category of FBO tends to use common equipment 
for processing. This equipment is often provided by government and NGOs (Salifu et al. 
2012). Members of such FBOs have a greater opportunity for a ready market for their 
produce as well as higher market prices, partly due to the high quality of their produce 
(Salifu et al. 2012).  
 
44 Gari is a popular starchy Ghanaian food made from cassava tubers through the process of peeling the 
tuber, washing, crushing, fermenting, sieving and roasting. 
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Figure 4.2. The distribution of FBOs according to activity 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Salifu, Francesconi and Kolavalli (2010) 
Note: The calculation was based on 3,052 FBOs that have registered with MOFA as of 2010. 
 
Marketing FBOs 
As shown in Figure 4.2, there is less involvement of farmers in marketing FBOs: only 
3% of the FBOs fall into this category. The main function of marketing FBOs is to help 
members to sell their produce, and they are common among farmers who cultivate fruits 
and vegetables such as pepper, cabbage, pineapple, mango and pawpaw. However, it is 
important to note that some production and processing FBOs sometimes market their 
produce collectively. This leads us to the final type of FBOs, namely those that 
transcend one single aspect along the agricultural value chain. 
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 Multipurpose FBOs 
Multipurpose FBOs are those FBOs that engage in more than one of the three main 
activities; that is, production, processing and marketing. Figure 4.2 suggests that about 
one third of FBOs are multipurpose in character. While it is difficult to identify a 
multipurpose FBO by its name, in a few cases it is possible to know from their names. 
For example, the name ‘cashew producers, processing and marketing association’ 
suggests that the members come together to support production and at the same time 
process and market their cashew for the market (MOFA 2009). 
In addition to discussing the different types of FBOs that have evolved over the past two 
and half decades, it is important to understand the growth and distribution of FBOs in 
Ghana.  
4.4 The prevalence of village-level FBOs 
Evidence from the Ghana Living Standard Survey 5 (GLSS5) of 2005/200645 – the most 
recent nationwide household survey data – suggests that there is an FBO in one out of 
every three villages in Ghana. In other words, a descriptive analysis of a question in the 
GLSS5 data that sought to investigate the existence of FBOs in rural communities 
revealed that there was at least one FBO present in about 27% of the rural communities 
surveyed. However, Ghana is yet to have a comprehensive database that reports the total 
population and distribution of FBOs across the country.  
There are three main plausible reasons why the country lacks a comprehensive database 
on FBOs. First, there is currently no clear policy regulating the registration of FBOs. 
The result of this, as noted earlier (Section 4.3.2), is the registration of FBOs with 
institutions that do not have a clear mandate to register them. Second, the existence of 
different registration institutions also compounds the problem because there is virtually 
45 The Ghana Living Standard Survey 6 (GLSS6) was released towards the end of 2014, but I have not 
been successful in acquiring the up-to-date dataset.  
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 no coordination among the institutions. Finally, there is no a single institution in Ghana 
with a clear mandate to coordinate the activities and development of FBOs.   
In spite of the lack of a comprehensive database of FBOs, one can rely on three main 
sources to provide rough estimates of the growing importance of FBOs in the country. 
The first source is a website that MOFA set up, which claims to present a single 
platform with relevant and current data on FBOs across the country.46 My analysis of the 
content of this website shows there are about 3,328 FBOs across the country (for the 
distribution according to regions, see Table 4.2). A major shortfall of the website is that 
MOFA created it through voluntary registration of FBOs and, undoubtedly, the total 
figure does not represent an accurate estimate of the population of FBOs in the country, 
as this process was unlikely to capture many of the informal, unregistered ones. The 
website’s under-representation of the total number of FBOs becomes obvious when one 
explores the second source; that is, FBO statistics reported in MOFA’s two annual 
workshops in 2007 and 2008. 
While MOFA has a direct link to the second source, it appears that MOFA did not take 
this source (the first source discussed above) into consideration in constructing its 
website. With the second source, my estimation depends on presentations from the two 
workshops MOFA organised in 2007 and 2008, to review the performance of its 
departments, agencies and regional units for 2006 and 2007, respectively. During these 
two workshops, the country’s ten Regional Agricultural Development Units (RADUs) 
presented on their activities and performance. The ten RADU presentations contain 
estimates of the number of FBOs in the regions and these were extracted. As depicted in 
Table 4.2, based on the RADU estimates, there were 7,999 and 9,358 FBOs in 2006 and 
2007, respectively, which suggests a 17% increase in the FBO population in a period of 
just over a year. 
 
46 The website is www.fboghana.org (accessed February 2012).  
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 Table 4.2  
The regional distribution of FBOs according to two MOFA sources 
Region 
MOFA annual review workshop MOFA database 
2006 2009 2009 
Ashanti  1,017 1,017 260 
Brong Ahafo 1,368 892* 257 
Central 78* 216* 322 
Eastern 203* 896* 719 
Greater Accra 82* 370 173 
Northern 1,588 1,520 454 
Upper East 812 916 316 
Upper West 17* 596 107 
Volta 1,966 2,067 477 
Western 868 868 243 
Total  7,999 9,358 3328 
Sources: Author’s compilations of figures from MOFA’s 2006 and 2007 performance annual review 
workshops; Salifu, Francesconi and Kolavalli (2010) 
Note: The asterisks (*) indicate that the figures represent only new FBOs formed during the year and 
not necessarily the total number of FBOs in the regions. 
 
The final source is the DOC. As noted earlier, the DOC has a primary responsibility for 
the registration of cooperatives, of which agricultural cooperatives (referred to as FBOs 
in this study) are one type. At the end of 2012, the DOC had registered about 5,383 
FBOs (see Figure 4.3). What is important to observe in the figure is the continuous 
growth in the number of FBOs (agricultural cooperatives) registered with the DOC. 
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 Unfortunately, however, the figures from the DOC also underestimate the number of 
FBOs in the country because, as discussed already (Section 4.3.2), many FBOs register 
with MOFA, District Assemblies and the Registrar General’s Department rather than the 
DOC.  
 
Figure 4.3. The number of FBOs registered with the Department of Cooperatives, 2008–12 
Source: Author’s compilation of statistics from Ghana’s Department of Cooperatives 
 
In summary, while is it difficult to present an accurate figure of the number of FBOs in 
Ghana, it is evident that their number is growing. This is especially evident in the figures 
from the DOC, which point to a 75% increase in registered FBOs from 2008 to 2012. 
Similarly, the two review workshops also indicate about a 17% increase from 2006 to 
2007. This raises the important question as to what accounts for the continual growth of 
FBOs in Ghana, which is discussed in the next section. 
We should also note that the majority of the FBOs are less than 7 years old. Data from 
the 2010 IFPRI survey showed that about 60% of the surveyed FBOs were formed after 
2003. Similarly, nearly 70% of the FBOs that I studied were established after 2003. The 
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 implication of this is that many FBOs have short lifespans, as government and NGOs 
establish the majority of FBOs to implement their projects but most of these FBOs do 
not live beyond the lifespan of the projects (I shall discuss this in detail in Section 4.5).   
4.4.1 Understanding the growth of FBOs in Ghana  
Three main factors seem to explain the continuous rise in the number of FBOs in the 
country: (a) the preference of government and NGOs to implement agricultural and its 
related projects and programs through FBOs; (b) MOFA’s policy of delivering extension 
services through FBOs; and (c) farmers’ perceived benefits of being members of FBOs. 
First, Salifu, Francesconi and Kolavalli (2010) report an increase in government and 
NGO projects supporting the development of FBOs in Ghana (Figure 4.4 summarises 
the main external actors dealing with FBOs). The rationale for many of these projects is 
to facilitate farmers’ access to credit, farm inputs, extension services and markets for 
their produce (World Bank 2007). Taking stock of over a dozen major projects 
implemented from the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s, they estimated that almost 
8,000 FBOs were formed or supported through the projects (Salifu, Francesconi & 
Kolavalli 2010). Through these projects, smallholder farmers have received a wide 
variety of support, ranging from farm inputs to transfers of technologies. For instance, 
between 2007 and 2012, the Millennium Challenge Account program, with sponsorship 
from the USA’s Millennium Challenge Corporation (as mentioned in Chapter 1), alone 
supported approximately 1,200 FBOs with training in agricultural technologies, seeds, 
fertiliser and credit (ISSER 2012). In addition, as recently as 2013, the Australian 
government committed to providing AU$1.4 million to build the capacities of selected 
FBOs, among other things.47  
 
47 See http://mofa.gov.gh/site/?p=12386 accessed 14/08/14 
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Figure 4.4. Actors supporting FBOs  
 
Second, the current policy, contained in the Food and Agriculture Sector Development 
Policy (FASDEP II), of using FBOs to deliver extension services to farmers partly 
explains the rise in the population of FBOs. It is to be hoped that such a policy will 
allow public extension agents to reach out to larger numbers of farmers, as the current 
extension agent to farmers ratio is about 1:2,500 (Owusu-Baah 2012).  
Finally, the available evidence suggests that about one third of FBOs are set up through 
the initiatives of farmers themselves, in the hope of receiving free goods and services 
from development programs. For instance, of the 40 FBOs surveyed, about 35% claimed 
that their own members initiated their establishment to benefit from the perceived 
‘goodies’ of belonging to FBOs. According to the 2010 IFPRI survey, about 42% of the 
FBOs out of a total sample size of 501 made similar claims.  
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With the above analyses on the growth of FBOs, it is also important to understand 
smallholder farmers’ perspectives regarding the perceived benefits of being FBO 
members. 
4.4.2 Farmers’ perceived benefits of membership of FBOs 
Figure 4.5 presents analysis of a multiple response question that sought to understand 
the main reasons why the FBOs were established. The majority of the surveyed FBOs 
identified access to credit and grants as the main reasons for their establishment (see 
Figure 4.5). While the responses were not ranked, the figure suggests that access to 
grants and credit are the primary reasons why the FBOs were established.  
 
Figure 4.5. Reasons for the establishment of FBOs  
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
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 This finding is consistent with the claim the claim that group formation is rapidly 
becoming a prerequisite for farmers to access credit and grants (World Bank 2007, 2010; 
Shiferaw, Hellin & Muricho 2011). However, Figure 4.5 shows that only 25% of the 
FBOs indicated that they were set up to access extension services, even though one of 
the primary objectives of Ghana’s current food and agriculture policy document 
(FASDEP II) is to set up FBOs to facilitate and promote smallholder farmers’ access to 
extension services.  
Similarly, according to the majority of FBO members surveyed, the primary motivation 
for membership to FBOs is to access financial support, which takes the form of grant or 
credit (see Figure 4.6). Here too, the responses to the question were multiple and not 
ranked.   
 
 
Figure 4.6 Reasons for becoming an FBO member  
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
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An examination of Figures 4.5 and 4.6 shows that not only do FBOs give access to 
extension services a low rating as a reason for their establishment, but a majority of their 
members also consider grants and credit as important motivation for membership in 
FBOs compared to extension services. The story becomes curious when one examines 
the support that FBO members have actually received – it is extension services that the 
majority of the members have received, compared to credit and grants. For example, of 
the 120 FBO members surveyed, about 38% perceived access to extension services as 
the reason for membership (see Figure 4.6), while about 96% of members had accessed 
extension services. In contrast, of the 120 FBO members surveyed, about 65% and 70% 
mentioned access to credit and grants, respectively, as the reasons for joining an FBO 
(see Figure 4.5), while only 40% and 29%, respectively, actually received credit and 
grants. This suggests that extensions services compared to grants and credit are more 
accessible to FBO members.  
Figure 4.6 also suggests that the perceived role of FBOs in facilitating access to the 
outputs market is low among smallholder farmers, as only 10% of the surveyed FBO 
members indicated access to marketing as the reason for joining an FBO. This is perhaps 
partly because there are fewer FBOs that focus on marketing (see Figure 4.2). In Central 
and Eastern Africa, the majority of FBOs are often considered as institutions that 
facilitate the marketing of smallholders’ farm produce (see, e.g., Fischer & Qaim 2011; 
Shiferaw, Hellin & Muricho 2011). 
The key point to note here is that while the primary motivation for most smallholder 
farmers who participate in FBOs is to enhance their ability to access financial support, 
the most common support that they get is extension services. Chapter 5 will delve deeper 
into understanding the extent to which FBOs facilitate smallholder farmers’ access to 
extension services. In the meantime, it is important to understand how FBOs are set up, 
the characteristics of their members and the extent of their collective activities.  
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 4.5 Participation and collective action in FBOs 
The objective of this section is two-fold. The first subsection critically examines how 
FBOs are set up, with a focus on who initiates them and how their members are 
recruited. It also examines FBOs governance and management. The second subsection 
scrutinises the extent of collective activities in FBOs.  
4.5.1 Participating in FBOs 
Although the number of FBOs in Ghana has grown significantly over the years, it is 
important to note that the majority of smallholder farmers in the country still do not have 
the opportunity to participate in FBOs, as is evident in the GLSS5 data. This is because 
farmers themselves initiate less than half of the FBOs, with outsiders such as 
government and NGOs initiating the majority of them (Figure 4.7).  
The implication of outsiders initiating the establishment of majority of FBOs is that it 
limits the opportunities for the majority of smallholder farmers to participate in FBOs. 
Meanwhile, as noted earlier in Chapter 2, studies have shown that FBOs initiated by 
farmers themselves tend to perform much better than those initiated by outsiders 
(Uphoff 1991; World Bank 2007), as outsiders tend to use FBOs mainly to deliver 
services to smallholder farmers.  
Nonetheless, one needs to understand how smallholder farmers are recruited to 
participate in FBOs. As expected, the way in which smallholder farmers are recruited 
into FBOs depends on whether the FBOs are ‘self-started’ or ‘outsider started’.  
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Figure 4.7 Who initiated the establishment of FBOs?  
Source: Author’s calculation based on the 2010 IFPRI survey of 501 FBOs 
Note: ‘Self-start’ represents FBOs started by smallholder farmers themselves, while ‘Outsider start’ 
represents those initiated by outsiders such as government and NGOs. 
 
First, interviews with FBO members show that when farmers initiate their own FBOs, 
they draw their members largely from family relations and friends with whom they feel 
comfortable working. Second, interviews with NGOs and government officials as well 
as FBO members reveal that if outsiders initiate the establishment of FBOs, they employ 
at least three main approaches to recruit members. The first approach is when outsiders, 
through a chief or opinion leader in a village, make an announcement for interested 
farmers to come together and form an FBO. Outsiders seem to employ this approach 
because it is the quickest way to form FBOs to implement their projects within a limited 
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 timeframe. Very often, the outsiders have quotas for FBO size and therefore 
participation is limited to the first few farmers who express an interest.48 In relatively 
small villages, the selection of members using this approach is somewhat formalised; 
that is, at least one member is selected from every household in the village (interview 
with FBO leader in Northern Region, 16/02/2013). However, the disadvantage of that 
approach is that it leads to the formation of FBOs whose members do not necessarily 
have a genuine interest in participating in FBOs, except to receive ‘free’ support from 
outsiders. In addition, this approach does not afford farmers the opportunity to choose 
members with whom they can cooperate. The overall effect of using this approach to 
select members is that it may lead to the formation of FBOs that lack clearly defined 
objectives and therefore hardly survive beyond the lifespan of the projects. 
The second approach used by outsiders to recruit smallholder farmers into FBOs is for 
those outsiders to contact a chief or someone in the community, who then recruits 
smallholder farmers to participate in the FBOs. With this approach, ‘… there is a high 
tendency of selecting members from the same family or household’ (interview with 
AEA in Northern Region, 15/02/2013), as the contact persons tend to include their 
neighbours - about 60% of the AEAs interviewed expressed similar views.  The 
approach also has the high possibility of selecting members along ethnic and party 
political lines. For example, farmers who are supporters of a ruling party have the 
greatest opportunity to participate in FBOs set up under projects by the ruling 
government. Field interviews reveal that the politicisation of who participates in FBOs 
goes beyond the village level, to embrace decisions by the ruling government as to 
which districts and regions should participate in FBO projects. This is particularly the 
case because governments implement many of the FBO projects and will therefore select 
regions, districts and villages that have a tendency to vote to retain them in power, a 
phenomenon often referred to as clientelism (World Bank and IFPRI 2010). In the 
context of agricultural services, clientelism refers to the excessive tendency of governing 
48 For example, an FBO size of about 50 members was required under the Ghana’s Millennium Challenge 
Account Program.  
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 political parties to provide goods such as fertiliser and credit to specific clients in 
exchange for political advantage. However, clientelism can weaken collective action in 
FBOs, because FBOs may regard services as gifts rather than working collectively to 
achieve services to which they are entitled (World Bank and IFPRI 2010).  
The final approach is a case where outsiders undertake direct recruitment of smallholder 
farmers into FBOs using participatory approaches, with no or little third-party 
involvement. Although interaction with the 40 FBOs in this study shows that outsiders 
hardly employ this approach in setting up FBOs, a variety of studies on rural collective 
action have shown that when farmers’ knowledge is sought and incorporated in the 
formation of FBOs, such groups are more likely to sustain activities after project 
completion (Uphoff & Wijararatna 2000; Pretty & Ward 2001).  
The above discussion points to two important issues, which are worthy of note. First, the 
way in which outsiders recruit smallholder farmers to participate in FBOs largely leads 
to the formation of FBOs that do not have clear objectives to undertake their own 
collective activities. Interviews with the eight AEAs revealed that the majority of 
outsiders spend little time in training farmers about how to develop strong FBOs, as they 
are often under pressure to form FBOs to meet key targets in the implementation of their 
projects. This leads to the establishment of FBOs whose members are not active 
participants in the internal activities of the organisations. Second, we should also note 
that recruitment approaches by outsiders lead to the formation of FBOs that their 
members consider mainly as avenues to access financial and farm inputs, rather than 
institutions that provide the opportunity to demand services as well as engage in 
economic activities.  
The next step in many FBOs after recruiting members is to put a governance structure in 
place; that is, the selection of leaders, creation of rules, registration of the FBOs and 
opening of a bank account, which I now turn to discuss. 
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 4.5.1.1 Governance in FBOs 
The first important variable for good governance and improved performance in FBOs is 
leadership (Markelova et al. 2009). The ability of an FBO, for example, to organise its 
members for extension meetings depends on the kind of leaders that it has (discussed in 
Chapter 5). Typically, FBOs have four leaders: a chairperson, a secretary, an organiser 
and a treasurer. Salifu et al. (2012) report that the majority of FBOs use democratic 
principles in selecting their leaders, although they also observe that family lineage, 
gender, education, age and the political and economic statuses of members are key 
determinants of who becomes a leader. For instance, the position of secretary is always 
the preserve of the most educated member in the FBO (see Figure 4.8). The leaders of 
the 40 FBOs included in this study consisted of 23 chairpersons, 16 secretaries and one 
treasurer. As shown in Figure 4.8, all the secretaries surveyed had some level of 
educational qualification, although over 60% of them had only secondary education.  
In contrast, education does not have to play a significant role in the selection of the 
chairperson, as 9 (39%) out of the 23 chairpersons had no education at all. Rather, FBOs 
tend to select the oldest or most respected person among the members as the chairperson 
(Salifu et al. 2012), which is largely a reflection of leadership style in rural Ghana. 
Similarly, if women are among the members, a woman gets the position of treasurer, 
because of the widely held perception that women are much less corrupt and therefore 
more trustworthy than their male counterparts in terms of guarding public resources 
(Salifu et al. 2012).  
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Figure 4.8. FBO leaders and their educational level  
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
 
The second governance issue to consider is rules, which should provide FBO members 
with the confidence to participate and invest in collective activities (Pretty & Ward 
2001). Similar to many organisations, FBOs create rules (often referred to as 
constitutions or by-laws) that should regulate how to become a member and exit, and 
how to undertake collective activities, as well as how to share benefits. The majority of 
the FBOs under consideration in this study have these constitutions and by-laws because 
they are often prerequisites for the registration of FBOs with the relevant departments 
and agencies. However, the ways in which FBOs acquire their constitutions and by-laws 
is questionable. Field evidence revealed that outsiders often draft FBOs’ constitutions 
and by-laws without taking the cultural and local conditions of the members into 
consideration. For instance, the DOC, one of the key institutions that registers FBOs, has 
a template constitution that it gives to FBOs that register with it. One may describe this 
constitution as a ‘bought’ one because FBOs pay to a get a copy during their registration 
with the DOC. The problem with this is that the enforcement of rules becomes more 
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 difficult because many of the rules are alien to the FBO members. Indeed, some studies 
(see, e.g., Ostrom 1990, 1995) suggest that when members of a group craft their own 
rules, they are better understood and adopted more easily than those that outsiders 
impose, because the local people have better information about the subtle nuances of 
their environment than do outsiders. For instance, many FBO constitutions reviewed in 
this study require members to make regular monetary contributions (often referred to as 
dues) but fail to take into consideration that, for most of the farming season, smallholder 
farmers do not have the money to make such contributions. For example, while 73% of 
the 120 FBO members surveyed indicated that they pay dues, only 35% of those who 
pay dues said that they pay on a monthly basis as stipulated in their constitutions. This 
suggests that many FBOs fail to abide by their constitutions and by-laws. Another 
example worth noting is the term of office for leaders. All the FBO constitutions I 
studied clearly indicated the number of years of tenure for which a leader can serve 
(often 2 or 4 years). However, interviews with FBO leaders revealed that they rarely 
hold elections to elect new leaders, and the leaders will usually serve until the FBOs 
collapse. The general view among smallholder farmers was that with their traditional 
style of governance, when leaders are elected, they are often allowed to rule until they 
die.  
Similar to constitutions and by-laws, FBOs also open bank accounts as part of their 
registration processes (92% of the 40 FBOs surveyed had bank accounts). The bank 
accounts serve at least two purposes: first, to receive financial support from outsiders 
such as government and NGOs; and, second, to save money accruing from FBOs’ 
activities such as entrance fees, membership dues and group farming (for a distribution 
on FBOs’ sources of income, see Figure 4.9). 
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Figure 4.9. FBOs’ sources of income  
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
 
As shown in Figure 4.9, membership dues constitute the most important source of 
income for the FBOs studied but, as noted already, not many members pay dues on a 
regular basis. The inability of the FBOs to receive dues on a regular basis is reflected in 
their average savings (see Table 4.3). Such savings, as little as they are, cannot boost 
collective activities in FBOs, as effective collective action would result in some level of 
administrative cost. As Rouse (2006) argues, FBOs with strong income generation, 
savings and capital accumulation will be more self-reliant, independent and sustainable 
in respect of their activities. 
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 Table 4.3 
Descriptive statistics on FBO savings 
 Amount (GH₵) Amount ($) 
Mean 411.25 205.63 
Median 300.00 150.00 
Standard deviation 360.07 180.03 
Minimum  0 0 
Maximum 1,400 700 
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
Note: GH₵ indicates Ghana cedi and GH₵1 = US$0.50: this exchange rate is used for all dollar 
calculations in this chapter; 1 June 2013 exchange rates are available online 
at http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=USD&date=2013-06-01. Accessed 07/12/13  
 
The analysis in this section suggests that the election of leaders, the creation of rules, the 
opening of bank accounts and the registration of FBOs are mere formalities that enable 
FBOs to receive external support. A seemingly frustrated FBO member in the Eastern 
Region summed up this observation when he indicated that 
… they told us to contribute money and open a bank account, register our group 
and all that, so that they will give us a loan but after going through all these 
[processes] we did not get the loan. (Interview with FBO member in Eastern 
Region, 03/01/2013)  
In addition to the above discussion, it is also important to understand the composition of 
FBOs and their members, especially in relation to the socio-economic characteristics of 
their members. 
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 4.5.1.2 The composition of FBOs 
Discussions on the composition of membership organisations often referred two key 
variables: the size of the organisation and the homogeneity or heterogeneity of its 
members (reviewed in Chapter 2).  
In relation to size, village-level FBOs in Ghana have a relatively small membership size. 
Fieldwork data for this study and the 2010 IFPRI survey put the average size of FBOs at 
33 and 36 members, respectively. The membership size for FBOs in this study ranged 
from eight to 76. One reason for the relatively small membership is that many outsiders, 
when forming FBOs, prescribe small sizes, usually ranging from 10 to 50 members. This 
rationalisation by the outsiders may be based on the theoretical and empirical arguments 
that FBOs are more likely to be effective if they have a small membership (Olson 1965; 
Ostrom 1990; Coulter et al. 1999). Although many studies on collective action (see, e.g., 
Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990; Coulter et al. 1999) claim that collective action in a group 
will be more effective if the membership is small, this does not seem to be an important 
factor in explaining the performance of Ghanaian FBOs. For example, it is argued that 
rule enforcement is often easier in smaller groups because these groups have higher 
internal cohesion (Coulter et al. 1999), but the analysis here (Section 4.5.1.1) suggests 
that rules that are alien to FBOs may be difficult to enforce even if the FBO in question 
has a small membership.  
It is also important to understand the socio-economic compositions of the FBOs; that is, 
whether FBO members are homogenous or heterogeneous. First, it is worth noting that 
the majority of FBOs are male-dominated.49 According to fieldwork data for this study, 
the average membership ratio of male and female members in an FBO is 21 and 12, 
respectively. It is reasonable to attribute the dominance of males over females partly to 
the manner in which smallholder farmers are recruited into FBOs. As discussed, in 
recruiting FBO members, the tendency to select heads of families of rural households, 
49 The Ministry of Food and Agriculture’s database suggests that about 58% of FBOs are male-dominated. 
This database is available at www.fboghana.org (accessed February 2012).  
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 the majority of whom are relatively elderly men, is strong. Because of this tendency, the 
FBOs tend to have a relatively elderly membership, with an average age of about 48 
years. An interview with a 25-year-old FBO non-member in the Northern Region 
supports this line of argument when he notes that, ‘FBOs are meant for the old people. I 
am a young man and do not participate in groups with old people’ (interview with FBO 
non-member in Northern Region, 22/03/2013). About 23% (9 out of the 35) of the FBO 
non-members interviewed expressed similar concerns. This also points to a key 
vulnerability in FBOs as a mechanism for training smallholder farmers and with regard 
to the long-term sustainability of FBOs. 
In addition, FBO members are largely homogenous in terms of their economic activity, 
particularly with respect to the types of crops they cultivate. Their memberships also 
largely consist of friends and neighbours from the same kinship (see Section 4.5.1). 
Fieldwork has shown that when outsiders set up FBOs whose memberships are drawn 
from more than one village, smallholder farmers find it difficult to manage such FBOs. 
For example, five FBOs in this study reported that they were merged with other FBOs in 
neighbouring villages under the Millennium Challenge Account program (discussed in 
Chapter 1), but broke up immediately after receiving support from the program. This 
goes to support the argument that FBOs work better when they have homogeneous 
members (Ostrom 1990; Fischer & Qaim 2011). 
The analysis in this chapter so far has shown the motivations of smallholder farmers in 
participating in FBOs as well as how FBOs are set up and governed. The discussion also 
shows that both smallholder farmers and outsiders (government and NGOs) consider 
FBOs as organisations that should increase smallholder farmers’ access to extension 
services, farm inputs, credit and the outputs market. While I return to examine the extent 
to which FBOs are helping smallholder farmers to access extension services, inputs and 
credit in the next three chapters of this thesis, there remains much to learn about how 
smallholder farmers use FBOs to engage in a wide range of collective activities, which 
are discussed in the next section.  
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 4.5.2 Collective activities in FBOs 
This section discusses a variety of collective activities in which FBOs engage, especially 
those activities that they undertake with little or no support from outsiders such as 
government and NGOs. While the collective activities in which FBOs engage may 
depend on their types (see Section 4.3.3), the emphasis here is on production FBOs, as 
this is the focus of this research.  
Four main types of collective activities have been identified in production FBOs, 
including joint purchase of inputs, joint production, joint marketing and mutual labour 
support. It will be evident in this section that most FBOs and their members undertake 
these activities to minimise transaction costs, and also as a strategy to prevent the FBOs 
from collapsing.  
We should also note that FBOs and their members undertake these collective activities 
largely on an ad hoc basis. For instance, 83% of the 120 FBO members surveyed 
indicated that they participate in collective activities as and when necessary, with the 
average participation being on two occasions over the past 4 months preceding the 
survey of this research. The four main collective activities are discussed as follows. 
Joint purchase of inputs 
Some FBO members jointly purchase inputs such as fertiliser, insecticides and 
herbicides (see Figure 4.10). Others also contribute to buying agricultural equipment 
such as knapsack sprayers for common use. Similarly, some smallholder farmers use 
their FBOs to bring tractor contractors to their villages, because tractor operators are 
more willing to go to a village if the farmers assure them of a greater number of hectares 
available for ploughing. This was observed in 5 FBOs. 
Approximately 24% of the 40 FBOs studied indicated that their members have jointly 
purchased farm inputs at least once since their establishment (see Figure 4.10). 
Similarly, 20% of the 501 FBOs in the 2010 IFPRI survey indicated to have jointly 
purchased inputs on at least one occasion (Figure 4.10). There are two main reasons why 
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 FBO members jointly purchase inputs. The first relates to economies of scale, as bulk 
purchase may lead to a decrease in the unit cost of inputs. This is because bulk purchases 
attract discounts and FBO members save on transportation costs, as only one member 
goes to the market to buy on behalf of the FBO. Second, for smallholder farmers to 
purchase inputs on credit, inputs dealers sometimes prefer those who are in FBOs 
because they consider the group as collateral.  
In spite of the advantages associated with joint input purchase, the majority of the FBOs 
are unable to undertake this collective activity because the FBOs lack the skills needed 
to mobilise money from their members. For example, during the field interviews, a 
majority FBO leaders (25 out of the 30 leaders interviewed) indicated that collecting 
money from their members to purchase inputs for them was difficult because their 
members were unable to raise money at the same time, which again points to 
weaknesses in the governance and management of FBOs.  
 
Figure 4.10. Collective activities in FBOs  
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data and the 2010 IFPRI survey 
Note: 2010* represents data from the 2010 IFPRI survey (n = 501) and 2013* represents the author’s 
fieldwork data (n = 40); these are not necessarily comparable datasets. 
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Joint production 
Some FBOs have group farms where members undertake joint production but, as noted 
earlier (Section 4.3.3), these group farms are relatively small in size. Figure 4.10 
suggests that joint production is the second most common collective activity among 
FBOs. About 51% and 45% of FBOs in this study and the 2010 IFPRI survey, 
respectively, undertook joint production.  
Typically, FBO members provide labour for all activities on the group farm as well as 
making monetary contributions to purchase inputs for the farm. Concerning land for the 
group farm, most FBOs in Southern Ghana make monetary contributions to rent or buy 
it, whereas for those in Northern Ghana, members donate the land for joint production 
because land is relatively abundant compared with Southern Ghana.  
In most case, AEAs initiate joint production among FBO members so that such group 
farms will serve for demonstration purposes. Some FBOs also do group farming as a 
way of keeping the members together in anticipation of future support. FBO members 
therefore do not regard joint production as a business-oriented collective activity from 
which they can make a profit. About 18% of the 40 FBOs surveyed indicated that they 
had stopped group farming because they were no longer attracting external support and 
not making a profit either. For example, an FBO member in the Eastern Region 
indicated that, ‘we were doing a group farm in order to get help [from outsiders] but 
since we are not getting help we got discouraged and have stopped the group farm’ 
(interview with FBO member, 03/01/2013). Nevertheless, when FBOs do make some 
revenue from their group farms, they mainly use that revenue to cover their 
administrative costs.  
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 Joint marketing 
A few FBOs also market their produce collectively (see Figure 4.10). Collective 
marketing can take at least three forms. First, the members gather their produce and then 
invite a buyer into the community. Second, they use a common facility to transport their 
produce to the market to benefit from collective bargaining power and minimise 
transportation costs. Finally, they link their members with agribusiness companies and 
facilitate contracts for members to sell their produce. While smallholder farmers in this 
study recognised the benefits of joint marketing, such as improved access to the market 
and higher prices for their produce, the majority of them still do not undertake this 
collective activity (see Figure 4.10). This is largely because they do not have the 
requisite organisational skills to monitor market information and organise their members 
to market collectively at a time when most of them would be willing to sell their 
produce.  
Mutual labour support 
Mutual labour support is the most common collective activity among the FBOs studied 
(see Figure 4.10). It refers to a situation in which FBO members provide each other with 
reciprocal labour support in their fields, a strategy they employ to cope with seasonal 
labour demands. Mutual labour exchange is the most common collective activity in 
FBOs, partly because it has been a practice among smallholder farmers through informal 
groupings since the pre-colonial period (DeGraft-Johnson 1958).  
The above discussion further supports the argument that the majority of smallholder 
farmers participate in FBOs not necessarily to undertake internal collective activities but 
primarily as a means of accessing external support such as grants and credit. As shown 
in the discussion, in many cases, FBO members undertake internal collective activities 
to sustain the identity of the group in anticipation of future external support.  
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 4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter first explored the definition of FBOs and identified a four-tier structure, 
which consists of village-, district-, regional- and national-level FBOs. The discussion 
then focused on the diversity and prevalence of village-level FBOs. The analysis has 
shown that the number of village-level FBOs continues to grow in Ghana, although the 
country is yet to have comprehensive policies governing the activities of FBOs. The 
chapter argues that three main factors explain the continuous rise in the number of 
FBOs, namely, the preference of the government and NGOs to implement their 
agricultural-related projects and programs through FBOs; the preference of MOFA in 
delivering extension services to farmers via FBOs; and farmers’ perception that FBO 
membership will facilitate their access to external support in the form of grants and 
credit. 
With a focus on production FBOs (discussed in Section 4.3.3), the evidence in this 
chapter also shows that although the primary motivation for smallholder farmers to join 
FBOs is to access financial support in the form of grants and credit, the majority of the 
members rather end up receiving extension services.  
The chapter then concludes that as the primary motivation for the majority of 
smallholder farmers who participate in FBOs is to facilitate their access to external 
support such as grants and credit, they undertake very little in the way of internal 
economic collective activities, such as joint production and joint marketing of their farm 
produce. Poor rule enforcement, weak leaders and a lack of clearly defined objectives in 
FBOs compound this situation.  
However, for FBOs to be effective, their members must pay attention to both their 
internal and external work. Their internal activities, such as regular meetings, joint 
purchase of farm inputs and joint marketing, are crucial in building strong FBOs. 
Without strong internal activities, FBOs are unlikely to attract outsiders to provide 
services such as inputs and credit. Miracle and Seidman’s observation, about six decades 
ago, that agricultural cooperatives in Ghana were often forced on farmers by the 
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 government (see Chapter 1) and did not bear out farmers’ own interests, as well as the 
individualistic nature of farmers in accessing services, are still relevant in today’s FBOs 
(Miracle & Seidman 1968). 
The next three chapters of this thesis focus on understanding the extent to which FBOs 
facilitate smallholder farmers’ access to external support in the form of extension 
services, inputs (which could take the form of grants) and credit.  
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
IMPROVING ACCESS TO EXTENSION SERVICES: DO FBOs MAKE A 
DIFFERENCE? 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, I set the stage to examine the key research question of this study: whether 
farmer-based organisations (FBOs) make a difference in the way smallholder farmers 
acquire extension services, inputs and credit by exploring the types, formation, 
characteristics and activities of FBOs. The evidence in the chapter shows that FBOs are 
becoming increasingly important stakeholders for the development of smallholder 
agriculture, resulting in continuous growth and expansion. Discussions in the chapter 
also showed that the majority of smallholder farmers participate in FBOs mainly to 
facilitate their access to external support in the form of credit, grants and extension 
services.  
This chapter focuses on understanding the degree to which FBOs are helping 
smallholder farmers in accessing extension services. In this study, I follow Birner and 
colleagues’ definition of extension services as a set of services that support farmers ‘to 
solve problems and to obtain information, skills, and technologies to improve their 
livelihoods and well-being’ (Birner et al. 2009, p. 342). Effective extension services are 
critical for improved productivity among smallholder farmers. As noted earlier (Chapter 
1), there are two main ways to increase agricultural output, namely ‘expanding the land 
area under cultivation and improving the yields on existing cultivated land’ (Norton 
2004, p. 357). Analyses in Chapter 1 showed that agricultural growth in Ghana (in fact, 
in many African countries) is mainly driven by land expansion rather than increases in 
the productivity of the current farming land, partly because the adoption of modern 
technology is still low among smallholder farmers (Breisinger et al. 2012). However, 
increasing agricultural productivity through land expansion is not environmentally 
126 
 
 sustainable (the case of Ghana is discussed briefly in Chapter 1); the only viable option 
is to improve yields on the cultivated land (Norton 2004).  
As noted earlier (Chapter 1), central to increasing yields on cultivated land is the 
existence of effective extension services that facilitate farmers’ use of improved 
technologies and modern farm inputs (Chang 2012; Diao et al. 2013). However, due to 
the majority of farmers in Ghana being smallholders, who are scattered geographically 
across the country, extension delivery to farmers is a huge challenge, as there are small 
numbers of agricultural extension agents (AEAs) to reach out to a wider spectrum of 
farmers (Chapter 1). FBOs are widely regarded as organisations that have a great 
potential to improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension services. The Government 
of Ghana aims at developing FBOs into independent institutions that generate and 
deliver extension services for their members (GOG 2010).  
With the primary aim of examining the degree to which FBOs improve smallholder 
farmers’ access to extension services, this chapter adopts the following structure. It 
begins with a detailed account of extension delivery approaches that various Ghanaian 
governments have implemented over the past four decades, before discussing how 
government and other relevant stakeholders are now using FBOs to deliver extension 
services. Next, the chapter discusses the key extension technologies (messages) that 
service providers (mainly the AEAs) deliver to farmers. The chapter then examines 
whether FBOs make a difference in smallholder farmers’ access to extension services by 
providing a critical comparison between smallholder farmers who participate in FBOs 
and those who do not. Finally, the chapter explores the factors that shape the role of 
FBOs in improving smallholder farmers’ access to extension services.  
5.2 Approaches to the delivery of extension services in Ghana: some 
established facts 
Agricultural extension services in Ghana have evolved considerably during the past 
several decades. During the colonial period, the colonial government, foreign-owned 
companies and church missionaries provided extension services mainly to farmers who 
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 cultivated export commodities such as cocoa and coffee (DeGraft-Johnson 1958; MOFA 
2002). In the course of this period, the colonial governments and other stakeholders used 
agricultural cooperatives to facilitate the delivery of extension services to these cash-
crop producers (DeGraft-Johnson 1958).  
When Ghana attained independence in 1957, the sovereign government started providing 
extension services to farmers who cultivated food crops such as maize in order to 
modernise traditional farming practices across the country (Amezah & Dormon 2004). 
During this period, different government departments and donor projects continued to 
use agricultural cooperatives on a limited basis, mainly to provide technical information 
and to distribute farm inputs to farmers at subsidised rates (Amezah & Dormon 2004; 
Asuming-Brempong, Sarpong & Asante 2005). The extension approach in the post-
independence period, however, received two major criticisms. First, it was argued that 
AEAs paid too much attention to pro-urban and progressive farmers, to the neglect of 
poorer smallholder farmers (Okorley 2007). The second criticism was that the various 
departments under the Ministry of Agriculture that provided commodity-based extension 
could not coordinate among themselves in providing extension services (Okorley 2007). 
To address some of these criticisms, the then Ministry of Agriculture established the 
Department of Agricultural Extension Services (DAES) in 1987, to bring together all 
public extension services under one umbrella (Asuming-Brempong, Sarpong & Asante 
2005). In addition, the Government of Ghana adopted a World Bank–sponsored Unified 
Extension System (UES), which was introduced in many developing countries in the 
1970s and 1980s to provide extension services to rural dwellers (MOFA 2002). 
The DAES was responsible for implementing the UES model nationwide. The UES 
model employed training and visit (T&V) as the primary approach to delivering 
extension services, which emphasised regular training and visits to farms. The T&V 
method was based on the ‘contact farmer’ concept, which implied transferring 
technologies from AEAs to selected farmers in villages, called contact farmers, who 
would in turn transfer what they had learnt to other farmers (Nagel 1997). The T&V 
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 approach to extension delivery suffered a major setback when the World Bank funding 
ended, as it required a high financial outlay (MOFA 2002). The approach was also 
regarded as non-responsive to farmers’ needs, because it was top-down and single-line 
in command, with farmers playing only passive roles. In this respect, farmers did not 
play any meaningful role in the generation of new knowledge or technologies (MOFA 
2002; Birner et al. 2009). In addition, the contact farmer concept failed not least because 
the so-called contact farmers often did not have the means to pass on what they had 
learnt to other farmers (Nagel 1997). These reasons, among others, led to a call for 
major extension reforms and in 2003, a new agricultural extension policy was ready for 
implementation in Ghana (Asuming-Brempong, Sarpong & Asante 2005).  
The current agricultural extension policy in Ghana emphasises a pluralistic, participatory 
and demand-driven delivery of extension services, both due to inadequate extension 
personnel (e.g. AEAs) and limited budgets to provide public extension (MOFA 2002; 
GOG 2007). The policy therefore underscores the need for partnership among 
government, NGOs, private-sector organisations and FBOs in the delivery of extension 
services. In spite of this initiative, it is important to note that the government (i.e. the 
public sector) is still the major provider of extension services, although the past decade 
has witnessed an increase in the involvement of NGOs and the private sector in 
extension provision (Okorley 2007). While some NGOs and private-sector organisations 
hire their own AEAs (who often are not graduates from Agricultural Extension 
colleges),50 many of them depend on the government’s AEAs to deliver services to 
farmers (Owusu-Baah 2012).  
50 Two NGOs in the Northern Region of Ghana, Care International and the Presbyterian Agricultural 
Station, recruit their own AEAs to deliver services. However, Send-Ghana, in the Northern Region, relies 
on public AEAs to deliver extension services through a memorandum of understanding with MOFA.  
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 The current extension policy also encourages the use of a wide range of extension 
methods, such as farmer field schools,51 mass communication through radio, television 
and communication vans,52 as well as the dissemination of extension through FBOs. In 
particular, it is argued that the use of farmer field schools and FBOs will ensure a high 
rate of participation of farmers in extension delivery, as these methods expect farmers to 
take part in the decision-making, such as defining goals, planning, implementing and 
assessing their extension activities (MOFA 2002; GOG 2007).  
Today, although government, NGOs and private-sector organisations organise and 
deliver extension services using a variety of ways, FBOs appear to be the preferred 
method. The use of radio, television and communications vans in delivering extension 
services appears to be supplementary, because they seem to lack a target audience as 
compared to FBOs. It is because of this that I now turn to focus on FBOs by first 
exploring the different ways in which AEAs use them to deliver extension services. 
5.3 Delivering extension services through FBOs 
This section sets out to examine the different ways in which AEAs interact with FBOs in 
delivering extension services. Specifically, the section begins with a discussion on the 
roles and functions of AEAs under MOFA, before examining how they mobilise FBO 
members to discharge their duties. The section also explores different kinds of 
technologies that AEAs deliver to farmers.  
5.3.1 The roles of agricultural extension agents 
In line with extension service provision at MOFA, each AEA has a designated 
operational area (about eight communities or villages) and is expected to visit every 
village on a fortnightly basis (Kolavalli et al. 2010) – a target that AEAs rarely meet (see 
51 The Farmer Field School (FFS) is a group-based learning process that involves technology development 
and dissemination based on adult-learning principles such as experiential learning (Naamwintome & 
Millar 2013). 
52 Communication vans are mobile vehicles that disseminate agricultural information to farmers in the 
villages.  
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 Section 5.4).53 It is important to note that AEAs provide extension services to farmers at 
both the village and farm levels (for a detailed discussion, see Section 5.3.2). Their main 
function is to inform farmers of improved agricultural technologies, including crop 
varieties, as well as gathering and transferring information from farmers to relevant 
stakeholders such as research institutions (MOFA 2005). While it is becoming the 
standard in many countries for AEAs to work with farmers to identify problems and 
developed shared solutions (Anderson, Feder & Ganguly 2006), my fieldwork shows 
that extension services provision focus more on transferring technologies and products 
(e.g. seeds) to farmers, whose role is merely to apply the available technologies (for a 
detailed discussion, see Section 5.3.3). This suggests that the views of farmers are less 
likely to be incorporated into the development and provision of new agricultural 
technologies.  
In addition to their core duty of providing agricultural technologies to farmers, current 
extension policies require AEAs to educate farmers on topics not directly related to 
agricultural production, such as HIV/AIDs, sanitation and hygiene, as part of their duties 
(MOFA 2002; GOG, 2007).  
What is important to note is that AEAs are increasingly using FBOs to undertake a large 
share of their extension work, because they consider these organisations not only as a 
more cost-effective means of providing services but also as local institutions that have 
the potential to facilitate rapid diffusion of appropriate technology among smallholder 
farmers (GOG 2007). It is therefore important to understand how AEAs deliver 
extension services through FBOs.  
5.3.2 How are extension services delivered in FBOs? 
Typically, the delivery of extension services through FBOs involves three key processes, 
as outlined in Figure 5.1 and discussed below. 
53 A study of four Districts in Ghana suggests that about 44% of operational areas do not have AEAs 
(Kolavalli et al. 2010). 
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Figure 5.1. The process of organising extension meetings  
First, the AEA contacts a leader of an FBO to schedule an extension meeting. Field 
interviews with the 40 FBO leaders and the eight AEAs show that many AEAs arrange 
extension meeting with FBO leaders via cell phones. This is not surprising, as cell 
phones appear to have penetrated deeply into rural Ghana. For example, of the 240 
farmers surveyed, about 74% owned cell phones (see Table 3.6).54 One would also 
expect FBOs to initiate extension meetings for their members, but field evidence shows 
that FBO leaders rarely do so. The interviews revealed two main reasons why the 
majority of FBO leaders find it difficult to initiate extension meetings. The first relates 
to the complexities of self-organising without the involvement of AEAs. Here, the 
leaders noted that organising members before inviting AEAs is difficult, particularly as 
members tend to be pessimistic about getting the AEAs into their communities to teach 
them on a timely basis. Second, they noted that they need financial resources to pay 
AEAs’ travel and transportation (‘T&T’) when they invite them over. For instance, an 
FBO leader asserted that, ‘when we invite [an] AEA …, we must reward him in either 
kind or cash to at least take care of the cost of transportation to the village’ (interview 
with FBO leader in Northern Region, 22/03/2013), which they do not have in most 
cases. This is because, as discussed in Chapter 4, the mobilisation of internal resources 
among FBO members is poor. 
54 This is line with statistics from the National Communications Authority, which reports, on a monthly 
basis, a continuous increase in the subscriber base in the country. For details, see 
http://www.nca.org.gh/40/105/Market-Share-Statistics.html  
The AEA contacts the FBO 
through its leader to 
schedule a meeting 
The FBO leader informs 
members about the meeting 
The extension meeting takes 
place 
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 In the second process (see Figure 5.1), the FBO leader informs the members about the 
extension meeting. It is the expectation of the AEA that the leader will pass on details 
about the meeting to all members of the FBOs. This means that FBO leaders have a key 
role to play, and that the quality of the leaders will greatly determine the number of 
members who will participate in the extension meeting. 
The final process is the extension meeting itself. Survey results from the 120 FBO 
members indicate that majority of AEAs hold extension meetings with them at the 
village or community centres (see Figure 5.2), which may not be appropriate venues for 
learning new farming technologies. It is reasonable to expect that a greater part of the 
teaching and learning between farmers and AEAs should take place at the farm level, for 
the purpose of practical demonstrations. However, as the evidence here shows (Figure 
5.2), less than 40% of the extension meetings did take place at the farm level. Recent 
studies suggest that learning in the field is the preferred means of learning for farmers, 
as this provides hands-on learning as well as the sharing of ideas from peers (see, e.g., 
Franz et al. 2010). In line with this observation, field interviews with both AEAs and 
farmers revealed that extension teaching and learning do not significantly improve 
farmers’ practical knowledge. The majority of the few extension meetings that took 
place in the field (on the farm) were between the AEA and individual farmers, rather 
than between the AEA and FBO members in a group (Figure 5.2).  
Although both farmers and AEAs recognised the shortcomings of extension meetings in 
the village centres as compared to field-based learning centres, two main factors partly 
explain why the former is still the most popular approach. First, AEAs ‘do not have the 
resources such as seeds, fertilisers, and agrochemicals to set up demonstration farms’ 
(interview with AEA in Eastern Region, 03/06/2013); a view expressed by all the AEAs 
interviewed.  
Some NGOs are investing in demonstration farms, albeit on a limited basis. For 
examples, in the East Gonja and West Mamprusi Districts, 1-acre (0.4 hectare) rice 
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 demonstration farms were set up for two FBOs under a project sponsored by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) during the 2012 farming season.55 To improve 
this situation, neither NGOs nor the private sector can do it alone; the state (government) 
must play a crucial role in supporting the setting up of demonstration farms across the 
country. As Green (2008) argues, states shape the evolution of the private sector and 
there are no short cuts through the private sector only.  
 
Figure 5.2. Where extension delivery with FBO members takes place  
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data  
 
The second reason why the majority of the extension meetings take place in the village 
centres is the inability of most FBOs to maintain group farms that can serve as 
demonstration farms. For instance, of the 40 FBOs studied, only 18 had group farms. 
55 Other NGOs that support FBOs in the Northern Region to set up demonstration farms include the 
Presbyterian Agricultural Station and Send-Ghana. 
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 We should note that the existence of a group farm does not necessarily provide the 
solution, as many of the FBOs may not have the internal resources to purchase the farm 
inputs required for effective teaching and learning (for a discussion on the generation of 
internal resources among FBO members, see Chapter 4).  
Notwithstanding the above reasons concerning the inability to hold the majority of 
extension meetings at the farm level, evidence from the field shows that when extension 
meetings take place in village centres, they sometimes offer FBO non-members the 
opportunity to participate,56 especially if the village is small. However, when FBO 
members cannot exclude non-members in their extension meetings, FBO members may 
have little incentive to incur cost to promote collective action in the FBO, a phenomenon 
often referred to in the literature of collective action as the ‘free-rider problem’ (Olson 
1965; Ostrom 1990). 
The discussion in this section so far has focused on a three-stage process for organising 
extension meetings as well as the key challenges that come with this process. However, 
Figure 5.2 suggests that there are other approaches to organising extension meetings. 
One approach that is evident in Figure 5.2 is extension meetings between AEAs and 
leaders or individual members. AEAs sometimes meet and teach only FBO leaders or a 
few members, who in turn are expected to pass on the knowledge to others. This is a 
common approach because all the AEAs interviewed indicated that organising FBO 
members to participate in extension meetings is often challenging. For instance, one 
AEA in the Northern Region reported that they sometimes adopt the individual learning 
approach because ‘getting a suitable time for all of them [farmers] is usually difficult’ 
(interview with AEA, 14/02/2013).  
Another approach is to organise extension meetings outside the village. In this case, 
AEAs select a few members (usually the leaders) to participate in training workshops at 
the District and Regional levels, who are then expected to train their colleagues on their 
56 However, fieldwork interviews with FBO non-members generally suggest that they do not want to 
participate in FBOs’ meetings for which they are not members. 
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 return.57 Unfortunately, leaders and other participants at such meetings ‘do not impart 
the knowledge to their members [farmers]’ (interview with AEA in Northern Region, 
08/12/2012), largely because they do not have the skills and capacity to do so. About 
60% of the AEAs interviewed made similar remarks. 
In summary, the analyses in this section have shown that delivering extension services 
through FBOs requires effective collaboration between AEAs and FBO leaders. In 
particular, it has been argued that the number of FBO members who participate in 
extension meetings depends on the ability of the leaders to mobilise the members. 
Another point worthy of note is that the majority of extension meetings take place at the 
village centres rather than in farms or on demonstration plots, where AEAs may easily 
pass on practical knowledge to farmers. Here, I have argued the need for government to 
play a key role in setting up demonstrations plots for FBOs.  
As noted earlier, it is also important to important to identify the different kinds of 
technologies that AEAs teach farmers during extension meetings.  
5.3.3 Technologies promoted to farmers 
This section presents a wide range of extension technologies (messages) that AEAs 
frequently promote among smallholder farmers. The focus here is to identify the most 
common extension technologies. This will form the basis for further examination of the 
frequency with which these technologies are promoted among smallholder farmers.  
A recent World Bank study (World Bank and IFPRI 2010) on gender and rural services 
in three African countries, including Ghana, reported that the five common topics that 
AEAs teach farmers in Ghana are as follows: 
– FBO formation, management and leadership;  
– planting techniques; 
57 For example, an FBO member in the Tamale Metropolis of the Northern Region indicated that in 2012, 
their AEA ‘selected five people [members] who went for training and they are [were] expected to train 
the entire group’ on their return (interview with FBO member, 25/02/2013).  
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 – improved seed variety of plant material;  
– soil fertility management; and  
– aquaculture (World Bank and IFPRI 2010).  
In line with this World Bank study, the present study identified the following as the most 
frequently taught technologies through field interactions with the eight AEAs: 
– preparation of the land;  
– the use of improved seed varieties;  
– planting distances;  
– fertiliser application; 
– weed control; and  
– harvesting and post-harvesting techniques.  
Field interviews with the AEAs revealed that the decision to teach farmers particular 
technologies is based largely on their discretion. In a few cases, when AEAs work on 
projects, the projects specify the technologies that should be taught to farmers. For 
example, under the Millennium Challenge Account Program (see Chapters 1 and 4), 
AEAs received specific guidelines on what technologies to teach farmers. Similarly, 
interviews with smallholder farmers in FBOs also show that when deciding what 
technologies they need assistance with, a great many of them do not have a voice. 
Naamwintome and Millar (2013) make a similar point when they describe extension 
delivery in many developing countries as a teacher–pupil relationship, with the AEAs 
assuming the position of knowing it all.  
In addition to understanding the most common technologies that AEAs teach 
smallholder farmers, it was also important to understand those technologies from the 
perspective of the farmers. A question was included in the survey/questionnaires that 
asked farmers to indicate the three most common technologies they had recently learnt 
from AEAs. The responses to the question are summarised in Figure 5.3, showing that 
the three most common technologies that AEAs teach smallholder farmers are planting 
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 techniques, fertiliser use and herbicide application. We should note that these 
technologies remain the most frequently taught among smallholder farmers even when 
one disaggregates the data by region (see Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3. Farmers’ perspective of the most frequent extension services (topics taught) that they 
receive  
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data  
 
While smallholder farmers cultivate more than one crop, it is important to note that the 
teaching and learning of these technologies are mainly in relation to the maize crop. The 
majority of the farmers are taught these technologies because maize is not only a major 
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 staple crop but also a crop grown in almost every part of the country. For instance, of the 
240 smallholder farmers surveyed in this study, approximately 88% indicated that they 
cultivated maize.  
To sum up, the above discussion shows that AEAs teach farmers a wide range of 
technologies, with planting techniques, fertiliser use and herbicide application being the 
most frequently taught technologies. However, the frequency with which AEAs teach 
farmers these technologies is still unclear. The section that follows answers this 
question. I also examine the extent to which FBOs influence how regularly AEAs teach 
smallholder farmers. In other words, one needs to examine if there are differences 
between FBO members and non-members regarding the frequency of the extension 
services (technologies) they receive.  
5.4 Smallholders’ access to extension services 
‘The truth is that if you do not belong to FBOs you hardly get training from us 
[agricultural extension agents].’ (Interview with AEA in Northern Region, 07/12/2012)  
This section has two main aims. First, it explores how frequently smallholder farmers 
receive extension services. Second, it examines the determinants of farmers’ access to 
extension services and the extent to which FBOs influence the frequency smallholder 
farmers get extension services.  
The analytical approach adopted in this section involves an extensive comparison 
between FBO members and non-members. As discussed in Chapter 3, the study used a 
propensity score matching technique, which reduced the smallholder farmers’ sample 
from 240 (120 FBO members and 120 FBO non-members) to 226 (120 FBO members 
and 106 FBO non-members). For purposes of comparison between FBO members and 
non-members, the remainder of this chapter and the subsequent chapters use the reduced 
sample of 226.  It is important to emphasise again in this chapter that the PSM technique 
was used mainly to ensure that the sampling approach used in selecting the two groups 
(FBO members and non-members) was robust to allow for a comparison between FBO 
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 members and non-members regarding their access to extension services. In other words, 
the PSM technique here is not intended to undertake analysis of paired individual 
farmers’ outcomes but rather to ensure a comparison between FBO members and non-
members. 
In undertaking these analyses, this section utilises both basic descriptive statistics and 
more complex statistical analyses such as regression analysis. The discussions also 
incorporate qualitative analysis, usually to provide in-depth explanations for the 
variations in accessing extension services based on field interviews.  
5.4.1 A measure of accessing extension services: do FBOs count? 
‘I do not know any AEA ... AEAs do not work with those of us who are not in FBOs.’ 
(Interview with FBO non-member in the Tamale Metropolis of the Northern Region, 
09/12/2013)  
This subsection answers two interrelated questions. The firsts relates to the determinants 
of access to extension services and the second concerns how frequently smallholder 
farmers receive extension services from AEAs. The second question particularly 
examines whether FBOs facilitate how often smallholder farmers receive extension 
services from AEAs.  
To begin with, evidence from the Ghana Living Standard Survey 5 (GLSS5) of 2005–6 
– the most recent nationwide household survey data – suggests that AEAs visit about 
51% of the rural communities in Ghana.58 However, the GLSS5 did not collect data 
regarding how frequently AEAs visit farmers in the rural communities. Although this 
present research cannot claim to have a nationally representative sample, it included a 
question that required smallholder farmers to describe their access to extension services. 
An examination of responses to this question, as shown in columns 1 and 4 of Table 5.1, 
shows that the majority of the surveyed smallholder farmers indicated that they 
58 The Ghana Living Standard Survey 6 (GLSS6) was released towards the end of 2014, but I have not 
been successful in acquiring the up-to-date dataset.  
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 sometimes (about 39%) or never (about 37%) received extension services. The figures 
further show that the majority of the farmers thought that they did not receive extension 
services in the manner they would have expected.  
The responses become even more revealing when one disaggregates the data according 
to whether smallholder farmers are FBO members or FBO non-members. Table 5.1 
suggests that membership of an FBO is the surest way for smallholder farmers to access 
extension, as none of the 120 FBO members indicated that they had never received 
extension services. In contrast, of the 106 FBO non-members, about 22% indicated that 
they had accessed one form of extension service (see column 3 of Table 5.1), with the 
majority of them (78%) indicating that they had never received any extension services.  
Table 5.1  
Smallholders’ perspective on their frequency of access to extension services  
 Frequency (%) 
Frequency of service  FBO member FBO non-member Total 
Always get service 14 (11.7) 1 (0.9) 15 (6.6) 
Usually get service 41 (34.2) 0 (0.0) 41 (18.1) 
Sometimes get service 65 (54.2) 22 (20.8) 88 (38.5) 
Never get service 0 (0.0) 83 (78.3) 83 (36.7) 
Total 120 (100) 106 (100) 226 (100) 
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
 
It is also important to note that in Table 5.1, even with the FBO members, more than 
half (about 54%) indicated that they sometimes got services, suggesting that FBO 
members did not get extension services at a frequency that they would have wished. 
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 A closer look at only FBO non-members shows that those who reside in communities 
with FBOs have a greater chance of receiving extension services compared to their 
counterparts in non-FBO communities. As shown in the Table 5.2, only 4 (12%) out of 
33 FBO non-members who reside in communities with no FBOs ever received extension 
service, which suggest that the presence of FBOs in a community can enhance 
smallholder farmers chances of receiving extension services from AEAs. Bratton 
(1986a) made a similar observation about four decades ago using data from one 
agricultural season in Zimbabwe, when he noted that membership of farmer 
organisations is a major factor explaining a high level of contact between AEAs and 
farmers. 
Table 5.2 
Whether FBO non-members received extension services based on the type of community  
 Whether farmer receives extension services?  
Type of community No Yes Total 
Non-FBO community 29 4 33 
 87.88% 12.12% 100% 
FBO Community 54 19 73 
 73.97% 26.03% 100% 
Total 83 23 106 
 78.30% 21.70% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
 
While Table 5.1 shows the significance of FBO membership in accessing extension 
services, it is also important to explore the factors that determine farmers’ access to 
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 extension services beyond membership of FBOs. Table 5.3 presents a binary logistic 
regression on the determinants of farmers’ access to extension services.  
Table 5.3 
Determinants of smallholder farmers’ access to extension using binary logistic regression (Dep. Var.: Whether farmer 
received extension services) 
Variables B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Whether farmer belong to FBO (dummy, 1=Yes) 2.229 .475 22.050 .000 9.295 
Age -.002 .024 .005 .946 .998 
Years of farming experience -.013 .026 .271 .603 .987 
Whether farmer owns a cell phone (dummy, 1=Yes) .149 .480 .096 .757 1.160 
Landholding size under cultivation -.148 .078 3.572 .059 .863 
Distance from extension service centre .001 .012 .003 .960 1.001 
Gender (male=1) 1.153 .619 3.470 .062 3.168 
Whether the village is assigned an AEA (dummy, 
1=Yes) 1.775 .577 9.470 .002 5.899 
Total landholding size -.018 .023 .630 .427 .982 
Farmer's years in education .109 .041 7.216 .007 1.115 
Whether farmer has access to radio (dummy, 1=Yes) 1.212 .574 4.461 .035 3.362 
Constant -3.969 1.223 10.530 .001 .019 
Note. Observations = 226; Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: Chi-square = 3.637, d.f. = 8, Sig = 0.888, -2 Log likelihood = 
180.426, Cox & Snell R Square = 0.439, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.588; overall percentage of right predictions = 54.9 
The dependent variable included in this regression is whether or not smallholder farmers 
receive extension services during the 2012 farming season. It is important to note that 
out of the 226 farmers, 102 (45%) received at least one form of extension service during 
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 the 2012 farming season. While 88 (73%) out of 120 FBO members received extension 
services, only 14 (13%) out of 106 FBO non-members did.    
The independent variables included in the regression are whether the farmer belongs to 
an FBO, the age of farmers, their years of farming experience, whether they own cell 
phone, their access to radio, their total landholding size and landholding size under 
cultivation. Other variable included in the regression are the gender of farmers, their 
years in education, their distance from the agricultural extension centre and whether the 
village is assigned an AEA from whom farmers can get extension support. 
The results in Table 5.3 further confirm the finding that smallholder farmers’ 
membership of FBO increases significantly their likelihood of receiving extension 
services. The results in the Table also suggest that smallholder farmers’ access to radio, 
their years in education and the whether the village is assigned an AEA significantly 
increase their likelihood of receiving extension services. These results are expected; for 
instance villages without the presence of AEAs will find it difficult to access extension 
services from neighbouring villages. In relation to farmers’ years in education, this 
finding corroborates other studies that have found farmers’ years of education to be 
positively associated with their access to extension services (see, e.g., Foster & 
Rosenzweig 1996; Abdulai & Huffman 2005). 
The remainder of the analysis now focuses on the intensity of farmers’ access to 
extension services.  Although Table 5.1 provides some insights regarding how often 
smallholder farmers receive extension services, it fails to tell us the varying degree of 
frequencies (i.e. the number of times) that farmers meet with AEAs. This study’s 
questionnaire included a question that sought to understand the number of times AEAs 
visited the farmers in the 2012 season (April–October 2012). An examination of the 
number of times AEAs visited smallholder farmers in that farming season shows that, on 
average, AEAs visit farmers once during the farming season. Meeting farmers once in a 
season appears inadequate, but a study conducted in Ethiopia has shown that receiving at 
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 least one extension visit per year reduces the likelihood of being poor by 10% (Dercon et 
al. 2009). However, as this section will show, it is important to note that in Ghana the 
majority of farmers do not receive at least one extension visit year. Extension visits are 
biased towards a particular group of farmers.  
If the survey data are disaggregated by the two administrative regions, one can see that 
farmers from the Eastern Region had the highest average number of AEA visits, 
compared to their Northern counterparts (see Table 5.4). One may see the difference in 
the average number of AEA visits between the Northern and Eastern Regions as 
insignificant, but a test of differences in the averages, using an independent-sample t-
test, shows that there is a statistically significant difference between the two regions.  
Table 5.4 
The average number of AEA visits to farmers in a season, by region  
Region Observations Mean Standard deviation 
Northern 120 1.20 2.509 
Eastern 106 1.92 2.680 
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
Note: The mean difference is significant at the 95% confidence level; t = –2.071, p < .04.  
 
Figure 5.4 provides a further analysis of AEAs’ average visits to smallholder farmers by 
district, which further supports why the average number of visits is higher in the Eastern 
Region compared with the Northern Region. Figure 5.4 shows that except for the East 
Gonja District, the average number of AEA visits for all districts in the Northern Region 
is less than for districts in the Eastern Region. A reasonable explanation for the variation 
may be that the number of farmers per AEA is lower in the Eastern Region as compared 
to the Northern Region. This line of reasoning is supported by the survey results, which 
show that while the average numbers of AEAs that smallholder farmers know, and from 
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 whom they can get extension advice, are 0.65 and 0.94 in the Northern and Eastern 
Regions, respectively; an independent-samples t-test shows that the difference between 
the two regions is statistically significant (t = –3.127, p < .002). Another plausible 
explanation may be that extension centres, located predominantly in District capitals, are 
further away from smallholder farmers in the Northern Region, compared to those in the 
Eastern Region. For example, results from the survey suggest that the average distance 
between farmers and the closest extension centres is greater in the Northern Region 
(about 26 kilometres) compared with the Eastern Region (about 23 kilometres).59  
 
Figure 5.4. Average AEA visits to smallholder farmers by district in one farming season in 2012  
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
 
Although the above analysis helps to reveal some significant variations in AEA visits to 
farmers in different districts and regions, it does not indicate the roles of FBOs in the 
59 Agricultural extension centres in the District are usually the District Agricultural Development Units 
(DADU), which are located in District capitals. 
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 process. Table 5.5 draws our attention to the extent to which FBO membership has a 
direct influence on whether smallholder farmers receive extension services. Table 5.5 
clearly shows a sharp difference between FBO members and non-members regarding the 
average number of AEA visits they get in a given season, and an independent-samples t-
test supports this difference as being statistically significant. This is not surprising, as 
AEAs tend to ‘visit farmers who are members of FBOs and … do not bother about those 
farmers who are not [in organised] groups …’ (interview with AEA in Northern Region, 
03/06/2013), a view shared by all the AEAs interviewed. Indeed, of the 106 FBO non-
members, about 36% indicated that they knew an AEA from whom they could get 
extension advice, but only 13% reported to have had at least one extension meeting with 
an AEA in the 2012 farming season. In contrast, of the 120 FBO members, about 96% 
indicated that they knew an AEA from whom they could get extension advice and a 
remarkable 73% reported having had at least one extension meeting with an AEA in the 
2012 farming season.  
 
Table 5.5 
The average number of AEA visits to farmers in a season, by FBO members and non-members  
Farmer type Observations Mean Standard deviation 
FBO non-member 106 0.21 0.727 
FBO member 120 2.71 3.074 
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
Note: The mean difference is significant at the 99% confidence level; t = –8.642, p < .0000001.  
 
In spite of the significant difference between FBO members and non-members in terms 
of the average number of visits they get from AEAs, three important issues are worth 
exploring. The first issue concerns whether there are differences among FBO members 
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 with regard to the number of visits they get from AEAs as well as the factors that may 
account for such differences (this is discussed in Section 5.4.3). Second, while FBO non-
members sometimes get the opportunity to participate in FBO extension meetings when 
they are held at village centres (see Section 5.3.2), it is important to explore further what 
factors may influence the intensity of FBO non-members’ access to extension services 
(explored in Section 5.4.4). Finally, as noted earlier, extension policies require AEAs to 
visit villages on a fortnightly basis during the farming season (Kolavalli et al. 2010). 
However, the average number of AEA visits to FBO members reported in Table 5.6 fall 
far short of this requirement; it is therefore important to understand the factors 
accounting for this shortfall (discussed in Section 5.4.5).  
5.4.2 Does membership of an FBO guarantee equal access to AEA visits? 
Our discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 show that members of Ghana’s FBOs can be 
categorised broadly into leaders (executives) and ordinary members. This section 
examines whether leaders differ from ordinary members with respect to the number of 
extension visits they get in a farming season, as well as explaining why there may be 
variations between FBO leaders and ordinary members. This line of analysis is 
important because some studies (e.g., Bernard et al. 2008) have suggested that corrupt or 
selfish FBO leaders tend to capture, for themselves alone, benefits that are meant for all 
of the FBO members. Such analysis is also critical as leaders may capture most 
extension services, especially in contexts where they lack the managerial skills to 
mobilise all the members for extension meetings, as noted earlier.  
To begin with, of the 120 FBO members surveyed, approximately 73% reported to have 
had at least one extension meeting with an AEA in the 2012 farming season (April–
October). If the responses are disaggregated according to FBO leaders and ordinary 
members (see Figure 5.5), it becomes evident that FBO leaders have a greater chance of 
having an extension meeting with an AEA than ordinary members. It is important to 
remember that 40 out of the 120 FBO members surveyed were leaders. Of the 40 FBO 
leaders, 85% (34 leaders) reported having had an extension meeting with an AEA, while 
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 about 68% (54 members) of ordinary members reported so, as shown in Figure 5.5. This 
finding becomes clearer if one compares the average number of extension meetings 
between FBO leaders and ordinary members in the 2012 farming season (see Table 5.6). 
The table shows that the numbers of meetings that FBO leaders have with AEAs is 
almost twice the number for ordinary members. A test of the mean difference using an 
independent-samples t-test supports the average number of extension meetings between 
FBO leaders and ordinary members as being statistically significant.  
 
Figure 5.5. Whether an FBO participated in an extension meeting, by type of member, in one 
farming season in 2012  
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
 
Here, two main interrelated factors explain the large difference between FBO leaders 
and ordinary members with regard to access to extension services. First, as we observed 
in Section 5.3.2, FBO leaders are the first people whom AEAs contact when organising 
extension meetings for these organisations. In many cases, the leaders are unable to 
mobilise their members to participate in scheduled extension meetings. An AEA in the 
Northern Region echoed this precisely when he noted that, ‘sometimes when we call for 
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 the meetings, the other members will not come, so we end up teaching only the leaders 
... We expect them [the leaders] to teach the other farmers’ (interview with AEA in 
Northern Region, 15/02/2013). Similarly, unlike the ordinary members, ‘most of us 
[leaders] have AEAs’ cell phone numbers and can call them to our farms anytime we 
want’ (interview with FBO leader in the East Gonja District of the Northern Region, 
22/03/2013). It is therefore reasonable to argue that FBO leaders receive more extension 
visits from AEAs as compared to ordinary members because AEAs are more accessible 
to the former.  
Table 5.6 
The average number of AEA visits to farmers in a season, by type of FBO member  
Farmer type Observations Mean Standard deviation 
FBO leader 40 3.85 3.919 
FBO ordinary member 80 2.14 2.380 
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
Note: The mean difference is significant at the 99% confidence level; t = 2.539, p < .01. 
 
This also points to weak leadership in FBOs, as their leaders appear less effective in 
motivating and mobilising members to participate in extension meetings. Markelova et 
al. (2009) argue that the ability of leaders to mobilise and motivate their members is a 
necessary leadership skill for successful collective enterprises in FBOs. However, when 
FBO leaders are not paid for mobilising and organising their members (as in the case of 
the FBOs in this study), they are less likely to be motivated to organise them to access 
collective services. In other words, as rational beings, FBO leaders will not put extra 
effort into mobilising their members if they know it will not result in extra benefit to 
them. 
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 The second reason for the huge difference between FBO leaders and ordinary members 
in the number of extension visits they receive relates to the bias of AEAs in 
implementing projects. When a project requires an individual farmer to do a 
demonstration farm, rather than the entire FBO, the AEAs tend to select leaders, to the 
neglect of ordinary members. As can be expected, when a farmer is selected to do a 
demonstration farm, he gets frequent visits from AEAs. For example, two FBO leaders I 
interviewed, one each from the West Mamprusi and Tolon-Kumbungu Districts of the 
Northern Region, indicated that their AEAs selected them to do demonstration farms 
and, as a result, the AEAs visited them on their demonstration farms at least once per 
fortnight.60  
Two points are worth noting in the above analyses. The first is that membership of FBOs 
influences the frequency of the extension visits that smallholder farmers get from AEAs, 
and that FBO members receive more extension visits than do FBO non-members. The 
other important point to note is that FBO leaders get more services than ordinary 
members largely due to weak leadership and poor organisational skills in FBOs. In 
addition to FBO membership and leadership in FBOs, other factors are likely to 
influence access to extension services. The next section therefore explores the 
determinants of intensity of accessing extension services for both FBO members and 
non-members. 
5.4.3 Determinants of accessing extension services: do they go beyond the existence 
of FBOs?  
This section delves deeper into understanding other factors that influence how frequently 
smallholder farmers’ access extension services. This line of investigation is important 
because the study has established, in the previous section, that membership of an FBO 
does not necessarily guarantee equal access to extension services among the members; 
instead, there is a particular bias in favour of the leadership. An important question, 
therefore, will be to examine whether other determinants influence how often they 
60 These demonstration farms were sponsored by the Savanna Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) 
located in the Northern Region.  
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 access extension services. For instance, studies have shown that the frequency of access 
to extension services is higher for men as compared with women (World Bank 2010; 
Ragasa 2012). The aim in this section therefore is to investigate whether the number of 
extension visits smallholder farmers have with AEAs is influenced by a set of variables 
such as the gender and years of education of farmers, the size of landholding under 
cultivation and their access to radio and television (TV), as well as their ownership of 
cell phones. Other variables included are whether the village is assigned an AEA, the 
number of AEAs farmers know from whom they can get extension advice, the distance 
from the closest extension centre, whether FBO member is a leader, the membership size 
of FBO and whether the FBO has a group farm.  
Table 5.7 reports the summary statistics of the key variables included in the analyses. 
The summary statistics are disaggregated according to FBO members and non-members, 
for easy comparison of their means. Appendices 5.1 (overall study sample), 5.2 (FBO 
non-member sample) and 5.3 (FBO member sample) also provide correlation matrices 
for these variables.  
Table 5.7 shows that the average age of FBO members is greater than that of their non-
FBO counterparts, which again reminds us of the fact that FBO membership is largely 
composed of the more elderly people (see Chapter 4). FBO members also own more cell 
phones as compared with FBO non-members. They also have more education and know 
more AEAs from whom they can get extension support, compared to FBO non-
members. With many of the variables in Table 5.7 that relate to personal characteristics, 
the differences between FBO members and non-members are statistically significant.  
The standard multiple linear regression, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), is used to 
understand those other factors that influence access to extension services between both 
FBO members and non-members, beyond FBO membership itself. 
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 Table 5.7 
Descriptive statistics of selected variables for smallholder farmers, FBO members and FBO non-members  
Variable Description FBO 
members (n = 
120) 
FBO non-
members (n = 
106) 
Total 
(n = 226) 
FreqAEA Average number of times AEAs and farmers met in the 
last season 
2.71 (3.07) 0.21 (0.73)* 1.54 (2.61) 
Age Average age (in years) 48.27 (10.14) 43.21 (11.94) 45.89 (11.28) 
Gender Gender (dummy, 1 = male) 0.73 (0.44) 0.61 (0.49) 0.68 (0.47) 
Education Average education (in years) 5.92 (5.73) 3.15 (4.40) 4.62 (5.32) 
Cellphone  Whether farmer owns a cell phone (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.80 (0.40) 0.67 (0.47)* 0.74 (0.44) 
Radio Whether farmer has access to radio (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.90 (0.30) 0.64 (0.48) 0.78 (0.42) 
TV Whether farmer has access to TV (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.36 (0.48) 0.15 (0.36) 0.26 (0.44) 
Farmexp. Average years of farming experience 19.07 (10.49) 16.59 (11.60)* 17.91 (11.07) 
Totland Average total landholding size (in acres) 10.76 (10.57) 9.89 (12.65) 10.35 (11.57) 
Landsize Average landholding size under cultivation (in acres) 5.65 (3.37) 5.12 (3.45) 5.40 (3.41) 
Distance Average distance from the closest extension centre (in 
miles)  
13.88 (15.50) 15.81 (18.01) 14.78 (16.71) 
VillageAEA Whether the village is assigned an AEA (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.96 (0.20) 0.36 (0.48)* 0.68 (0.47) 
NoAEA Average number of AEAs that farmer knows 1.18 (0.66) 0.34 (0.48)* 0.79 (0.72) 
FBOmem Whether farmer belong to FBO (dummy, 1 = yes)   0.53 (0.50) 
Leader Whether FBO member is a leader (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.33 (0.47)   
FBOsize Average size of FBO 32.45 (17.70)   
VilFBO Whether there is FBO in the village (dummy, 1 = yes)  0.69 (0.47)  
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. * mean differences between FBO members and non-members are 
significant at the 99% confidence level.  
153 
 
 It is important to indicate that all zeros (that is those farmers who did not receive 
extension services in the 2012 farming season) were dropped in the regression analysis.   
The results of the regression analysis are summarised in Table 5.8, which reports both 
unstandardised coefficients and standardised coefficients, with corresponding standard 
errors. The analysis has three levels, labelled Models 1, 2 and 3. Model 1 estimates the 
determinants of extension services access intensity using the entire sample, while 
Models 2 and 3 estimate the determinants for FBO members and non-members, 
respectively. 
In Model 1, the independent variables included are whether the farmers belong to an 
FBO, their gender and years of education, their size of landholding under cultivation, 
and farmers’ access to radio and TV sets. The inclusion of gender in this model is 
important, as some studies have shown the neglect of women in extension delivery 
(World Bank and IFPRI 2010).61 Farmers’ years of education and their access to radio 
and TV also have the potential to expose them to the need to acquire appropriate 
technologies from extension service providers to achieve better yields. I also include in 
the model variables such as farmers’ ownership of cell phones and the distance from the 
nearest extension centre, whether the village is assigned an AEA, the AEAs known to 
farmers from whom they can seek extension advice. The inclusion of the cell phone is 
based on the rationalisation that farmers who have access to cell phones are likely to be 
contacted easily to receive different kinds of information such as extension messages. 
An examination of the Model 1 coefficients supports the argument that the number of 
AEAs that farmers know from whom they can get support has a significant effect on the 
number of extension meetings they have with AEAs. This suggests that while 
membership in FBOs (this is significant at the 10% level) is important for smallholder 
farmers’ access to extension services, the number of AEAs they know personally, from 
61 For example, a study by the World Bank suggested that agricultural extension services are almost 
exclusively with male farmers, and that extension meetings are held at times that are not convenient for 
women (World Bank and IFPRI 2010). 
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 whom they get extension support, is even more important for their access to the services. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, we should note that smallholder farmers who 
participate in FBOs but do not have personal contact with AEAs get less in the way of 
extension services. Similarly, FBO non-members who have direct contact with AEAs 
can receive more extension services. The implication of this is that smallholder farmers 
in FBOs with no personal contact with AEAs will receive inadequate extension services, 
unless FBOs have the capacity to demand collective extension services from the AEAs 
for their members. In line with the above argument, Sims and Leonard (1990), in their 
study of the political economy of the development and transfer of agricultural 
technologies in developing countries in Africa and Asia, note that the most important 
determinant of the success of the delivery of extension services is the strength of FBOs. 
Model 1 further shows that the distance of smallholder farmers to the agricultural 
extension centres significantly influences the number of extension visits they receive. 
The results suggest that farmers who are further away from the extension centres are 
likely to receive more extension services. A reasonable explanation could be that 
extension services providers focus more on smallholder farmers in remote areas who 
may need extension services most to increase their crop yields. Access to TV is also 
shown to be significant (at the 10% level) although negatively, suggesting that those 
farmers who have access to TV are likely to receive less extension services. Here, 
gender, the size of landholding, ownership of a cell phone and years of education are not 
significant. What is surprising is that ownership of cell phone does not significantly 
influence the number of extension visits smallholders get. This is surprising because 
interviews with all the eight AEAs revealed that they visit farmers who contact them via 
cell phones promptly. As one AEA from the Eastern Region noted, we ‘visit farmers 
who call us on our phones’ (interview with AEA in Eastern Region, 17/05/2013). 
Model 2 has a different specification from Model 1 and runs on a subsample (FBO 
members only). Except for FBO membership and whether there is FBO in the village 
variables, it includes the same independent variables as Model 1. 
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 Table 5.8 
Determinants of access to extension services (OLS regression, Dep. Var.: number of AEA visits to farmers in a season)  
Variable 
Model 1 
Overall sample 
Model 2 
FBO members 
Model 3 
FBO non-members 
 
Unstandardis
ed coefficient 
Standardised 
coefficient 
Unstandardis
ed coefficient 
Standardised 
coefficient 
Unstandardis
ed coefficient 
Standardised 
coefficient 
FBOmem 1.494 (0.861) 0.175 (0.861)* _ _ – – 
Gender -0.453 (0.779) -0.063 (0.779) -0.059 (0.932) -0.008 (0.932) -7.321 (0.967) -1.901 (0.967)*** 
Education 0.045 (0.061) 0.084 (0.061) 0.016 (0.068) 0.03 (0.068) 0.211 (0.041) 0.654 (0.041)*** 
Landsize 0.074 (0.094) 0.074 (0.094) 0.02 (0.105) 0.02 (0.105) 0.276 (0.107) 0.509 (0.107)* 
Radio 0.653 (1.056) 0.056 (1.056) 0.288 (1.167) 0.024 (1.167) 8.846 (1.166) 1.69 (1.166)*** 
VillageAEA 0.697 (1.373) 0.056 (1.373) -0.21 (2.003) -0.01 (2.003) 2.359 (0.62) 0.791 (0.62)** 
Distance 0.045 (0.017) 0.243 (0.017)*** 0.049 (0.019) 0.266 (0.019)** 0.041 (0.019) 0.328 (0.019)* 
NoAEA 2.165 (0.471) 0.468 (0.471)*** 2.213 (0.492) 0.496 (0.492)*** _ _ 
Cellphone  1.327 (0.805) 0.168 (0.805) 1.216 (0.876) 0.155 (0.876) -0.096 (0.504) -0.018 (0.504) 
TV -1.266 (0.673) -0.208 (0.673)* -1.72 (0.772) -0.277 (0.772)** -2.726 (0.619) -0.914 (0.619)** 
VillFBO 0.500 (1.796) 0.033 (1.796) _ _ -0.466 (0.395) -0.156 (0.395) 
Leader _ _ 1.005 (0.635) 0.162 (0.635) _ _ 
FBOsize _ _ 0.015 (0.018) 0.092 (0.018) _ _ 
FBOfarm _ _ 1.021 (0.592) 0.169 (0.592)* _ _ 
No. of obs. 102  88  14  
Pseudo R2 0.346  0.380  0.981  
Adjust R2 0.267  0.281  0.939  
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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 However, Model 2 also includes whether the FBO has a group farm (joint production), 
the FBO size and whether the FBO member is a leader of the group. In line with Model 
1, Model 2 shows that, among FBO members, the most important determinant of how 
many extension visits they receive is the number of AEAs they know from whom they 
get extension support. 
This supports the earlier argument that membership of an FBO may not necessarily 
guarantee equal access to extension services. This line of argument is further evident in 
the following statement: ‘there is another group in the village which gets more training 
than our group because the AEA is closer to them’ (interview with FBO member in the 
East Gonja District of the Northern Region, 26/03/2013). In addition, Model 2 also 
supports the evidence in Model 1 that smallholder farmers who are further away from 
the District agricultural extension centres receive more extension visits. Model 2 further 
shows that farmers’ access to TV sets is significant but negatively influences access to 
extension services; that is, access to TV sets is likely to reduce the number of extension 
visits that smallholder farmers receive to about 28%. While one would expect 
smallholder farmers with TV sets to be better informed about the benefits of extension 
and to demand more extension services, this is not the case, because such farmers may 
feel they have learnt so much through their TV sets. They may not therefore see the need 
to demand or participate in regular extension meetings. 
Model 2 also shows that the existence of group farms in FBOs significantly improves 
the number of extension visits members receive, although it is significant only at the 
10% significance level. A reasonable explanation for this is that FBOs with group farms 
still find it challenging to mobilise their members for extension meetings. Here like 
Model 1, gender, the size of landholding, ownership of a cell phone and years of 
education are not significant. In addition, the Model shows that FBO leadership has an 
insignificant effect on the number extension visits FBO members receive. While the 
leadership variable is insignificant, it shows the tendency of FBO leaders getting more 
extension visits compared to ordinary members (discussed in Section 5.4.2). 
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Finally, Model 3 has different specification from Models 1 and 2; and it runs on a 
subsample (FBO non-members only). It includes all the independent variables for Model 
2 except for whether the FBO has a group farm, FBO size and the numbers of AEAs 
farmers know from whom they get extension support. However, Model 3 includes the 
variable of whether there is an FBO in the village, as some participants were located in 
villages without the presence of FBOs. The inclusion of this variable is important to 
understand whether the presence of FBOs in villages significantly influence FBO non-
members’ access to extension services.  
Model 3 shows that smallholder farmers who have more years of education are likely to 
improve their access to extension services. In relation to years of education, many 
studies on extension and adoption of technology have shown that farmers’ years of 
education have a positive association with their access to extension and adoption of 
technology (see, e.g., Foster & Rosenzweig 1996; Abdulai & Huffman 2005). The 
model also shows that men compared to women are less likely to more receive extension 
services. It also shows that smallholder farmers’ landholding under cultivation positively 
influence their extension access intensity, although this is significant only at the 10% 
level. 
Model 3 further shows that the existence of AEA in the village significantly influences 
extension access intensity among FBO non-member. What may matter is whether FBO 
non-members personally know AEAs from whom they can get extension support. An 
FBO non-member in the Eastern Region rightly echoed this line of argument when he 
indicated that, ‘I do not belong to an FBO but I still get training from the extension 
officer because he is my friend’ (interview with FBO non-members, 17/01/2013).62 
Other variables that influence FBO non-members extension access intensity are access 
62 Another FBO non-member remarked, ‘I am a friend to the extension officer, he teaches me alone on 
my farm’ (interview with FBO non-member in the West Mamprusi District of the Northern Region, 
20/12/2012). 
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 to radio, distance from the agricultural extension centre and access to TV. However, the 
Model suggests that the presence or absence of FBO in a village has no significant effect 
on FBO non-members’ access to extension services. This is not surprising as the 
evidence in this thesis shows that AEAs pay significant attention to farmers who belong 
to FBOs, compared to those without FBOs. 
In conclusion, the analysis in this section shows that the most significant variable in 
explaining the probability of smallholder farmers’ access to extension is whether they 
personally know AEAs who they can rely on for advice. We should note that there is a 
strong link between FBO membership and the numbers of AEAs smallholder farmers 
know, from whom they can get extension support. The implication of this is that FBOs 
are important channels through which AEAs introduce themselves to smallholder 
farmers and this suggests the need to increase both the number of FBOs and AEAs. The 
analysis further implies that smallholder farmers with no FBO membership are more 
likely to receive extension services if they have more years of education which also 
points to the need for broad-based education policies that will minimise or prevent early 
school dropouts.   
In addition to the above discussion, it is important to note that the number of extension 
visits that the majority of FBO members receive does not meet their expectations 
(discussed in Section 5.4.1), although about 96% of the surveyed FBO members 
indicated that they know at least one AEA from whom they can request extension 
advice. As noted earlier, it is required that AEAs visit villages for which they are 
responsible on a fortnightly basis during a farming season (Kolavalli et al. 2010), but the 
average number of visits that FBO members received in the 2012 farming season (April–
October) was approximately three. This raises a fundamental issue in relation to the 
capacity of FBOs and AEAs. Given that a major farming season runs from April to 
October and the requirement is for AEAs to make fortnightly visits to villages, the 
average number of visits per village (and by extension per FBO) should be about 14 per 
season. This evidence suggests a significant shortfall in the average number of extension 
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 visits that farmers get. It is therefore important to understand what factors account for 
this shortfall among FBO members.  
5.4.4 Accessing extension services in FBOs: what are the impediments? 
This section explores the reasons why the average number of extension visits that FBO 
members receive from AEAs per farming season falls far short of expectations. As the 
key stakeholders directly involved in extension delivery here are FBOs and AEAs, the 
section examines the capacity and efficiency of both FBOs and AEAs in the context of 
extension provision and delivery.  
5.4.4.1 The capacity and efficiency of AEAs 
‘When we were given fuel and other incentives in the 1990s we used to go to eight 
communities in an operational area and visited each community at least two times a 
month but this is not possible in our current circumstance.’ (Interview with AEA, 
Northern Region, 06/02/2013) 
The above quote from an AEA (one shared by all the AEAs interviewed) reflects the 
general obstacles that AEAs face in delivering extension services to smallholder 
farmers. One can divide the primary challenges that AEAs face into two categories: 
AEAs have multiple roles and the resources available to undertake extension delivery 
are limited. First, while it is estimated that there are about 2,500 smallholder farmers per 
AEA (Chang 2012), AEAs also perform multiple roles and functions.  
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The roles of AEAs go beyond the provision of agricultural extension services to include 
the implementation of health programs and credit schemes (see Box 5.1). However, 
when AEAs have multiple roles, they get overburdened (World Bank and IFPRI 2010), 
making it difficult to discharge their core responsibilities of providing adequate services 
to FBO members. The delivery of adequate extension services to smallholder farmers 
would require the state (government) not only to increase the number of AEAs, but also 
to assign realistic roles and responsibilities to AEAs. 
Box 5.1: The diverse roles of agricultural extension agents 
Agricultural extension agents (AEAs) are often the government officers who deal 
directly with farmers at the village level. Although AEAs have a core duty of 
providing advice to farmers on improved and proven agricultural technologies 
and practices, they are increasingly used by government agencies and NGOs to 
facilitate the implementation of projects that do not relate directly to agricultural 
production, processing and marketing. This is because it is believed that as AEAs 
work with farmers in the village setting, they are in good position to organise 
farmers quickly to implement their projects. An AEA in the Northern Region 
noted that, ‘our District Office often calls upon us to organise farmers in the 
villages and educate them on issues such as child labour, HIV/AIDs, and 
sanitation in the villages’. Whenever possible, the AEAs interact with the farmers 
about these issues through FBOs.  
In addition, government agencies and NGOs engage AEAs in inputs distribution 
and the management of credit schemes, which are associated with a substantial 
amount of administrative tasks. Consequently, the AEAs are overburdened with 
other tasks, which contribute to their inability to organise regular extension 
meetings with farmers within an already resource-constrained extension services 
delivery system. To improve AEAs’ advisory services on agricultural 
technologies and practices, they need to ease off from somewhat overburdened 
tasks.  
 
Source: Author’s interview with AEAs and FBO leaders 
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 Second, while AEAs are overburdened, they also have limited resources with which to 
discharge their duties. One may divide these resources into two categories: physical and 
financial.  
Concerning physical resources, the eight AEAs interviewed in this study indicated 
motorbikes as the chief physical resources they need in the provision of extension 
services. This corroborates Kolavalli et al.’s (2010) study of four districts in Ghana, 
when they observe that the distances travelled and the number of visits AEAs make are 
higher where government and its extension department provide motorbikes to the 
majority of AEAs. However, evidence from the field shows that many AEAs do not 
receive motorbikes to discharge their duties. None of the eight AEAs interviewed 
received motorbikes from the government, although six of them indicated that they use 
their personal motorbikes. An AEA in the Northern Region reported that out of 22 AEAs 
in his District, only 11 received motorbikes from the employer (the government). This 
implies that the remaining 11 AEAs will have to find their own means of transportation 
to visit smallholder farmers in the villages in order to provide extension services, a 
situation that will undoubtedly affect their extension service delivery.  
Other physical resources that affect AEAs’ extension delivery are availability of training 
materials. Interviews with the AEAs reveal that they do not have the required training 
materials (e.g. fertiliser, seeds and agrochemicals) to do demonstrations during training. 
The evidence here again points to the need for effective government, what (Green 2008) 
called an effective state, if AEAs are to deliver adequate extension through FBOs. We 
cannot make much progress in improving smallholder access to extension if the very 
agents who are central in this process are under-resourced. 
In relation to financial resource deficiencies, the major complaint of AEAs was the 
irregular and late release of their fuel allowance (and, on worse occasions, the allowance 
not being disbursed at all), which again points to the weak capacity of the state. An AEA 
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 in the Eastern Region appears to have summarised the views of AEAs on these issues 
when he notes: 
We do not have motorbikes not to talk of fuel. They used to give us T&T [fuel 
allowance] but now it does not come as expected. We are in the middle of the 
year and we are yet to receive T&T. See, the whole of last year I was given only 
100 cedis [about $50] as T&T. How do you expect me to go to eight villages at 
least twice a month for each [village], which are scattered all over the place with 
100 cedis? (Interview with AEA in Eastern Region, 30/05/2013) 
According to another AEA I interviewed, given the logistical challenges that confront 
them, AEAs tend to visit the FBOs that call on them.63 As expected, if AEAs use their 
personal motorbikes or use their personal resources to fuel the motorbikes, the number 
of visits they will make to FBO members will unquestionably remain lower than 
expected. Norton (2004) noted that resource deficiencies in the delivery of extension 
services in many developing countries have led to a syndrome of extension agents 
spending less time in the field. Indeed, issues about insufficient operational resources 
and unmotivated AEAs are common in many developing countries, with many 
advocating for privatisation of extension services, although there are already concerns 
that complete privatisation would not be feasible and realistic in many developing 
countries for now.64 Our current efforts should therefore focus on enhancing the capacity 
of the public extension systems – especially the AEAs, who are in direct contact with the 
farmers. The state or government must play a central role in the design and 
implementation of effective strategies to ensure inclusive participation of NGOs and 
private-sector organisations in extension delivery.  
 
63 Interviews with AEAs in the Northern Region.  
64 A debate on privatisation of extension services is available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1109943 
(accessed 14/07/2014). 
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 5.4.4.2 The capacity and efficiency of FBOs 
While both internal and external factors may influence the ability of FBOs to undertake 
collective action such as accessing extension services (Ostrom 1990), the focus here is 
more on the internal factors. In referring to internal factors, I mean the capacity of FBO 
members to develop trust (e.g. rules), to communicate with each other and to engage in 
collective activities.  
As discussed already, delivering extension services through FBOs requires collaboration 
between AEAs and FBO leaders, and then between FBO leaders and the members. In 
particular, this study has established that the number of FBO members who participate 
in extension meetings depends on the capacity of the leaders; the majority of FBO 
leaders participate in extension meetings alone because they lack the capacity to 
mobilise their members.  As shown in Table 5.6, whereas the average number of AEAs 
visit to FBO leaders per season is about four times, it is only two times for the ordinary 
members. 
The level of education is also quite low among the leaders.  As discussed in Chapter 4 
(see Figure 4.8), 9 out of the 40 leaders interviewed did not have formal education. 
Approximately 50% of the leaders who had formal education dropped out either at the 
primary or secondary level. Such low level of education has the tendency of influencing 
the management of FBOs such as keeping up-to-date records and supervising group 
activities. For instance, a review of 30 out of 40 FBOs constitutions shows that their 
members are expected to pay dues (make financial contributions) on regular basis. 
However, about 60% of the FBO indicated that their member fail to pay such dues on 
regular, which they attributed mainly to poor enforcement of rules.  
The low level of education among the leaders was also recognised by the only three 
FBO leaders with tertiary education.  Indeed, one of them in the Northern Region noted 
that, ‘almost all FBOs in this area have their secretaries being school leavers who often 
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 are not well enlightened and lack the capacity to pull the group together’.65 This 
evidence corroborates other studies that suggest that weak leadership in FBOs has 
adverse effects on their ability to undertake collective action (see, e.g., Barham & 
Chitemi 2009; Wilhemina et al. 2010). In a study of two agricultural cooperatives in 
Kenya, Hannan (2014) also suggests that governance and leadership play important roles 
in their access to outside support. However, evidence in this study shows that outsiders 
focus more on the provision of extension services and tangible goods such as fertiliser 
and seeds, with little focus on the organisational development of FBOs (see Chapter 4). 
Efforts in FBO development that neglect or focus narrowly on their capacity building in 
organisational skills, including trust-based relationships among FBO members on the 
one hand, and between the FBOs and outsiders (government and NGOs) on the other, 
would not lead to effective collective action in FBOs.  
In addition, FBO members receive few visits from AEAs because many of their leaders 
fail to demand extension services from the AEAs, because they largely perceive FBOs 
as avenues through which they can receive inputs and financial support (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4.2). Six out the eight AEAs indicated that, in most cases, FBO members do 
not demand services but will wait until they deliver the services. As one AEA notes, ‘if 
farmers do not ask for services they will get services only once a year’.66 In particular, 
when FBOs receive extension services under government and NGO projects, they find 
no incentive to demand extension services when the projects fold up, because of their 
belief that new projects will turn up. Nonetheless, about 10 FBO leaders indicated that 
demanding extension services is frustrating mainly because of the limited number of 
AEAs available to them. As one FBO leader puts it, ‘I called many times before the 
AEA finally came. He [the AEA] kept telling me he was busy working elsewhere. So I 
will say it is time wasting and disappointing to rely on them [AEAs]’.67  
65 Interview with FBO leader in the Tamale Metropolis of the Northern Region, 04/02/2013.  
66 Interviews with AEAs in the Northern Region.  
67 Interview with FBO leader in the Akwapim North District of the Eastern Region, 24/04/2013. 
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 In addition to the lack of good leaders to mobilise their members to demand extension 
services, many FBOs cannot afford the administrative costs that come with collective 
acquisition of extension services, let alone pay for the services themselves, because of 
their inability to generate internal resources (discussed in Chapter 4).  
The key point to note here is that the commitment and active participation of FBO 
members in collective activities is crucial to improving the performance of FBOs. Much 
of this can be achieved if FBOs have the required organisational and leadership skills to 
get members involved in collective activities such as joint purchase of inputs and weekly 
or monthly meetings.  
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has indicated that agricultural extension services are critical for 
productivity-led agriculture and has examined the extent to which FBOs improve 
smallholder farmers’ access to extension services. The evidence here shows that 
membership of FBOs is a strong determinant of smallholder farmers’ access to extension 
services. The analysis has demonstrated that smallholder farmers who participate in 
FBOs receive more extension services than their non-FBO counterparts, which suggests 
a need to encourage broad-based participation of smallholder farmers in FBOs. 
Similarly, the analysis has further showed that smallholder farmers’ access to extension 
services is largely influenced by the number of AEAs farmers personally know, who 
they can rely on for advice. The chapter argues that a strong link exists between FBO 
membership and the numbers of AEAs who smallholder farmers know, as FBOs remain 
important channels through which AEAs introduce themselves to smallholder farmers.  
The chapter has also shown that membership of an FBO does not result in equal access 
to extension services. It has revealed that FBO leaders receive more services compared 
with ordinary members, and it has argued that this is largely due to weak leadership in 
FBOs. In addition to the disproportionate access to extension services in FBOs, the 
analysis in the chapter has shown that members generally receive extension services that 
are far below optimal levels. In this regard, the chapter has argued that the AEAs, who 
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 play a pivotal role in extension delivery, are not only overburdened in their line of work, 
but also have limited resources with which to discharge their duties, and has indicated 
the need for the state or government to play a central role in this process.  
Similarly, the chapter has established that FBOs have weak capacities to mobilise their 
members to demand extension services, partly because smallholder farmers largely 
perceive them as institutions for receiving farm inputs and financial support from 
government and NGOs. 
The overall picture that emerges in the analyses in this chapter has two sides: the supply 
and demand sides. With the supply side, it must be noted that while FBOs improve 
smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, the number of AEAs available to 
smallholder farmers is the most important determinant of access to extension services 
for smallholder farmers. Yet the provision of AEAs is currently beyond the reach of 
smallholder farmers. In Ghana and many developing countries, it remains largely the 
role of the state. With the demand side, it is important to note that FBOs generally lacks 
the capacity to collectively acquire extension services from the limited available AEAs 
mainly due to poor leadership and passive participation of members in collective 
activities. The implication here is that political leadership is necessary to increase the 
number of well-resourced AEAs available to smallholder farmers as well as increase the 
knowledge of smallholder farmers to ensure their active participation in FBOs. This does 
not mean that the state will have to do it alone. While the state needs support from 
NGOs, the private sector and smallholder farmers, it must play a pivotal role in this 
process. For example, when smallholder farmers are well educated and knowledgeable 
about their environment, they can make informed choices such as demanding extension 
services. As Green (2008) argues, effective government (what he called an effective 
state) and active participation of relevant stakeholders (what he called effective citizens) 
are the two most important ingredients that will ensure sustainable development and 
poverty reduction in developing countries.  
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 As noted earlier, smallholder farmers’ access to extension services alone is not enough 
for sustained productivity-led agricultural growth. They also need access to resources 
such as inputs and credit to realise the full potential of the extension services they have 
received or learnt from AEAs (Norton 2004). Smallholder farmers would be able to 
adopt the technologies they have learnt if they had adequate access to inputs such as 
fertiliser and seeds. Similar to extension services, FBOs are considered as local 
institutions that promote smallholder farmers’ access to inputs and, additionally, 
facilitate their adoption of technology. It was therefore the aim of this study to 
understand the extent to which FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to inputs and 
adoption of technology, which I examine in the next chapter.  
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 Appendix 5.1. Correlation matrix for regression and descriptive statistics (overall sample, 226 observations) 
 No. AEA visits to farmers FBOmem Gender Education Landsize Radio VillageAEA Distance NoAEA Cellphone TV FBOfarm VilFBO Mean STD 
No. AEA visits to farmers 1.00             1.54 2.61 
FBOmem .48** 1.00            .53 .50 
Gender .21** .12 1.00           .67 .47 
Education .33** .26** .34** 1.00          4.62 5.32 
Landsize .09 .08 .53** .07 1.00         5.40 3.41 
Radio .23** .31** .45** .27** .27** 1.00        .78 .42 
VillageAEA .38** .64** .16* .18** .07 .27** 1.00       .68 .47 
Distance .05 –.06 –.02 –.11 –.05 –.13 –.08 1.00      14.78 16.71 
NoAEA .56** .59** .25** .38** .12 .29** .67** –.10 1.00     .79 .72 
Cellphone .20** .15* .27** .35** .16* .34** .17** –.08 .25** 1.00    .74 .44 
TV .19** .24** .14* .42** .07 .29** .17** –.16* .36** .33** 1.00   .26 .44 
FBOfarm .42** .55** .04 .18** .08 .11 .40** .07 .41** .11 .21** 1.00  .25 .44 
VilFBO .22** .44** .06 .07 .01 .11 .57** –.10 .38** .13 .19** .24** 1.00 .85 .35 
Note: ** and * indicate that the correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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 Appendix 5.2. Correlation matrix for regression and descriptive statistics (FBO non-members sample, 106 observations) 
 No. AEA visits to farmers Gender Education Landsize Radio VillageAEA Distance NoAEA Cellphone TV VilFBO Mean STD 
No. AEA visits to farmers 1.00           .21 .73 
Gender .04 1.00          .61 .49 
Education .32** .25** 1.00         3.15 4.40 
Landsize –.06 .60** –.02 1.00        5.12 3.45 
Radio .19* .50** .20* .28** 1.00       .64 .48 
VillageAEA .25 .19 .02 .06 .15 1.00      .36 .48 
Distance –.08 –.04 –.05 –.07 –.22* –.09 1.00     15.81 18.01 
NoAEA .40** .32** .23* .10 .20* .75** –.03 1.00    .34 .48 
Cellphone .17 .18 .30** .08 .40** .15 –.13 .25** 1.00   .67 .47 
TV .21** .06 .33** .03 .26** .07 –.16 –.02 .24** 1.00  .15 .36 
VilFBO .05 .01 –.08 –.03 –.04 .46** –.11 .31** .09 .17 1.00 .69 .47 
Note: ** and * indicate that the correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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 Appendix 5.3. Correlation matrix for regression and descriptive statistics (FBO members sample, 120 observations) 
 No. AEA visits to farmers Gender Education Landsize Radio VillageAEA Distance NoAEA Cellphone TV FBOfarm Mean STD 
No. AEA visits to farmers 1.00           2.71 3.07 
Gender .25** 1.00          .73 .45 
Education .26** .38** 1.00         5.92 5.73 
Landsize .10 .46** .10 1.00        5.65 3.37 
Radio .12 .35** .23** .23** 1.00       .90 .30 
VillageAEA .16 –.04 .03 –.06 –.07 1.00      .96 .20 
Distance .16 .01 –.15 –.02 .04 .02 1.00     13.88 15.50 
NoAEA .42** .17 .32** .09 .09 .25** –.13 1.00    1.18 .66 
Cellphone .18 .35** .36** .21* .18* .00 –.01 .17 1.00   .80 .40 
TV .08 .15 .41** .07 .25** –.02 –.15 .43** .37** 1.00  .36 .48 
FBOfarm .23* –.05 .06 .07 –.13 .20* .18* .17 .06 .12 1.00 .48 .50 
Note: ** and * indicate that the correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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 CHAPTER SIX 
PROMOTING ACCESS TO INPUTS AND ADOPTION OF 
TECHNOLOGY: THE ROLE OF FBOs 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter examined one of the key research questions of this study, namely 
whether farmer-based organisations (FBOs) contribute to improving smallholder 
farmers’ access to extension services. The evidence in the chapter showed that 
membership of FBOs contributes significantly to improving smallholder farmers’ access 
to extension services, although this tends to be somewhat constrained by the capacity of 
FBOs (e.g. in terms of weak leadership) and the limited availability of resources to 
agricultural extension agents (AEAs) (e.g. motorbikes and demonstration plots).  
This chapter is motivated by the important observation that smallholder farmers’ access 
to extension services is not a sufficient condition to increasing productivity; their ability 
to adopt appropriate technologies is also essential for improving productivity (Norton 
2004). Fundamental to their ability to adopt these technologies is adequate access to 
inputs such as seeds, fertiliser and herbicides. For instance, it is not sufficient to train 
smallholder farmers in how to use improved seeds and fertiliser in order to improve their 
productivity without improving their access to the actual seeds and fertiliser.  
This chapter seeks to understand the extent to which FBOs are helping smallholder 
farmers to access inputs such as seeds, fertiliser, herbicides and insecticides. It also 
examines whether FBO membership improves the adoption of extension technologies by 
smallholder farmers. This line of investigation is important, as government and other 
development partners consider FBOs not only as local institutions that can facilitate 
smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, but also institutions that are crucial 
for improving smallholder farmers’ access to inputs and the adoption of technologies 
(GOG 2007).  
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 The chapter is organised as follows. It begins with a brief discussion of the role of inputs 
in improving agricultural productivity and presents two key government programs 
initiated to make major inputs accessible and affordable for smallholder farmers. It then 
examines whether FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to inputs from two main 
perspectives. First, it explores whether FBOs have the capacity to purchase inputs in 
bulk to enable their members to benefit from economies of scale. Second, it compares 
the use and the intensity of use of inputs between FBO members and non-members, with 
the aim of understanding the extent to which FBOs facilitate smallholder farmers’ access 
to inputs. The chapter then examines the factors that influence the intensity of use of 
inputs between FBO members and non-members. Finally, it discusses the adoption of 
technology among smallholder farmers. Here, the focus is on the three most common 
technologies that AEAs teach farmer: row planting, fertiliser use and herbicide 
application (see Chapter 5). The objective here is to understand whether FBOs make a 
difference in the adoption of these technologies, as well as to explore key factors that 
influence smallholder farmers’ decisions to adopt. 
6.2 The role of farm inputs in productivity  
In most developing countries, including Ghana, smallholder farmers’ access to farm 
inputs such as improved seeds, fertiliser, pesticides, insecticides and herbicides is crucial 
for improving yields and accelerating agricultural growth (Todaro & Smith 2003).68 One 
recent study in Madagascar, for example, suggests that the use of modern seed varieties 
is vital for farmers to meaningfully increase their crop harvests and hence get out of 
poverty (Minten & Barrett 2008). 
While agricultural productivity is a function of many variables, including land quality 
and weather conditions, the low use of inputs such as improved seeds and fertiliser 
partly explains why growth in agricultural productivity remains fairly stagnant in many 
developing countries (Norton 2004). In Ghana, for example, the average yields for major 
68 The success of the green revolution in Asia was largely due to the high level of adoption of improved 
technology with the use of subsidized inputs, which led to a significant increase in yields (Chang 2012).  
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 staple crops such as maize and rice are less than half of the achievable yields in part due 
to low fertiliser use, the use of low-yielding planting materials (e.g. seeds) and the use of 
traditional farming practices (MOFA 2011). This suggests that Ghana has the potential 
to increase the yields of major crops if farmers have adequate access to inputs as well as 
adopting appropriate technologies. 
With reference to maize, the most widely grown cereal in the country, average 
production (in metric tonnes) per hectare remained fairly stagnant from 1993 to 2007 
(see Figure 6.1). The average maize yield between 1993 and 2010 was about 1.5 metric 
tonnes per hectare. However, on-farm trials of maize at different stations across Ghana 
using recommended inputs and technologies have shown yields averaging 4–6 metric 
tonnes per hectare (Ragasa et al. 2013a). This suggests that with access to the right 
inputs and technologies, the current average yield of about 1.5 metric tonnes per hectare 
has the potential to increase in many folds.  
 
Figure 6.1. Average national maize productivity, 1992–2010  
Source: Author’s calculation based on MOFA (2011) and raw data collected from MOFA about yields per 
hectare from 1992–2003  
 
Against the backdrop of the low average yields, successive governments in Ghana have 
recently undertaken some initiatives to make key inputs such as improved seed varieties, 
fertiliser, herbicides and insecticides more accessible to farmers as a key step towards 
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 improving their yields. Two major government initiatives currently being implemented 
to improve smallholder farmers’ to access inputs are (a) the Fertiliser Subsidy Program 
(FSP) and (b) the Block Farms Program (BFP).69 I refer to these two initiatives as part of 
the analysis in this chapter and Chapter 7; it is therefore important to briefly describe 
them here.70  
The Fertiliser Subsidy Program  
The FSP started in 2008, with the goal of making fertiliser affordable and accessible to 
farmers.71 It also aims at increasing the current national average rate of fertiliser use 
from 8 kilograms per hectare (kg/ha) to 20 kg/ha (Benin et al. 2013). The FSP thus seeks 
to stimulate an increase in farm-level fertiliser application among farmers to increase 
their productivity and ensure food security (Banful 2011). The program first started with 
a voucher system, which involved the printing of coupons at the national level and their 
distribution to Regional Agricultural Development Units (RADUs) based on their 
estimated consumption of fertiliser. The RADUs then distributed them to their District 
Agricultural Development Units (DADUs), which in turn allocated them to AEAs for 
onward distribution to selected farmers identified by communities; with the voucher, a 
farmer then paid an amount lower than commercial fertiliser prices to redeem two 50 
kilogram bags of fertiliser (for further details, see Benin et al. 2013). In 2010, a waybill 
system replaced the voucher system, partly because of inconsistencies in targeting 
farmers and the long distribution line that characterised the voucher system (Benin et al. 
2013). Under the waybill system, the government subsidises fertiliser at the port of entry 
to enable farmers to purchase the subsidised fertiliser from designated agents without a 
voucher. To limit leakages under this system, in 2012 the implementers provided 
69 In addition to these two main government programs, it is important to point out that several local 
NGOs in Ghana, such as Send-Ghana, the Presbyterian Agriculture Station and Care-Ghana, have also 
initiated various programs to improve smallholder farmers’ access to inputs. 
70 It must, however, be mentioned that doing an impact evaluation on these initiatives is beyond the 
scope of this research. For an impact evaluation of these initiatives, see Benin et al. (2013). 
71 Ghana and other African countries seem to have initiated a fertiliser subsidy following Malawi’s 
successful implementation of its subsidy program (Banful 2011). 
175 
 
                                                          
 passbooks (see Figure 6.2) to farmers through AEAs to purchase the subsidised fertiliser 
and seeds (for further details on the waybill system, see Benin et al. 2013).72  
 
Figure 6.2. A passbook for the purchase of fertiliser  
Source: Author, taken in the Eastern Region during fieldwork  
 
These passbooks are limited and not all farmers have access to them.73 Although all 
farmers are eligible to receive the passbooks, fieldwork for this study shows that FBO 
members tend to receive more of such passbooks, compared to FBO non-members, 
partly because AEAs distribute the passbooks to farmers they know (for more details, 
see the next section).  
72 The passbooks serve as a form of identity, which farmers can use to purchase subsidised fertiliser, and 
the government will only pay for fertilisers and seeds bought by farmers with passbooks (Benin et al. 
2013). 
73 For example, according to one AEA in the Eastern Region, in the 2012 farming season he received 100 
passbooks to distribute to farmers, when there are over 1,000 farmers in the eight villages he operates 
(interview, 30/05/2013).  
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 The implementation of the FSP led to increased availability of fertiliser for farmers in 
the country (Benin et al. 2013). For example, the amount of fertiliser imported into the 
country between 2008 and 2010 increased by about 39.5% per year, compared to 2.4% 
prior to the implementation of the FSP; that is, from 2004 to 2007 (Benin et al. 2013). It 
may be reasonable to partly attribute the increase in the average maize production per 
hectare from 2008 to 2010 (see Figure 6.1) to the increased availability of fertiliser for 
farmers to use.  
The Block Farms Program 
The government launched the BFP in 2009 on pilot bases in six out of the ten 
administrative regions of Ghana; namely, the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Northern, 
Upper East and Upper West Regions. By 2010, the program had been extended to all the 
ten regions. Based on the principle of economies of scale, the BFP aimed at bringing 
large tracts of agricultural land into blocks for the cultivation of selected crops (e.g. 
maize) that have a comparative advantage in the location in which they are cultivated. 
The BFP also aimed at improving the use of appropriate technologies (including inputs) 
to increase the productivity of farmers (Benin et al. 2013).  
Today, some smallholder farmers are benefiting from subsidised inputs such as fertiliser, 
improved seeds, herbicides and pesticides in the form of credit under the BFP. Similar to 
the FSP, AEAs deliver the subsidised inputs to the farmers participating in the BFP on 
credit as well as recovering the credit. Fieldwork interviews with AEAs and FBO 
members in this study suggest that the BFP concept has not been operationalised fully in 
many locations as envisaged. Instead of supporting farmers with subsidised inputs to 
cultivate jointly on large tracts of land, rather the inputs are given to individual farmers, 
who cultivate on separate plots. Here, fieldwork showed that in distributing the inputs 
under this program, AEAs tend to target farmers who belong to FBOs, compared to FBO 
non-members.  
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 In relation to the above discussion, the question of particular importance for this study 
relates to whether, and to what extent, FBOs play a role in facilitating smallholder 
farmers’ access to the inputs distributed in both programs. 
6.3 Accessing inputs among smallholder farmers 
The overall objective of this section is to understand whether FBOs are helping farmers 
to access inputs. The discussions focus on four main inputs – certified seeds, fertiliser, 
herbicides and insecticides – because they are the most common technologies promoted 
to farmers for increase agricultural production in Ghana (see Chapter 5). The goal is to 
establish whether there is a significant difference between FBO members and non-
members in their intensity of usage of inputs. It is important to emphasise that the 
analysis in this chapter on the smallholder farmers is also based on the reduced sample 
of 226. As discussed in Chapter 3, a propensity score matching technique (PSM) was 
applied on the sample of 240 smallholder farmers(120 FBO members and 120 FBO non-
members), which was reduced to 226 (120 FBO members and 106 FBO non-members) 
after the analysis. We should note that the PSM technique was used mainly to ensure 
that the sampling approach used in selecting the two groups (FBO members and non-
members) was robust to allow for a comparison between FBO members and non-
members regarding their access to inputs. The use of PSM technique was not intended to 
undertake analysis of paired individual farmers’ outcomes but mainly to ensure a 
comparison between the two groups of farmers.  
This section begins with an examination of the capacity of FBOs to purchase inputs 
collectively for their members, as they are often considered as institutions through which 
smallholder farmers can purchase inputs jointly to minimise transaction costs (Rondot & 
Collion 2001; Bosc et al. 2002; World Bank 2007; Markelova et al. 2009). Second, it 
discusses the different kinds of support FBOs receive from external agencies, with a 
focus on inputs. Specifically, it examines whether inputs constitute a significant 
proportion of the support that external agencies provide to FBOs. Third, the section then 
explores the factors that influence inputs use and examines the intensity of usage of 
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 inputs between FBO members and non-members. Finally, it discusses the factors that 
influence intensity of usage of inputs among smallholder farmers, paying particular 
attention to FBO membership in this process.  
6.3.1 Collective purchase of inputs in FBOs 
FBOs are considered to be local institutions that can help smallholder farmers to acquire 
inputs in bulk to reduce cost (GOG 2007; World Bank 2007). Through bulk or collective 
purchases, FBO members may acquire inputs at lower prices due to discounts that come 
with bulk purchases as well as reduced transportation costs. However, Chapter 4 showed 
that less than a third (20%) of the 40 FBOs surveyed indicated that they sometimes 
jointly purchase inputs such as fertiliser and herbicides.74 Similarly, when farmers want 
to purchase inputs on credit, inputs dealers would reasonably prefer FBOs to individual 
farmers, as FBOs can serve as collateral.  
To purchase inputs jointly, FBOs have mainly three options from which to choose. First, 
FBO members make financial contributions, based on the quantity of inputs they 
require, and the leaders then purchase the inputs on their behalf from input dealers.75 
The problem with this option is that ‘farmers often do not have money at the same time 
to collectively purchase inputs’ (interview with FBO member in Northern Region, 
01/01/2013), a viewed shared by about 65% of the FBO members interviewed. The 
second option is when FBOs approach a private-sector input dealer and acquire inputs 
on credit. This option is rare because there is a seemingly a ‘lack of trust between FBOs 
and input dealers due to inadequate repayment of credit’ (interview with NGO in 
Northern Region, 12/06/2013).76 The final option is when FBOs purchase inputs using 
their internal generated funds through collective activities such as joint production 
74 The 2010 IFPRI survey in Ghana, with a sample of 501 FBOs, also showed that about 24% of FBOs 
jointly purchase inputs (see Chapter 4). 
75 For example, according to one FBO member in the Tolon-Kumbungu District in the Northern Regions, 
in the 2012 farming season, they contributed and bought about 40 bags (50 kilograms per bag) of 
fertiliser collectively (interview, 11/02/2013). 
76 Similar views were indicated by the other NGO officials and AEAs 
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 (group farms) and payment of dues.77 The challenge with this option is that not many 
FBOs are able to generate internal funds (see Chapter 4). 
The majority of FBOs are unable to purchase inputs collectively. This is not surprising, 
as previous analyses have shown that many FBOs find it difficult to undertake collective 
activities, largely due to their members’ perception that FBOs are institutions through 
which they can receive external support, rather than institutions for undertaking internal 
collective activities for the benefits of all members. The section that follows therefore 
examines key external support to FBOs, with a focus on inputs. 
6.3.2 Supporting FBOs with inputs 
The majority of the 40 FBOs studied indicated access to grants (75%) and credit (65%) 
as the main reasons for which they were set up. By grants, smallholder farmers are 
referring to free access to inputs and cash; and with credit, they mean providing them 
with inputs or cash on loan basis. Similarly, the majority of the FBO members surveyed 
claimed that their reasons for joining FBOs were to access grants (63%) and credit 
(61%). Approximately 38% of the FBO members specifically indicated access to 
fertiliser, certified seeds, herbicides and insecticides as one of the key reasons for joining 
FBOs. The above shows that access to inputs is a strong motivation for establishing and 
joining FBOs.  
The question that arises is whether FBOs play a significant role in helping their 
members to access inputs. Figure 6.3 shows different types of external support that the 
40 FBOs had received since their establishment and it suggests that more than half of the 
FBOs (23 FBOs) received grants.78 Often, grants to FBOs take the form of inputs such 
as seeds, fertiliser, herbicides and insecticides.   
77 This was observed in an FBO in the West Mamprusi District of the Northern Region, which purchased 
inputs from its savings and distributed to members (interview with FBO leader, 21/12/2012). 
78 It is important to indicate that of these 23 FBOs, 22 benefited from the Millennium Challenge Account 
program (implemented between 2007 and 2012), which supported FBO members with inputs such as 
seeds and fertiliser. 
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Figure 6.3. Types of external support that FBOs received  
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
 
Figure 6.3 shows that credit is the least type of support that FBOs receive, with only less 
than half of the FBOs surveyed receiving credit since their establishment. The main 
sources of credit support to FBO are government and NGO programs.79 
Similarly, Figure 6.4 shows the results of the main forms of support that the FBO 
members surveyed claimed to have received from external agencies since joining. About 
62% of the FBO members indicated that they received grants such as fertiliser, seeds and 
herbicides.80 About 40% of the FBO members also received credit in the form of cash or 
as payment in kind. 
79 Key government programs from which FBOs received credit (kind/cash) include the Block Farm 
Program, the Millennium Challenge Account Program and the Microfinance and Small Loan Centre 
(MASLOC). NGO programs include the Presbyterian Agricultural Station, Send-Ghana, the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Millennium Villages Project), the Trade and Investment 
Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE), the Akwapim Community Foundation and a few 
rural community banks.  
80 The majority of the FBO members received these grants through the Millennium Challenge Account 
Program.  
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Figure 6.4. Types of external support that FBO members received  
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
 
The key point to note here is that FBOs play a role in improving their members’ access 
to inputs, although the quantity of inputs that smallholders received through FBOs is not 
yet clear. In the next section, therefore, I examine inputs use and use intensity between 
FBO members and non-members.  
6.3.3 Inputs use among smallholder farmers: do FBOs make a difference? 
This section explores smallholder farmers’ use of certified seeds, fertiliser, insecticides 
and herbicides. It begins by answering the question of whether smallholder farmers 
applied/used each of the four inputs in the major farming season of 2012 (April–
October) and explores factors that influence smallholder farmers’ input use, and in 
particular the roles that FBOs play.  
Use of certified seeds 
The effectiveness of the other three inputs (fertiliser, herbicides and insecticides) in 
improving yields will depend on the nature and quality of seeds. Indeed, the 
96.6 
62.2 
40.3 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Extension services Fertiliser, seeds,
herbicides/insecticide
Credit (cash/kind)
Pe
r c
en
t 
Type of external support 
182 
 
 effectiveness of the green revolution in Asia through increased fertiliser use was 
enhanced because the new seeds were highly responsive to fertiliser (Chang 2012). 
While the use of certified seeds is crucial for increasing agricultural productivity, the 
available evidence suggests that in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
including Ghana, seed systems are not well developed (Bay 1998; Scowcroft & Polak 
Scowcroft 1999).81 In many countries, the procedures for the release of seed varieties 
not only take several years (up to 6 years in some cases), but there is also a lack of 
coordinated and harmonised variety release systems (Adesina et al. 2014). 
As shown in Figure 6.5, less than half of the smallholder farmers surveyed in this study 
indicated that they had used certified seeds in the major farming season of 2012.82 If one 
disaggregates the results according to region, about 66% of farmers who used certified 
seeds came from the Eastern Region and the remainder from the Northern Region. 
While it is difficult to prescribe reasons for the difference in the use of certified seeds 
between the two regions, field interviews with the eight AEAs revealed the main reasons 
for the relatively low use of certified seeds among smallholder farmers. The first is 
limited supply of the seeds due to low production levels and poor distribution; and the 
second is weak demand from smallholder farmers. This corroborates the work of Bay 
(1998), Scowcroft and Polak Scowcroft (1999) and Adesina et al. (2014).  
In addition, the cost of certified seeds is relatively high and thus farmers are not 
motivated to purchase them. According to an NGO official in the Northern Region, the 
cost of certified seeds is too high for farmers to afford; he claimed that a farmer needs 
about 9 kilograms of maize seeds to supply a 1-acre maize farm and that the cost of 1 
81 Due to the lack of a clear policy on seed production and distribution, the Seed Producers Association of 
Ghana (SEEPAG) has recently renewed its call on Parliament to pass without delay the National Seed 
Policy and Regulations Bill into law; available at 
http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2013/05/30/group-renews-call-on-parliament-to-pass-national-
seed-policy/ (accessed 05/07/2013). 
82 As discussed in Chapter 5, the initial sample was 240 but was reduced to 226 due to propensity score 
matching analysis. 
183 
 
                                                          
 kilogram is about GH₵8 ($4) (interview, 12/06/2013).83 Similarly, interviews with 
farmers majority of the farmers who failed to use the certified seeds showed that many 
of them are satisfied with their own seeds and feel reluctant to abandon seed varieties 
that they have been using for several years. For example, a farmer in the Northern 
Region noted that, ‘I do not buy seeds because I believe … in my own seeds’ (interview, 
27/02/2013). 
The above observations are in line with a recent study in Eastern and Southern Africa 
that indicates that farmers’ low use of improved certified seeds is constrained by their 
low level of awareness of seed availability, their unwillingness to change to new seeds, 
the relatively high prices of the seeds and inadequate credit available to farmers to 
purchase them (Langyintuo et al. 2010).   
 
Figure 6.5. The use of inputs among smallholders  
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
83 GHS1 = US$0.50; this exchange rate is used for all dollar calculations in this chapter; 1 June 2013 
exchange rates available online at http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=USD&date=2013-06-01 
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 Do FBOs make a difference in the use of certified seeds? If one breaks the data down 
according to FBO membership, it shows that the use of certified seeds is high among 
FBO members compared to FBO non-members. As shown in Table 6.1, there is a 
significant difference between FBO members (55%) and FBO non-members (25%) in 
their use of certified seeds. In other words, the likelihood of using certified seeds among 
FBO members is more than twice as high as for FBO non-members. 
Table 6.1 
The use of inputs based on membership of FBOs 
Type of input 
FBO members (n = 120) FBO non-members (n = 106) 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Certified seeds 65 55 26 25 
Fertiliser 104 88 79 77 
Insecticide 26 22 8 8 
Herbicide 110 93 83 81 
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
There may be several reasons for this variation, but a key potential explanation here is 
that in distributing certified seed under various projects and programs, AEAs tend to 
target farmers who belong to FBOs.84 In their study on maize productivity and fertiliser 
use in Ghana, Ragasa et al. (2013a) found that the majority of AEAs (76%) distribute 
various inputs such as certified seeds through FBOs, suggesting that the likelihood of 
farmers’ usage of certified seeds depends significantly on FBO membership. However, 
Shiferaw et al. (2009) observed in Kenya that FBO membership did not have a 
significant effect on the adoption of improved maize seed, because both FBO members 
and non-members had equal access to the improved maize seeds.  
84 For instance, at leastt three FBOs in the Northern Region indicated that they had received certified 
seeds for trial from the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI). 
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 Table 6.2 
Determinants of smallholder farmers’ use of certified seeds using binary logistic regression (Dep. Var.: Whether 
farmer use certified seeds) 
Variables B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Whether farmer belong to FBO (dummy, 1=Yes) .492 .434 1.282 .258 1.635 
Age -.024 .021 1.328 .249 .976 
Gender (male=1) -.958 .525 3.326 .068 .384 
Years of farming experience .055 .023 5.619 .018 1.056 
Farmer's years in education .163 .036 20.032 .000 1.177 
Whether farmer owns a cell phone (dummy, 1=Yes) .450 .417 1.165 .280 1.568 
Whether farmer has access to radio (dummy, 1=Yes) -.373 .483 .595 .440 .689 
Total landholding size -.011 .022 .274 .601 .989 
Landholding size under cultivation -.011 .065 .029 .864 .989 
Distance from extension service centre -.006 .010 .401 .526 .994 
Whether the village is assigned an AEA (dummy, 
1=Yes) 
.770 .536 2.064 .151 2.160 
AEAs farmers know from whom to get support .325 .340 .914 .339 1.384 
Constant -1.306 .900 2.106 .147 .271 
Note. Observations = 226; Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: Chi-square = 10.098, d.f. = 8, Sig = 0.258, -2 Log likelihood 
= 242.014, Cox & Snell R Square = 0.242, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.327; overall percentage of right predictions = 74.8 
Indeed, FBOs would not necessarily improve smallholder farmers’ access to, and use of, 
certified seeds within a framework of institutional and policy bottlenecks regarding seed 
production and distribution (Langyintuo et al. 2010). That is, if FBOs and their members 
had the means to purchase improved certified seeds, the supply side would be the main 
limiting factor. 
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 A logistics regression on the determinant of the use of certified seeds (see Table 6.2), 
however, shows the farmers’ years of education and farming experience significantly 
determine whether they will use certified seeds. The results in Table 6.2 suggest that 
smallholder farmers’ membership of FBO does not increase significantly their likelihood 
to use certified seeds. Rather, the results suggest that smallholder farmers who have 
more years of education and farming experience are more likely to use certified seeds. 
As observed in Chapter 5, smallholder farmers’ year of education is coming up strongly 
as a determinant of adoption. 
The study found it difficult to collect data on the quantity of certified seeds used, as most 
of the farmer who used them could not indicate a reasonable unit of measurement and 
quantify the seeds used. 
Fertiliser use 
There seems to be a consensus among researchers, policymakers and farmers about the 
contribution of fertiliser to agricultural productivity. However, due to low fertiliser use 
in SSA, various efforts exist to improve fertiliser use and optimal fertiliser application 
among farmers (Crawford et al. 2006, cited in Benin et al. 2013). In SSA, Ghana has 
comparatively low fertiliser use, with an average of 7.4 kg/ha, which is low compared to 
Côte d’Ivoire (35.2 kg/ha), Morocco (47.5 kg/ha) and South Africa (65.4 kg/ha) (Benin 
et al. 2013). It is therefore not surprising that in 2008, the Government of Ghana started 
a FSP to improve fertiliser use among farmers (see Section 6.2).  
It is important to note that farmers use two major types of fertiliser: nitrogen–
phosphorus–potassium (NPK) and sulphate of ammonia. As this study is interested in 
fertiliser use and use intensity, rather than the type of fertiliser, the analysis is not done 
according to fertiliser types.  
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 Figure 6.5 shows that of the 226 smallholder farmers, about 83% indicated that they 
used fertiliser in the major 2012 farming season (April–October).85 One may attribute 
the high level of fertiliser use to the importance that farmers attach to it as being critical 
for increasing their yields. Consistent with Chapoto and Ragasa (2013), the data further 
suggests that the use of fertiliser is higher in the Northern Region compared to the 
Eastern Region; this is expected, as the soils in Northern Ghana are relatively less fertile 
as compared to those in Southern Ghana (FAO 2005).86  
Fertiliser use is relatively high among FBO members (88%) compared with FBO non-
members (77%). Among the FBO non-members, 78% of those in FBO villages used 
fertilizer, compared to 67% for those in villages without FBOs.  This again suggests that 
presence of FBOs in villages can influence FBO non-members’ fertilizer use. 
However, the use of a binary logistic regression to find out the determinants of fertilizer 
use among the farmers shows that the years of farming experience is the most important 
determinant (see Table 6.3).  Membership of FBO is not a significant determinant of 
fertilizer use partly because over 80% of the surveyed smallholder farmers indicated the 
use of fertilizer in the 2012 farming season. As we will observe later in this chapter, 
membership of FBO rather influences significantly the intensity of fertiliser use.  
We should therefore note that the use of fertiliser does not necessarily mean a high 
intensity of usage. In other words, there are variations in the quantity of fertiliser use 
among smallholder farmers, with many applying suboptimal amounts of fertiliser (this is 
examined in detail in Section 6.4). For instance, Table 6.4 shows the average quantities 
of inputs use per hectare in the 2012 farming season (April–October) and shows that on 
average smallholder farmers used about 36 kilograms of fertiliser per hectare. It further 
shows a significant difference in the intensity of fertiliser use per hectare between FBO 
members (41 kilograms) and FBO non-members (30 kilograms).  
85 It is essential to note that almost all the respondents in the study who reported the use of fertiliser 
said that they had applied it on their maize farms. 
86 Available online at ftp://ftp.fao.org/agl/agll/docs/fertuseghana.pdf  
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 Table 6.3 
Determinants of smallholder farmers’ use of fertilizer using binary logistic regression (Dep. Var.: Whether farmer use 
fertiliser) 
Variables B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Whether farmer belong to FBO (dummy, 1=Yes) .048 .509 .009 .925 1.049 
Age -.039 .023 2.953 .086 .962 
Gender (male=1) -.383 .579 .438 .508 .682 
Years of farming experience .054 .027 4.142 .042 1.056 
Farmer's years in education .040 .042 .896 .344 1.041 
Whether farmer has access to radio (dummy, 1=Yes) .653 .463 1.985 .159 1.921 
Landholding size under cultivation -.008 .071 .013 .910 .992 
Distance from extension service centre .000 .013 .001 .973 1.000 
AEAs farmers know from whom to get support .691 .427 2.627 .105 1.996 
Distance to the closest agriculture market -.023 .031 .541 .462 .977 
Constant 1.642 .903 3.312 .069 5.168 
Note. Observations = 226; Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: Chi-square = 14.363, d.f. = 8, Sig = 0.073, -2 Log likelihood 
= 198.808, Cox & Snell R Square = 0.089, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.144; overall percentage of right predictions = 80.1 
While Section 6.4 uses regression analysis understand the factors that influence the 
intensity of fertiliser use, a brief discussion of the factors that explain the difference in 
fertiliser use intensity between FBO members and non-members is important here. 
Three main factors can explain this significant difference. The first reasonable 
explanation could be that FBO members’ land sizes under cultivation are relative larger 
than those of their non-FBO counterparts and that they would therefore use more 
fertiliser. However, this is not the case, as there is no statistically significant difference 
in the average land size under cultivation by FBO members (5.65 acres) and FBO non-
members (5.12 acres).  
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 Table 6.4 
Average quantities of inputs use per hectare, according to FBO members and non-members 
Type of input 
All sample FBO members FBO non-members 
Observed Mean Observed Mean Observed Mean 
Fertiliser 
(kilograms) 
183 35.92 (17.30) 105 40.58 (16.59)* 
 
78 29.79 (16.36)* 
 
Insecticide 
(litres) 
34 0.65 (0.43) 26 0.60 (0.40) 
 
8 0.82 (0.52) 
 
Herbicide 
(litres) 
193 0.51 (0.31) 110 0.51 (0.28) 
 
83 0.51 (0.34) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. * represents a significant difference between FBO 
members and non-members at the 1% level.  
The second factor that plausibly explains the difference in intensity of fertiliser use 
between FBO members and non-members relates to farmers’ accessibility to fertiliser. 
As discussed already, when distributing inputs such as fertiliser under various projects 
and programs, AEAs usually do so through FBOs and their members (see Section 6.2). 
At least, this is largely the case under the FSP, where AEAs primarily target those 
smallholder farmers who participate in FBOs. About 95% of the FBO non-members 
interviewed indicated that they could not acquire fertiliser under the FSP because they 
did not get the passbook from the AEAs. As one FBO member notes, ‘getting a 
passbook to buy fertiliser is difficult. You need to have strong ties with AEA before you 
can get one’ (interview with FBO member in Northern Region, 19/03/2013).  
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 Table 6.5 
Average prices of inputs according to membership of FBOs 
Type of input Type of farmer Observations Mean (GH₵)  
Standard 
deviation 
 
Fertiliser (price per 50 kilogram bag) 
FBO member 105 38.34* 2.43 
 
FBO non-member 
 
79 41.27* 5.10 
 
Insecticide (price per 1 litre bottle) 
FBO member 23 8.22 .93 
 
FBO non-member 
 
8 8.63 1.06 
Herbicide (price per 1 litre bottle) 
FBO member 110 7.62* 0.72 
FBO Non-member 82 8.05* 0.83 
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
Note: * represents a significant difference between FBO members and non-members at the 1% level. 
 
The final reason relates to affordability of fertiliser. The prices of fertiliser sold under 
the FSP and BFP are often lower than prices in the open market. As shown in Table 6.5, 
there is a difference between FBO members and non-members with regard to the 
average price at which they bought their fertiliser during the 2012 farming season 
(April–October). A test of differences in the averages, using a t-test, shows that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the average prices. This reveals that the 
average price at which FBO members buy fertiliser is cheaper compared with FBO non-
members. A further disaggregation of the data according to FBO non-members who live 
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 in villages with the presence of FBOs and those without FBOs in the village shows some 
difference in the average prices of fertiliser, that is, GH₵40.72 and GH₵42.73 
respectively. However, a t-test indicates that the difference is not statistically significant 
(t= 1.5673, p < 0.1212). 
Herbicide use 
Farmers use herbicides for land preparation and weed control. Herbicides have become 
very popular among smallholder farmers in Ghana and are among the most widely used 
inputs (see Figure 6.5). Approximately 87% of smallholder farmers surveyed indicated 
that they had used herbicides in the major season of 2012 (see Figure 6.5). Similar to 
fertiliser use, the use of herbicides is higher in the Northern Region (56%) than the 
Eastern Region (44%). To test whether the proportions of herbicide use for the two 
regions are statistically different, I used the χ2 test, with α = 0.05 set as the criterion for 
significance. According to the χ2 test of dependence, these differences are statistically 
significant; χ2 = 4.345, p = 0.037. A reasonable explanation for this difference is that the 
Northern Region (savannah) and Eastern Region (forest) lie in two different agro-
ecological zones, with higher growth of weeds expected in the Northern Region 
compared to the Eastern Region.  
While a regression analysis is undertaken in Section 6.4 to understand the determinants 
of herbicide use intensity among smallholder farmers, it is important to discuss briefly 
why such a high number of farmers (87%) used herbicides. The first reason relates to 
easy access and low cost due to the influx of cheap herbicides from China (Ragasa et al. 
2013a). Herbicides are not only relatively accessible to most farmers but they are also 
more affordable for farmers compared to fertiliser. For example, the average price of 1 
litre of herbicide is about eight Ghana cedis ($4), compared to 40 Ghana cedis ($20) for 
one bag (50 kilograms) of fertiliser. Second, interviews with farmers revealed that the 
use of human labour for land preparation and weed controls has become expensive, 
compared to the use of herbicides.  This was also supported by interviews with the 
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 AEAs. According to one AEA for instance, a farmer can use 1 litre of herbicides at a 
cost of nine Ghana cedis ($4.5) to control an acre (0.4 hectare) of weeds, compared to 36 
Ghana cedis ($18) for the labour cost in controlling an acre (0.4 hectare) of weeds.87  
In spite of the widespread use of herbicides among smallholder farmers, it is still 
important to understand whether membership of an FBO increases farmers’ intensity of 
herbicide use. Table 6.1 indicates that the use of herbicides is relatively high among both 
FBO members (93%) and FBO non-members (81%). Concerning the average quantity of 
herbicide use per hectare, there is no difference between FBO members and non-
members (see Table 6.2), examined in detail in Section 6.4.  
Insecticide use 
Smallholder farmers also use insecticides for pest control. In this study, insecticides are 
the least used input (see Figure 6.5).88 Indeed, only 15% of the surveyed farmers 
indicated that they had used insecticides/pesticides in the farming season. The data 
indicates that almost all the farmers who had used insecticides came from the Eastern 
Region, where the majority of farmers used insecticides on their cash crops and 
vegetable fields. Concerning whether FBOs make a difference in insecticide use 
intensity, the data suggests that there is no significant difference between FBO members 
and non-members (see Table 6.4).  
The key points to note in this section are as follows. First, certified seed and insecticide 
use are relatively low among smallholder farmers; and while FBOs have a significant 
effect on the use of certified seeds, they have no effect on the use of insecticides among 
smallholder farmers. Second, fertiliser and herbicides are the most widely used inputs 
among smallholder farmers. While there is a significant difference between FBO 
members and non-members regarding their intensity of fertiliser use, there is no 
87 Interview with AEA in the Eastern Region, 03/06/2013. 
88 This is expected, as this study did not focus on farmers who grow cash crops (e.g. cocoa) and 
vegetables (e.g. tomatoes); cash crop and vegetable farmers have the likelihood of using insecticides, 
compared to farmers who grow cereals.  
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 significant difference between them concerning the use of herbicides, largely because 
herbicides are easily accessible and more affordable. 
As fertiliser and herbicides are the most widely used inputs among smallholder farmers, 
it is important to discuss in detail the factors that influence the intensity of their use in 
addition to FBO membership. This line of investigation is useful as FBOs only seem to 
have a significant influence for intensity of fertiliser use and not that of herbicides. The 
next section therefore employs regression analysis to understand the factors that 
influence smallholder farmers’ intensity of fertiliser and herbicide use.  
6.4 Beyond FBOs: understanding the intensity of fertiliser and 
herbicide use 
The previous section established the significance of membership of FBOs in farmers’ 
use of fertiliser, but not that of herbicides. It is therefore necessary to explore broadly the 
factors that influence smallholder farmers’ intensity of use of herbicides and fertilizer. 
To do this, the section employs regression analysis (OLS). Table 6.6 shows descriptive 
statistics of the variables on which the analysis relies, presented according to FBO 
members and non-members for easy comparison. I begin with the factors that influence 
the intensity of fertiliser use. 
6.4.1 The intensity of fertiliser utilisation 
Table 6.7 reports the regression analysis of the factors that influence the quantity of 
fertiliser that smallholder farmers apply (Appendices 6.1 (overall study sample), 6.2 
(FBO member sample) and 6.3 (FBO non-member sample) also provide correlation 
matrices for these variables). The table reports estimates of the unstandardised and 
standardised coefficients and the corresponding standard errors for independent 
variables, categorised into three: Models 1, 2 and 3. While Model 1 estimates the factors 
that influence the quantity of fertiliser used, using the entire sample, Models 2 and 3 
estimate for FBO members and non-members, respectively. It is important to indicate 
that all zeros (that is those farmers who did not use fertiliser in the 2012 farming season) 
were dropped in the regression analysis.  
194 
 
 Table 6.6 
Mean statistics of selected variables according to FBO members and non-members  
Variable Description FBO members 
(n = 120) 
FBO non-members 
(n = 106) 
Total 
(n = 226) 
Fertperha Average quantity of fertiliser use per hectare 
(kiloggrams) 
40.58 (16.59)2 29.79 (16.36)3* 35.92 
(17.30)4 
FBOmem Whether farmer belongs to FBO (dummy) - - 0.53 (0.50) 
Education Average education (in years) 5.92 (5.73) 3.15 (4.40) 4.62 (5.32) 
Radio Whether farmer has access to radio (dummy) 0.90 (0.30) 0.64 (0.48) 0.78 (0.42) 
Distmark Average distance from the closest market (in miles)  4.78 (6.31) 6.96 (7.54)* 5.80 (6.99) 
Distagric Average distance from the closest extension centre 
(in miles) 
13.88 (15.50) 15.81 (18.01) 14.78 (16.71) 
NoAEA Average number of AEAs that farmer knows 1.18 (0.66) 0.34 (0.48)* 0.79(0.72) 
FBOfarm Whether FBO has a group farm (dummy) 0.45 (0.50)1   
Fertprice Average price of a bag (50 kilograms) of fertiliser 
(GH₵) 
38.34 (2.43)2 41.29 (5.13)3* 39.60 (4.07)4 
Herbprice Average price of 1 litre of herbicide 7.62 (0.72)5 8.05 (0.83)6* 7.80 (0.80)7 
Herbperha Average quantity of herbicide use per hectare (litres) 0.51 (0.28)5 0.51 (0.34)6 0.51 (0.31)7 
Grants Whether FBO member has received 
seeds/fertiliser/herbicide in past 3 years (dummy) 
0.62 (0.49)   
Leader Whether FBO member is a leader (dummy, 1 = yes) 0.33 (0.47) 1   
FBOsize Average size of FBO 32.45 (17.70) 1   
VilFBO Whether there is FBO in the village (dummy, 1 = yes)  0.69 (0.47)  
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. *, ** and *** indicate significant differences between FBO members and 
non-members at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 1 represents n = 40, 2 n = 105, 3 n = 78, 4 n = 183, 5 n = 110, 6 n = 83 
and 7 n = 193.  
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 In Model 1, the variables included are whether the farmer belongs to an FBO, their years 
of education, their access to radio, their distance from the nearest market and extension 
centre, the AEAs known to farmers from whom they can seek extension advice and the 
average price of fertiliser. 
As noted in Chapter 5, the inclusion of farmers’ years of education and their access to 
radio is important because these variables have the potential to expose them to the need 
to increase the intensity of fertiliser use to achieve improved productivity. An 
examination of the coefficients of Model 1 further supports the evidence that 
membership of FBOs improves smallholder farmers’ intensity of fertiliser use. The 
model also shows that farmers who have additional years in education will be able to 
increase their intensity of fertiliser use. As noted already, many studies have shown that 
years of education often tend to have a positive association with levels of adoption of 
technology (see, e.g., Foster & Rosenzweig 1996; Abdulai & Huffman 2005). As Green 
(2008) notes, education is seen as crucial in breaking the cycle of poverty, as it equips 
individuals to understand their environment and hence to lead full lives. He further 
argues that education and knowledge ‘allows people to make informed choices, and 
strengthens their ability to demand their rights’ (Green 2008, p. 43).  
Model 2 has the same variables as Model 1 except for the inclusion of three more 
variables: whether the FBO member received grants within the past 3 years, whether the 
FBO member is a leader of the organisation and the size of the FBO. The grant variable 
is included because receipt of grants is one of the most important reasons why 
smallholder farmers participate in FBOs, and it will be useful to see how it influences 
intensity of fertiliser use. The inclusion of the FBO leadership variable will help us to 
understand the extent to which leaders of the FBOs may capture group benefits. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the membership size of FBOs has been identified as one of the 
factors that influence their effectiveness and it is important to see how this variable 
influences the intensity of fertilizer use.  Since Model 2 is run on a subsample of FBO 
members only, it excludes the variable of whether farmers belong to FBOs. Model 2 
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 shows that among FBO members, the average price of fertiliser is the most important 
factor that influences intensity of fertiliser use. The results show that an additional unit 
increase in the price of fertiliser will result in about a 21% decrease in the quantity of 
fertiliser that smallholder farmers apply per hectare. As expected, a fall in the price of 
fertiliser is most likely to increase demand, which would result in a greater intensity of 
fertiliser use. This finding supports evidence from a recent study in SSA, which 
concludes that ‘[t]he price of fertilizers has been one of the major factors limiting the use 
of fertilizers for all farmers, especially for smallholders in agriculture’ (Adesina et al. 
2014, p. 257).  
Model 2 also shows that the size of an FBO significantly influences the intensity of 
fertiliser use. The results suggest that as the size of an FBO increases its members are 
likely to increase their intensity of fertiliser application in their fields. Here, the analysis 
further shows that education is not a significant determinant of intensity of fertiliser use 
among the FBO members. The distance to the closest agricultural market where farmers 
can purchase fertiliser is not also significant. Similar to the results discussed in Chapter 
5 (see Table 5.8), Model 2 also shows that FBO leadership has an insignificant effect on 
the intensity of fertiliser use among the FBO members. Nonetheless, the coefficients 
suggest that FBO leaders have a tendency to use more fertiliser per hectare, compared to 
the ordinary members. 
Model 3 runs on the FBO non-members subsample. It has the same specification as that 
of Model 1, except for exclusion of the variable concerning whether farmers belong to 
FBOs. The Model also includes the variable of whether the FBO non-members live in 
FBO-villages or not. Similar to Model 1, the results in Model 3 also show the 
importance of education in improving smallholder farmers’ intensity of fertiliser use. It 
suggests that additional years of education would increase fertiliser use intensity even 
among FBO non-members. Indeed, fertiliser use tends to be inefficient among 
smallholder farmers who lack adequate education (Crawford, Jayne & Kelly 2006). 
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 Surprisingly, unlike FBO members, the coefficient of fertiliser price is positive (10% 
level significance) for FBO non-members.  
Table 6.7 
Factors that influence intensification of fertiliser use (OLS regression, Dep. Var.: quantity of fertiliser (kg) per hectare)  
Variable 
Model 1 
Overall sample 
Model 2 
FBO members 
Model 3 
FBO non-members 
 
Unstandardised 
coefficient 
Standardised 
coefficient 
Unstandardis
ed coefficient 
Standardised 
coefficient 
Unstandardis
ed coefficient 
Standardised 
coefficient 
FBOmem 6.329** 0.181** (3.107)   – – 
Education 0.607** 0.194** (.239) 0.340 0.121 (0.303) 1.313*** 0.368 (0.411)*** 
Radio 2.422 0.054 (3.358) -7.026 -0.108 (6.255) 5.109 0.149 (3.785) 
Distmark 0.036 0.014 (.219) 0.116 0.044 (0.287) -0.065 -0.027 (0.329) 
Distagric –0.127 –0.115 (.091) 0.037 0.034 (0.13) -0.205 -0.206 (0.133) 
NoAEA 2.480 0.102 (2.126) 3.307 0.133 (2.453) -0.988 -0.03 (3.95) 
Fertprice 0.083 0.020 (.315) -1.406** -0.208 (0.635)** 0.646* 0.204 (0.342)* 
Grant – – 1.063 0.032 (3.847) – – 
Leader _ _ 3.002 0.089 (3.416) _ _ 
FBOsize _ _ 0.277** 0.29 (0.107)** _ _ 
VillFBO _ _ _ _ 4.825 0.135 (4.411) 
Number of 
observations 183  105  78  
Pseudo R2  0.168  0.196  0.244  
Adjust R2 0.134  0.119  0.168  
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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 This may be explained by the fact that FBO non-members do not get opportunity to buy 
subsidised fertiliser from government and are willing to buy fertilizer at higher prices in 
the market. As found in Chapter 5, Model 3 also shows that whether FBO non-members 
live in FBO villages or not does not influence significantly their intensity of fertiliser 
use. Similar to the regression in Chapter 5 (Table 5.8), Model 3 here also suggests that 
the presence or absence of FBO in a village has no significant effect on FBO non-
members’ fertiliser use intensity. 
In summary, the analysis here confirms the earlier finding that FBO membership should 
improve smallholder farmers’ intensity of fertiliser use, and shows that a decrease in 
fertiliser prices should improve the intensity of fertiliser use among FBO members. The 
analysis also shows that smallholder farmers’ additional years of education should lead 
to a greater intensity of fertiliser use. The implication of this is that while effective FBOs 
are crucial to ensure the rapid growth in fertiliser use among smallholder farmers, it is 
also important to increase investment that would drive down the costs of fertiliser as 
well as better extension services that can improve smallholder farmers’ ability to use 
fertiliser profitably (Crawford, Jayne & Kelly 2006). It also points to the importance of 
improving education in rural communities, as this can lead to improved agricultural 
productivity and poverty reduction. 
6.4.2 The intensity of herbicide use 
Table 6.8 reports estimates of the coefficients and corresponding standard errors for 
independent variables to determine the factors that influence the intensity of herbicide 
use among smallholder farmers. It is important to indicate that all zeros (that is those 
farmers who did not use herbicides in the 2012 farming season) were dropped in the 
regression analysis. The independent variables included in the analysis are whether 
farmers belong to FBOs, farmers’ years of education, their distance from the closest 
market and extension centre, the AEAs known to farmers from whom they can seek 
extension advice and the average price of herbicides.  
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 The results in Table 6.8 support the earlier finding that there is no significant mean 
difference between FBO members and non-members concerning the quantity of 
herbicides used per hectare (see Table 6.4). It also shows that farmers who have more 
years in education are likely to intensify herbicide use, compared to farmers with fewer 
years of education. This is consistent with the earlier argument that improved education 
among smallholder farmers has a great potential to improve their access to extension 
services as well as increase their intensity of fertiliser use.  
Table 6.8 
Factors that influence intensification of herbicide use (OLS regression, Dep. Var.: quantity of herbicides (litres) per 
hectare)  
Variable  
Unstandardised 
coefficient 
Standardised coefficient Standard error 
FBOmem –0.086 –0.057 0.054 
Education 0.023** 0.165** 0.004 
Distmark –0.011 –0.107 0.004 
Distagric 0.004 0.104 0.002 
NoAEA –0.043 –0.041 0.038 
Herbprice –0.169** –0.178** 0.029 
    
Number of 
observations 
 
193  
Pseudo R2  0.065  
Adjust R2  0.035  
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 5% level. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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 The results in Table 6.8 also show that the average price of herbicides influences the 
intensity of herbicide use. It indicates that an additional unit increase in the price of 
herbicides would lead to a significant reduction in the quantity of herbicides that 
smallholder farmers apply per hectare. 
To sum up, there are two are key points to note in this section. First, FBOs do not have a 
significant influence on the intensity of herbicide use in the way that they do for 
fertiliser. Rather, the price of herbicide and the smallholder farmers’ years in education 
significantly influence the intensity of herbicide use.  
Second, it is important to note that the analysis here has only identified key factors that 
influence the smallholder farmers’ intensity of fertiliser and herbicide use. The 
discussion does not tell us whether smallholder farmers are using optimal amounts of 
fertiliser and herbicides on their farms. In other words, one needs to understand whether 
farmers are applying these inputs in the right quantities, which is examined in the next 
section. More importantly, it also explores the extent to which FBOs enhance the 
optimal application of these inputs.  
6.5 Adoption of technology 
One of the key findings of Chapter 5 was that FBO members get more extension visits 
and training in agricultural technologies relative to their non-FBO counterparts. The 
previous section also indicated a high intensity of fertiliser use among smallholder 
farmers, as compared to their non-FBO counterparts. Yet, the question of whether FBOs 
influence the way in which smallholder farmers use recommended technologies remains 
to be answered. This question is important, as low adoption of technologies is often cited 
as the major reason for the relatively low yields in SSA (Benin et al. 2013; Ragasa et al. 
2013a). The primary objective of this section is to understand whether membership of 
FBOs enhances smallholder farmers’ adoption of recommended technology. The 
discussion here focuses on maize as it is the major crop cultivated by the majority of 
farmers; approximately 88% of the surveyed smallholder farmers cultivated maize. The 
analysis also centres on the three main technologies identified in Chapter 5 as the most 
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 frequently taught technologies: planting in rows, application of fertiliser and herbicides. 
I explore two main issues under each technology. First is the extent to which smallholder 
farmers adopt each of these technologies, as well as whether FBOs make a difference in 
adoption of technology. This is important to understand because the classic justification 
for using FBOs to provide extension services is that information is likely to filter from 
FBO members to FBO non-members. Second, it examines key factors that influence 
farmers’ decisions to adopt these technologies.   
6.5.1 Row planting 
Row planting technology involves a specified measurement for intra- and inter-row 
spacing between plants to ensure optimal plant density and spacing (see pictures in 
Figure 6.6). Smallholder farmers understanding of how far apart to space their seeds as 
well as how wide to dig trenches can have effects of their yields (AGRA 2013). With the 
right spacing in place, crops are most likely to make optimal use of the resources 
available to them, which would lead to an improvement in crop yields. It is therefore not 
surprising that row planting is the most common technology that AEAs teach farmers 
(see Chapter 5). Approximately 61% of the 226 respondents claimed to be practicing 
row planting on their farm.89 
 
Figure 6.6. Plants planted in rows and farmers planting in rows  
Source: Author; taken in the Eastern Region during fieldwork 
89 When asked to indicate how they measure the spacing between plants, there were varied answers. 
While some said that they use ropes/lines that have the measurement, others said that with their 
farming experience over several years, they do row planting without the aid of ropes/lines.  
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An important question, however, relates to the extent to which FBO members and non-
members differ concerning the practice of row planting. Figure 6.7 suggests that about 
81% of FBO members practice row planting, whereas only 31% of the FBO non-
members do so. This points to a high level of adoption of the technology among FBO 
members compared to FBO non-members. Other recent studies in developing countries, 
such as Matuschke and Qaim (2009), Wollni et al. (2010) and Schipmann and Qaim 
(2010), make a similar point when they show that group membership would lead to a 
high level of adoption of technologies. For instance, based on data collected from 241 
smallholder farmers, Wollni et al. (2010) showed that group membership had a positive 
and significant effect on adoption of soil conservation technologies, and suggested that 
individuals who belong to groups are 24% more likely to adopt one soil conservation 
practice on their land than non-members.  
 
 
Figure 6.7. Practicing row planting  
Source: Author’s creation based on fieldwork data 
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 Although this difference is not surprising, as FBO members get more training than FBO 
non-members do, one would have expected the practice of row planting to be much 
more widespread among FBO non-members than reported in Figure 6.7. This is because 
it is expected that FBO members should pass on the knowledge they have acquired to 
other farmers (GOG 2007). While there is evidence that FBO non-members learn from 
FBO members, it is likely to be on a very small scale.90 
Further examination of the data shows that the adoption of row planting is higher among 
FBO leaders (95%), compared to 74% for ordinary members. As FBO leaders have more 
access to extension services compared to the ordinary members (see Chapter 5), it is 
reasonable to expect them to have a higher level of adoption than the ordinary members.  
It is also important to note that FBO members practice row planting on a limited basis. 
For example, among the FBO members, while the average land size under cultivation is 
5.7 acres (2.3 hectares), on average they practiced row planting on 3.5 acres (1.4 
hectares). What, then, explains farmers’ seemingly low adoption of row planting? Based 
on field interviews, one can identify at least two main reasons why farmers do not 
practice row planting on a limited basis. The first relates to labour requirements. The 
majority of the farmers interviewed reported that row planting is labour intensive and 
requires more than one farmer at a time to practice. As one FBO member in the Tolon-
Kumbungu District in the Northern Region explained:  
The AEA has taught us how to do row planting but we are finding it difficult to 
practice it on our farms. Last year I cultivated 10 acres but only did row planting 
on two acres. You see, we now send all our children to school, so we cannot get 
cheap labour to do row planting on all our farms. (Interview, 04/03/2013) 
In Sri Lanka, Namara et al. (2003) found that adoption of technology in rice farming 
was positively related to family size, which points to availability of labour. In 
90 For example, an FBO non-member in the Northern Region indicated that he sometimes asks farmers in 
FBOs to teach him what they have learnt (interview, 16/12/2012). 
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 Madagascar, Moser and Barrett (2003) made similar observations and found that 
adopters of rice technologies did so only on small parts of their total rice crop, despite 
higher returns, because of labour constraints. 
The second reason for the relatively low intensification of row planting is that many 
farmers claim that the application of sufficient fertiliser is a precondition for good yields 
if they practice row planting (interview with AEA in Northern Region, 15/02/2013). 
However, as noted, the majority of smallholder farmers do not have adequate access to 
fertiliser.  
In spite of the limitations of row planting, smallholder farmers who adopted this practice 
and others such as optimal application of fertiliser reported significant improvements in 
maize yields, with an average increase from three bags to about ten bags.91 This implies 
that both row planting and recommended fertiliser application are important in 
improving crop yields of smallholder farmers. 
6.5.2 Recommended application of fertiliser  
Although the regression analysis in Section 6.4.1 shows that FBO membership and 
smallholder farmers’ years of education significantly influence their intensity of 
fertiliser use, it is still not clear if they are applying the right quantity of fertiliser on 
their plots. While the recommended quantity of fertiliser required for an acre (0.4 
hectare) of maize may vary based on the fertility level of the soil, in Ghana, MOFA’s 
Directorate of Agricultural Extension Services (DAES) recommends that farmers 
growing maize should, at the minimum, use two 50-kilogram bags of nitrogen–
phosphorous–potassium (NPK) and then two bags of sulphate of ammonia per acre 
(Chapoto & Ragasa 2013). However, field interviews with the eight AEAs and the 
smallholder farmers showed that three bags of fertiliser per acre (two bags of NPK and 
91 The size of a bag of maize varies considerably and MOFA estimates the average weight of one bag at 
about 59 kilograms; see http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/x5426e/x5426e03.htm  
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 one bag of sulphate of ammonia) is the most widely used application rate.92 The 
variation in the actual quantity of fertiliser to apply per acre is not peculiar to only 
Ghana. As Adesina et al. (2014) observe, in many parts of SSA fertiliser 
recommendations are outdated, with many relying on fertiliser application outcomes for 
cash crops without taking into consideration the ‘diversity of the farming systems, 
rainfall, risks, soil types, farmers’ resource constraints, and objectives for production’ 
(Adesina et al. 2014, p. 259). 
Table 6.9 
Average numbers of bags (50 kilograms per bag) of fertiliser use per acre of maize farm, according to FBO 
membership 
Type of farmer Observations Mean (bags) Standard deviation 
FBO member 105 2.00* 0.82 
 
FBO non-member 
 
79 1.47* 0.81 
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
Note: * represents a significant difference between FBO members and non-members at the 1% significance 
level; t = –4.384, p < .00002. 
Nonetheless, the survey data for this study shows that, on average, smallholder farmers 
apply about two bags of fertiliser per acre on their maize fields, a quantity which falls 
well short of the recommended three bags per acre. When disaggregated according to the 
two regions in this study, the results show no significant difference between the 
Northern (1.7 bags) and Eastern (1.8 bags) Regions. What is more important to know is 
whether membership of FBOs improves recommended fertiliser application among 
92 Indeed, the Ghana Millennium Challenge Account Program supported FBO members with three bags 
of fertiliser for the cultivation of acre each. In addition, under the Block Farming Program, farmers 
receive three bags of fertiliser per acre.  
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 smallholder farmers. Table 6.9 shows simple means comparisons of the quantity of 
fertiliser applied per acre of maize farm. The results show that the average quantity of 
fertiliser that FBO members apply per acre of maize farm is higher compared to the 
figures for FBO non-members. A t-test shows that this difference is statistically 
significant. As discussed, this is the case because many FBO members receive training 
in how to apply fertiliser and they purchase fertiliser at relatively cheaper prices, 
compared to FBO non-members.  As the regression analysis is Section 6.4.1 also 
indicates, FBO members will intensify the use of fertiliser with a decrease in fertiliser 
price. 
However, it is important to note that the average number of bags of fertiliser that FBO 
members apply per acre also falls short of the recommended three bags. Further 
disaggregation shows that the average bags of fertiliser per acre that FBO leaders apply 
(2.2 bags) is higher than the number for ordinary members (1.9 bags),93 although it also 
falls short of the recommended three bags. The regression analysis in Section 6.4.1, 
however, showed that being an FBO leader does not significantly influence the intensity 
of fertiliser use.  
It is important, therefore, to understand why smallholder farmers are unable to apply the 
recommended quantity of fertiliser per acre. This line of investigation is even more 
important for FBO members who have received training in fertiliser application and 
have a good chance of accessing more fertiliser through the FSP.   
The field interviews show that the main reason why farmers are unable to apply 
recommended quantities of fertiliser on their farms is inadequate funding, which again 
corroborates the regression in Section 6.4.1 that farmers will buy and use more fertiliser 
if prices decrease. As one AEA explained:  
93 This is consistent with the finding in Chapter 5 that FBO leaders get more extension services than 
ordinary members do.  
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 we teach farmers recommended fertilizer application but I am sorry to say that 
they do not usually go by it because they keep saying they do not have money to 
purchase enough fertilizer. (Interview with AEA in Eastern Region, 30/05/2013)  
Adesina et al. (2014) also indicated the high cost of inputs and the poorly developed 
inputs market as key factors that contribute to the low adoption of agricultural 
technology among smallholder farmers in developing countries. It is therefore 
reasonable that many studies have emphasised the importance of smallholder farmers’ 
access to credit as being crucial for adoption of technology (see, e.g., Abdulai & 
Huffman 2005; Ragasa et al. 2013a).  
Another common reason expressed by many FBO members is delay in the supply of 
fertiliser by projects and programs (e.g. the FSP and BFP). With reference to the 
ongoing FSP (discussed in Section 6.2), about one third of the FBO members 
interviewed in the Northern Region indicated that the government usually supplies the 
fertiliser very late and at a time when farmers do not have money. Benin et al. (2013, p. 
6) make a similar point in their study of Ghana’s FSP when they note that, ‘[t]he ability 
of farmers to … adopt the technologies … offered by the different programs also hinges 
on timely supply or availability of the technologies and services’. The untimely delivery 
of fertiliser to FBO members could have been partly resolved if the FBOs had the 
capacity to facilitate the distribution of fertiliser to their members along the supply 
chains of the different programs.   
The overall picture that emerges from the above analysis is that FBOs have the potential 
to improve smallholder farmers’ intensity of fertiliser use. The analysis has shown that, 
on average, FBO members tend to apply more fertiliser per acre compared to FBO non-
members, although their average application per acre is still lower than the 
recommended rate, largely due to inadequate financial resources for the purchasing of 
fertiliser.  
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 6.5.3 Recommended application of herbicide 
Although previous analysis (see Section 6.4.2) has shown that herbicide use is high for 
FBO members and non-members partly because herbicides are relatively accessible and 
cheaper as compared to fertiliser, it is not clear whether smallholder farmers apply 
herbicides at acceptable rates. Before I explore this issue, it is important to indicate that 
there are different types of herbicides,94 but this study focuses only on the quantity of 
herbicides used rather than the type.  
The quantity of herbicides that farmers apply per acre depends on whether the herbicides 
are used for land preparation before planting and/or weed control after planting. In this 
study, the survey focused on herbicides for weed control after land preparation. The 
survey results show that on average, smallholder farmers apply about 1.26 litres of 
herbicide per acre. While the recommended rate of herbicide application is estimated at 
about 2.5–3.6 litres per acre (MOFA/CRI/SARI 2005, cited in Ragasa et al. 2013a), the 
estimate includes both herbicides for land preparation and weed control. The figure of 
1.26 litres per acre reported here is likely to increase to the recommended rates if it 
includes herbicides for land preparation.  
Table 6.10 
Average litres of herbicides used per acre of maize farm, according to FBO membership 
Type of farmer Observations Mean (litres) Standard deviation 
FBO member 110 1.26 0.68 
 
FBO non-member 
 
83 1.25 0.85 
Source: Author’s calculation based on fieldwork data 
94 Examples of herbicides available in Ghana include Roundup®, Roundup® Turbo, Lasso-Atrazine® and 
Gramoxone®.  
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 Table 6.10 shows that there is no significant difference between FBO members and non-
members regarding the quantity of herbicides they apply per acre. 
Two main factors may explain why FBOs do not make a difference in the adoption of 
recommended herbicide application among smallholder farmers. First, and as noted 
already, the relatively easy access and affordability of herbicides explains the even 
adoption of the input between FBO members and non-members. Almost all the farmers 
interviewed indicated the herbicides are affordable and readily available compared to 
fertiliser. As an FBO non-member notes, ‘herbicides are available in the market anytime 
for us to buy but with fertiliser even if we have the money it sometimes difficult to get 
and buy’.95  
Second, herbicide sellers teach FBO non-members the quantity of herbicide to apply per 
acre at the time of purchase. However, one AEA remarked that, ‘farmers listen to 
chemical dealers [herbicide sellers], but they are often poorly educated because many of 
the dealers cannot read instructions for herbicide application’ (interview with AEA in 
Eastern Region, 03/06/2013).96 Meanwhile, the health of FBO non-members and their 
environment may be at risk if they are not trained in the proper use of herbicides, and 
this emphasises the need for training smallholders in the use of inputs even if they are 
readily available and cheaper in the market.  
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined whether FBOs facilitate smallholder farmers’ access to key 
inputs such as certified seeds, fertiliser, herbicides and insecticides. While FBOs are 
perceived as local institutions that should improve smallholder farmers’ access to inputs 
through collective acquisition of inputs, the analysis shows that the majority of them are 
unable to purchase inputs collectively. The chief reason is that FBOs and their members 
find it difficult to pool resources together to purchase inputs collectively, largely due to 
95 Interview with an FBO non-member in the Northern Region, 20/12/2012. 
96 An FBO leader in the Northern Region also reported that in his village there is no scientific means of 
mixing herbicides for application and that irrespective of the type of herbicide, they mix a tin of milk with 
one bucket of water (interview, 04/02/2013).  
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 weak leadership. That is, most FBOs have weak leadership with regard to organising 
members to acquire inputs collectively as well as linking their FBOs to input dealers. In 
most cases, FBOs largely serve as targeted local institutions for external agencies to 
implement their projects and programs through which they provide inputs to smallholder 
farmers.  
Among the four mains inputs discussed, this study shows that fertiliser and herbicides 
are the most widely used. In relation to fertiliser, the discussion shows that membership 
of FBOs is significant in improving smallholder farmers’ access to fertiliser. The 
analysis shows that fertiliser use and intensity is high among FBO members compared to 
FBO non-members. This difference is largely explained by the desire of external 
agencies to channel input distribution to farmers through FBOs. The analysis also shows 
that smallholder farmers’ additional years of education and reduced cost of fertiliser 
should improve the intensity of fertiliser use. The chapter argues that while effective 
FBOs are important for improvement of the intensity of fertiliser use, it is also important 
to develop strategies that will make fertiliser more accessible and cheaper, which is 
currently beyond the reach of FBOs and their members. Similar to extension services, 
the state must play a crucial role to make fertilizer accessible and affordable for 
smallholder farmers. As in the case of the Green Revolution in Asia, the states 
recognised that fertilizer was critical for improved productivity among farmers and 
ensured that farmers had adequate access to it (Chang 2012; Birner & Resnick 2010). 
While strong and active FBOs are important for improved access to inputs, they may not 
make much impact if the inputs are not readily available, accessible and affordable to the 
smallholder farmers.   
The chapter also emphasises that education is crucial for increasing the intensity of 
fertiliser use. While the chapter establishes the importance of FBOs in determining the 
intensity of fertiliser use, it shows that FBO members are unable to do apply fertiliser 
optimally, due largely to inadequate financial resources for the purchase of fertiliser.  
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 Concerning herbicides, the chapter shows that FBOs do not have a significant influence 
on the quantity of herbicides that smallholder farmers apply on their farms, because 
herbicides are easily accessible and affordable for the majority of farmers. However, it 
argues that smallholder farmer’ additional years of education and reduced prices of 
herbicides should increase the intensity of herbicide use.  
The chapter also reveals that the majority of smallholder farmers do not use certified 
seeds, partly because certified seeds are expensive and are not readily accessible to 
smallholder farmers. Nonetheless, the study shows that there is a significant difference 
between FBO members and non-members in their use of certified seeds. This is because 
AEAs distribute certified seed under various projects and programs, with smallholder 
farmers who are participating in FBOs being their main targets.  
Concerning whether FBOs make a difference in insecticide use and intensity of use, the 
analysis shows that there is no significant difference between FBO members and non-
members in the average quantity of insecticides used.  
The broad picture that emerges in the chapter is that while membership of FBOs plays a 
facilitating role in improving smallholder farmers’ access to inputs and adoption of 
technology, it is on a limited scale, as they depend heavily on government and NGO 
programs to achieve this. FBOs generally do not have the capacity to acquire inputs 
directly from input dealers. Meanwhile, their over-reliance on government and NGO 
programs with poorly developed inputs markets, a high cost of inputs and inadequate 
extension services would not lead to sustainable access to inputs and adoption of 
technology (Adesina et al. 2014). We should therefore not lose sight of the fact that as 
many of these programs that are designed to quickly improve input use and adoption of 
technology among smallholder farmers (Crawford, Jayne & Kelly 2006) are channelled 
mostly through FBOs, membership of FBOs may not lead to any improved access to 
inputs after the programs cease to exist. This will be particularly the case if FBOs are not 
212 
 
 linked to well-developed inputs markets, such as private-sector and commercial inputs 
dealers, in order to acquire inputs for their members.  
It is important to note that the discussion in this chapter has shown that inadequate 
access to financial resources is a major obstacle that impedes both FBO members’ and 
FBO non-members’ access to and intensification of inputs. For instance, the analysis has 
shown that one of the factors that inhibit both FBO members and non-members in 
practicing optimal adoption of fertiliser application is that they have limited access to 
financial resources. Access to credit is therefore critical for smallholder farmers to 
improve their access to inputs and adopt fully the agricultural technologies that they 
understand (Norton 2004; Chang 2012).  
The next chapter therefore examines credit access among smallholder farmers; in 
particular, the extent to which FBOs can improve their access to credit. This is even 
more important as FBOs are not only considered as institutions with the potential to link 
smallholder farmers to financial service providers but, also, government and NGOs 
initiate programs to provide inputs on credit to FBO members.  
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 Appendix 6.1. Correlation matrix for regression and descriptive statistics (overall sample, 
226 observations) 
 FBOmem Education Radio Distmark Distagric NoAEA Fertprice Mean STD 
FBOmem 1.00       .53 .50 
Education .26 1.00      4.62 5.32 
Radio .31** .27** 1.00     .78 .42 
Distmark –.16 –.24** –.16* 1.00    5.80 6.99 
Distagric –.06* –.11 –.13 .60** 1.00   14.78 16.71 
NoAEA .59** .38** .29** –.19** –.10 1.00  .79 .72 
Fertprice .10* .09 .14* –.10 –.04 .17* 1.00 32.06 16.00 
Note: ** and * represent the fact that the correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
 
Appendix 6.2. Correlation matrix for regression and descriptive statistics (FBO members 
sample, 120 observations) 
 Education Radio Distmark Distagric NoAEA Fertprice Credit Grants Mean STD 
Education 1        5.92 5.73 
Radio .23* 1       .90 .30 
Distmark –.26** .01 1      4.78 6.31 
Distagric –.15 .04 .49** 1     13.88 15.50 
NoAEA .32** .09 –.17 –.13 1    1.18 .66 
Fertprice .12 .19* –.09 –.06 .07 1   33.55 12.93 
Credit .13 –.04 –.12 –.10 .18* –.14 1  .37 .48 
Grants –.17 –.15 –.07 –.37** .09 .06 –.15 1 .62 .49 
Note: ** and * represent the fact that the correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
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 Appendix 6.3. Correlation matrix for regression and descriptive statistics (FBO non-members sample, 106 
observations) 
 Education Radio Distmark Distagric NoAEA Fertprice Mean STD 
Education 1.00      3.15 4.40 
Radio .20* 1.00     .64 .48 
Distmark –.15 –.20* 1.00    6.96 7.54 
Distagric –.05 –.22* .68** 1.00   15.81 18.01 
NoAEA .23* .20* –.08 –.03 1.00  .34 .48 
Fertprice .03 .09 –.09 –.01 .23* 1.00 30.38 18.81 
Note: ** and * represent the fact that the correlation is significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
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 CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ROLE OF FBOs IN THE PROVISION OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
TO SMALLHOLDER FARMERS 
7.1 Introduction  
The discussions in the previous chapter showed that one of the key reasons why 
smallholder farmers use inputs at below-optimum levels is the unavailability of adequate 
financial resources to acquire inputs. Access to good sources of credit has often been 
mentioned as critical if smallholder farmers are to raise their productivity through 
intensification of inputs use (Norton 2004; Abdulai & Huffman 2005; Chang 2012; 
Ragasa et al. 2013a). However, smallholder farmers in many developing countries have 
great difficulty in getting access to credit, partly because they suffer risks (e.g. 
dependence on rainfall and lack of capital assets) that are too high for private-sector 
financial institutions to lend to them (Chang 2012; Owusu-Baah 2012). Thus, 
smallholder agriculture in many developing countries has remained largely self-financed 
(Khandker & Koolwal 2014).  
Importantly, many have considered FBOs as institutions that have the potential to 
improve smallholder farmers’ access to credit (GOG 2007; World Bank 2007; Ali, 
Deininger & Duponchel 2014). For instance, using data from a nationally representative 
sample in Rwanda, Ali, Deininger and Duponchel (2014) found that participating in 
networks such as FBOs can contribute significantly to reducing the credit constraints of 
smallholder farmers. There are three main reasons for this potentially progressive role 
associated with FBOs. First, when lenders deliver agricultural credit through FBOs, it 
reduces the unit cost of loan administration (Tinsley 2004). Second, group lending 
improves loan repayment through peer pressure and joint liability (Birner & Resnick 
2010). Third, FBOs can guarantee loans, whereas only a few smallholder farmers have 
capital assets for collateral to acquire loans (World Bank 2007). However, in Ghana and 
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 many developing countries, it is not clear whether FBOs have the capacity to achieve 
these aims. 
This chapter examines smallholder farmers’ access to credit; in particular, the extent to 
which FBO membership brings about an improvement. It explores three main questions: 
(1) To what extent do FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to credit? (2) Under 
what conditions are FBOs suitable for improving their members’ access to credit? (3) 
Finally, what factors inhibit FBOs as suitable local institutions for improving 
smallholder farmers’ access to credit? 
To answer these questions, this chapter is structured as follows. First, a brief outline of 
rural financial systems in Ghana is provided to underscore sources of credit and credit 
potentials in the agricultural sector over the past five decades. Next, the chapter 
examines the extent to which smallholder farmers acquire credit. Then, it explores 
whether membership of FBOs improves smallholder farmers’ access to credit and credit 
delivery in the agricultural sector. In relation to credit delivery, the chapter examines 
whether FBOs have the capacity to reduce loan default rates, which have been 
disappointing among smallholder farmers in past decades (Bratton 1986b; World Bank 
2007). Specifically, the chapter discusses the conditions under which FBOs improve 
loan repayment as well as the conditions under which they encourage high loan default 
among their members.   
7.2 Sources of credit to smallholder farmers: an overview of the rural 
financial structure in Ghana 
One may divide the evolution of rural agricultural finance in Ghana into three main 
phases: (1) a period marked by private individuals, governments and donors providing 
credit to farmers; (2) a liberalised financial sector, in which the banks became major 
partners in lending to farmers; and (3) a period that witnessed the emergence of 
microfinance institutions.  
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 During the first phase, which spans from the colonial period up to the early 1960s, the 
main sources of agricultural credit for smallholder farmers were mainly from informal 
sources such as government and donor projects, moneylenders, susu,97 traders, family 
and friends (DeGraft-Johnson 1958; Aryeetey 1994). While government and donors 
mainly provided inputs credit (e.g. for fertiliser) through agricultural cooperatives, 
traders and moneylenders provided largely cash credit (DeGraft-Johnson 1958; Aryeetey 
1994). However, a key limitation of credit from traders and moneylenders was that they 
often exploited their monopolistic positions in rural areas and charged smallholder 
farmers high interest rates (Aryeetey 1994; Chang 2012). Consequently, the above 
sources of agricultural credit were not adequate to resolve the challenges of agricultural 
financing in rural areas, prompting a shift towards a more formalised system of 
agricultural financing in rural areas. This ushered in the second phase of the evolution of 
rural agricultural financing in Ghana. 
In the second phase (from 1965 to the early 1980s), the Government of Ghana took at 
least three key initiatives to improve access to financial services in rural areas. First, in 
1965, the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) was established, with a primary 
mandate of lending to the agricultural sector (Meyer 2013).98 The ability to deliver on 
this mandate was undermined by the fact only about one third of the ADB’s branches 
were located in rural areas, and even in the rural areas, most of them were located in 
cocoa-growing areas (Mensah 1993, cited in Nair & Fissha 2010).  
The second key initiative involved the government instructing all commercial banks 
operating in Ghana to lend at subsidised rates, and that at least 20% of their loan 
portfolios should be allocated for agricultural purposes (Nair & Fissha 2010). In spite of 
this directive, lending in rural areas remained low because commercial banks’ lending 
97 Susu is a traditional savings collection system in which a group of people agree among themselves to 
contribute money regularly into a pool and the sum is given to a member at each contribution, until all 
participating members have received the sum contribution.  
98 The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) was called the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Bank at 
establishment, but was renamed in 1968.  
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 requirements were too high for smallholder farmers to meet. For instance, smallholder 
farmers needed to have high-deposit accounts and stronger collateral before they could 
access loans from the banks (Nair & Fissha 2010). The directive even suffered a major 
setback following the World Bank’s insistence that the allocation of subsidised credit for 
agricultural purposes should be abolished (Owusu-Baah 2012). The intervention of the 
World Bank led to withdrawal of all the major banks from agricultural funding, except 
for the ADB (Owusu-Baah 2012). Contrary to the World Bank’s directive, experience in 
many of the now-developed countries has shown that it is crucial for the governments of 
developing countries to be significantly involved in the provision of agricultural credit 
(Chang 2009, 2012). This is because without government directives for mandatory 
lending to smallholder farmers, major private-sector financial providers are less likely to 
extend credit to them (Chang 2009, 2012).  
Third, in the 1970s, the Government of Ghana started supporting the establishment of 
rural community banks to provide financial services to the rural people, given the 
limited spread of the ADB in rural areas (Nair & Fissha 2010). Established through 
partnership with the Bank of Ghana and rural communities, the aim was to make rural 
community banks community owned; providing a wide range of services to rural 
dwellers such as ‘individual savings with credit’ and ‘group savings with credit’ (Steel 
& Andah 2003). With the ‘group savings with credit’ service, for example, the 
expectation was that groups of farmers would open joint savings accounts and mobilise 
savings deposits to levels that qualified them for a loan (Steel & Andah 2003). A 
limitation of this third initiative is that there are no clear policies on how the rural 
community banks should provide credit to farmers on a realistic basis. Nonetheless, 
various governments and NGOs sometimes use the rural community banks to provide 
credit and grants to smallholder farmers under their programs (Nair & Fissha 2010).99 
Today, there are about 136 rural community banks with over 400 branches, and they 
99 Examples of government programs that have utilized rural community banks in providing grants and 
credit to farmers include Ghana’s Millennium Challenge Account Program and the Agricultural Services 
Sub-sector Investment Program. 
219 
 
                                                          
 constitute the largest formal financial service providers in rural areas (Bank of Ghana 
2012).  
The final phase in the evolution of agricultural finance experienced the emergence of 
microfinance institutions and financial NGOs (late 1980s onwards). This period has 
witnessed the growth of non-bank financial institutions and there are about 145 of such 
financial institutions in Ghana, including saving and loans companies, credit unions, 
credit bureaux and financial non-governmental organisations (FiNGOs) (Bank of Ghana 
2012). In spite of the surge of non-bank final institutions, many of them, unfortunately, 
provide services in urban and peri-urban areas and therefore do not deliver the require 
services needed in rural Ghana (Nair & Fissha 2010). In many developing countries, it is 
has been observed that while the microfinance revolution opened access to loans for 
millions of poor people, as access to credit requires no formal collateral, ‘it has not 
reached most agricultural activities, except in high-turnover activities such as small 
livestock and horticulture’ (World Bank 2007, p. 13).  
 
Figure 7.1. Sources of agricultural credit  
The above overview suggests that Ghana has a wide range of agricultural sources of 
credit for farmers to access, summarised in Figure 7.1. However, many of these sources 
still ignore lending to smallholder farmers. Indeed, between 1997 and 2006, only about 
2% of commercial banks’ loans went to the agricultural sector in Ghana (Owusu-Baah 
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 2012). This has led to the emergence of pressure groups in the agricultural sector in 
Ghana recently, calling on government to instruct all financial institutions to allocate 
20% of their loan portfolio into the agriculture sector.100   
7.3 Accessing credit among smallholder farmers  
While it is difficult for smallholders to access credit, this study explored the various 
sources from which smallholder farmers acquired agricultural credit within the 3 years 
immediately preceding the survey. As noted already (see Chapter 3), a propensity score 
matching technique (PSM) was applied on the sample of 240 smallholder farmers, which 
was reduced to 226. As stated in the previous chapters, the PSM technique was used 
mainly to ensure that the sampling approach used in selecting the FBO members and 
non-members was robust to allow for a comparison between FBO members and non-
members regarding their access to credit. It should be noted again that the PSM 
technique was not intended to show analysis of paired individual farmers’ outcomes but 
mainly to ensure a comparison between FBO members and non-members. 
The study found that banks (mainly rural community banks), government and NGO 
projects, relatives, moneylenders, traders and input dealers were the main sources of 
funding for rural smallholder farmers. As shown in Figure 7.2, banks and extended 
family relations (relatives) were the most frequent sources from which the surveyed 
smallholder farmers obtained credit, with very few farmers obtaining credit via 
government and NGOs. The evidence suggests that traders and moneylenders are less 
attractive to smallholder farmers in their acquisition of credit; although the discussion in 
the previous section indicated they were the main sources of credit to farmers long 
before the introduction of formal institutions in rural areas. Interviews with smallholder 
farmers revealed that traders and moneylenders charge exorbitant interest on credit they 
provide. As one FBO member in the Yilo Krobo District of the Eastern Region notes, 
‘the interest the moneylenders charge is so high and in the end the loan is not beneficial; 
100 An example of a pressure group that made such a statement is the General Agriculture Workers 
Union; available online at http://business.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201307/109189.php (accessed 
10/06/2013).  
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 so I will stop taking loan from them’ (30/04/13). This finding supports Tinsley (2004), 
in his extensive work on smallholder agriculture in developing countries, when he notes 
that smallholder farmers need ‘to avoid informal credit provided by landlords, traders, 
and shopkeepers with interest rates often exceeding 100 per cent per season’ (Tinsley 
2004, p. 124). Tinsley (2004) however noted that the high interest rates sometimes 
reflect the actual cost of loan administration.   
In spite of the high interest rates associated with these informal sources, they continue to 
be major sources of credit for many rural dwellers (World Bank 2001). Research in the 
mid-1990s shows, for example, that in Nepal, 81% of rural borrowing came from 
informal sources, and in Nigeria the figure was about 70% (World Bank 2001, p. 40).  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Smallholder farmers’ sources of credit 
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
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 Responding to the question of whether they had accessed credit within the 3 years 
immediately preceding the survey, only about 30% (68 farmers) of the 226 surveyed 
farmers indicated they had acquired credit, suggesting that the acquisition of credit is 
quite low among smallholder farmers. Compared to extension services (discussed in 
Chapter 5), credit is scarcer for smallholder farmers. Unlike extension services that are 
provided largely by the public sector, the public sector alone cannot provide credit to 
smallholder farmers, since agricultural financing requires a wide variety of alternatives 
(World Bank 2007).  
As only about one third of the surveyed smallholder farmers acquired credit, it is 
important to understand why the majority of farmers fail to acquire credit. The survey 
results show that about 65% of farmers who did not access credit identified lack of 
knowledge regarding procedures for acquiring credit beyond their families and friends as 
the main reason. Other studies suggest that smallholder farmers’ ability to acquire credit 
is limited by a lack of information and education (see, e.g., Meyer 2013). Similarly, it is 
reasonable to assume that the availability and closeness of financial institutions to 
smallholder farmers will improve their access to credit, but evidence from this study 
does not support this assumption. Only 1% of the surveyed smallholder farmers who did 
access credit indicated lack of financial service providers in their vicinity as the reason 
why they could not access credit. This is reasonable, as the majority of the farmers live 
within the catchment areas of financial institutions (particularly rural community banks). 
Indeed, the average distance of all surveyed farmers to the closest financial service 
provider is about 11 kilometres and 14% of them have banks located in their 
communities.  
In addition to the above, 23% of the surveyed farmers identified lack of collateral and/or 
savings as the reason why they could not access credit. For a very long time, the 
financial institutions have found credit to smallholder farmers to be an unprofitable 
venture. Because of this, they often require capital assets or adequate savings from 
smallholder farmers before they will provide loans to them (Bratton 1986b; World Bank 
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 2007; Dorward et al. 2009; Karlan et al. 2012). Finally, about 13% of the smallholder 
farmers indicated high interest rates from financial providers as the reason why they did 
not acquire a loan.  
The discussion in this section shows a relatively low level of access to credit among 
smallholder farmers, largely due to lack of information and collateral to acquire credit. 
As many have considered FBOs to be important local institutions that can improve 
smallholder farmers’ access to credit, in the next section I examine the extent to which 
they assist their members in accessing credit. However, before one undertakes such an 
analysis, it is important to indicate that collecting data from both FBO members and 
non-members regarding credit they have accessed is difficult. Despite providing 
extensive background about this study to participants, many respondents saw me as a 
potential source of financial support and therefore either refused to disclose relevant 
information or underestimated the credit they had already accessed (this is also 
discussed in Chapter 3). The underlying thinking here was the fear of undermining their 
own chances of securing further credit if full disclosures were made. Consequently, 
while 40% of the 40 FBOs surveyed indicated that their members had received credit 
from external sources, only 31% of FBO members provided credit information.  
7.4 Do FBOs enhance smallholder farmers’ access to credit? 
The evidence in this thesis shows that access to credit is a powerful motivation for 
cooperation among smallholder farmers, with about 65% of the 40 FBOs surveyed in 
this study identifying access to credit as the main reason for which they were set up (see 
Chapter 4). However, only 40% of FBOs reported to have accessed credit. Similarly, 
about 61% of the 120 FBO members mentioned ‘to access credit’ as the reason why they 
joined, but only 31% indicated that they had received credit from external sources (see 
Chapter 4). How, then, do FBOs make smallholder farmers different regarding access to 
credit? To answer this question, I begin with an examination of the view that FBOs can 
generate internal income through collective activities, which they can lend to their 
members (World Bank 2007).  
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 Chapter 4 indicated that the main sources of internal income for FBOs are through 
collective activities such as payment of dues and joint production. FBOs with internally 
generated income sometimes invite their members to borrow, although this was rarely 
observed in this study. Of the 40 FBOs surveyed, only 20% offered credit services to 
their members on an ad hoc basis. For example, through its members’ monthly 
contributions, an FBO in the Northern Region loaned GH₵30 (US$15)101 each to its 
members to plough 1 acre (0.4 hectare) in the 2012 farming season (April–October).102 
Often, the amount of money involved in FBOs’ internal loan arrangements is small, and 
may only be enough to purchase a bag (50 kilograms) of fertiliser or pay for the cost of 
ploughing an acre (for a description of an FBO internal credit scheme, see Box 7.1). 
 
101 GHS1 = US$0.50; this exchange rate is used for all dollar calculations in this chapter; 1 June 2013 
exchange rates available online at http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=USD&date=2013-06-01  
102 Interview with FBO leader in the Tolon-Kumbungu District of the Northern Region, 13/02/13. 
Box 7.1: Understanding internal credit arrangements in FBOs: the case of Sugru Vella 
Farmers Group 
Sugru Vella Farmer Group is located in the West Mamprusi District of the Northern 
Region. An AEA initiated the establishment of this FBO in 2008, to benefit from Ghana’s 
Millennium Challenge Account Program. The FBO registered with the Department of 
Cooperative (DOC) in 2009, with 45 members. It currently has 44 members, of whom 11 
are females.  
Under the Millennium Challenge Account Program, each member of this FBO was provided 
with grants in the form of seeds, fertiliser and money for land preparation to cultivate 1 
acre (0.4 hectare) of maize in the 2009 farming season. At the end of the farming season, 
the FBO tasked each member with contributing a bag of maize (about 59 kilograms) to the 
group. In 2010, the FBO sold the bags of maize it collected from its members and started a 
2-acre group farm (1 acre each for maize and rice). In the 2011 and 2012 farming seasons, 
the FBO provided interest-free in-kind credit (one bag of fertiliser) to its members from 
the profits it made from the group production. As at December 2012, the FBO had a 
balance of GHS 400 (US$200) in its bank account and was preparing to recover the in-kind 
credit it provided to its members in the 2012 farming season.  
Source: Author’s interview with FBO leader, 21/12/2012 
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 The above analysis points to the fact that not many FBOs have internal credit schemes 
for their members. Even the few FBOs with internal credit arrangements operate on an 
ad hoc basis, making this a less viable option for improving smallholder farmers’ access 
to credit.  
Below, I explore whether differences exist between FBO members and non-members 
regarding their access to credit. Figure 7.3 shows the sources from which both categories 
obtain credit. It suggests that FBO members and non-members differ significantly in 
many respects. First, while family relations (relatives) are the most important source of 
credit for FBO non-members, banks tend to be the main source for FBO members. 
Unsurprisingly, whereas only 24% of FBO non-members held bank accounts, a 
remarkable 55% of FBO members did. This indicates an appreciable level of awareness 
among FBO members on the need to open bank accounts. Second, the results presented 
in Figure 7.3 reflect the fact that smallholder farmers can only access credit from 
government and NGO programs if they belong to FBOs, as not a single FBO non-
member in this study received credit from such sources.  
 
Figure 7.3. Comparing sources of credit between FBO members and non-members  
Source: Author’s calculation from the fieldwork data 
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 One must also note that of the 68 smallholder farmers (30% of the surveyed farmers) 
who had accessed credit within the 3 years immediately preceding the survey, 65% were 
FBO members and 35% FBO non-members. Similarly, approximately 37% of all FBO 
members had accessed credit, while about 23% of FBO non-members had done so (only 
about 38% of FBO non-members who accessed lived in villages without FBOs). Using 
the Pearson χ2 test, with α = 0.05 set as the criterion for significance, to check whether 
the proportions of FBO members and non-members who had accessed credit were 
statistically different from each other, the test results show that the differences are 
statistically significant. The average amount of credit FBO members and non-members 
received also differed: while the average amount of credit FBO non-members received 
in the 3 years immediately preceding the survey was about GH₵413 (US$207), FBO 
members received about GH₵739 (US$370). However, a test of the differences in the 
averages, using a t-test, shows there is no statistical significant difference between them.  
What is important to observe here is that the average amounts of credit received by both 
FBO members and non-members are relatively low. However, while more than two 
thirds of FBO non-members (74%) did not have knowledge of the procedures for 
accessing credit, only about half of the FBO members (54%) did not have such 
knowledge. In addition, unlike their non-FBO counterparts, several FBO members 
reported the unavailability of collateral and high interest rates charges as the reasons 
why they could not access credit (see Figure 7.4). However, as pointed out in the 
introduction to this chapter, it has often been argued that FBOs can guarantee loans for 
their members (World Bank 2007). Evidence from this study shows that obtaining credit 
from banks, for example, goes beyond FBO membership. The requirements posed by 
rural community banks are too high for many FBOs to meet. For example, they require 
FBOs to make some minimum savings in their group accounts before they are eligible to 
apply for a loan.103 One FBO leader reported that a bank asked them to have savings of 
GH₵3,000 (US$1,500) in their group account before they could be granted a loan of 
103 Banks will normally require FBOs to have bank accounts, business plans and registration certificates 
with the relevant authority as part of their loan application process.  
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 GH₵15,000 (US$7,500), an amount they were unable to raise.104 Another FBO leader 
indicated that they needed GH₵2,000 (US$1,000) savings in their group account to 
borrow GH₵10,000 (US$5,000), which they also failed to raise.105 The above accounts 
underscore the inability of FBOs to generate internal savings through collective 
activities, as already observed in Chapter 4. 
 
Figure 7.4. Comparing reasons why FBO members and non-members have not accessed credit  
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
 
Field interviews with farmers, government and NGO officials suggest that banks and 
other financial institutions have strict requirements for lending to FBOs, because they 
have high loan default rates, which does not necessarily support the argument that group 
lending improves loan repayment through peer pressure and improved responsibility for 
individual borrowing (Birner & Resnick 2010). To examine loan repayment among 
FBOs, one needs to have adequate data on credit disbursements to FBOs and their 
repayment. However, as noted already, collecting such data from FBOs was difficult 
104 Interview with an FBO leader in the Akuapim North District of the Eastern Region, 01/01/2013. 
105 Interview with an FBO leader in the East Akim District of the Eastern Region, 06/04/2013. 
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 because farmers either did not want to disclose the details of their access to credit or 
simply did not keep records. Nonetheless, to demonstrate loan disbursement and 
repayment, and explain the conditions under which FBOs improve or do not improve 
loan default rates, this research examines four credit schemes administered to FBOs in 
the next section.  
7.5 Credit schemes with FBOs: what conditions make them successful? 
This section subjects four credit programs, from which some of the sampled FBOs for 
this study benefited, to close scrutiny. The aim here is to demonstrate that FBO 
formation will not necessarily guarantee improved credit delivery and loan repayment if 
weak FBOs are set up and loan disbursement and administration are poor. The analyses 
here therefore focus on the institutional arrangements of the credit programs with the 
FBOs and the conditions that shape their performance (or the conditions that make them 
successful or otherwise). The discussion is divided into two main subsections. The first 
examines two government credit programs that have performed poorly, through a low 
level of loan repayment, and explores the factors that account for their poor 
performance. The second subsection considers two NGO credit programs that have 
experienced a high level of loan repayments from FBOs and examines why there are low 
default rates in such credit programs.  
7.5.1 Government credit schemes with FBOs 
The two credit programs analysed here were administered to FBO members under the 
Block Farming Program (BFP), discussed in Chapter 6, and Ghana’s Millennium 
Challenge Account Program (see Chapter 1). I first present some basic facts about the 
two credit programs of interest here, before turning to explain the factors that shape their 
varied effectiveness.  
7.5.1.1 Credit to FBOs under the Millennium Challenge Account Program 
As already mentioned in previous chapters, between 2007 and 2012, the Millennium 
Challenge Account Program supported approximately 1,200 FBOs with training in 
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 agricultural technologies, seeds and fertiliser (ISSER 2012). Of the 1,200 FBOs, 275 
received credit, shown in Table 7.1 according to the regions covered in the program. 
About 9,500 FBO members received credit under this program to improve their 
agricultural activities. The program disbursed two types of loans to FBOs: short term (18 
months) and long term (36 months). The program channelled its loans to FBOs through 
selected rural community banks, which were expected to recover the loans. 
Disbursement of loans to FBOs started in March 2008 and ended in September 2010. 
The maturity dates of the loans also span from August 2009 to September 2012.106 
Table 7.1 
The numbers of FBOs under the credit scheme of the Millennium Challenge 
Account Program, by region 
Region Number of FBOs 
Ashanti 43 
Central 24 
Eastern 56 
Greater Accra 10 
Northern 109 
Volta 33 
Total 275 
Source: Author’s calculation based on raw data from the Millennium 
Development Authority, 2013 
At the end of the program, a total of about GH₵22.6 million (US$11.3 million) had been 
disbursed to the FBOs. However, as of June 2013, the time the researcher collected the 
data, only about GH₵2 million (US$1 million) had been recovered (see Figure 7.5), 
106 It is important to note that there were three FBOs in the data with maturity dates of March 2013, 
August 2013 and December 2013. 
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 which represents a recovery rate of about 9.2%. One can best describe this recovery rate 
after the end of the program as disappointing. Indeed, a key official who worked under 
this program assessed the credit component of the program in the following words: ‘If 
you ask me about my assessment of the loan component of the program, I will say it was 
a complete failure; and I will blame our system in Ghana’ (interview, 06/06/2013). 
 
Figure 7.5. The total credit disbursement and repayment for FBOs  
Source: Author’s calculation based on raw data from the Millennium Development Authority, 2013 
Note: GH₵1 = US$0.5. 
 
If one disaggregates the total disbursement and total repayment according the six 
administrative regions that the program covered, the default rate is high across all the 
regions (see Figure 7.6). Although it is beyond the scope of this research to explain 
specific factors that account for the regional variations in total disbursement and 
repayment, some points are worthy of note. First, although the Northern Region had the 
highest number of FBOs (see Table 7.1), FBOs in the Eastern Region received the 
highest amounts of credit. Second, the Northern Region had the highest recovery rate 
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 (19.3%) and the Central Region the lowest recovery rate (0.3%). The Eastern Region, 
with the highest total credit disbursed, had a recovery rate of 9.3%.  
 
Figure 7.6. The total credit disbursements and repayments for FBOs by region 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Millennium Development Authority, 2013 
Note: GH₵1 = US$0.5. 
 
The loan recovery figures shown in Figures 7.5 and 7.6 after the completion of the 
program offer little hope that the FBO members could ever repay such loans. What is 
important to understand is why FBOs are unable to improve credit recovery through peer 
pressure and joint liability. Before I return to answer this question, let me examine 
another government credit program for FBOs. 
7.5.1.2 Credit to FBOs under the Block Farming Program 
The BFP (discussed in Chapter 6), implemented largely through FBOs, provides in-kind 
credit to FBO members. It started in 2009 and focuses on providing seeds, fertiliser, 
herbicides and the cost of ploughing to FBO members on credit. In the 2009 farming 
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 program (MOFA 2010b). Due to poor repayment of the credit, the BFP currently 
provides only fertiliser and seeds on credit to FBO members.107 AEAs deliver the in-
kind credit and must recover the credit as payment in kind (farm produce) after the 
harvest, with no interest.  
Unlike the Millennium Challenge Account Credit Program, it was difficult to access 
disbursement and recovery data under this program for all the ten administrative regions 
in which it is being implemented. I only acquired data for the Northern Region, covering 
the 2010 farming season. Figure 7.7 shows expected and actual recoveries in bags of 
maize and rice in the Northern Region. It is important to note that expected recovery in 
bags is equivalent to the total cost of inputs that the program provided to farmers on 
credit.  
 
Figure 7.7. The expected and actual recovery of in-kind credit to FBOs in the Northern Region for 
the 2010 farming season  
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Northern Regional Agriculture Development Unit 
(RADU), Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA), 2013  
107 Interview with AEA in the Northern Region, 07/12/2012. 
50,359 
42,140 
17,346 15,845 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
Rice grain Maize grain
Crops 
Expected Recovery (bags)
Actual Recovery (bags)
233 
 
                                                          
  
Although Figure 7.7 suggests that actual credit recovery under the BFP for the Northern 
Region is better, compared to the Millennium Challenge Account Credit Program, one 
cannot still describe this as satisfactory. A reasonable explanation for their difference 
may be that while the Millennium Challenge Account Credit Program recovered in cash, 
the BFP recovered in kind. The recovery rates for rice and maize under the BFP for 2010 
were 34.4% and 36.7%, respectively, compared with an average of 9.2% for Millennium 
Challenge Account Credit Program. As the recovery rates under the BFP and the 
Millennium Challenge Account Credit Program are low among FBOs, the next section 
explains why delivering credit through FBOs does not provide satisfactory results.  
7.5.1.3 Explaining low levels of loan repayment in FBOs under government credit 
schemes 
It is important to acknowledge that bad weather conditions (e.g. inadequate or too much 
rainfall) may result in a poor harvest among smallholder farmers, which will affect their 
ability to pay off loans they would have invested in their farms. However, the focus in 
this section is not to explore these natural factors but, rather, to examine the political, 
social and institutional factors that influence loan repayment in FBOs. 
First, while is it is essential for government to be involved in providing credit to 
smallholder farmers, systematic political interference results in a low level of loan 
repayment even with the involvement of FBOs. When FBO members – and especially 
those members who support the ruling party – know that the government is providing 
credit, they regard the loans as gifts, especially if the FBOs and their members did not 
receive adequate orientation and training at their formation stage. An FBO leader in the 
Eastern Gonja District of the Northern Region appears to have summarised the above 
line of argument when he notes that  
Politics is the cause of low credit recovery in FBOs. For us, once your party is in 
power and you get credit you will not pay. We think they give us the credit 
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 because we have our party in government. (Interview with FBO leader, 
19/03/2013)  
Similarly, responding to why there continues to be low credit recovery among 
smallholder farmers even when credit is channelled through FBOs, an NGO official 
notes that, ‘MOFA has a lot of political colouration in its activities, so passing credit 
programs through MOFA tends to politicise everything, so farmers will not pay’.108 The 
above explanation for low loan recovery is not entirely new in developing countries, as 
Tinsley (2004) also reports that in Zambia, politicians seeking votes would often inform 
farmers that they simply did not have to repay loans if they were elected into office, 
because the loans would be gifted from the government. An official at MOFA argues 
that government should be committed to creating long-term credit facilities that 
transcend political parties for FBOs, in order for farmers to appreciate that loans 
received are not rewards for their party political affiliations.109  
The second explanation for poor loan repayment in FBOs is untimely release of credit to 
farmers. For instance, when government agencies deliver either credit in kind or cash to 
FBOs in the middle of the farming season, it has a tendency to reduce their yields well 
below anticipated levels, making it difficult to repay their loans. In relation to the BFP, 
an AEA remarked that, ‘… on [a] yearly basis, our recovery is less than half of what we 
disbursed; this is partly due to untimely distribution of inputs to farmers’.110 In its own 
report, MOFA, the implementer of the BFP, acknowledged that inputs, especially 
fertiliser, arrived with farmers late (MOFA 2010b). The literature already abounds with 
the effects of late release of inputs or credit to smallholder farmers (see, e.g., Bratton 
1986b; Tinsley 2004) but not in relation to FBOs. With strong FBOs, one would expect 
timely delivery of credit to their members, as they have the potential to demand and 
facilitate the delivery of credit. A senior official at MOFA supported this argument when 
108 Interview with NGO official in the Northern Region, 10/06/2013. 
109 Interview with MOFA official, Accra, 06/06/2013. 
110 Interview with AEA in the Northern Region, 15/02/2013. 
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 he noted that, ‘support to FBOs in the form of credit will be more effective if they are 
sent directly to the FBOs and not through a chain of government institutions’.111 
However, as the analyses in Chapters 4–6 show, many FBOs do not have the capacity to 
chase or link up with credit providers to demand credit at the right time, and often have 
to wait for credit to be delivered at a time deemed appropriate to the credit providers.  
Another reason for the low recovery of credit in FBOs is inadequate supervision and 
monitoring by credit providers. Since, at their current level of development, many FBOs 
in Ghana do not have effective leadership to manage the use of credit and enforce strict 
sanctions for members who default (see Chapter 4), credit providers must participate in 
supervising and monitoring to ensure that FBO members are investing the credit 
appropriately and observing cultural practices (e.g. weeding). Indeed, it is has been 
established that collective action is effective where there is strict enforcement of rules 
(Ostrom 1990; World Bank 2001; Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom 2010). It is important to 
note that the main agents in the administration of many government credit schemes are 
the AEAs, who are not only limited in numbers but also do not have adequate mobility 
resources (e.g. motorbikes) to undertake effective monitoring and supervision (see 
Chapters 1 and 5). For instance, If AEAs are unable to visit FBO members at the time of 
harvesting to recover credit, the members will sell or use their produce for other 
purposes (interview with AEA, 15/02/2013). It is therefore not surprising that an FBO 
leader made the following remark about AEAs regarding credit recovery: ‘We ask that 
when they give us loans, they should come regularly to collect some of the money as it 
is difficult for us to go to the bank and repay ourselves.’112 In addition, when the 
government channels credit to FBOs through rural community banks, as in the case of 
the Millennium Challenge Account Program, the banks are less likely to have the human 
resources to monitor and supervise the use of the credit, and will therefore depend on the 
FBOs themselves to use the credit appropriately and repay the loan.  
111 Interview with senior official at MOFA, 09/05/2013. 
112 Interview with FBO leader in the East Gonja District of the Northern Region, 22/03/2013. 
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 Finally, we should note that credit to FBOs is usually not for collective investment; 
rather, their members receive it and make individual investments. Unfortunately, FBOs 
usually do not keep credit records of their members; it is therefore puzzling how their 
leadership can enforce loan repayment when they have no such records. For instance, of 
the 40 FBOs surveyed, only 50% kept records. However, these were not records about 
credit; rather, they were records of their own monetary contributions and minutes. When 
FBOs do not keep records of their individual members’ activities, their leaders cannot 
manage or coordinate their investment.  
This discussion shows that, at their current level of development, FBOs will not be able 
to improve repayment of the loans provided to smallholder farmers by government 
unless credit disbursement is devoid of politics, and there is improved supervision and 
monitoring of credit disbursement and investment. The next section examines two 
NGOs’ credit programs with FBOs, which turn out to be relatively successful in terms of 
loan repayment, compared to the government projects. 
7.5.2 NGO credit programs with FBOs  
The Presbyterian Mile 7 Agricultural Station (PAS) and the Social Enterprise 
Development Foundation (SEND) Financial NGO (FiNGO) implemented the two credit 
programs discussed in this section. They are both local NGOs that operate in the 
Northern Region of Ghana. This section is structured as follows. The first subsection 
presents the PAS credit program with FBOs, while the second discusses SEND FiNGO’s 
credit program. The final subsection discusses the factors that account for the 
performance of the two credit programs in relation to FBOs.  
7.5.2.1 The Presbyterian Mile 7 Agricultural Station credit program 
The PAS credit program is part of its broader market access program,113  which is aimed 
at linking FBOs to important actors in the agricultural value chain, such as banks, input 
113 In addition to the Mile 7 station, there are other Presbyterian Agricultural Stations in Northern Ghana, 
including Langbensi, Garu and Sandema. 
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 dealers and markets. The station operates in five Districts (see Figure 7.8). PAS 
establishes FBOs and provides training in crop production, financial management and 
agribusiness. According to the data I collected from the station in March 2013, the 
number of FBOs under this station grew from 24 in 2005 to 103 in 2012. 
In 2010, the station supported 53 FBOs involving about 1,009 smallholder farmers with 
credit, mainly to cover the cost of seeds and ploughing up to a maximum of 2 acres (0.8 
hectare) 114 per farmer. The station guaranteed and assisted the FBOs in accessing credit 
from rural community banks. The loans were not given in cash to the FBOs and their 
members. Rather, the station used the money to buy certified seeds for the FBOs and 
their members, as well as organising tractors to enable them to plough. 
Figure 7.8 shows the total amount of credit that the station disbursed to the FBOs, as 
well as total recoveries for the 2010 farming season. The data are presented according to 
the five Districts that the station operates in the Northern Region. The total cost of seeds 
and ploughing provided to the FBOs stood at GH₵21,300 (US$10,650). At the end of 
the farming season, the station recovered about GH₵20,580 (US$10,290) from the 
FBOs, mainly in kind (farm produce). This represented a recovery rate of 96.62%. 
Indeed, as shown in Figure 7.8, three out of the five districts recorded 100% recoveries, 
with the remaining two Districts also recording impressive recovery rates of 90.9% and 
87.50%.  
When one compares the recovery rates here with those discussed in Section 7.5.1, it 
raises a fundamental question of what factors account for the low default rate. I will 
return to this question after discussing the other NGO credit program.  
 
 
114 In addition to the Mile 7 station, there are other Presbyterian Agricultural Stations in Northern Ghana, 
including Langbensi, Garu and Sandema. 
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Figure 7.8. The total credit disbursed and recovered from FBOs in the 2010 farming season under 
the Presbyterian Mile 7 credit program 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Presbyterian Mile 7 Agricultural Station, 2013 
Note: GH₵1 = US$0.5. 
 
7.5.2.2 The SEND FiNGO credit program 
The main aim of the SEND FiNGO is to promote the development of an inclusive 
financial sector among the poor in society, through the establishment and development 
of community-based member-owned credit unions. It also aims at improving 
microfinance services for FBOs through its credit unions. Key requirements for FBOs to 
access credit from its credit unions include the opening of a deposit account and making 
an agreed saving based on the credit needs of the FBOs. Under this program, FBO 
members receive credit in cash; each FBO member receives either GH₵100 (US$50), 
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 GH₵150 (US$75) or GH₵200 (US$100). SEND FiNGO also sometimes assists farmers 
in acquiring tractor services and inputs collectively with the credit.115 
By the year 2012, SEND FiNGO’s credit unions had loaned credit to about 48 FBOs in 
three Districts in the Northern Region. From 2008 to 2011, its credit unions loaned 
GH₵161,421 (US$80,710) to FBOs and recovered GH₵105,290 (US$52,645), 
representing a 65% loan recovery rate over the period. Figure 7.9 shows the yearly loan 
disbursement from the credit unions to FBOs and recoveries from 2008 to 2011. In 2008 
and 2009, there was not a single default from FBOs and their members. In 2010, 
although there was a default, the rate was low (only 4%) and could rarely have had any 
significant adverse implications for the credit program. In 2011, the unions experienced 
a high default rate from FBOs and their members (63%). In an interview, a senior 
official at SEND FiNGO explained that the high default rate in 2010 was largely due to 
bad rains, which resulted in a poor harvest (interview with NGO official in Northern 
Region, 14/06/2013). 
In spite of the relatively high default rate in 2011, one can conclude that SEND 
FiNGO’s credit program with FBOs has been a success. Again, the question is what 
accounts for the high credit recovery under this program compared with those discussed 
in Section 7.4.1. 
 
115 Interview with NGO official in the Northern Region, 14/06/2013. 
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Figure 7.9. The total credit disbursed and recovered from FBOs in the 2008–11 farming seasons 
under SEND FiNGO credit program 
Source: Author’s calculation based on credit data from the SEND FiNGO, 2013 
Note: GH₵1 = US$0.5. 
 
7.5.2.3 Explaining the high level of loan repayment under NGO credit programs 
Discussions in this chapter have already outlined some of the key factors that affect 
FBOs’ ability to improve credit delivery among smallholder farmer, with a focus on loan 
repayment (Section 7.5.1.3). This section discusses the conditions under which FBOs 
improve their loan repayments.  
As I shall discuss, when FBOs have weak leadership and little in the way of collective 
activities, recovering loans provided to them requires the effective participation of the 
loan providers. They need to participate in educating the FBOs and their members on 
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 and monitoring loan use through to harvesting and recovery. While these activities have 
a tendency to increase the cost of the loan administration to FBOs, they appear necessary 
in the early stages of FBO development, to nurture them into strong local institutions 
that will take up such roles on their own when they mature.  
The first explanation for the high recovery rates under the two NGO credit programs 
discussed is the awareness by FBOs that such loans are not free. In providing loans to 
FBOs, ‘our first major step is to educate them [that] the loans will not be free and that 
we are only helping them with credit to improve their production’.116 This kind of 
education is necessary, as many smallholder farmers participate in the FBO only to 
receive grants or gifts. As noted already, farmers require adequate education in order to 
know that.  
Second, when credit is delivered to FBOs late in the farming season, it will be difficult 
for FBO members to make maximum benefits out of such credit (kind or cash) to repay 
their loans. Compared with government credit programs, the NGO programs have less 
bureaucracy and tend to deliver credit on a timely basis. For instance, SEND FiNGO not 
only has all its credit unions located in close proximity to FBOs, but also makes 
decisions on credit applications locally, in the shortest possible time.117  
Another factor that explains the high level of loan recovery is the supervision and 
monitoring of loan use. Ideally, FBOs must have leaders who will manage and supervise 
credit they have received but, as indicated already, at their current level of development 
many FBOs lack such leadership qualities. It is therefore necessary for loan providers to 
assist FBO members by supervising and monitoring how credit is used. In assessing the 
success of their credit program, a program officer at the PAS concludes that, ‘monitoring 
is key for the success of our program; our officers are always on the ground’ with the 
FBOs (interview with NGO official in Northern Region, 12/06/2013), although this will 
require a large number of committed field staff. This argument is in line with Meyer 
116 Interview with NGO official in the Northern Region, 12/06/2013. 
117 Interview with NGO official in the Northern Region, 13/06/2013. 
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 (2013), who argues that loan providers need to develop appropriate systems for planning 
loan disbursement and monitoring loan performance with farmers.  
Similarly, as the sustenance of any credit program will depend on its recovery rate, there 
must be mechanisms in place to recover credit from FBO members. Without strong FBO 
leadership, it is highly unlikely that members will repay their loans if they are not 
encouraged or coerced to do so. Recognising that at this stage of their development 
FBOs themselves cannot recover credit from their members, the NGOs participated in 
the recovery process under their programs. For instance, the PAS credit program links 
FBOs and their members to a marketing company,118 which buys their produce and 
ensures that farmers’ loans are deducted from their total revenue.119 However, some 
FBO members claimed that with this mechanism, they end up using all their produce to 
pay loans, not least because the price of farm produce is often lower at the time they are 
compelled to sell to the company. As an FBO leader in the Northern Region noted, ‘the 
timing of our repayment was not good because at that time, prices of our produce were 
very low and we virtually gave all the produce to them’.120  
Finally, if sanctions are in place for FBOs and their members who default, farmers will 
have less incentive to default. However, if there are no penalties for FBOs that default, 
as in the case of the government credit programs discussed, then FBOs and their 
members will not cooperate and will therefore default. In the NGO credit programs 
discussed, FBOs and their member who default lose the opportunity to participate in 
future programs. According to the program officer of the Presbyterian Mile 7 
Agricultural Station, ‘if any group defaults …, we force them to pay before we get them 
off our program’.121 In the case of SEND FiNGO, until every member of an FBO pays, 
it is ineligible to apply for loan from its credit unions. With such punitive measures in 
118 This company is called the Savannah Marketing Company, and is located in Tamale. 
119 Interview with NGO official in the Northern Region, 12/06/2013. 
120 Interview with FBO leader in the Tolon-Kumbungu District, 16/02/2013, 
121 Interview with NGO official in the Northern Region, 12/06/2013. 
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 place, if FBOs and their members want to continue benefiting from a credit program, 
they must repay their loans.  
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that smallholder farmers’ access to credit is crucial for 
increasing their productivity through intensification of the use of inputs. The chapter has 
also examined the extent to which FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access to credit. 
The analysis in the chapter has shown that access to credit is relatively low among 
smallholder farmers, as financial services providers do not find the smallholder 
agricultural sector attractive because of its high risks (e.g. dependency on rainfall).  
It was also found that FBOs largely rely on external agencies for credit, although a few 
FBOs can generate internal income through collective activities for their members to 
borrow. It also indicates that credit access is relatively low for both FBO members and 
non-members, although FBO members have better access because government and 
NGOs use FBOs to deliver credit to smallholder farmers.  
The chapter has argued that the way in which FBOs are founded to participate in credit 
programs – that is, whether credit is disbursed through government or NGO programs – 
is critical for credit recovery. It shows that there is a high rate of loan repayment default 
among FBO members under government credit programs, compared with NGO 
programs, not only because smallholder farmers treat credit from government as 
handouts, but also because of poor supervision and monitoring of loans.  
The chapter also contends that the formation of FBOs to deliver credit to smallholder 
farmers alone would not guarantee improved credit delivery and loan repayment. It has 
demonstrated that when FBOs have weak leadership and little in the way of collective 
activities, loan recovery requires the effective participation of the loan providers in 
educating the FBO members, ensuring timely delivery of loans, supervising and 
monitoring loan use and undertaking recovery itself. It has further argued that the 
effective participation of loan providers is necessary in the early stages of FBO 
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 development to nurture them into becoming strong local institutions that will take up 
those responsibilities when they mature. This is particularly necessary at the current 
stage of FBO development, as the motivation for the majority of smallholder farmers to 
participate in FBOs is mainly to receive tangible resources such as inputs and cash. The 
utmost attention must therefore be paid to ensure a strong relationship between FBOs 
and their members on the one hand and credit providers on the other.  
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 CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH FBOs 
MAKE A DIFFERENCE AMONG SMALLHOLDER FARMERS 
8.1 Introduction 
This study set out to explore the extent to which farmer-based organisations (FBOs) 
improve smallholder agriculture in Ghana, particularly in respect of smallholder 
farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and credit. The research was guided by the 
notion that improved knowledge of and access to agricultural extension services, inputs 
and credit play important roles in improving the overall productivity of smallholder 
agriculture (World Bank 2007; Chang 2012; Hazell & Rahman 2014) and examined the 
roles that FBOs play in this process. Central to this thesis was the aim of understanding 
whether, and to what extent, smallholder farmers’ membership of FBOs improves their 
access to extension services, inputs and credit, with special attention to understanding 
the factors that shape the performance of FBOs in this process.  
As pointed out in Chapter 1, smallholder farmers in Ghana and many developing 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) constitute the majority of the population and are 
often geographically dispersed, which makes it difficult for governments and other 
development agencies with limited resources to improve their access to extension 
services, inputs and credit (GOG 2007). A key theoretical assumption has been that 
smallholder farmers, when organised into FBOs, would improve their ability to access 
services through collective action (Rondot & Collion 2001; World Bank 2007; Bernard 
et al. 2008; Hazell & Rahman 2014). Some key arguments have been that FBOs would 
provide collective voice to smallholder farmers and reduce their transaction costs of 
accessing services, as well as serving as collateral security for smallholder farmers to 
acquire credit (Rondot & Collion 2001; Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003; GOG 
2007; World Bank 2007; Bernard et al. 2008; Hazell & Rahman 2014). Consequently, 
Ghana and many developing countries witnessed significant investment in the 
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 development of FBOs. In Ghana, such investment has led to a continuous growth in the 
population of FBOs, but it remained unclear whether FBOs make a significant difference 
in the way smallholder farmers’ access extension services, inputs and credit. 
To answer this key research question, the study adopted a mixed-methods approach to 
data collection and analysis. One method of data collection involved questionnaires 
administered to 240 smallholder farmers (both FBO members and non-members), 
mainly to measure whether membership of FBOs improves access to extension services, 
inputs and credit. However, a propensity score matching technique (PSM) was applied 
on the sample of 240 smallholder farmers, which was reduced to 226 to ensure that the 
sampling approach used in selecting the FBO members and non-members was robust to 
allow for a comparison between FBO members and non-members. The use of PSM 
technique was not intended to provide analysis of paired individual farmers’ outcomes 
but rather to ensure a comparison between FBO members and non-members.   
Another method was semi-structured interviews with 90 smallholder farmers, 12 
government officials and four NGO officials, mainly to understand the factors that shape 
the performance of FBOs. The study has also utilised a variety of secondary sources, 
including survey dataset on FBOs in 2010 by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) and credit programs data from government agencies and NGOs, as well 
as documentation from FBOs themselves. The data analysis has therefore utilised both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative data analysis has involved both 
descriptive and inferential statistics, such as frequencies, percentages, means, cross-
tabulation and multiple regressions. The qualitative approach to analysis has utilised 
thematic analysis and descriptions.  
In relation to the question of whether FBO membership improves smallholder farmers’ 
access to extension services, inputs and credit, the thesis has shown a positive but rather 
limited relationship between FBO membership and access to these services. This thesis 
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 has presented three main arguments to explain the limited role of FBOs in improving 
smallholder farmers’ access. 
First, the thesis has argued that government and NGOs play key roles in the formation of 
the majority of FBOs, but pay little attention to building the governance and 
management structures of FBOs, which are critical for undertaking internal collective 
activities. Consequently, the majority of FBOs have a weak leadership and governance 
structure in place and therefore are unable to undertake effective collective activities, 
such as mobilising their members to receive or demand extension services and joint 
purchase of inputs.  
Second, the ways in which external agencies organise smallholder farmers to participate 
in FBOs (usually through projects and programs) gives the general impression among 
smallholder farmers that FBOs are mainly institutions to receive ‘handouts’ such as 
inputs, grants and credit, rather than organisations to undertake internal collective 
activities for the benefit of all members. These perceptions have adverse effects on the 
intensity of internal collective activities in FBOs, even when smallholder farmers 
themselves form the FBOs.  
Third, I have argued that the majority of external agencies involved in the development 
of FBOs often fail to nurture them into stronger organisations through regular 
supervision and monitoring of their activities. Despite the widespread belief among 
government, donors and NGOs that FBOs are important institutions with the ability to 
improve smallholder agriculture in developing countries (World Bank 2007), they are 
often used largely as a transmission belt to deliver irregular and short-term services to 
smallholder farmers. This means that while FBOs are key partners in the advancement 
of smallholder agriculture, the way they have been set up and developed undermines 
their capacity to undertake internal collective activities without the intervention of 
government and NGOs.  
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 The above arguments differ significantly from the extant literature on collective action 
in agricultural development, which often explains the performance of FBOs and related 
organisations based on their membership size and the extent of homogeneity or 
heterogeneity among the members. In the reminder of this concluding chapter of the 
thesis, I highlight the above findings and arguments in detail. I begin by focusing on the 
questions of whether, and to what extent, FBO membership improves smallholder 
farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and credit, as well as the factors that shape 
the performance of FBOs (Section 8.2). Next, I discuss the implications of the findings 
for both theory (Section 8.3) and policy (Section 8.4). The theoretical discussions 
highlight how the key findings of this thesis relate to the broader conceptual and 
theoretical debates on the role of collective action in smallholder agricultural 
development. In particular, I discuss the underlying political, cultural, social and 
economic factors that shape FBO outcomes. The policy implications highlight the need 
for investments in building the management and governance capacities of FBOs. The 
thesis is then rounded off with some suggestions for possible future research.  
8.2 Improving smallholders’ access to extension services, inputs and 
credit: the role of FBOs 
The main empirical findings of this study are contained in Chapters 4–7. This section 
ties together the empirical findings on the question of whether, and to what extent, FBOs 
improve smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and credit. The 
analysis in the thesis has shown that FBOs do lead to improvements. Figure 8.1 brings 
together data that I have already discussed in Chapters 5–7. In particular, it pulls 
together the proportions of smallholder farmers who accessed extension services, inputs 
and credit based on whether they are FBO members or non-members.  
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Figure 8.1. Access to extension services, fertiliser and credit  
Source: Author’s calculation from fieldwork data 
Figure 8.1 shows that about 73% of the FBO members surveyed accessed extension 
services in the 2012 farming season (April–October), compared to 23% for FBO non-
members. It also shows that about 87% of FBO members surveyed used fertiliser in their 
farms in the 2012 farming season, compared to 75% of FBO non-members. Finally, 
while about 37% of FBO members surveyed had accessed credit within the 3 years 
immediately preceding this study, only about 23% of FBO non-members had done so. 
These percentages suggest that FBOs are better at improving smallholder farmers’ 
access to extension services and inputs (fertiliser), as compared to credit. While the 
majority of FBO members accessed extension services and inputs, this thesis argued that 
their access is limited. I examine this argument in detail in the following subsections.  
8.2.1 Improving access to extension services 
With reference to the roles of FBOs in improving smallholder farmers’ access to 
extension services, the study first explored the question of how frequently smallholder 
farmers receive extension services from agricultural extension agents (AEAs). A key 
conclusion from such an analysis was that the majority of smallholder farmers receive 
extension services that fall short of their expectations; for example, approximately 76% 
of all surveyed smallholder farmers indicated that they either sometimes (about 39%) or 
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 never (about 37%) received extension services. It is important to note that all the farmers 
who indicated that they had never received extension services were FBO non-members, 
which shows that FBO membership is an important step in accessing extension services 
(Chapter 5). This supports Bratton’s (1986a) finding in Zimbabwe that farmers’ 
membership of farmer organisations is a major factor in explaining their high level of 
contact with AEAs.  
While FBO membership is important for smallholder farmers’ access to extension 
services, the study has shown that FBO membership does not guarantee optimum access 
to extension services. Indeed, more than half of the surveyed FBO members (about 54%) 
indicated that they sometimes get services, which implies that they receive extension 
services that fall short of their expectations. Regarding the actual number of times AEAs 
visited all of the surveyed smallholder farmers, the findings showed an average of one 
visit during the 2012 farming season (April–October). While visiting farmers only once 
during a season may appear inadequate, a recent study has shown that receiving at least 
one extension visit per year reduces the likelihood of being poor by 10% (Dercon et al. 
2009). However, the study has shown that the AEA visits to smallholder farmers favour 
those who belong to FBOs. The study indicated a sharp difference between FBO 
members and non-members regarding the average number AEA visits they get in the 
farming season (0.2 visits for FBO non-members and 2.71 visits for FBO members). 
In view of the large difference between FBO members and non-members in terms of the 
average number of visits they get from AEAs, the study has further examined three 
important issues. First, it has explored the differences among FBO members regarding 
their frequencies of extension access and revealed that FBO leaders get more extension 
services as compared to the ordinary members. The thesis has offered at least two main 
explanations for the unequal excess to extension services among FBO members. It has 
argued that the majority of FBOs have weak leadership, who find it difficult to organise 
their members to participate in extension meetings. The advantage that FBO leaders 
have over the other members is that the leaders are usually the first contact for AEAs 
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 when providing extension services. Due to weak leadership and poor organisational 
skills, the leaders would often have their extension meetings with AEAs alone, as they 
had failed to organise their members to participate. This weak leadership in FBOs is 
exacerbated by the fact that FBO leaders are often not rewarded (either in kind or cash) 
for services they provide to their organisations, thereby providing little or no incentive to 
mobilise their members for collective activities (see Chapter 4). The other explanation 
given for the disproportionate access to extension services among FBO members is the 
over-reliance of AEAs on FBO leaders to implement extension-related projects, which 
results in frequent visits to the leaders (see Chapter 5).  
Second, the thesis has examined whether participating in FBOs ensures optimal access 
to extension services, and concludes that FBO membership does not necessarily lead to 
adequate access even among FBO leaders (see Chapter 5). As observed, when AEAs are 
assigned to farming villages, they are expected to visit each village on a fortnightly basis 
during the farming season, but the analysis in this study showed that their visits to FBO 
members in those villages fall far short of expectations. It is important to explain this 
shortfall, especially as about 96% of the surveyed FBO members indicated that they 
know at least one AEA from whom they can request extension advice. The thesis 
explains this shortfall largely in relation to the capacity of FBOs and AEAs. A key 
argument here is that as most FBOs have weak leaders, they are disadvantaged in their 
ability to organise themselves and demand extension services from AEAs. These 
features of FBOs imply that they are several steps away from becoming independent 
institutions that generate and deliver extension service for their members (GOG 2010). 
This is particularly the case given that smallholder farmers largely perceived FBOs as 
institutions with opportunities to receive extension services, inputs and credit from 
government and NGOs, rather than institutions that would enable them to make a 
collective effort to acquire or demand them. The evidence in the study has also shown 
that the majority of AEAs have limited resources to organise regular extension meetings 
with FBOs. Most AEAs use their personal motorbikes to make extension visits to 
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 farming villages and this limits the number of visits they make to FBO members (see 
Chapter 5). Here, the analysis indicates the need for effective government – what Green 
(2008) has called the ‘effective state’ – to facilitate the provision of adequate resources 
to AEAs, as they are pivotal in the delivery of extension services to smallholder farmers.  
Third, I have examined the factors that influence smallholder farmers’ access to 
extension services beyond FBOs through regression analysis, and have found that the 
number of AEAs smallholders know, on whom they can rely for extension advice, is 
significant in explaining the intensity of smallholder farmers’ access to extension. The 
findings show that non-FBO smallholder farmers are more likely to intensify their 
access to extension services if the community has an AEA, which implies the need to 
increase both the number of FBOs and AEAs to achieve effective extension delivery. 
Other factors that have a strong and significant impact on access to extension services 
include access to TV, farmers’ years of education and the distance of farmers from 
extension centres (see Chapter 5). 
8.2.2 Improving access to inputs  
This thesis has also recognised that smallholder farmers’ access to extension services 
alone is not enough to ensure sustained productivity-led agricultural growth. They also 
need, among others, inputs such as seeds and fertiliser to realise the full potential of the 
extension services that they have received or learnt from AEAs (Norton 2004). As many 
consider FBOs as local organisations with a great potential to improve smallholder 
farmers’ access to inputs in developing countries (GOG 2007; World Bank 2007), the 
study has examined the question of whether FBOs improve smallholder farmers’ access 
to inputs and has found the following. First, the majority of the FBOs surveyed (about 
80%) were unable to purchase inputs collectively for their members, a situation that is 
contrary to the belief that when smallholder farmers participate in FBOs, they are more 
likely to jointly purchase inputs (GOG 2007; World Bank 2007). As noted earlier in 
Section 8.2.1, the majority of the FBOs could not undertake joint purchase of inputs 
because of weak leadership and lack of active participation of their members. 
253 
 
 Smallholder farmers mainly perceived FBOs as institutions through which to receive 
free inputs from external agencies rather than institutions that would ensure cost-
effective and timely acquisition of inputs. Similarly, the argument that FBOs can 
provide collateral to their members to purchase inputs on credit from private-sector input 
dealers (World Bank 2007; Birner & Resnick 2010) is not common among the surveyed 
FBOs. This is because there is a general ‘lack of trust between FBOs and input dealers 
due to inadequate repayment of credit’.122  
Second, we should note that FBO members may receive inputs (such as seeds, fertiliser, 
herbicide and insecticides) from outsiders, as about 62% of the FBO members surveyed 
indicated that they received at least one form of input from government and NGOs, 
either as grants or credit (see Chapter 6). On the contrary, none of the FBO non-
members I surveyed received any form of inputs from government and NGOs, which 
means that smallholder farmers have little or no chance of receiving inputs from external 
organisations such as government and NGOs if they do not belong to FBOs. In spite of 
the above advantage that FBO members have over their non-FBO counterparts, the study 
has pursued further enquiries in order to understand the intensity of use of inputs 
between FBO members and non-members, with a focus on seeds, fertiliser and 
herbicides, which are the most common inputs.  
In relation to the use of certified seeds, the study has found that the likelihood of using 
certified seeds among FBO members (55%) is more than twice that for FBO non-
members (25%). The thesis has argued that this difference between them is due largely 
to the fact that when distributing certified seeds under government and NGO projects, 
AEAs tend to target FBO members (Ragasa et al. 2013a). Nonetheless, this research 
maintains that the relatively low use of certified seeds among smallholder farmers is 
constrained by their low level of awareness of seed availability, their unwillingness to 
change to new seeds, the relatively high prices of the seeds and inadequate credit 
available to purchase them, as well as the existence of poor seed production and 
122 Interview with NGO in the Northern Region, 12/06/2013. 
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 distribution systems (Langyintuo et al. 2010). Thus, FBOs would not necessarily 
improve smallholder farmers’ access to, and use of, certified seeds within a framework 
of poor seed production and distribution systems. 
With reference to fertiliser, the evidence has shown that fertiliser use is relatively high 
among both FBO members (88%) and FBO non-members (77%). The thesis has argued 
that the relatively high level of fertiliser use among smallholder farmers is due to the 
high importance farmers attach to fertiliser for increasing their yields. However, it 
should be noted that the fact that the majority of smallholder farmers indicate that they 
use fertiliser does not necessarily suggest a high intensity of usage; the study has 
therefore examined whether there are variations in the intensity of fertiliser use between 
FBO members and non-members. The results show a significant difference between 
FBO members and non-members regarding the average quantities of fertiliser they used 
per hectare in the 2012 farming season (see Section 6.3.3). While FBO members used on 
average about 41 kilograms of fertiliser per hectare, their non-FBO counterparts used 30 
kilograms per hectare. This study has argued that the difference in the intensity of 
fertiliser use between FBO members and non-members is largely due to the preference 
of government and NGOs to implement their fertiliser programs through FBOs (see 
Section 6.2). Under such programs, the price of a bag of fertiliser (50 kilograms) is 
lower than the prices on the open market (see Section 6.3.3). 
This implies that the high intensity of fertiliser use among FBO members is not 
necessarily the outcome of their internal collective activities, but occurs mainly because 
outsiders use FBOs to implement their programs. When outsiders target FBOs in their 
fertiliser programs, they not only improve FBO members’ access to fertiliser but it also 
affords them the opportunity to buy the fertiliser at relatively cheaper prices and some 
cases on a credit basis. Results from regression analysis suggest that beyond 
membership of FBOs, smallholder farmers with more years of education are likely to 
use more fertiliser, compared to farmers with fewer years in education. This finding 
corroborates the available empirical evidence that shows years of education to have a 
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 positive association with levels of adoption of technology (see, e.g., Foster & 
Rosenzweig 1996; Abdulai & Huffman 2005).  
Regarding herbicides, the analysis has shown that the use of herbicides was high in both 
FBO members (93%) and FBO non-members (81%). The study has noted that the high 
use of herbicides is explained by smallholder farmers’ easy access to cheap herbicides 
from China (Ragasa et al. 2013a). Herbicides are also more affordable for farmers 
compared to fertiliser (see Section 6.3.3). The study has found no significant difference 
between FBO members and non-members concerning the average quantity of herbicide 
used per hectare. This is not surprising, as herbicides are relatively accessible and 
affordable for both FBO members and non-members. This suggests that FBOs would be 
less significant in improving smallholder farmers to inputs, if all inputs were accessible 
and affordable like the herbicide. Here, regression analysis also suggests that 
smallholder farmers with more years in education are likely to intensify herbicide use, 
compared to farmers with fewer years of education. The analysis further suggested that a 
low price for herbicides would intensify their usage.   
8.2.3 Improving adoption of technology 
In addition to the above, the study has explored whether membership in FBOs enhances 
smallholder farmers’ adoption of appropriate technology with a focus on row planning, 
recommended fertiliser and the application of herbicides. This line of analysis was 
necessary as low adoption of technologies is frequently mentioned as a major reason for 
low yields among smallholder farmers (Benin et al. 2013; Ragasa et al. 2013a). In 
addition, such analysis may provide us with insights regarding the extent to which FBO 
members pass on technologies they have learnt to FBO non-members, as one of the 
classic justifications for using FBOs to provide extension services is the belief that 
information about appropriate technologies is likely to filter from FBO members to FBO 
non-members (GOG 2007).  
With reference to row planting, the results show a high level of adoption among FBO 
members (about 81%) as compared to FBO non-members (only 31%), which suggests 
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 that the rate at which FBO members may pass on such knowledge to FBO non-members 
is low. This empirical evidence supports other studies in developing countries (e.g. 
Matuschke & Qaim 2009; Schipmann & Qaim 2010; Wollni et al. 2010) showing that 
group membership will lead to a high level of adoption of technologies. Among the FBO 
members, the results show that the adoption of row planting is higher among FBO 
leaders (95%) compared to ordinary members (74%). Here, the main argument is that as 
FBO leaders have more access to extension services as compared to the ordinary 
members (see Section 8.2.1), one would expect them to be more adaptable to 
technologies.  
In relation to recommended fertiliser application, the results reveal that FBO members 
apply an average of two bags (50 kilograms per bag) of fertiliser per acre, which falls 
short of the recommended three bags. Even among the FBO leaders who have a higher 
intensity of fertiliser use, their application of 2.2 bags per acre also falls short of the 
recommended three bags. The explanation for this shortfall is not because FBO members 
are not aware of the recommended quantities to apply per acre, but largely due to 
inadequate financial resources to purchase the right quantity of fertiliser. As we have 
shown in this study, the majority of FBOs unfortunately do not have the capacity to 
improve their members’ access to fertiliser beyond that offered by family relations, 
government and NGOs.  
Finally, regarding the recommended application of herbicides, the analysis shows no 
significant difference between FBO members (1.26 litres) and FBO non-members (1.25 
litres). The study has argued that FBOs do not make a difference in the adoption of the 
recommended application of herbicides among smallholder farmers because herbicides 
are relatively affordable and readily available on the market, compared to seeds and 
fertiliser.  
8.2.4 Improving access to credit 
This thesis has also acknowledged that access to financial resources is critical for 
smallholder farmers to improve their access to inputs and fully adopt agricultural 
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 technologies (see Chapter 6; see also Norton 2004; Chang 2012). Many have argued that 
FBOs have a great potential to improve their members’ access to credit (GOG 2007; 
World Bank 2007). Others have argued that FBOs would serve as collateral for their 
members to borrow from financial institutions, and that when lenders deliver agricultural 
credit through FBOs, it reduces the unit cost of loan administration and improves loan 
repayment through peer pressure (Tinsley 2004; World Bank 2007; Birner & Resnick 
2010). Here, the study has examined three main issues.  
The first concerned whether membership in FBOs improves smallholder farmers’ access 
to credit. Of the 40 FBOs surveyed, less than half of them (about 40%) indicated that 
their members had received credit from external sources such as government and NGOs 
within the 3 years immediately preceding the survey. While many of the smallholder 
farmers were unwilling to provide credit information, partly for fear of undermining 
their own chances of securing credit if full disclosures were made, the study found that 
FBO members and non-members differed significantly in many respects (see Chapter 7). 
First, while family relations (relatives) are the most important source of credit for FBO 
non-members, banks tend to be the main source for FBO members. Unsurprisingly, 
whereas only 24% of FBO non-members held bank accounts, a remarkable 55% of FBO 
members did, which indicates an appreciable level of awareness among FBO members 
on the need to open bank accounts to improve their chances of accessing credit in the 
formal financial sector. Second, the results show that smallholder farmers can access 
credit from government and NGO programs if they belong to FBOs, as no single FBO 
non-member surveyed received credit from such sources. Third, more than two thirds of 
FBO non-members (74%) had no knowledge of the procedures for accessing formal 
credit, while about half of the FBO members (54%) had no such knowledge. Several 
FBO members reported unavailability of collateral and high interest rate charges as the 
reasons why they could not access credit, although it has often been argued that FBOs 
can guarantee for loans for their members (World Bank 2007). This thesis has argued 
that obtaining formal credit (e.g. from banks) goes beyond FBO membership, as many 
258 
 
 banks have minimum deposit requirements that are too high for many FBOs to meet (see 
Section 7.4). 
The second major issue explored in the study in relation to credit was the view that 
FBOs can lend to their members from income internally generated through collective 
activities (World Bank 2007). The study has found that the majority of the surveyed 
FBOs do not provide internal credit to their members. Of the 40 FBOs surveyed, only 
20% offered credit services to their members on an ad hoc basis. Credit to FBO 
members is not only ad hoc but, also, the amounts of money involved are small, and 
may only be enough to purchase a bag (50 kilograms) of fertiliser or pay for the cost of 
ploughing an acre (see Chapter 7). I have argued that relying on FBOs’ internally 
generated funds as a main source of credit for members is not a viable option for 
improving smallholder farmers’ access to credit, since many cannot generate income 
through internal collective activities.  
The final issue examined was in relation to the conditions that shape the performance of 
FBOs in improving credit delivery among smallholder farmers. In particular, the study 
has examined whether FBOs have the capacity to reduce loan default rates, as loan 
recovery from smallholder farmers has been disappointing in the past few decades 
(Bratton 1986b; World Bank 2007). Here, the thesis has argued that the ways in which 
FBOs are used for credit delivery – that is, whether through government or NGO 
programs – matters in credit recovery. The analysis shows that there is a high rate of 
loan repayment default among FBO members under government credit programs 
compared with NGO programs.  
In relation to government credit programs with FBOs, while recognising the negative 
effects of bad weather, the thesis has argued that systematic political interference results 
in a low level of loan repayment, as farmers regard the loans as gifts, especially when 
the FBO members support the ruling party (see Section 7.5.1). In Zambia, Tinsley 
(2004) also observed that politicians seeking votes would often inform farmers that they 
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 simply did not have to repay loans if they were elected into office, because the loans 
would be gifted by the government. In addition, the finding in Chapter 7 shows that the 
late release of credit to FBO members by government agencies accounts for poor loan 
repayment. This is partly because the majority of the FBOs that were studied did not 
have the capacity to facilitate the timely delivery of credit to their members. In addition, 
the study has revealed that government agencies in charge of FBO credit schemes do not 
undertake adequate supervision and monitoring. The study maintains that, at their 
current level of development, the majority of the FBOs do not have effective leadership 
to manage the use of credit and enforce strict sanctions for members who default (see 
Chapters 4 and 7). This therefore requires credit providers to participate actively in 
monitoring and supervising loan investment.  
Indeed, the evidence in Chapter 7 has shown that NGO credit programs with FBOs are 
relatively successful with loan repayment for at least three important reasons. First, 
NGOs pay special attention to educating FBO members in the understanding that loans 
are not free. This is particularly important, as one of the primary motivations for 
smallholder farmers who participate in FBOs is to access grants or gifts. Second, the 
study has found that compared with government programs, NGO credit programs deliver 
credit on a timely basis because of less bureaucracy. Third, unlike government credit 
programs, NGOs recognise the weak leadership in FBOs and therefore pay special 
attention to supervising and monitoring loan use as well as credit recovery. The main 
argument is that because FBOs have weak leadership and little in the way of internal 
collective activities, loan recovery requires the effective participation of the loan 
providers in educating the FBO members, ensuring timely delivery of loans, supervising 
and monitoring loan use, undertaking recovery itself and punishing loan defaulters. 
Here, the thesis has argued that the effective participation of loan providers is necessary 
in the early stages of FBO development to nurture them into strong local institutions that 
will take up those responsibilities when they mature.  
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 8.3 Theoretical and conceptual implications 
In this section, I highlight how the key findings of this thesis relate to the broader 
conceptual and theoretical debates on the role of collective action in agricultural 
development, especially smallholder agriculture. The discussion here also reflects the 
usefulness of the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 2 to the broad literature. 
This section begins with a discussion on how the research findings can shape our 
understanding on forming FBOs and nurturing them into sustainable organisations. 
Next, the section relates the findings to key arguments about the characteristics of 
membership-based farmer organisations and their likelihood of influencing outcomes in 
collective action. The central focus here is to evaluate theories that emphasise that the 
membership size of farmer organisations, and how the homogeneity and heterogeneity 
of the membership shapes their collective activities.  
8.3.1 Forming FBOs and nurturing their capacity for sustainable development 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I pointed out that many governments, donors and NGOs set up 
FBOs to deliver services to smallholder farmers in a more cost-effective way (Uphoff & 
Wijararatna 2000; World Bank 2007). However, those in favour of minimising the cost 
of service delivery to smallholder farmers through FBOs appear to neglect the fact that 
considerable effort is needed to establish effective FBOs that are not passive receivers of 
services but, rather, organisations that can undertake internal collective activities to 
facilitate the delivery of cost-effective services.  
This study argues that the approaches that many external agencies use to recruit 
smallholder farmers to participate in FBOs leave farmers with the impression that FBOs 
are mainly passive institutions to receive external support, rather than institutions that 
provide avenues for internal collective activities. The findings in this study have shown 
that when forming FBOs, many external agencies spend little time on training and 
building the skills of the members, because these agencies are often under pressure to 
form FBOs quickly to meet project objectives (see Chapter 4). This results in the 
formation of FBOs whose members largely perceive them as passive institutions for 
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 receiving external support. In addition, FBOs that are formed hastily, with inadequate 
attention to the underlying patterns of the social, economic and cultural conditions of 
smallholder farmers, will be short-lived (Stringfellow et al. 1997). This thesis therefore 
contends that external agencies that pay attention to building the collective capabilities 
of FBOs during their formation stage are likely to help to develop organisations that will 
survive and work for their members beyond the lifespan of the projects. This argument is 
in line with Cook and Chambers (2007), who argued that FBOs are likely to be short-
lived if they rely largely on external support for their activities and not on their internal 
investment and resources.  
The discussions in this study have also shown that the majority of FBOs are formed 
through government and NGO projects, which often have predetermined goals. The 
problem with this approach is that when external agencies set up FBOs to achieve their 
predetermined goals (Rondot & Collion 2001), they are most likely to form FBOs that 
lack clearly defined objectives, especially if the FBOs rely on the external agents to act 
collectively.  
The thesis has further explained that when external agencies form FBOs, they 
automatically create a series of internal costs (such as skills, time and money) within the 
FBOs, which the members must bear. When the external agencies fail to recognise that 
smallholder farmers do not have the experience and skill to work collectively on a 
regular basis to achieve their common interests, the FBOs formed may disappear when 
the agencies leave (Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003). Uphoff and Wijararatna 
(2000) and Pretty and Ward (2001) therefore remind us that external agencies that seek 
to incorporate farmers’ knowledge in the formation of FBOs are more likely to sustain 
the activities of FBOs after the end of projects. In view of the above, this thesis has 
argued that successful collective action in FBOs is associated with their governance and 
managerial capacity. This line of argument is consistent with the finding of Ostrom 
(1990), Ostrom and Varughese (2001) and Bernard et al. (2008), who show a link 
between governance styles and the success of FBOs.  
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 The evidence in this study has shown that FBO leaders are crucial for the effective 
performance of FBOs. They must possess the technical expertise, drive and managerial 
skills (World Bank 2007) to be able to mobilise their members for internal collective 
activities and link them to service providers at the local, district, regional and national 
levels. This study has shown rather weak leadership and poor rule enforcement in FBOs 
(see Chapter 4). This is partly because the majority of the leaders I studied did not have 
any formal education (see Chapter 4). Similar studies in SSA attribute the weak 
leadership in FBOs to a low level of formal education (Barham & Chitemi 2009; 
Bernard et al. 2008), although Poulton, Dorward and Kydd (2010) reminds us that 
leaders with no formal education will perform better in FBOs if they receive suitable 
training. The thesis has emphasised that weak leadership in FBOs affects their members’ 
access to extension services, inputs and credit. In particular, I argue that FBO members’ 
limited access to these services is partly due to their leaders’ inability to mobilise their 
members to undertake collective activities. Without effective leaders who can 
communicate and mobilise their members, the notion that organised groups of 
smallholder farmers will have greater credibility in seeking for external support such as 
financial services and extension services (Penrose-Buckley 2007) will continue to be a 
mirage. As Day and Schyns (2010) note, good exchange and agreements between 
leaders and their members are more likely to lead to the attainment of organisational 
goals.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the enforcement of FBO rules and regulations is poor. Yet, 
strict enforcement of these rules is critical for effective collective action (Ostrom 1990; 
World Bank 2001; Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom 2010). The study argues that rule 
enforcement is poor in FBOs largely because the rules are often alien to them. External 
agents often write up rules for FBOs without actively engaging their members in the 
process. The problem with this approach is that FBOs operate with rules that their 
members do not understand and own. They mainly accept such rules because they want 
to receive support. This line of thinking is evident in Ostrom’s extensive work on 
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 common-pool resources, when she argues that group members are better able to 
understand and adapt rules that they create themselves than those that outsiders impose 
on them (see, e.g., Ostrom 1990, 1995). External agencies must help FBO members to 
create their own rules. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) argue for outsiders to strike a balance 
between modern and traditional styles of governance in FBOs in rural communities. 
The key point to note here is that while external agencies are important in the 
development of FBOs, they may not help much in the development of sustainable FBOs 
if little effort is put into building the skills and interests of the FBO members to 
participate actively in internal collective activities – what Green (2008) has called the 
‘effective citizens’. This is because FBOs and their members may have little or no stake 
in maintaining their organisational structures through collective activities after external 
intervention ends (Cooke & Kothari 2001; Upton 2008). External agencies could 
stimulate internal collective action in FBOs in two ways at the very least. First, they 
must pay attention to developing the collective capabilities of FBOs and their members 
by involving them in the acquisition of services rather than making FBOs passive 
receivers of services. FBOs with active collective activities are likely to engage well 
with external agencies for services and assume some degree of responsibility for their 
members. Second, they must realise that FBOs need considerable support at the early 
stage of their development and have to be natured over a longer period until they have 
matured in order to engage in active collective activities on a sustainable basis. The 
effectiveness of FBOs in helping smallholder farmers should be based on the slow 
building of their members’ skills and capabilities, as well as fostering changes in their 
attitudes and beliefs.  
8.3.2 Does FBO membership size and composition matter?  
In Chapter 2, I reviewed arguments about how FBO membership size and composition 
influence the outcome of collective action (see, e.g., Olson 1965; Rondot & Collion 
2001; Kaganzi et al. 2009). In this section, I highlight the contribution of the thesis to 
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 this ongoing debate, with a focus on FBO membership size and the 
homogeneity/heterogeneity of their members.  
8.3.2.1 FBO membership size  
Contrary to the widespread conclusion in the literature on collective action – that farmer 
groups with small memberships are more likely to be effective and have positive 
outcomes (Olson 1965, 1990; Coulter et al. 1999) – this thesis contends that the size of 
farmer groups does not matter unless the group has an effective governance and 
management structure in place. However, the regression analysis in Chapter 6 suggests 
that an increase in membership size of FBOs is likely to increase their members’ 
intensity of fertiliser use.  
While there is ongoing debate as to what constitutes a small membership, Wanyama et 
al. (2014) suggest a group size of 20–40 members as most suitable for successful 
collective action in agricultural marketing. The average membership size for the FBOs I 
studied ranges from 33 to 36 (see Chapter 4).123 Approximately 52% of the FBOs 
surveyed in this study have membership numbers of no more than 30, yet the research 
findings from Chapters 4 to 7 point to key limitations regarding the performance of 
FBOs in improving their members’ access to extension services, inputs and credit. The 
evidence in this study does not support the argument that rule enforcement will be easier 
in smaller groups because these groups have higher internal cohesion and therefore find 
it easier to organise for collective action (Coulter et al. 1999; Wanyama et al. 2014). 
While the transaction costs of organising FBO members would be lower in smaller 
groups (Stockbridge, Dorward & Kydd 2003), this thesis maintains that rule 
enforcement will be poor in FBOs with a small membership if they have weak 
leadership as well as the existence of rules that are alien to the members.  
123 Fieldwork data for this study and the 2010 IFPRI survey put the average size of FBOs at 33 and 36 
members, respectively.  
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 This implies that management inefficiencies are not limited to just larger FBOs, as 
Wanyama et al. (2014) suggested. If small-sized FBOs do not undertake collective 
activities such as the joint purchase of farm inputs, regular meetings and regular 
payment of membership dues (see Chapter 4), they are unlikely to become strong 
organisations to improve the wellbeing of their members. Thus, no matter how small the 
FBO membership may be, the members will not initiate internal collective activities for 
their own benefit if they perceive their organisation as a passive one through which 
government and NGOs deliver support such as inputs, credit and extension services to 
them. Similarly, it is often argued that FBOs with a small membership will have 
homogenous members and that this can ensure effective collective action (Ostrom 1990, 
2000), which I discuss further in the section below.  
8.3.2.2 Heterogeneity or homogeneity of members 
Again, the review in Chapter 2 has shown contrasting empirical and theoretical views 
about the role that homogeneity or heterogeneity of FBO membership plays in 
successful collective action. Principal elements in this debate have been the composition 
of FBOs in relation to age, wealth and ethnicity or family relations.  
For instance, Meinzen-Dick and colleagues have observed in India that rule enforcement 
is easier for organisations whose membership comes from the same neighbourhood or 
other social sphere, and conclude that social heterogeneity makes communication, 
cooperation and the enforcement of rules more difficult (Meinzen-Dick, Raju & Gulati 
2002). In contrast, this study has shown in Chapter 4 that the FBOs studied largely had 
homogenous membership in relation to age, ethnicity or kinship and economic activity, 
and yet this did not lead to effective rule enforcement and collective action. 
Homogenous FBO membership will be ineffective in their collective activities if they 
have a weak organisational structure, weak leaders and rules that are alien to them. In 
contrast with Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002), Berdegué (2002) observed in Chile that close 
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 and homogenous social relations prevented FBO members from enforcing rules for fear 
of alienating friends and neighbours.  
In addition, the findings in Chapter 4 have shown that FBOs are largely male-dominated, 
have relatively elderly membership (average age of 48 years) and consist of people from 
the same kinship, and that the members mainly cultivate food crops such as cereals. 
However, this did not lead to effective collective action, which supports Ostrom and 
Varughese (2001) when they argue that heterogeneity of group membership does not 
affect collective action. This study finds that what is important for effective collective 
action is good institutional design, such as timely investment and creating better rules 
for collective activities. If FBOs have good institutional design, one can overcome the 
issue of heterogeneity in the membership. Although the FBOs in this study largely have 
homogenous membership, their performance is below optimum levels regarding 
improving their members’ access to extension services, inputs and credit, because they 
suffer from bad institutional design.  
8.4 Policy implications 
The empirical findings and theoretical arguments presented in this thesis have important 
implications for the development of FBOs to improve smallholder agriculture in Ghana 
and other developing countries. This section highlights some key policy implications of 
the research findings. 
First, although policy documents in Ghana and elsewhere have hailed FBOs as 
instrumental in improving smallholder farmers’ access to extension services, inputs and 
credit (GOG 2007; World Bank 2007), evidence from this thesis points to the fact that 
their development in Ghana in terms of the policy and legislative frameworks is still in 
its infancy (see Chapter 4). While some have cautioned that over-regulation could affect 
the development of FBOs (Shiferaw, Obare & Muricho 2008), in the case of Ghana, 
there are no clear legal and policy frameworks as to who should establish FBOs, what is 
required to establish them and how they should function. The seven-decade-old 1968 
Cooperative Societies Decree is still the main legislation that guides the activities of 
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 FBOs, but this piece of legislation is outdated, as it gives the Registrar of the 
Department of Cooperatives (DOC) substantial powers that impede the development of 
autonomous FBOs (Salifu, Francesconi & Kolavalli 2010). Today, government agencies, 
NGOs and farmers themselves can establish FBOs without any recourse to the current 
legislation (see Chapter 4). This may not only result in the establishment of weak FBOs, 
but it also becomes difficult to harmonise, monitor and supervise their activities, and 
thereby to evaluate their performance. I describe the current structure of FBOs from the 
village to the national level as a loosely structured network of convenience (see Chapter 
4), as such a structure is not borne out of strategic planning and implementation.  
Second, the analyses in this thesis also show that most FBOs were initiated through 
government and NGO projects (see Chapters 5–7). The majority of the FBOs, however, 
do not appear to survive well beyond the lifespan of the projects (see Chapter 4), which 
means that they are largely agents of outsiders, rather than institutions that represent the 
true interests of smallholder farmers. The effect of this is that we are only witnessing the 
establishment of FBOs, but not necessarily developing them into stronger local 
institutions with strong governance structures and effective internal collective activities 
that will improve their members’ access to the inputs and outputs markets. In this regard, 
long-term programs are needed, that have a strong focus on nurturing the collective 
capabilities of FBOs. Instead of establishing FBOs as passive institutions to receive 
support, we should develop them to engage in internal collective activities (such as joint 
purchase of inputs, production and marketing) that would make them sustainable as well 
as link their members to the inputs and outputs markets. For instance, in relation to 
inputs, the evidence shows that FBOs largely do not have the capacity to acquire inputs 
collectively from input dealers. Their reliance on government and NGOs to provide 
them with inputs will not lead to sustainable access to inputs and adoption of technology 
(Adesina et al. 2014). We should note that government and NGOs often provide such 
inputs through various projects to improve smallholder farmers’ use of inputs within a 
relatively short period. Continued membership of such FBOs after the exit of the 
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 projects will not lead to improved access to inputs if the FBOs are not linked to inputs 
markets, such as private-sector and commercial inputs dealers.  
Third, the analysis has also demonstrated that agricultural extension agents (AEAs) play 
a pivotal role in the development of FBOs. However, AEAs are not only limited in 
number but also have inadequate resources to discharge their duties. This points to the 
need to increase the number of AEAs and the resources they need as well as improve 
their knowledge and skills to develop sustainable FBOs, which are oriented towards 
collective action. While the government or state has an important role to play in this 
respect, it should work in collaboration with NGOs and private-sector organisations. 
Fourth, evidence in this research (see Chapters 4 and 7) shows that politicisation of the 
formation and activities of FBOs significantly affects their performance. In the case of 
credit, for example, we observed that when there is political colouration in credit 
disbursement through FBOs, it leads to high default rates. While the government (the 
state) should still play a pivotal role in the provision of credit to FBOs and their 
members, government credit programs must be devoid of political colouration. 
Government should collaborate with NGOs and private-sector organisations to 
implement their credit programs in such a way that FBOs will not regard credit as a gift 
or a reward for votes. As this study has shown, when NGOs implement credit programs, 
FBOs and their members rarely default, largely because they recognise them as non-
political institutions. The NGOs also actively monitor and supervise the investment of 
credit by the farmers (see Chapter 7). Efforts should be made to change the mindsets of 
smallholder farmers to the effect that support through FBOs is not free. 
Fifth, the evidence in the research has shown that FBOs have become the main channels 
through which government and NGOs provide extension services, inputs and credit to 
smallholder farmers, and that smallholder farmers who do not participate in FBOs are 
largely constrained from accessing such services. This points to the need to encourage 
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 broad-based participation of smallholder farmers in FBOs, particularly in relation to 
accessing extension services.  
Finally, it is important we recognise that in the foreseeable future, smallholder 
agriculture will continue to be the major source of livelihood for the majority of people 
in Ghana and many developing countries in SSA. Smallholder farmers will continue to 
be the primary producers of food. Transforming smallholder agriculture will therefore be 
a major step towards poverty reduction as well as ensuring food security and economic 
growth. While developing FBOs is a key option to transform the smallholder agriculture 
– as this study has shown that collective action among smallholder farmers improve their 
access to extension services, inputs and credit – it is important to note that FBOs’ 
effectiveness requires ‘effective state’ and ‘active citizenship’ (Green 2008). This is 
because FBOs at their current level of development can neither generate agricultural 
knowledge through research nor transmit the knowledge to smallholder farmers to 
propel productivity-led growth without the active involvement of the state through 
effective extension services, among others. Similarly, the limited level of education 
among FBO members, their limited access to financial services as well as their 
inadequate access to, and affordability of, inputs needs effective state that will facilitate 
active participation of relevant stakeholders. The limited level of collective activities in 
FBOs implies the need for measures that make smallholder farmers to recognise that 
FBOs are not merely institutions to receive ‘handouts’ but rather institutions that provide 
opportunities for active collective actions. Smallholder farmers’ active participation in 
FBOs is critical to improve significantly their access to extension services, inputs and 
credit, which will ultimately lead to improved productivity, poverty reduction and food 
security among them.  
8.5 Directions for future research and conclusions  
While the findings of this study are important for both theoretical or conceptual 
development as well as policy formulation, the scale of this study was limited to two out 
the ten administrative regions of Ghana, largely due to time and funding limitations 
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 associated with doctoral research. The number of FBOs and smallholder farmers studied 
in those two regions were also somewhat limited. Therefore, future research could 
expand the scale of the research to include more FBOs and smallholder farmers as well 
as more administrative regions.  
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4, FBOs in Ghana take a variety of forms, ranging 
from informal to formal FBOs, village-level to national-level FBOs, and production to 
multipurpose FBOs, as well as those formed by farmers themselves, to those formed by 
external agencies. This research has focused on village-level FBOs, whose members’ 
primary activity is the production of food crops such as cereals. It is therefore significant 
for future research to consider the performance of other types of FBOs, such as 
marketing FBOs, agro-processing FBOs, district-level FBOs, regional-level FBOs and 
national-level FBOs. Like many studies in SSA, future research in Ghana may also 
examine the performance of FBOs in high-value and cash crops such as cocoa. 
Chapter 7 of this research has also shown that credit recovery among FBO members is 
better under NGOs’ credit programs as compared to government programs. It would be 
useful for future research to compare in detail the general performance of FBOs created 
by governments and NGOs and the factors that shape their performance. Another area 
identified for future research involves comparing the performance of male-only FBOs to 
female-member FBOs, to understand the extent to which gender shapes performance.  
Finally, an avenue for future research could be to examine whether FBO membership 
improves the productivity of smallholder farmers. Although improved access to 
extension services, inputs and credit is likely to improve productivity, research that 
incorporates measuring the productivity of FBO members is essential.   
In conclusion, this thesis has shown that while smallholder farmers’ participation in 
FBOs improves their access to extension services, inputs and credit, their access to these 
services is rather limited. The thesis has argued that the limited roles that FBOs play in 
improving smallholder farmers’ access relate largely to their governance and 
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 management structure and the internal collective capabilities of the members, as well as 
their motivations for participating in FBOs. The study argues that when external 
institutions that form FBOs pay little attention to building their organisational structures 
and leadership capacities, this results in FBOs that are passive, with weak leadership and 
no clear objectives. The thesis maintains that collective activities such as demanding 
extension services will remain limited in FBOs if their leaders do not have the 
experience and skills to mobilise their members to undertake collective activities, 
irrespective of how small or how homogenous the membership may be. Organisational 
structures such as good rules that ensure that FBOs invest time in collective activities are 
important for their success. 
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 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of interviewees (government and NBO officials) 
No. Name Designation and Institution 
1. 
 
Mr. Alhassan Mahama 
 
Deputy Programmes Manager of the Presby Agricultural Station, Mile 7, 
Tamale  
2. Mr. Edward Agbomlie 
 
Agricultural Extension Agent of Akuapim North District, Eastern Region 
 
3. Mr. Habib Haruna 
 
General Manager, SEND FiNGO at Salaga in Northern Region 
 
4. Mr. Ibrahim Abudu 
 
Agricultural Extension Agent at Walewale in the West Mamprusi District, 
Northern Region 
 
5. Mr. Gabriel Owusu 
 
FBO Coordinator at the Directorate of Agricultural Extension Services, 
MOFA 
 
6. Mr. Wekem Raymond Avatim 
 
Program Officer, Eastern Corridor Livelihood Security Promotion 
Programme (ECLSPP), SEND-Ghana at Salaga, Northern Region 
 
7. Mr. Imoro Ziblim 
 
Agricultural Extension Agent in East Gonja District, Northern Region 
 
8. Mr. Issac Amissah 
 
Agriculture Extension Officer at New Tafo in the East Akim District, 
Eastern Region 
 
9. Mr. Issahaku Mohammed 
Haadi 
 
Project Officer of Care International at Tamale in the Northern Region 
 
10. Mr. Jerry Bismark Wuver 
 
Agricultural Extension Officer in the Akwapim South District at Nsawam, 
Northern Region  
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 11. Mr. Joseph Oliver Nkansa 
 
Agricultural Extension Agent at Nkurankan in the Yilo Krobo District, 
Eastern Region  
 
12. Mr. Luke Nayi 
 
Desk Officer in Charge of FBO Development at the Northern Regional 
Agricultural Development Unit (RADU) 
 
13. Mr. Michael Asomani-Adem 
 
Project Manager, Commercialisation of Agriculture, Millennium 
Development Authority,  
 
14. Ms. Ogechi Mbah 
 
Agricultural Extension Agent in the Tolon-Kumbungu District, Northern 
Region  
 
15. Mr. Razak Zakaria 
 
Agricultural Extension Agent at Tamale in the Tamale Metropolis, 
Northern Region 
 
16. Mr. Theophilus Osei Owusu 
 
Deputy Director, Agricultural Extension, Communication and 
Development Management, MOFA at Accra 
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 Appendix 2: Surveys/questionnaires  
Appendix 2.1: Survey for leaders of FBOs  
 
ID: Questionnaire identification 
 Name 
ID1. NAME OF FBO   
ID2. REGION  
ID3. DISTRICT  
ID4. TOWN/VILLAGE  
ID5. DATE  
CR: Characteristics of respondent 
 Name  
CR1. RESPONDENT   
CR2. GENDER  [Code 1] 
CR3. POSITION  [Code 2] 
CR4. EDUCATION  [Code 3] 
CR5. OCCUPATION OTHER 
FARMER  
 
CR6. AGE   
 
Code 1: Gender Code 2: Position Code 3: Education Code 4: Literacy level 
    
1. Male 1. Chairperson 1. None 1. Can’t read, write or 
speak 
2. Female 2. Secretary 2. Primary 2. Can speak 
 3. Treasurer 3. Middle/JSS 3. Can write 
 4. Organiser 4. Vocational 4. Can write 
 5. Vice-chairperson 5. ‘O’ Level/SSS  
 6. Ordinary member 6. ‘A’ Level  
  7. Training College  
  8. Technical/Professional  
  9. Tertiary  
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 CR7 How many years of farming experience do you have?   
CR8 Do you have access to radio?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR9 Do you own a mobile phone?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR1
 
Do you have access to TV?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR1
 
Are you a household head?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR1
 
What is your level of literacy in English Language?    [Code 4] 
FC: FBO characteristics and activities (purpose and activities of FBO) 
FC1 What year was your FBO established?  Year 
FC2 Is the FBO registered?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
FC3 If yes, which year was it registered?  Year 
FC4 If yes, which institution is your FBO registered with?  [Code 5] 
FC5 If yes, why did you register it?  [Code 6] 
FC6 Does your FBO have a bank account?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
FC7 How much money is in the bank account?  GH₵ 
FC8 What are the main sources of income for your FBO bank account? 
1. Entrance fee 
2. Membership dues 
3. Profit from group activities 
4. External support 
5. ______________________________________________________ 
6. ______________________________________________________ 
 
    
FC9 What is the current total membership of your FBO?   
FC10 How many of the current members are females?   
FC11 On whose initiative was the FBO established?  [Code 7] 
FC12 What was the main/original purpose for which your FBO was formed?    [Code 8] 
FC13 What are the current collective activities undertaken by your FBO?    [Code 9] 
FC14 Which of the collective activities has your FBO stopped doing?    [Code 9] 
FC15 What is the main reason why the FBO stopped doing such collective activities?  [Code 12] 
FC16 Do non-members participate in any of the collective activities?    1 = Yes, 0 = No 
FC17 If yes, which activities?    [Code 9] 
FC18 Has the FBO received any external support in the past 3 years?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
FC19   If yes, from whom?    [Code 10] 
FC20 List the names of all organisations or individuals the FBO has received support from: 
1. ___________________________________________________________________ 
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 2. ___________________________________________________________________ 
3. ___________________________________________________________________ 
4. ___________________________________________________________________ 
FC21   If yes, which type of external support?    [Code 11] 
 
 Code 5: Institution FBO is 
registered 
 Code 6: Main reasons for 
registering FBO 
 Code 7: Initiative to establish FBO 
1 MOFA  1 To access to credit  1 Member (s) 
2 DOC  2 For opening bank account  2 Agricultural Extension office 
3 Registrar General’s Department  3 Requirement of government  3 NGOs/donors 
4 District Assembly  4 NGO/donor requirement  4 DOC 
5 Union/Apex body  5 Other 
(specify:____________
______) 
 5 Chief/traditional leader 
6 Other 
(specify:_______________
___) 
    6
  
Political leader 
     7 Other 
(specify:________________
__) 
       
Code 8: Main reason for 
establishing FBO 
 Code 9: Collective activities of 
FBO 
 
 Code 10: Provider of external 
support  
1 To get access to grants  1 Joint production  1 Government agency 
2 To get access to credit  2 Joint processing  2 NGO/donor 
3 To get access to market  3 Joint marketing  3 Private-sector 
organisation/individual 
4 To get access to extension 
service 
 4 Joint inputs purchase  4 Other 
(specify:________________
__) 
5 Joint production  5 Labor exchange   Code 11: Type of support 
6 labour sharing  6 Micro-credit scheme  1 Training in FBO management 
7 Other (specify: 
______________________
_) 
 7 Welfare services  2 
 
Extension (training in production 
and storage) 
Code 12: Reasons for halting a 
collective activity 
 8 Community development  3 Grant (cash) 
1. Not beneficial to members  9 Other 
(specify:____________
________) 
 4 Credit (cash/kind) 
 
2. Disagreements in the FBO     5
  
Free access to farm inputs 
3. No more external support     6 Free access to equipment 
4. Don’t have the expertise     7 Market services (certification) 
5. Other (specify_______     7 Other (specify:________ 
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 I now want to know the assets owned by your FBO. Write zero if the FBO does not own a particular item 
 Item No. of items Source of items [Code 13] 
FC22 Office   
FC23 Chairs   
FC24 Hoe   
FC25 Cutlass   
FC26 Mattocks   
FC27 Dibbler   
FC28 Sickle   
FC29 Head pan/basket   
FC30 Pots for storage   
FC31 Cribs/barns   
FC32 Room storage   
FC33 Sacks   
FC34 Knapsacks   
FC35 Motorised spraying 
machine  
  
FC36 Water pump   
FC37 Tractor   
FC38 Carts   
FC39 Planter   
FC40 Harvester   
FC41 Rice mill   
FC42 Corn mill   
FC43 Palm extractor   
FC44 Other (specify: 
_______________) 
  
FC45 Other 
(specify:__________
_____) 
  
 
Code 13: FBO source of item 
 
1. Bought by FBO 
2. Rented by FBO 
3. Provided by government 
4. Provided by NGO 
5. Provided by a private individual 
6. Other (specify______________) 
 
Section A. Members’ landholdings and reasons for joining FBO 
I would like to ask you a few questions about your landholdings and crops   
A
 
How do you get land for agricultural purposes?    [Code 14] 
A
 
What is your total landholding size?  Acres 
A
 
What is the total size of your land currently under cultivation?  Acres 
A
 
Have you increased your total land size for cultivation over the past 3 years?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
296 
 
 A
 
If yes, what was the total size of your land before you increased it?  Acres  
A
 
If yes, why did you increase your land size?    [Code 15] 
A
 
What are the three major crops you cultivated in the last season?    [Code 16] 
 
Code 14: FBO source of land Code 15: Reason for increasing farm 
size 
Code 16: Main crop 
   
1. Rent/lease 1. Had more free land 1. Maize 
2. Buy 
3. Sharecropping 
2. Had access to more credit 
3. Because I acquired new technologies 
2. Rice 
3. Sorghum 
4. Family owned 
5. Community land 
6. Government land 
7. Other (specify______________) 
 
4. To make more profit 
5. Other (specify: 
________________________) 
 
 
 
 
4. Pineapple 
5. Cassava 
6. Plantain 
7. Cocoa 
8. Yams 
9. Other (specify____________) 
 
   
 
I would like to ask you a few questions about the reasons why you joined this FBO  
A8 For how many years have you been a member of this FBO?   
A9 How much did you pay before joining the group? (Write zero if you paid nothing)  GH₵ 
A10 Do you pay dues?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
A11 How much dues?   
A12 How often do you pay dues? 
1. Once a week 
2. Once a month 
3. One a year 
4. Irregular (pay due if FBO needs to do something) 
5. Other__________________________________________________ 
  
A13 What were the main reasons why you joined the FBO?    [Code 17]  
A14 Have you received any personal external support since you joined the group?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
A15 If yes, what kind of external support have you received?    [Code 18] 
A16 Are you a member of other groups apart from the FBO?     1 = Yes, 0 = No 
A17 If yes, what kind of groups?   [Code 19] 
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 A18 How often do you participate in the activities of the FBOs? 
1. Once a week 
2. Once a month 
3. Once every 3 months 
4. Other (Specify_______________________________) 
  
A19 How many times have you participated in the activities of the group in the past 4 
months? 
  
 
Code 17: Main reason for joining the 
FBO 
Code 18: Type of support Code 19: Members of other 
groups 
 1. Extension services  
1. To get access to grants 
2. To get access to fertiliser, seeds and 
agrochemicals 
2. Fertiliser, seeds and agrochemicals 
3. Grant (cash) 
4. Credit (cash/kind) 
1. Religious groups 
2. Labour groups 
3. Micro-finance groups 
3. To get access to credit 5. Subsidised inputs 4. Susu groups 
4. To get access to market 
5. To get access to extension service 
6. Joint production 
7. Labour sharing 
7. Other (specify: 
_______________________) 
6. Free access to equipment 
7. Other (specify:__________________) 
5. Other (specify: 
______________________
__) 
   
Section B. Access to extension services 
I would now like to know about your access to agricultural extension in your community  
B1 Is there an agricultural extension centre in your community?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
B2 Is there an agricultural extension officer in your community?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
B3 How far is the closest agriculture extension centre from your community?  Miles  
B4 How many agriculture extension officers do you know in your community from 
whom you can get support? 
  
B5 Did you have contact with any extension officer over the last season?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
B6 If yes, how many personnel?   
B7 If yes, how many times have you met the extension personnel in the last season?   
B8 In which way does an extension personnel contact you?   [Code 20] 
B9 What is your mode of meeting an extension officer for training?   [Code 21] 
B10 Mention three main services that extension officers provide to you    [Code 22] 
B11 Which of the following best describes your situation regarding the provision of 
extension services?  
 [Code 23] 
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 Code 20: Mode of 
meeting 
extension officer 
Code 21: Meeting place of 
extension officer 
Code 22: Main service officer 
provides 
Code 23: Assessment 
of extension 
service 
    
1. Meet me alone at my 
farm 
2. Meet the FBO 
members 
3. Meet any group of 
farmers in the 
community 
4. Other 
(specify________
_____) 
1. At my farm 
2. FBO farm 
3. Farm of any FBO member  
4. Extension office 
5. Any member of the 
community farm 
6. At community centre 
7. Other (specify: 
____________________
____) 
1. Row planting 
2. Record keeping 
3. Use of herbicides 
4. Use of pesticides 
5. Fertiliser application 
6. Harvesting techniques 
7. Post-harvest techniques 
8. Investigate a specific problem 
9. Information on new technology 
10. Use of high-yielding variety 
11. Other (specify: 
________________________) 
1. Always get services 
2. Usually get 
services 
3. Sometimes get 
services 
4. Never get services 
    
Section C. Adoption of technology and input use  
I would like to know your use of the following inputs over the past season (write 0 if no use) 
 Items List crops No. of acres Quantity 
used 
Source of item (code 24) Amount 
spent 
(GH₵) 
C1 Certified seeds/high 
yield varieties 
     
C2 Improved planting 
materials 
     
C3 Inorganic fertiliser      
C4 Manure       
C5 Pesticides/insecticides      
C6 Herbicides      
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 Code 24: Member source of inputs 
 
1. Bought by myself 
2. Family property 
3. Acquired through the FBO 
4. Provided by government 
5. Provided by NGO 
6. Provided by a private individual 
7. Other (specify_________________________________________________________) 
 
 
I would like to know the extent to which you used the following technology over the last season 
 Items No. of times No. of acres 
C11 Planting techniques (rows)   
C12 Recommended plant population   
C13 Recommended fertiliser application   
C14 Recommended pesticide application   
C15 Recommendation herbicide application   
C16 Use of organic manure   
C17 Harvesting techniques   
C18 Post-harvest storage and handling   
 
I would now like to know your record keeping strategies regarding farming activities  
C19 Do you keep farm records?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
C20 If yes, why do you keep records?  [Code 25] 
C21 What kind of records do you keep?  [Code 26] 
C22 How do you keep your records?  [Code 27] 
 
Code 25: Reasons for keeping records Code 26: Types of records Code 27: Ways of keeping records 
   
1. To keep track of expenditure 1. Calendar (e.g. time of planting) 1. Simple book keeping 
2. Recording on walls 
2. To keep track of revenues 
3. To know whether I make a profit 
2. Expenditure on inputs 
3. Expenditure on land preparation 
3. Someone keeps records for me 
4. FBO member keeps records 
5. Other_____________________ 
4. Extension officer requirement 
5. Other (specify______________) 
4. Yields on farms 
5. Other __________________ 
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 Section D. Farmers’ access to credit and grants 
I would now like to know about your access to credit over the past 3 years  
D1 Do you have a bank in your community?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D2 How far is the closest bank in your community?  Miles 
D3 Do you have a personal bank account?   
D4 In the past 3 years have you received any credit in cash?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D5 If no, why are you unable to access credit?  [Code 28] 
D6 If yes what was the source of the credit?  [Code 29] 
D7 If yes, how much credit did you receive? 
Year1_________________________________________ 
Year2_________________________________________ 
Year3_________________________________________ 
 GH₵ 
D8 If yes, what did you use the credit for? 
Year1_____________________________________ 
Year2____________________________________ 
Year3 ____________________________________ 
 [Code 30] 
D9 How much was the interest rate (%)?  
Year1___________________________________ 
Year2___________________________________ 
Year3___________________________________ 
  
D10 What was the duration of the credit repayment? 
Year1____________________________________ 
Year2____________________________________ 
Year3_____________________________________ 
 Months 
I would now like to know about your access to grant (cash) over the past 3 years  
D11 In the past 3 years have you received any grant in cash?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D12 If yes, what was the source of the grant?    [Code 31] 
D13 If yes, what did you use the grant for?    [Code 32] 
D14 If yes, how much grant did you receive? 
Year1_________________________________________ 
Year2_________________________________________ 
Year3_________________________________________ 
 GH₵ 
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Code 28: Reasons for not accessing 
credit 
Code 29: Sources of credit Code 30: Use of credit 
   
1. Do not have access to bank 1. Bank 
2. Government project 
1. Buy inputs (fertiliser, 
chemicals 
2. Rent or buy land 
2. Do know the procedure to get credit 
3. No collateral 
4. High interest rate 
3. NGO project 
4. Relatives 
5. Susu group 
7. FBO 
8. Rotation savings 
9. Trader/inputs dealer 
3. Cost of land preparation 
4. Saved in my bank account 
5. Buy food and clothing 
6. Petty trade 
7. Pay ward’s school fee 
8. Organise wedding/funeral 
9. 
Other_________________
____ 
5. Other_______________________ 
 
10. Others_________________ 
 
 
   
 
I would now like to know about your access to grants (in kind) over the past 3 years  
D15 In the past 3 years have you received any grant in kind?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D16 If yes, what was the source of the grant?  [Code 31] 
D17 If yes, what did you use the grant for?  [Code 33] 
D18 If yes, what type of grant did you receive? 
Year1______________item___________________________quantity__________ 
Year2______________item___________________________quantity__________ 
Year3______________item___________________________quantity__________ 
 
 GH₵ 
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 Code 31: Source of grant  Code 32: Use of grant (cash) Code 33: Use of grant (kind) 
   
1. Government project 
2. NGO project 
1. Buy inputs (fertiliser, chemicals) 
2. Rent or buy land 
1. Cultivating crops 
2. Rearing animals 
3. Private individual  
4. Other______________________ 
3. Cost of land preparation 
4. Saved in my bank account 
5. Buy food and clothing 
6. Petty trade 
7. Pay ward’s school fee 
8. Organise wedding/funeral 
9. Other_____________________ 
3. Trading 
4. Home consumption 
5. Other____________________ 
   
 
Section E. General question 
  
E1 Overall, how would you describe your access to extension services and inputs? 
1. Worse 
2. Better 
3. Best 
4. No change 
  
E2 As an FBO member, among the following, which one would say you benefit from most? 
1. Access to credit 
2. Access to grants 
3. Access to extension services 
4. Access to fertiliser 
5. Access to improved seeds 
6. Access to agrochemicals 
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 Appendix 2.2: Survey for ordinary members of FBOs  
ID: Questionnaire identification 
 Name 
ID1. NAME OF FBO   
ID2. REGION  
ID3. DISTRICT  
ID4. TOWN/VILLAGE  
ID5. DATE  
 
CR: Characteristics of respondent 
 Name  
CR1. RESPONDENT  
 
CR2. GENDER  
[Code 1] 
CR4. EDUCATION  
[Code 2] 
CR5. OCCUPATION OTHER 
FARMER  
 
CR6. AGE  
 
 
CR7 How many years of farming experience do you have?   
CR8 Do you have access to radio?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR9 Do you own a mobile phone?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR10 Do you have access to TV?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR11 Are you a household head?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR12 What is your level of literacy in English Language?    [Code 3] 
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 Code 1: Gender Code 2: Education Code 3: Literacy level 
   
1. Male 1. None 1. Can’t read, write or speak 
2. Female 2. Primary 2. Can speak 
 3. Middle/JSS 3. Can write 
 4. Vocational 4. Can write 
 5. ‘O’ Level/SSS  
 6. ‘A’ Level  
 7. Training college  
 8. Technical/professional  
 9. Tertiary  
   
 
Section A. Members’ landholdings and reasons for joining FBO 
I would like to ask you a few questions about your landholdings and crops  
A1 How do you get land for agricultural purposes?    [Code 4] 
A2 What is your total landholding size?  Acres 
A3 What is the total size of your land currently under cultivation?  Acres 
A4 Have you increased your total land size for cultivation over the past 3 years?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
A5 If yes, what was the total size of your land before you increased it?  Acres  
A6 If yes, why did you increase your land size?    [Code 5] 
A7 What are the three major crops you cultivated in the last season?    [Code 6] 
 
Code 4: FBO source of land Code 5: Reason for increasing farm size Code 6: Main crop 
   
1. Rent/lease 1. Had more free land 1. Maize 
2. Buy 
3. Sharecropping 
2. Had access to more credit 
3. Because I acquired new technologies 
2. Rice 
3. Sorghum 
4. Family owned 
5. Community land 
6. Government land 
7. Other (specify______________) 
 
4. To make more profit 
5. Other (specify: 
________________________) 
 
 
 
 
4. Pineapple 
5. Cassava 
6. Plantain 
7. Cocoa 
8. Yams 
9. Other 
(specify____________
) 
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I would like to ask you a few questions about the reasons why you joined this FBO  
A8 For how many years have you been a member of this FBO?   
A9 How much did you pay before joining the group? (Write 0 if you paid nothing)  GH₵ 
A10 Do you pay dues?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
A11 How much dues?   
A12 How often do you pay dues? 
6. Once a week 
7. Once a month 
8. One a year 
9. Irregular (pay dues if FBO needs to do something) 
10. Other__________________________________________________ 
  
A13 What were the main reasons why you joined the FBO?    [Code 7]  
A14 Have you received any personal external support since you joined the group?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
A15 If yes, what kind of external support have you received?    [Code 8] 
A16 Are you a member of other groups apart from the FBO?     1 = Yes, 0 = No 
A17 If yes, what kind of groups?   [Code 9] 
A18 How often do you participate in the activities of the FBOs? 
5. Once a week 
6. Once a month 
7. Once every 3 months 
8. Other (Specify_______________________________ 
  
A19 How many times have you participated in the activities of the group in the past 
4 months 
  
 
Code 7: Main reason for joining the 
FBO 
Code 8: Type of support Code 9: Members of other 
groups 
 1. Extension services  
1. To get access to grants 
2. To get access to fertiliser, seeds and 
agrochemicals 
2. Fertiliser, seeds and agrochemicals 
3. Grant (cash) 
4. Credit (cash/in kind) 
1. Religious groups 
2. Labour groups 
3. Micro-finance groups 
3. To get access to credit 5. Subsidised inputs 4. Susu groups 
4. To get access to market 
5. To get access to extension service 
6. Joint production 
7. Labour sharing 
7. Other (specify: 
_______________________) 
6. Free access to equipment 
7. Other (specify:__________________) 
5. Other (specify: 
______________________
__) 
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Section B. Access to extension services 
I would now like to know about your access to agricultural extension in your community  
B1 Is there an agricultural extension centre in your community?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
B2 Is there an agricultural extension officer in your community?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
B3 How far is the closest agriculture extension centre from your community?  Miles  
B4 How many agriculture extension officers do you know in your community from 
whom you can get support? 
  
B5 Did you have contact with any extension officer over the last season?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
B6 If yes, how many personnel?   
B7 If yes, how many times have you met the extension personnel in the last season?   
B8 In which way does an extension personnel contact you?   [Code 10] 
B9 What is your mode of meeting an extension officer for training?   [Code 11] 
B10 Mention three main services extension officers provide to you    [Code 12] 
B11 Which of the following best describes your situation regarding the provision of 
extension services?  
 [Code 13] 
 
Code 10: Mode of 
meeting 
extension officer 
Code 11: Meeting place of 
extension officer 
Code 12: Main service officer 
provides 
Code 13: Assessment of 
extension service 
    
1. Meet me alone at my 
farm 
2. Meet the FBO 
members 
3. Meet any group of 
farmers in the 
community 
4. Other 
(specify________
_____) 
1. At my farm 
2. FBO farm 
3.Farmer of any FBO 
member  
4. Extension office 
5. Any member of the 
community farm 
6. At community centre 
7. Other (specify: 
_________________
_______) 
1. Row planting 
2. Record keeping 
3. Use of herbicides 
4. Use of pesticides 
5. Fertiliser application 
6. Harvesting techniques 
7. Post-harvest techniques 
8. Investigate a specific problem 
9. Information on new technology 
10. Use of high-yielding variety 
11. Other (specify: 
_______________________
_) 
1. Always get services 
2. Usually get services 
3. Sometimes get services 
4. Never get services 
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Section C. Adoption of technology and input use  
I would like to know your use of the following inputs over the past season (write 0 if no use) 
 Items List crops No. of acres Quantity 
use
d 
Source of item 
(code 14) 
Amount spent 
(GH₵) 
C1 Certified seeds/high yield 
varieties 
     
C2 Improved planting 
materials 
     
C3 Inorganic fertiliser      
C4 Manure       
C5 Pesticides/insecticides      
C6 Herbicides      
 
Code 14: Member source of inputs 
 
1. Bought by myself 
2. Family property 
3. Acquired through the FBO 
4. Provided by government 
5. Provided by NGO 
6. Provided by a private individual 
7. Other (specify_________________________________________________________) 
 
 
I would like to know the extent to which you used the following technology over the last season 
 Items No. of times No. of acres 
C11 Planting techniques (rows)   
C12 Recommended plant population   
C13 Recommended fertiliser application   
C14 Recommended pesticide application   
C15 Recommended herbicide application   
C16 Use of organic manure   
C17 Harvesting techniques   
C18 Post-harvest storage and handling   
 
I would now like to know your record keeping strategies regarding farming activities  
C19 Do you keep farm records?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
C20 If yes, why do you keep records?  [Code 15] 
C21 What kind of records do you keep?  [Code 16] 
C22 How do you keep your records?  [Code 17] 
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Code 15: Reasons for keeping records Code 16: Types of records Code  17: Ways of keeping records 
   
1. To keep track of expenditure 1. Calendar (e.g. time of planting) 1. Simple book keeping 
2. Recording on walls 
2. To keep track of revenues 
3. To know whether I make a profit 
2. Expenditure on inputs 
3. Expenditure on land preparation 
3. Someone keeps records for me 
4. FBO member keeps records 
5. Other_____________________ 
4. Extension officer requirement 
5. Other (specify______________) 
4. Yields on farms 
5. Other __________________ 
 
   
 
Section D. Farmers’ access to credit and grants 
I would now like to know about your access to credit over the past 3 years  
D1 Do you have a bank in your community?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D2 How far is the closest bank in your community?  Miles 
D3 Do you have a personal bank account?   
D4 In the past 3 years have you received any credit in cash?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D5 If no, why are you unable to access credit?  [Code 18] 
D6 If yes what was the source of the credit?  [Code 19] 
D7 If yes, how much credit did you receive? 
Year1_________________________________________ 
Year2_________________________________________ 
Year3_________________________________________ 
 GH₵ 
D8 If yes, what did you use the credit for? 
Year1_____________________________________ 
Year2____________________________________ 
Year3 ____________________________________ 
 [Code 20] 
D9 How much was the interest rate (%)?  
Year1___________________________________ 
Year2___________________________________ 
Year3___________________________________ 
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 D10 What was the duration of the credit repayment? 
Year1____________________________________ 
Year2____________________________________ 
Year3_____________________________________ 
 Months 
 
Code 18: Reasons for not accessing 
credit 
Code 19: Sources of credit Code 20: Use of credit 
   
1. Do not have access to bank 1. Bank 
2. Government project 
1. Buy inputs (fertiliser, chemicals 
2. Rent or buy land 
2. Do know the procedure to get credit 
3. No collateral 
4. High interest rate 
3. NGO project 
4. Relatives 
5. Susu group 
7. FBO 
8. Rotation savings 
9. Trader/inputs dealer 
3. Cost of land preparation 
4. Saved in my bank account 
5. Buy food and clothing 
6. Petty trade 
7. Pay ward’s school fee 
8. Organise wedding/funeral 
9. Other_____________________ 
5. Other_______________________ 
 
10. Others_________________ 
 
 
   
 
I would now like to know about your access to grant (cash) over the past 3 years  
D11 In the past 3 years have you received any grant in cash?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D12 If yes, what was the source of the grant?    [Code 21] 
D13 If yes, what did you use the grant for?    [Code 22] 
D14 If yes, how much grant did you receive? 
Year1_________________________________________ 
Year2_________________________________________ 
Year3_________________________________________ 
 GH₵ 
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 I would now like to know about your access to grants (in kind) over the past 3 years  
D15 In the past 3 years have you received any grant in kind?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D16 If yes, what was the source of the grant?  [Code 21] 
D17 If yes, what did you use the grant for?  [Code 23] 
D18 If yes, what type of grant did you receive? 
Year1______________item_______________________quantity____ 
Year2______________item_______________________quantity_____ 
Year3______________item_______________________quantity_____ 
 GH₵ 
 
Code 21: Source of grant  Code 22: Use of grant (cash) Code 23: Use of grant (kind) 
   
1. Government project 
2. NGO project 
1. Buy inputs (fertiliser, chemicals) 
2. Rent or buy land 
1. Cultivating crops 
2. Rearing animals 
3. Private individual  
4. Other______________________ 
3. Cost of land preparation 
4. Saved in my bank account 
5. Buy food and clothing 
6. Petty trade 
7. Pay ward’s school fee 
8. Organise wedding/funeral 
9. Other_____________________ 
3. Trading 
4. Home consumption 
5. Other____________________ 
   
Section E. General question 
  
E1 Overall, how would you describe your access to extension services and inputs? 
1. Worse 
2. Better 
3. Best 
4. No change 
  
E2 As an FBO member, among the following, which one would you say you benefit from most? 
1. Access to credit 
2. Access to grants 
3. Access to extension services 
4. Access to fertiliser 
5. Access to improved seeds 
6. Access to agrochemicals 
  
311 
 
 Appendix 2.3: Survey for non-members of FBOs 
ID: Questionnaire identification 
 Name 
ID2. REGION  
ID3. DISTRICT  
ID4. TOWN/VILLAGE  
ID5. DATE  
 
CR: Characteristics of respondent 
 Name  
CR1. RESPONDENT  
 
CR2. GENDER  
[Code 1] 
CR3. EDUCATION  
[Code 2] 
CR5. OCCUPATION 
OTHER FARMER  
 
CR6. AGE  
 
 
Code 1: Gender Code 2: Education Code 3: Literacy level 
   
1. Male 1. None 1. Can’t read, write or speak 
2. Female 2. Primary 2. Can speak 
 3. Middle/JSS 3. Can write 
 4. Vocational 4. Can write 
 5. ‘O’ Level/SSS  
 6. ‘A’ Level  
 7. Training college  
 8. Technical/professional  
 9. Tertiary  
   
 
CR7 How many years of farming experience do you have?   
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 CR8 Do you have access to radio?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR9 Do you own a mobile phone?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR10 Do you have access to TV?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR11 Are you a household head?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
CR12 What is your level of literacy in the English language?  [Code 3] 
 
Section A. Farmers’ landholdings 
I would like to ask you a few questions about your landholdings and crops  
A1 How do you get land for agricultural purposes?  [Code 4] 
A2 What is your total landholding size?  Acres 
A3 What is the total size of your land currently under cultivation?  Acres 
A4 Have you increased your total land size for cultivation over the past 3 years?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
A5 If yes, what was the total size of your land before you increased it?  Acres  
A6 If yes, why did you increase your land size?    [Code 5] 
A7 What are the three major crops you cultivated in the last season?    [Code 6] 
 
Code 4: FBO source of land Code 5: Reason for increasing farm size Code 6: Main crop 
   
1. Rent/lease 1. Had more free land 1. Maize 
2. Buy 
3. Sharecropping 
2. Had access to more credit 
3. Because I acquired new technologies 
2. Rice 
3. Sorghum 
4. Family owned 
5. Community land 
6. Government land 
7. Other (specify______________) 
 
4. To make more profit 
5. Other (specify: 
________________________) 
 
 
 
 
4. Pineapple 
5. Cassava 
6. Plantain 
7. Cocoa 
8. Yams 
9. Other 
(specify____________
) 
 
   
 
I would like to know if you belong to any form of group or network  
A16 You said you are not a member of any FBO; do you belong to any other group?    1 = Yes, 0 = No 
A17  If yes, what kind of groups?   [Code 7] 
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Code 7: Members of other groups 
 
1. Religious groups 
2. Labour groups 
3. Micro-finance groups 
4. Susu groups 
5. Other (specify: ________________________) 
 
 
Section B. Access to extension services 
Code 8: Mode of meeting 
extension officer 
Code 9: Meeting place of 
extension officer 
Code 10: Main service officer 
provides 
Code 11: Assessment 
of extension 
service 
    
1. Meet me alone at my 
farm 
2. Meet the FBO members 
3. Meet any group of 
farmers in the 
community 
4. Other 
(specify_________
____) 
1. At my farm 
2. FBO farm 
3. Farm of any FBO member 
4. Extension office 
5. Any member of the community 
farm 
6. At community centre 
7. Other (specify: 
_______________________
_) 
1. Row planting 
2. Record keeping 
3. Use of herbicides 
4. Use of pesticides 
5. Fertiliser application 
6. Harvesting techniques 
7. Post-harvest techniques 
8. Investigating a specific 
problem 
9. Information on new 
technology 
10. Use of high-yielding variety 
11. Other (specify: 
_____________________
___) 
1. Always get services 
2. Usually get services 
3. Sometimes get 
services 
4. Never get services 
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 I would now like to know about your access to agricultural extension in your community  
B1 Is there an agricultural extension centre in your community?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
B2 Is there an agricultural extension officer in your community?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
B3 How far is the closest agriculture extension centre from your 
community? 
 Miles  
B4 How many agriculture extension officers do you know in your 
community from whom you can get support? 
  
B5 Did you have contact with any extension officer over the last season?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
B6 If yes, how many personnel?   
B7  If yes, how many times have you met the extension personnel in the last 
season? 
  
B8 In which way does an extension personnel contact you?   [Code 8] 
B9 What is your mode of meeting an extension officer for training?  [Code 9] 
B10 Mention three main services extension officers provide to you    [Code 10] 
B11 Which of the following best describes your situation regarding the 
provision of extension services?  
 [Code 11] 
 
Section C. Adoption of technology and input use  
I would like to know your use of the following inputs over the past season (write 0 if no use) 
 Items List crops No. of acres Quantity 
used 
Source of item (code 
12) 
Amount spent 
(GH₵) 
C1 Certified seeds/high 
yield varieties 
     
C2 Improved planting 
materials 
     
C3 Inorganic fertiliser      
C4 Manure       
C5 Pesticides/insecticides      
C6 Herbicides      
 
Code 12: Source of inputs 
 
1. Bought by myself 
2. Family property 
3. Acquired through an FBO 
4. Provided by government 
5. Provided by NGO 
6. Provided by a private individual 
7. Other (specify_________________________________________________________) 
 
 
I would like to know the extent to which you used the following technology over the last season 
 Items No. of times No. of acres 
C7 Planting techniques (rows)   
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 C8 Recommended plant population   
C9 Recommended fertiliser application   
C10 Recommended pesticide application   
C11 Recommended herbicide application   
C12 Use of organic manure   
C13 Harvesting techniques   
C14 Post-harvest storage and handling   
 
I would now like to know your record keeping strategies regarding farming activities  
C15 Do you keep farm records?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
C16 If yes, why do you keep records?  [Code 13] 
C17 What kind of records do you keep?  [Code 14] 
C18 How do you keep your records?  [Code 15] 
 
Code 13: Reasons for keeping records Code 14: Types of records Code 15: Ways of keeping records 
   
1. T keep track of expenditure 1. Calendar (e.g. time of planting) 1. Simple book keeping 
2. Recording on walls 
2. To keep track of revenues 
3. To know whether I make a profit 
2. Expenditure on inputs 
3. Expenditure on land preparation 
3. Someone keeps records for me 
4. FBO member keeps records 
5. Other_____________________ 
4. Extension officer requirement 
5. Other (specify______________) 
4. Yields on farms 
5. Other __________________ 
 
   
 
Section D. Farmers’ access to credit and grants 
I would now like to know about your access to credit over the past 3 years  
D1 Do you have a bank in your community?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D2 How far is the closest bank in your community?  Miles 
D3 Do you have a personal bank account?   
D4 In the past 3 years have you received any credit in cash?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D5 If no, why are you unable to access credit?  [Code 16] 
D6 If yes what was the source of the credit?  [Code 17] 
D7 If yes, how much credit did you receive? 
Year1_________________________________________ 
Year2_________________________________________ 
 GH₵ 
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 Year3_________________________________________ 
D8 If yes, what did you use the credit for? 
Year1_____________________________________ 
Year2____________________________________ 
Year3 ____________________________________ 
 [Code 18] 
D9 How much was the interest rate (%)?  
Year1___________________________________ 
Year2___________________________________ 
Year3___________________________________ 
  
D10 What was duration of the credit repayment? 
Year1____________________________________ 
Year2____________________________________ 
Year3_____________________________________ 
 Months 
 
Code 16: Reasons for not accessing 
credit 
Code 17: Sources of credit Code 18: Use of credit 
   
1. Do not have access to bank 1. Bank 
2. Government project 
1. Buy inputs (fertiliser, chemicals) 
2. Rent or buy land 
2. Do know the procedure to get credit 
3. No collateral 
4. High interest rate 
3. NGO project 
4. Relatives 
5. Susu group 
7. FBO 
8. Rotation savings 
9. Trader/inputs dealer 
3. Cost of land preparation 
4. Saved in my bank account 
5. Buy food and clothing 
6. Petty trade 
7. Pay ward’s school fee 
8. Organise wedding/funeral 
9. Other_____________________ 
5. Other_______________________ 
 
10. Others_________________ 
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I would now like to know about your access to grant (cash) over the past 3 years  
D11 In the past 3 years have you received any grant in cash?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D12 If yes, what was the source of the grant?    [Code 19] 
D13 If yes, what did you use the grant for?    [Code 20] 
D14 If yes, how much grant did you receive? 
Year1_________________________________________ 
Year2_________________________________________ 
Year3_________________________________________ 
 GH₵ 
 
Code 19: Source of grant  Code 20: Use of grant (cash) Code 21: Use of grant (kind) 
   
1. Government project 
2. NGO project 
1. Buy inputs (fertiliser, chemicals) 
2. Rent or buy land 
1. Cultivating crops 
2. Rearing animals 
3. Private individual  
4. Other______________________ 
3. Cost of land preparation 
4. Saved in my bank account 
5. Buy food and clothing 
6. Petty trade 
7. Pay ward’s school fee 
8. Organise wedding/funeral 
9. Other_____________________ 
3. Trading 
4. Home consumption 
5. Other____________________ 
   
 
I would now like to know about your access to grants (in kind) over the past 3 years  
D15 In the past 3 years have you received any grant in kind?  1 = Yes, 0 = No 
D16 If yes, what was the source of the grant?  [Code 19] 
D17 If yes, what did you use the grant for?  [Code 21] 
D18 If yes, what type of grant did you receive? 
Year1______________item_________________________quantity_____ 
Year2______________item_________________________quantity_____ 
 
 GH₵ 
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 Section E. General question 
  
I1 Overall, how would you describe your access to extension services 
and inputs? 
1. Worse 
2. Better 
3. Best 
4. No change 
  
I2 Among the following, which one would you say you have 
benefited from most as a farmer?  
1. Access to credit 
2. Access to grants 
3. Access to extension services 
4. Access to fertiliser 
5. Access to improved seeds 
6. Access to agrochemicals 
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 Appendix 3: Semi-structured Interviews 
Appendix 3.1: Semi-structured interviews: interview schedule for leaders of FBOs 
1. Historical development/evolution of FBO 
I would like to understand briefly the history of your FBO; could you start by telling me when and how you became a 
leader? 
What are your roles and responsibilities in your FBO as a leader? 
Could you now tell me how your FBO was established (the main stakeholders that were involved in the process and 
their roles)? 
What about the roles of its founding members? 
What were the reason(s) for forming the FBO? 
Since the establishment of your FBO, what exactly do you do as a group? 
Prompt: Under this this question, explore the areas on which the FBO has focused its operations as well as the 
nature of the operations; roles and responsibilities of members; different kinds of support it has received 
from external agencies. 
2. Benefits of the FBO (with a focus on extension services and inputs) 
In your opinion, is it important and useful to be part of an FBO? If so, why; if not, why not?  
Prompt: Explore benefits regarding material, financial resources and training. 
A. Extension services 
What is your experience of extension services in your community? 
Prompt: Explore who provides extension services; how the services are acquired; and what types of services are 
provided. 
What benefits do you feel you gain by accessing extension services? 
Prompt: Do you gain any knowledge from extension services? If so, what knowledge? 
Since you joined your FBO, what roles has it played with regard to the way you access extension services?  
Prompt: Explore any changes regarding how often they get extension services; the types of services provided; the 
quality of the services (knowledge) provided; who provides the services; how the services are acquired 
including the cost of accessing the services. 
Has the FBO made any difference to how you farm? If yes, how so? If no, why has it not? 
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 B. Inputs (seeds, fertiliser, agrochemicals and credit)  
How do you go about getting:  
a. Improved seeds 
b. Fertiliser 
c. Agrochemicals  
d. Credit 
Prompt: Explore who provides the inputs; the procedures/bureaucracies for acquiring the inputs. 
Does belonging to an FBO make it easier to access the following inputs? If so, in what ways does it improve access? 
If not, why not?  
a. Improved seeds 
b. Fertiliser 
c. Agrochemicals  
d. Credit  
Prompt: Explore any changes on how often they access the inputs; sources of accessing the inputs; the cost of 
accessing inputs.  
3. Determinants of successful collective action in an FBO 
I now want to understand the ingredients that you think make for a successful FBO. 
First of all, I’m keen to know about the leadership of your FBO; what are the roles and responsibilities of the other 
leaders of your FBO? 
Prompt: Explore the roles of leaders in coordinating FBO’s activities (e.g. accessing extension services and inputs); 
their roles with external agencies. 
Does your FBO interact with MOFA? If so, how is MOFA involved with your FBO?  
Prompt: Explore the role of MOFA in organising and providing technical advice, financial resources (including 
credit), material resources (e.g. seed, fertiliser). 
Do you think there are any obstacles your FBO faces in interacting with MoFA? If so, what are they? 
(i.e. is it easy to interact and do business with MoFA) 
Are you aware of NGOs? Are they involved with your FBO? How are they involved? 
Prompt: Explore the role of NGOs in organising and providing technical advice, financial resources (including credit) 
and material resources (e.g. seed, fertiliser). 
Do you think there are any obstacles your FBO faces in interacting with NGOs? If so, what are they? 
In your view, what do you think your FBO has been successful at doing and why? 
Prompt: Explore the different activities that the FBO do. 
321 
 
 Do you feel your members are committed to the purpose and course of the FBO? If so, in what ways are they 
committed? If not, why not? 
How do you work as a team? 
Prompt: Explore how internal funds are raised and the challenges involved; how rules are crafted and implemented 
and the challenges involved. 
Does the attitude of your FBO members affect your access to extension services? If yes, in what ways does their 
attitude affect access? 
Does the attitude of your FBO members affect how you access/acquire the following? If so, in what ways does their 
attitude affect access? 
a. Improved seeds 
b. Fertiliser 
c. Agrochemicals 
d. credit 
Do you have contact with MOFA at all? When and why? 
How supportive do you find MOFA? 
In your opinion, does your FBO’s interaction with MOFA influence the way you access the following? If so, in what 
ways does the interaction influence access? If not, why not? 
a. Extension services 
b. Improved seeds 
c. Fertiliser 
d. Agrochemicals 
e. Credit 
Prompt: Explore issues such as ability to locate MoFA offices and interact with officials for support, the ability to 
get MOFA’s support such as extension services and inputs.  
Do you have contact with NGOs at all? When and why? 
How supportive do you find NGOs? 
In your opinion, does your FBO’s interaction with NGOs influence the way you access the following? If so, in what 
ways does the interaction influence access? If not, why not? 
a. Extension services 
b. Improved seeds 
c. Fertiliser 
d. Agrochemicals 
e. Credit 
Prompt: Explore issues such as ability to locate NGOs and interact with officials for support, the ability to get 
NGOs’ support such as extension services and inputs. 
In your opinion, what are the key obstacles that prevent/confront your FBO in accessing extension services?  
322 
 
 In your opinion, what are the key obstacles that prevent/confront your FBO in accessing inputs?  
4. Strengthening the FBO 
Is there anything the leaders of your FBO could do to improve the operations of your FBO? If so, what? 
Prompt: Explore this question with a focus on how the FBO is organised to access extension and the inputs. 
Is there anything that ordinary members could do to improve the operations of your FBO? If so, what?  
Prompt: Explore this question with a focus on how the FBO is organised to access extension and the inputs. 
Is there anything that MoFA could do better to strengthen how your FBO operates? If so, what? 
Prompt: Explore this question with a focus on how the FBO is organised to access extension and the inputs. 
Is there anything NGOs could do better to strengthen the way your FBO operates? If so, what? 
Prompt: Explore this question with a focus on how the FBO is organised to access extension and inputs. 
5. Documents to be collected from leaders of FBOs  
• FBO’s activities record book; 
• Constitution of FBO; 
• Letters indicating support from government and NGOs; and 
• Any other relevant document the FBO might have. 
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 Appendix 3.2: Semi-structured interviews: interview schedule for ordinary FBO 
members 
1. Overview of the operations of the FBO 
Could you start by telling me when and why you joined your FBO? 
Do you have any particular roles or responsibilities in the FBO? If so, what are they? If not, why not? 
What exactly do you as a group since you became a member? 
Prompt: Under this this question, explore the areas the on which FBO has focused its operations as well as the 
nature of the operations; roles and responsibilities of members; different kinds of support it has received 
from external agencies. 
 
2. Benefits of FBO (with a focus on extension services and inputs) 
In your opinion, is it important and useful to be part of an FBO? If so, why; if not, why not?  
Prompt: Explore the benefits regarding materials, financial resources and training. 
A. Extension services 
What is your experience of extension services in your community? 
Prompt: Explore who provides extension services; how the services are acquired; and what type of services are 
provided. 
Do you think you have gained any useful knowledge from extension services? If so, what knowledge? 
Has it made any difference to how you access extension services since you joined your FBO?  
Prompt: Explore any changes regarding how often they get extension services; the types of services provided; the 
quality of the services (knowledge) provided; who provides the services; how the services are acquired, 
including the cost of accessing the services.  
Has the FBO made any difference to how you farm? If yes, how so? If no, why has it not? 
B. Inputs (seeds, fertiliser, agrochemicals and credit)  
How do you go about getting the following? 
e. Improved seeds 
f. Fertiliser 
g. Agrochemicals  
h. Credit 
Prompt: Explore who provides the inputs; how the inputs are acquired. 
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 Does belonging to an FBO make it easier to access the following inputs? If so, in what ways does it improve access? 
If not, why not?  
e. Improved seeds 
f. Fertiliser 
g. Agrochemicals  
h. Credit 
Prompt: Explore any changes on how often they access the inputs; sources of accessing the inputs; the cost of 
accessing inputs. 
Since you joined your FBO, what roles has it played with regard to the way you access and acquire the following 
inputs, if at all? 
i. Improved seeds 
j. Fertiliser 
k. Agrochemicals  
l. Credit 
Prompt: Tell me about any changes regarding the frequency of getting the inputs, the sources of the inputs and the 
associated cost of accessing the inputs. 
3. Determinants of successful collective action in an FBO 
I am keen to know about the leaders of your FBO; what are the roles and responsibilities of the leaders of your FBO? 
Prompt: Explore the roles of leaders in coordinating the FBO’s activities, such as accessing extension services and 
inputs; their roles with external agencies. 
Are you satisfied with roles of your leaders? If yes, in what ways? If no, why not? 
Does your FBO interact with MOFA? If so, how is MoFA involved with your FBO?  
Prompt: Explore the role of MOFA in organising and providing technical advice, financial resources (including 
credit), material resources (e.g. seed, fertiliser). 
Do you think there are any obstacles your FBO faces in interacting with MOFA? If so, what are they? 
Are you aware of NGOs? Are they involved with your FBO? How are they involved? 
Prompt: Explore the role of NGOs in organising and providing technical advice, financial resources (including 
credit), material resources (e.g. seed, fertiliser). 
Do you think there are any obstacles your FBO faces in interacting with NGOs? If so, what are they? 
In your view, what do you think your FBO has been successful at doing and why? 
Prompt: Explore the different activities that the FBO undertakes.  
Do you feel your members are committed to the purpose and course of the FBO? If so, in what ways are they 
committed? If not, why not? 
325 
 
 How do you work as a team? 
Prompt: Explore how internal funds are raised and the challenges involved; how rules are crafted and implemented 
and the challenges involved. 
Does the behaviour of members of your FBO affect your access to extension services? If yes, in what ways does their 
behaviour affect access? 
Does the behaviour of members of your FBO affect how you access/acquire the following? If yes, in what ways does 
their behaviour affect access? 
e. Improved seeds 
f. Fertiliser 
g. Agrochemicals 
h. credit 
In your opinion, does the way MOFA relates with your FBO affect the way you access the following? If so, in what 
ways does their relation affect access? If not, why not? 
f. Extension services 
g. Improved seeds 
h. Fertiliser 
i. Agrochemicals 
j. Credit 
Prompt: Explore issues such as ability to locate MOFA offices and interact with officials for support, the ability to 
get MOFA’s support such as extension services and inputs.  
In your opinion, does the way NGOs relate with your FBO affect the way you access the following? If so, in what 
ways does their relation affect access? If not, why not? 
f. Extension services 
g. Improved seeds 
h. Fertiliser 
i. Agrochemicals 
j. Credit 
Prompt: Explore issues such as ability to locate NGOs and interact with officials for support, the ability to get 
NGOs’ support such as extension services and inputs. 
In your opinion, what are the key obstacles that confront your FBO in accessing extension services?  
In your opinion, what are the key obstacles that confront your FBO in accessing inputs? 
4. Strengthening the FBO 
Is there anything the leaders of your FBO could do to better the operations of your FBO? If so what? 
Prompt: Explore this question with a focus on how the FBO is organised to access extension and the inputs. 
Is there anything ordinary members could do to better the operations of your FBO? If so, what?  
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 Prompt: Explore this question with a focus on how the FBO is organised to access extension and the inputs. 
Is there anything MoFA could do better to strengthen your FBO operates? If so, what? 
Prompt: Explore this question with a focus on how the FBO is organised to access extension and the inputs. 
Is there anything NGOs could do better to strengthen the way your FBO operates? If so, what? 
Prompt: Explore this question with a focus on how the FBO is organised to access extension and the inputs. 
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 Appendix 3.3: Semi-structured interviews: interview schedule for FBO non-
members 
1. Perceptions of FBOs  
I note that you are not a member of an FBO; can you tell me your decision not to become a member of an FBO? 
Have you ever been a member of any FBO? If so, why did you leave? 
Do you see any advantages of being a member of an FBO? If so, explain. 
Do you see any disadvantages of being a member of an FBO? If so, explain. 
Do you hear of any, or do you observe any, problems regarding those farmers who are members of FBOs? If so, 
explain. 
Do you know much about how FBOs are governed or run? If so, explain. 
Prompt: Explore how they are set up; how they function.  
Do you feel that members of FBOs are committed to the purpose and course of the FBO? If so, in what ways are they 
committed? If not, why are they not committed? 
2. Access to extension services and inputs 
So now we have discussed perceptions regarding FBOs, I’m now keen to understand about how you access extension 
services and inputs such as fertiliser, credit, improved seeds and agrochemicals. 
Extension  
What is your experience of extension services in your community? 
Prompt: Explore who provides extension services to them; how they go about acquiring extension services; and what 
type of services are provided. 
Do you gain any knowledge from extension services? If so, what knowledge? 
Are there any obstacles or problems you face in accessing extension? If so, what are they? 
Prompt: Explore this issue in terms of frequency (how often) of access, location of service, processes and cost 
associated with access. 
In your opinion, in what ways can your access to extension services be improved? 
Prompt: Are FBOs among the options you are considering and why? 
Inputs 
How do you go about getting:  
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 a. Improved seeds 
b. Fertiliser 
c. Agrochemicals  
d. Credit 
Prompt: Explore who provides the inputs; procedures/bureaucracies for acquiring inputs.  
So can you tell me about any problems you face when trying to access the inputs? 
Prompt: Explore this issue in terms of frequency of access, location, processes and cost associated with access. 
In your opinion, what would make it easier to gain access to these inputs? 
Prompt: Are FBOs among the options you are considering and why? 
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 Appendix 3.4: Semi-structured interviews: interview schedule for 
government/NGO officials  
1. Determinants for success in an FBO 
Introduction: job qualification; job roles and responsibilities 
We know that there are many FBOs in Ghana; some may work better than others, so I’m keen to know why this may 
be so.  
What do you think are the main ingredients of a successful FBO? 
Prompt: Explore the structure of the FBOs, including the characteristics of leaders and members, rules governing the 
FBO, ability to generate internal funds, ability of FBO to contact external agencies. 
What makes an FBO successful? 
What do you think are the common mistakes in the way FBOs operate or are governed? 
What do you consider as the main issues that hinder the development of strong FBOs? 
Prompt: Explore the major internal issues within FBOs that affect their operations; and the major external issues 
that affect their operations.  
2. Benefits of FBOs (with a focus on extension services and inputs) 
Generally speaking, what would you say are the main ways in which FBOs are contributing to smallholder 
agriculture? 
Prompt: explore how beneficial they are to farmers, government/NGOs or even agricultural production as a whole. 
Extension services 
Specifically, what are the roles of FBOs in the delivery of extension services to farmers? 
Prompt: Explore how providers of extension services contact FBOs, how the services are delivered through FBOs? 
What kind of extension services are provided to FBOs? 
Prompt: Explore the knowledge and types of messages provided to farmers. 
How do you get your extension knowledge and messages? 
In what ways, if any, does extension service delivery through FBOs differ from other approaches to extension? 
Prompt: Explore the advantages and disadvantages of FBOs over other approaches to extension. 
Are there any differences between farmers who belong to FBOs and those without FBOs in relation to their access to 
extension services? If so, what are the differences?  
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 Prompt: Explore differences in terms of frequency of access to extension, the types and quality of services provided, 
and the processes involved in accessing extension services.  
  
Inputs  
Specifically, in what ways do FBOs assist farmers in acquiring the following inputs? 
a. Improved seeds 
b. Fertiliser 
c. Agrochemicals 
d. Credit 
What are the main ways in which you deliver the above inputs to FBOs? 
Prompt: Explore how FBOs are contacted; the sources of the inputs. 
What are the main ways in which FBOs acquire the above inputs? 
Prompt: Explore how input providers are contacted; the types of input providers and processes involved in acquiring 
the inputs. 
Do you feel that FBOs improve farmers’ access to the inputs? If so, in what ways do they improve access? If not, why 
not?  
Do you think there are any differences between farmers who belong to FBOs and those who are not members in the 
way they access the inputs? If so, what are they? 
Prompt: Explore differences in terms of the types of inputs; quality of inputs provided, and the processes involved in 
accessing the inputs. 
3. Development of FBOs 
Briefly describe to me the processes you go through when setting up or supporting FBOs. 
Prompt: Explore what government/NGO needs to know about the farmers, and what resources they must possess; the 
requirements farmers should meet; all the relevant stakeholders involved in the process. 
In your opinion, are there any useful policy interventions to improve the operation of FBOs? 
 Could the government do more to help FBOs? If so, what? 
 Could NGOs do more to help FBOs? If so, what? 
In your view, what are the main collective activities that FBOs are very successful at doing? Why are they successful 
in such collective activities? 
Specifically, what types of strategies do you put in place to ensure that FBOs are able to access extension services?  
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  Could you explain how the leaders are chosen and trained? 
 Could you explain how the FBOs are monitored? 
 Could you explain how the FBOs are financed? 
Specifically, what types of strategies do you put in place to ensure that FBOs are able to access inputs?  
 Could you explain how the leaders are chosen and trained? 
 Could you explain how the FBOs are monitored? 
 Could you explain how the FBOs are financed? 
4. Policy context 
Could you tell me any policies/strategies you know that are put in place for FBO development? 
Prompt: Explore the reasons why FBOs are set up or supported; the different forms of support (i.e. technical, 
financial and material) with which FBOs are provided. 
Are you aware of future FBO policy? If yes, when and what is likely to change? Why do you think there should be a 
change in FBO policy?    
5. Documents to be collected from government and NGOs official (if available)  
• Statistics of FBOs in the Districts; 
• Various reports on FBO projects that have been implemented by government and NGOs such as progress 
and completion reports. 
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 Appendix 4: Propensity score matching analysis
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 Appendix 5: Coding framework for qualitative data collected  
Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective  
 AEAs perspective  How AEAs work with FBOs and what they 
think about their performance 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Challenges  
 Challenges  Key challenges in FBO development 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Collective activities  
 Collective activities  The nature and extent of collective 
activities in FBOs 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Extension policy  
 Extension policy  Exploring current extension policies 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\FBOs contributions  
 FBOs contributions  The overall contribution of FBOs to 
smallholder agriculture 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Setting up FBOs  
 Setting up FBOs  Understanding how FBOs are set up 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Setting up FBOs\How 
to set up 
 
 How to set up  How do FBOs come into existence 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Setting up 
FBOs\Mistakes in setting up 
 
 Mistakes in setting 
up 
 Perceived mistakes in setting up FBOs 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Strengthening FBOs  
 Strengthening FBOs  Different ways to strengthen or make 
FBOs more effective in helping their 
members 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Successful FBOs  
 Successful FBOs  What makes FBOs successful in improving 
their members’ access to services? 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Name  Description 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Types of support  
 Types of support  Different kinds of support AEAs provide 
to FBOs and their members 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Types of 
support\Credit support 
 
 Credit support  The nature and type of credit FBOs and 
their members received 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Types of 
support\Credit support\Credit recover 
 
 Credit recover  Understanding the challenges in recovering 
credit from FBOs and their members 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Types of support\Input 
support 
 Input support  The nature and type of inputs FBOs and 
their members received 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Types of 
support\Market support 
 
 Market support  The nature of support to FBOs and their 
members to improving the 
marketing of their farm produce 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Types of 
support\Technical support 
 
 Technical support  How FBOs are set up and supporting FBOs 
to develop their governance and 
management structures 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Types of 
support\Technical support\Ext challenges 
 
 Ext challenges  Challenges extension agents face in 
delivering their services 
Nodes\\AEAs perspective\Weak FBOs  
 Weak FBOs  Factors that contribute to having weak 
FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO leaders  
 FBO leaders  The views of FBO leaders about their 
participation in FBOs and the 
performance of FBOs in general 
335 
 
 Hierarchical Code Name  Code Name  Code Description 
 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Benefits of FBO  
 Benefits of FBO  Key benefits of FBOs to leaders 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Collective activities  
 Collective activities  The nature and extent of collective 
activities in FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Collective 
activities\challenges in collective activities 
 
 Challenges in 
collective 
activities 
 Factors that influence collective activities 
in FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\demand services  
 Demand services  The extent to which FBO leaders demand 
services for their members 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\leadership  
 Leadership  Understanding the role of leaders in FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Monetary contributions  
 Monetary 
contributions 
 Internal income generation in FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Rules  
 Rules  Understanding rule making and 
enforcement from FBOs leaders 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Setting up FBOs  
 Setting up FBOs  Understanding how FBOs are set up from 
leaders 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Setting up FBOs\Challenges 
in setting up 
 
 Challenges in setting 
up 
 Challenges faced when setting up FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Strengthening FBOs  
 Strengthening FBOs  Different ways to strengthen or make 
FBOs more effective in helping their 
members 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Successful FBOs  
 Successful FBOs  What makes FBOs successful in improving 
their members’ access to services? 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received  
 Support received  The nature and different types of support 
FBO leaders received 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\Credit 
support 
 
 Credit support  The nature and extent of credit received 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\Credit 
support\Improve recovery 
 
 Improve recovery  Understanding the challenges in recovering 
credit from FBOs and their members 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\Credit 
support\Why less support 
 
 Why less support  Reasons for low access to credit 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\Input 
support 
 
 Input support  The nature and type of inputs FBOs leaders 
received 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\Input 
support\Implementation challenges 
 
 Implementation 
challenges 
 Challenges in accessing inputs 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\Market 
support 
 
 Market support  The extent to which FBO leaders are 
supported to market their farm 
produce 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Name  Description 
 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\Market 
support\Implementation challenges 
 
 Implementation 
challenges 
 Challenges FBOs face in marketing their 
farm produce 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\nature of 
support 
 
 Nature of support  The nature and types of support FBO 
leaders received 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\nature of 
support\Credit 
 
 Credit  The nature and the extent to which FBO 
leader received credit 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\nature of 
support\extension 
 
 Extension  The nature and the extent to which FBO 
leaders received extension services 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\nature of 
support\Inputs 
 
 Inputs  The nature and types of inputs received 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\Technical 
support 
 
 Technical support  The nature and extent of improved 
technologies received 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Support received\Technical 
support\Implementation challenges 
 
 Implementation 
challenges 
 Factors that influence the adoption of 
improved technologies 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Weak FBOs  
 Weak FBOs  Factors that contribute to having weak 
FBOs 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
Nodes\\FBO leaders\Why member  
 Why member  Reasons for becoming an FBO member 
and leader 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member perspective  
 FBO ordinary 
member 
perspective 
 The views of FBO ordinary members about 
their participation in FBOs and the 
performance of FBOs in general 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Benefits of FBOs 
 
 Benefits of FBOs  Key benefits of FBOs to ordinary members 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Collective activities 
 
 Collective activities  The nature and extent of collective 
activities in FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Collective activities\Challenges 
in collective activities 
 
 Challenges in 
collective 
activities 
 Factors that influence collective activities 
in FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Monetary contribution 
 
 Monetary 
contribution 
 Internal income generation in FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member perspective\Rules  
 Rules  Understanding rule making and 
enforcement from FBO ordinary 
members 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Setting up FBOs 
 
 Setting up FBOs  Understanding how FBOs are set up from 
ordinary members 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Setting up FBOs\Challenges in 
setting up 
 
 Challenges in setting 
up 
 Challenges faced when setting up FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Strengthening FBOs 
 
 Strengthening FBOs  Different ways to strengthen or make 
FBOs more effective in helping their 
members 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Successful FBOs 
 
 Successful FBOs  What makes FBOs successful in improving 
their members’ access to services? 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received 
 
 Support received  The nature and different types of support 
FBO ordinary members received 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Credit 
support 
 
 Credit support  The nature and extent of credit received 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Credit 
support\Improve recovery 
 
 Improve recovery  Understanding the challenges in recovering 
credit from FBOs and their members 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Credit 
support\Why less support 
 
 Why less support  Reasons for low access to credit 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Input 
support 
 
 Input support  The nature and types of inputs FBO 
ordinary members received 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Input 
support\Implementation challenges 
 
 Implementation 
challenges 
 Challenges in accessing inputs 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Market 
support 
 
 Market support  The extent to which FBO ordinary 
members are supported to market 
their farm produce 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Market 
support\Implementation challenges 
 
 Implementation 
challenges 
 Challenges FBOs face in marketing their 
farm produce 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Nature of 
support 
 
 Nature of support  The nature and types of support ordinary 
FBO members received 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Nature of 
support\Credit 
 
 Credit  The nature and the extent to which 
ordinary FBO members received 
credit 
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 Hierarchical Code Name  Code Name  Code Description 
 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Nature of 
support\Extension 
 
 Extension  The nature and the extent to which 
ordinary FBO members received 
extension services 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Nature of 
support\Inputs 
 
 Inputs  The nature and types of inputs received 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Technical 
support 
 
 Technical support  The nature and extent of improved 
technologies received 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member 
perspective\Support received\Technical 
support\Implementation challenges 
 
 Implementation 
challenges 
 Factors that influence the adoption of 
improved technologies 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member perspective\Weak 
FBOs 
 Weak FBOs  Factors that contribute to having weak 
FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO ordinary member perspective\Why 
member 
 
 Why member  Reasons for becoming an FBO member 
Nodes\\Government perspective  
 Government 
perspective 
 How governments support FBOs and what 
they think about their performance 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Challenges  
 Challenges  Key challenges in FBOs development 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Collective 
activities 
 
 Collective activities  The nature and extent of collective 
activities in FBOs 
Nodes\\Government perspective\FBOs 
contributions 
 
 FBOs contributions  The overall contribution of FBOs to 
smallholder agriculture 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Setting up FBOs 
 Setting up FBOs  The way government agencies set up FBOs 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Setting up 
FBOs\How to set up 
 
 How to set up  The different ways FBOs are established 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Setting up 
FBOs\Mistakes in setting up 
 
 Mistakes in setting 
up 
 Perceived mistakes in setting up FBOs 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Strengthening 
and sustainability FBOs 
 
 Strengthening and 
sustainability 
FBOs 
 Different ways to strengthen or make 
FBOs more effective in helping their 
members 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Successful 
FBOs 
 
 Successful FBOs  What makes FBOs successful in improving 
their members’ access to services? 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Types of 
support 
 
 Types of support  
Nodes\\Government perspective\Types of 
support\Credit support 
 
 Credit support  The nature and type of credit FBOs and 
their members received 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Types of 
support\Credit support\Credit recover 
 
 Credit recover  Understanding the challenges in recovering 
credit from FBOs and their members 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Types of 
support\Input support 
 
 Input support  The nature and type of inputs FBOs and 
their members received 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Types of 
support\Market support 
 
 Market support  The nature of support to FBOs and their 
members to improving the 
marketing of their farm produce 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Types of 
support\Technical support 
 
 Technical support  How FBOs are set up and supporting FBOs 
to develop their governance and 
management structures 
Nodes\\Government perspective\Weak FBOs  
 Weak FBOs  Factors that contribute to having weak 
FBOs 
Nodes\\History of FBOs  
 History of FBOs  Brief history on how the FBOs started 
Nodes\\History of FBOs\Achievements  
 Achievements  The achievements FBOs have achieved  
Nodes\\History of FBOs\Achievements\credit  
 credit  The extent to which FBOs improve their 
members’ access to credit 
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 Hierarchical Name Name  Description 
 Improved access to 
inputs 
 The extent to which FBOs improve their 
access to inputs 
Nodes\\History of 
FBOs\Achievements\Knowledge and yields 
 
 Knowledge and 
yields 
 The extent to which FBOs improve 
smallholder access to technical 
knowledge and improving the crop 
yields of members 
Nodes\\History of FBOs\Achievements\Market  
 Market  The extent to which FBOs improve the 
marketing of smallholders farm 
produce 
Nodes\\History of FBOs\challenges of FBOs  
 Challenges of FBOs  Key challenges FBOs face 
Nodes\\History of FBOs\Collapse of FBOs  
 Collapse of FBOs  Factors accounting for the collapse of 
FBOs 
Nodes\\History of FBOs\collective activities  
 collective activities  The nature and extent of collective 
activities in the FBOs 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
 
Nodes\\History of FBOs\Establishment of FBOs  
 Establishment of 
FBOs 
 Who established the FBOs and how were 
they established 
Nodes\\History of FBOs\Funds in group  
 Funds in group  Money available in FBOs 
Nodes\\History of FBOs\leaders background  
 leaders background  Leadership composition in FBOs 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives  
 NGOs perspectives  How NGOs support FBOs and what they 
think about their performance 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Challenges  
 Challenges  Key challenges in FBOs development 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Collective activities  
 Collective activities  The nature and extent of collective 
activities in FBOs 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\FBO contributions  
 FBO contributions  The overall contribution of FBOs to 
smallholder agriculture 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Setting up FBOs  
 Setting up FBOs  The different ways FBOs are established 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Setting up FBOs\How 
to set up 
 How to set up  The different ways FBOs are established 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Setting up 
FBOs\Mistakes in setting up 
 
 Mistakes in setting 
up 
 Perceived mistakes in setting up FBOs 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Strengthening FBOs  
 Strengthening FBOs  Different ways to strengthen or make 
FBOs more effective in helping their 
members 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Successful FBO  
 Successful FBO  What makes FBOs successful in improving 
their members’ access to services? 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Types of support  
 Types of support  Different kinds of support NGOs provide 
to FBOs and their members 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Types of 
support\Credit support 
 
 Credit support  The nature and type of credit FBOs and 
their members received 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Types of 
support\Credit support\Credit Recovery 
 
 Credit Recovery  Understanding the challenges in recovering 
credit from FBOs and their members 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Types of 
support\Inputs support 
 
 Inputs support  Different types of support NGOs provide 
to FBOs and their members 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Types of 
support\Market support 
 
 Market support  The nature of support to FBOs and their 
members to improving the 
marketing of their farm produce 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Types of 
support\Technical support 
 
 Technical support  How FBOs are set up and supporting FBOs 
to develop their governance and 
management structures 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
Nodes\\NGOs perspectives\Weak FBOs  
 Weak FBOs  Factors that contribute to having weak 
FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective  
 FBO non-member 
perspective 
 Smallholder farmers who are not members 
of FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community 
 
 FBO community  Villages or towns where there is an FBO 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Challenges in groups 
 
 Challenges in groups  What non-FBO smallholder farmers know 
about challenges/problems in FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Challenges in 
groups\Collectivity 
 
 Collectivity  What non-FBO smallholder farmers know 
about challenges in FBOs regarding 
collective activities 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Challenges in 
groups\Leadership 
 
 Leadership  What non-FBO smallholder farmers know 
about challenges in FBOs leadership 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Challenges in groups\Politics 
 
 Politics  What non-FBO smallholder farmers know 
about challenges in FBOs regarding 
political interference 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Challenges in groups\Rules 
 
 Rules  What non-FBO smallholder farmers know 
about challenges FBOs face in 
making and implementing rules 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Challenges in groups\Support 
 
 Support  What non-FBO smallholder farmers know 
about challenges FBOs face in 
getting support 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Knowledge about FBO 
formation 
 
 Knowledge about 
FBO 
formation 
 What non-FBO smallholder farmers know 
about how FBOs are formed as well 
as how they function 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Perceived benefits 
 
 Perceived benefits  The perception of non-FBO smallholder 
farmers on the benefits of FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Support received 
 
 Support received  Different forms of support non-FBO 
smallholder farmer received from 
external agencies such as 
government and NGOs 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Support received\Credit 
 
 Credit  The nature and kinds of credit non-FBO 
smallholder farmers received 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Support received\Extension 
 
 Extension  The nature and kinds of extension services 
non-FBO smallholder farmers 
received 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Support received\Inputs 
 
 Inputs  The nature and kinds of inputs non-FBO 
smallholder farmers received 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\FBO 
community\Why not member 
 
 Why not member  Reasons why smallholder farmers are not 
members of FBOs even though there 
is an FBO in the community 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\Non-FBO 
community 
 
 Non-FBO 
community 
 Villages or towns where there is no FBO 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\Non-FBO 
community\Challenges in groups 
 
 Challenges in groups  What non-FBO smallholder farmers know 
about challenges/problems in FBOs 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\Non-FBO 
community\Knowledge about FBO 
formation 
 
 Knowledge about 
FBO 
formation 
 What non-FBO smallholder farmers know 
about how FBOs are formed as well 
as how they function 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\Non-FBO 
community\perceived benefits 
 
 Perceived benefits  The perception of non-FBO smallholder 
farmers on the benefits of FBOs 
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 Hierarchical Code Name Code Name  Code Description 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\Non-FBO 
community\Support received 
 
 Support received  Different forms of support non-FBO 
smallholder farmers received from 
external agencies such as 
government and NGOs 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\Non-FBO 
community\Support received\Credit 
 
 Credit  The nature and kinds of credit non-FBO 
smallholder farmers received 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\Non-FBO 
community\Support received\Extension 
 
 Extension  The nature and kinds of extension services 
non-FBO smallholder farmers 
received 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\Non-FBO 
community\Support received\Inputs 
 
 Inputs  The nature and kinds of inputs non-FBO 
smallholder farmers received 
Nodes\\FBO non-member perspective\Non-FBO 
community\Why not member 
 
 Why not member  Reasons why smallholder farmers are not 
members of FBOs 
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